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ABSTRACT

MAX SCHELER’S CRITICAL THEORY:
THE IDEA OF CRITICAL PHENOMENOLOGY

By
Eric J. Mohr
August 2014

Dissertation supervised by Dr. James Swindal
This work explores the way core elements of phenomenology map on to the
critical theory program in order to demonstrate phenomenology’s relevance for
ideology critique. “Critical phenomenology” means putting the findings of
phenomenology to work for the sake of social critique. I argue that phenomenology
gains a critical edge precisely where many critical theorists suggest phenomenology
withdraws from a critical function: on the basis of their theory of intuition. While
Adorno takes phenomenological intuition to be another version of identity
philosophy, he overlooks the significance of the way in which phenomenological
givenness is incommensurable with, and at best only symbolized by, conceptual
articulation. An awareness of the tension between logos (concept) and phenomenon
iv

(intuition) offers an opportunity for the phenomenologist to critique the
substitution of lived-experience for conceptual variations of that experience, a
tendency central to ideology.
This is seen clearly in Scheler’s phenomenology. With the three concurrent
components of his theory of intuition—the givenness of the intentional object; the
givenness of reality; and the givenness of value—Scheler addresses all the main
objections Frankfurt School critical theorists traditionally pose against
phenomenology. And he insists on phenomenology’s importance for sociology and
the sociology of knowledge. The fact that Scheler’s theories of intentionality and
value are, as I argue, taken into an existential and social context, adds social
relevance to his value theory. This is significant for the question of ideology and for
emphasizing certain shortcomings of critical theory’s approach to this question.
I suggest that phenomenology elucidates prior grounds for the possibility of
emancipatory critique. The domain of the moral (love and the values the act
discloses) is the common root of both theory and practice. The way a society thinks
and acts is an outgrowth of attitudinal factors suggestive of certain patterns of
valuation. Ideology is, in this case, an intellectual outcome of improper valuing.
According to Scheler, rationality is in large part an expression of patterns of
valuation, so a critique of rationality in its instrumental form, for example, has to be
framed in terms of a moral critique of the trends of social valuation.
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INTRODUCTION
NONCONCEPTUALITY IN PHENOMENOLOGY AND DIALECTICS
The idea of critical phenomenology begins by designating phenomenological
experience as a critical experience. By “critical experience,” I do not mean something
overly problematic nor something very new. It refers to a level of incongruence or
incommensurability between our lived-experience throughout the course of our
daily, worldly interaction and the ability to think and articulate that experience
conceptually. Arguably, this kind of experience is as old as philosophical inquiry, for
it is behind Socrates’ admission that he knows that he doesn’t know, as well as his
attempts to make the reputedly wise in Athens admit this as well. The idea is likely
to have gained momentum in the modern period with Hegel; radicalized with
Nietzsche and Lebensphilosophie; equally important, I suggest, to both
phenomenology and critical theory; and continues in various forms within the
Anglo-American philosophical tradition, especially under Wittgenstein-influenced
philosophy.1
Within a phenomenological context, this idea pertains to a type of meaning that
early phenomenologists, and in particular Max Scheler, called “materiale,” i.e., a
nonformal domain of meaning that does not submit to conceptual verifiability, nor is
it reducible to sensible content. The concept “art” (or related concepts), for example,
cannot exhaust the magnificence of this Botticelli or the brilliance of that Matisse.
Although much of this idea has its roots in Hegelian philosophy, it is an idea that is
being phased out in certain sectors of analytic philosophy ironically because of the “NeoHegeliansim” of Robert Brandom and John McDowell. Following Wilfrid Sellars’s attack on
the notion of the Given, they advocate making concepts and rationality pervasive in all
perception and natural experience.
1
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The concept “friendship” does not contain the nuances of meaning of individual
friendships nor the meaningful differences among friendships with specific people.
The concept of “family” is relatively empty in comparison to the meaning of one’s
own; the conceptual classification of my home as just another house cannot account
for the incongruence between the meaning of my house and those of strangers. The
conceptual form “happiness” or “sadness” cannot express the varieties of joy or
sorrow felt at the occurrence of this event or of that one.
Such experiences may not yield content reducible to conceptual cognition, but
they do yield an intuitive meaning content nevertheless. Critical experience
includes, therefore, what is more traditionally formulated in various ways as the
relation between “concept and intuition,” “scheme and content,” “subject and
object,” etc. This relation becomes critical when it includes both awareness of its
incommensurability as well as utilizing this awareness for the sake of critique: a
critique of concepts as well as of the social and historical conditions upon which
they in part depend. This awareness begins, I suggest, in the lived-experience
(Erlebnis) of the formal limitation of the concept to express or reflect the material
content of experience. That is to say, when, at the conceptual precipice, we try to say
the unsayable and come up empty. In those moments, one might feel that the best
conveyance is simply the suggestion that one “experiences it for oneself.”
The idea of critical experience corresponds with what Adorno means by
dialectics. He claims that “Dialectics is the consistent sense of nonidentity. … It says
no more…than that objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a
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remainder.”2 An object is always “more” than the concepts employed to understand
it: “What it is,” he says “is more than it is. This ‘more’ is not imposed upon it but
remains immanent to it.”3 It is therefore “up to dialectical cognition to pursue the
inadequacy of thought and thing, to experience it in the thing.”4
Adorno’s reinterpretation of dialectics is the cornerstone of his conception of
philosophical experience. His view of experience has recently received some
attention, most notably, from Brian O’Connor5 and Roger Foster.6 Foster’s book,
Adorno: The Recovery of Experience, is an examination of Adorno’s “theory of
spiritual experience” (geistig Erfahrung) which was the title that the introduction of
Negative Dialectics had originally carried.7 Foster explains that “This experience that
there is something we want to say, something we wish to express but which cannot
be said with our concepts, is what philosophy as negative dialectic strives
continually to reproduce.”8 And further, “It is precisely these moments, experiences
of the failure of concepts…that Adorno is attempting to describe with the term
‘spiritual experience’.”9
The experience of the inadequacy of concepts to capture all that we might wish

Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, E. B. Ashton, trans. (New York: Continuum,
1973), 5
3 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 161.
4 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 153.
5 Brian O’Connor, Adorno’s Negative Dialectic: Philosophy and the Possibility of Critical
Rationality (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004).
6 Roger Foster, Adorno: The Recovery of Experience (Albany: SUNY Press, 2007).
7 “Spiritual experience” is his own preferred rendering in contrast to the more common
translation of gestig as “intellectual.” He explains that his “dissatisfaction with this
translation is that it seems to reinforce precisely that model of the role of the subject in
experience that Adorno wants to oppose with the idea of geistige Erfahrung.” Foster,
Adorno, 4.
8 Foster, Adorno, 29.
9 Foster, Adorno, 29.
2
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to express is just as accurate of a depiction of phenomenology as it is of dialectics.
The idea is already there in Husserl’s call to return zu den Sachen selbst, which has
been interpreted by later phenomenologists to mean a retrieval of intelligible
content tainted and unmatched by thinking. Phenomenology’s method would be
nullified if concepts were to reflect experience perfectly since, if this were the case,
it would be senseless to return to experience in order to awaken its content by
means of fresh description. Heidegger, of course, made the distinction between
phaenomenon and logos, taking language or discourse (logos) as a way of making
that which shows itself (phaenomenon) be seen.10 But over a decade before the
publication of Being and Time, Max Scheler wrote that the only “possible sense of a
phenomenological discussion” is bringing someone “to see that which, by its
essence, can only be ‘seen’” (GW X, 391).11 He adds (referring in part to Husserl’s
phenomenology) that:
all the propositions…, all the conclusions, all the provisional definitions that
are introduced as they are needed, all the provisional descriptions, all the
chains of argument and proof, have simply the function of a “pointer,”
pointing to what is to be brought to sight (Husserl). However, what is to be
brought to sight can never be present in any of the judgments, concepts, or
definitions…. (GW X, 391-2).12
Scheler makes a rather bold claim, one that is arguably even more radical than
Heidegger’s distinction between phenomenon and logos. Scheler claims that the
essence “can never be present” in concepts or definitions. The concept alone cannot
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. trans. John Macqaurrie and Edward
Robinson (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1962), ¶7, 49-63.
11 Scheler, “Phenomenology and the Theory of Cognition,” in Selected Philosophical
Essays, trans. David Lachterman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 152.
Parenthetical citation refers to the Scheler’s Gesammelte Werke with volume number
10

and page number.
12

Scheler, “Phenomenology,” 153.
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bring about insight. Concepts contribute to intuition or “seeing” only by illuminating
something that can only be seen in a lived-experience. He therefore characterizes
phenomenology as the “antithesis of all rapidly produced talk-philosophy
[Redephilosophie]” (GW X, 393);13 he rejects the idea that the “the world exists in
order to be designated with univocal [conceptual] symbols and…that it is nothing
before it enters into this talk” (GW X, 393).14 Instead the phenomenologist “talks
less, is silent more, and sees more, perhaps that aspect of the world which can no
longer be discussed” (GW X, 393).15
Phenomenology rejects in principle the idea that an object “must first cross the
hurdle of symbolic [i.e., linguistic and conceptual] identifiability in order to prove
that it is indeed an object” (GW X, 392-3).16 Concepts and language constitute
symbolic copies that approximate the meaning content given in intuitive experience.
Concepts necessarily bear reference to the nonconceptual. The material or
nonconceptual content, i.e., content irreducible to the structure of thinking, is a
critical content because it indirectly contains within itself a reference to the limits of
conceptual thinking.
I argue that if this content is irreducible to the structure of thinking, then there
must be a domain of meaningful experience independent from formal or
conceptually-constituted meaning structures. So, at least to start, I suggest the
Scheler, “Phenomenology,” 153.
Scheler, “Phenomenology,” 154.
15 Scheler, “Phenomenology,” 154. A hallmark of Scheler’s epistemology (and critique of
Kant) refers to the fact that a datum of experience need not be universalized in order to be
intelligible. It is possible in principle, he thinks, for a single individual to see a truth or value
that no one else sees. Equating intelligibility with universality would effectively restrict the
domain of intelligibility and meaning tremendously.
16 Scheler, “Phenomenology,” 154.
13
14
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following distinctions have to apply for a critical phenomenology to succeed:
1. The difference between the intentional and the conceptual. According to the
phenomenological idea of intentionality, objects do not require concepts in
order to appear as objects.17 If they did, then language would be a necessary
requirement for intuition. But consciousness does not rely on concepts to
intend things even if concepts are shown to be formative of our cognition of
the things consciousness intends.18

2. The difference between conceptual (formal) meaning and intuitive (nonformal)
meaning. According to the phenomenological idea of intuition, objects do not
require concepts in order for intuited objects to bear meaning (or value). In
other words, concepts are not originally the source of the meaning of
experience, rather, intuitive experience is the original source of the meaning
of concepts.19

There is a recent debate as to whether phenomenological relations with things are
conceptual or mostly nonconceptual. The debate is a spin-off from the Dreyfus-McDowell
debate about the extent concepts factor into expertise and everyday coping skills. The
debate has for the most part been centered upon Husserl. Walter Hopp endorses a
nonconceptual reading of Husserl in Perception and Knowledge: A Phenomenological
Account (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), and Michael Barber has recently
written a rebuttal aligning Husserlian intentionality with McDowell’s conceptualism in The
Intentional Spectrum and Intersubjectivity: Phenomenology and the Pittsburgh Neo-Hegelians
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 2012).
18 Scheler’s theory of concept formation, that he calls “functionalization,” will be
examined in detail through the work. I will underscore how concepts, for Scheler, are a
relatively late occurrence in relation to the total process of their formation. Human beings
are practically and emotionally oriented toward their “environment” (Umwelt) well before
they are conceptually oriented toward a “world” (Welt).
19 The meaning and value that things have, first refer to our drive-based striving and
practical comportment (e.g., things edible or drinkable) before the meanings of things take
on a theoretical or spiritual dimension.
17
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Language, then, is an approximate signification of intuitive experience, a
linguistic employment of concepts in order to express the experiences that require
and call for expression. The cognitive goal of phenomenology is to utilize those
approximations in order to return to content given within the more adept intuitive
standpoint. It seeks to uncover the experience to which the concept is supposed to
refer, but which the concept cannot wholly contain. This is a critical reference
according to the usual meaning of the term. The critical capacity of phenomenology
is, then, a kind of “dialectical phenomenology” as long as the meaning of “dialectical”
is taken generally, according to Adorno’s understanding, as a sense of nonidentity
between concept and the object. But one fundamental difference endangers any
further dialogue between critical theory and phenomenology: dialectics is not a
“standpoint” in the way phenomenologists classify intuition. Let’s now consider this
difference.

The Trouble with Intuition
If phenomenology and critical theory agree with respect to the incongruence of
the conceptual and nonconceptual, as I suggest, the two philosophies disagree
concerning whether there is some other alternative or more adept standpoint
beyond the space of concepts. Adorno’s insistence that “dialectics is not a
standpoint” makes intuition a nonviable epistemic alternative. Concepts may indeed
be fractured and incapable of achieving the identity for which they strive, but this
does not change the fact that they are the only equipment available by which to
achieve understanding as well as to fashion a critique of those very concepts. The
xvi

critical theorist insists that there is nowhere else to turn for a more unified relation
to the object. Adorno writes that “Only in traces and ruins is [reason] prepared to
hope that it will ever come across correct and just reality.”20 Hence his insistent
focus on the “negative,” and refusal to use philosophy for positive exposition.
While phenomenology makes conceptual nonidentity the occasion to turn their
attention toward nonconceptual forms of identity in order to ground cognition,
Adorno insists that our only option is to remain attentive to the nonidentity itself
and find within it the impetus by which to make “a rational critique of reason.”21
Even if it is impossible to grasp that which exceeds the limits of a conceptually
constituted structure of experience, Foster explains that, “it is possible…to
experience those limits as limits.”22
In contrast to Lukács’ reading of Marx, which suggests overcoming reification by
achieving the “identical subject-object” among the proletariat, Adorno refuses to
posit any kind of subject-object identity either conceptually (within the space of
concepts) or nonconceptually (outside of that space). Forging an identity within the
space of concepts amounts to rationalism, and the suggestion that identity is
achieved beyond this conceptual space (e.g., in intuition), Adorno calls irrationalism.
He wants to avoid both errors by forging a new kind of philosophical experience—
critical rationality—that accomplishes a critique of concepts by means of those very
concepts which gives way to self-reflective critique. Critical rationality does not
critique a theory simply insofar as theory relies upon a conceptual framework;
20 Adorno, “The Actuality of Philosophy,” in The Adorno Reader, ed. Brian O’Connor
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2000), 24.
21 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 85.
22 Foster, Adorno, 29.
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relying on concepts is inevitable and philosophically necessary. The critique is
rather about a theory’s typical lack of awareness of the historical dependence of
different conceptual frameworks and the ways concepts carry and express historical
experience. Adorno calls this awareness of historical dependency, Selbstbesinnung,
usually rendered as “self-reflection” or “self-awareness.” He is calling for awareness
and reflection about the fact that our concepts all have a history. Foster puts the
idea of self-awareness well: “It is the process in which philosophy brings to
expression the historical experience that is the condition [for the] possibility of its
concepts.”23
Adorno is said to offer a transcendental critique insofar as historical experience
is the condition for the possibility of the conceptual frameworks we come to
endorse and employ. O’Connor suggests that Adorno’s immanent critique is a
transcendental critique whereby the way concepts are sometimes employed are
antinomical, internally, to the fundamental conditions that make conceptual
experience possible.24 While this idea is promising, I find that the historical
component is often lacking in O’Connor’s explanations. Immanent critique is meant
to point out specifically the contradiction between a conceptual framework and the
history of both that framework and the objects to which concepts refer. The lack of
awareness of the socio-historical dependence of theories (namely, the ahistorical
element of theory) disrupts that which a philosophy is attempting to claim.
When interpreted with respect to the dimension of social and historical factors,

23
24

Foster, Adorno, 21.
O’Connor, Adorno’s Negative Dialectic, 25-8.
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critical rationality offers a view into what Adorno means by nonconceptuality.25 The
“nonconceptualities” to which Adorno says all concepts refer are extremely difficult
to pin down precisely because they are outside the domain of concepts. Since
concepts are required for knowledge, little, if anything, can be said about the
nonconceptual domain. Furthermore, even if we can refer to a nonconceptual
sphere, it is not possible, by Adorno’s account, to refer to the nonconceptual in
terms of determinate content insofar as determinate content indicates something
knowable. The sphere of the nonconceptual is little more than a kind of epistemic
emptiness (indeed, a realm of unknowing) that can be mobilized, by way of critique,
against ideological and totalizing claims. The Socratic lineage to critical theory is
apparent here, but not often emphasized.
Strictly speaking, nothing is knowable beyond the space of concepts, according to
Adorno, but the space of nonconceptuality still implies something experienceable,26
even if only in terms of conceptual limitation. He says that nonconceptuality refers
to the reality that the formation of concepts requires, namely, those parts of human
experience that concepts are meant to reflect or express, but which are not
contained in the abstract content of the concept. In other words, the sphere of the
nonconceptual is that part of reality that is lost or goes missing in the process of
conceptual abstraction. If this characterization is accurate, the nonconceptual is a
See, Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 11-15.
The difference between something knowable and something experienceable is
employed also by Scheler, as we will see. However, while for Adorno there is a rough
distinction between conceptual knowing and nonconceptual (non-epistemic) experience,
Scheler maintains a difference between three different spheres instead of only two:
conceptual knowing (cognition), non-conceptual knowing (intuition), and non-conscious
(ecstatic) experience. Consciousness, for Scheler, does not operate only on the basis of
categorial demarcations since intentionality is broader than conceptuality.
25
26
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domain including more than simply one kind of thing or a single determinate part of
reality; it is composed of anything and everything that ends up failing to make the
cut, so to speak, in the process of concept formation.
Of course, Adorno is rather reluctant to spell out all that the nonconceptual
would or could include because that would involve reducing that part of experience
to concepts in its very articulation. Yet we can surmise, by a process of negation, of
course, that it would include what abstract concepts do not include, such things as
empirical qualities, physical properties, contingent characteristics, sensible
particularities, etc. But over and above these elements—and by far the most
significant element—Adorno insists that the nonconceptual refers to the “historical
sedimentation” or “implicit history” of the object. Foster writes that the essential
idea of the nonconceptual is an understanding of the object “as a site that
accumulates meanings in its movement through historical time.”27 Foster continues:
Those meanings are not accessible in it as though they were static properties.
… They are rather the features of the thing as reflected through its
relationship to its social and temporal context, features that require the
concrete elucidation of the way they are subjectively experienced in order to
be brought to the surface. … It is nothing less than the experiential conditions
of philosophical concepts and, as such, the disclosure of their full historical
truth.28
The idea, it seems, is that when ideas are abstracted from their historical
conditions, there is a kind of subtraction that takes place whereby the idea or
concept loses the (nonconceptual) socio-historical particularity upon which the
formation of concepts depends. He is indicating that on the occasion of perceiving
objects, for example, a door, a house, a neighborhood, a city, etc., we encounter the
27
28

Foster, Adorno, 22.
Foster, Adorno, 22.
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historical features those objects bear. The door is worn from constant slamming; the
house is decrepit and perhaps abandoned; the city is under populated, but with a
noticeable repetitive routine, and perhaps run down. On the one hand, such
characterizing historical features are not included in the abstract concept of a door,
house, neighborhood, or city. But on the other hand, the concepts are also abstract
expressions of the objects that find expression precisely on account of the objective
historical sedimentation. Adorno thinks we should be understanding things
according to their historical position and process: “The history locked in the object
can only be delivered by a knowledge mindful of the historic positional value of the
object in its relation to other objects…. Cognition of the object in its constellation is
cognition of the process stored in the object.”29 Since it is out of this history that
concepts of things arise, it is possible to unlock, like a “well-guarded safe-deposit
box,”30 the accumulated historical meaning of the concept.
On the one hand, I acknowledge that an object contains an historical meaning
not identical (rather nonidentical) to the concept’s abstract meaning. The “history
locked in the object” is disclosed by means of a cognitive process of reflection on
those concepts in light of the “historic positional value of the object in its relation to
other objects.” But how we are supposed to be aware that there is in fact more to an
object than what the abstract conceptual meaning indicates if the “knowledge
mindful of the historic positional value” of the object is not possible outside the
space of the concept? How is our knowledge supposed to look beyond the concepts
that knowledge itself requires? My response is that such historical experiences—of
29
30

Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 163.
Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 163.
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the door, the house, the neighborhood and city—are a quality of things given,
phenomenologically, in the course of our environmental interaction: using the door
of the house, residing and living in the neighborhood and city. By investigating
objects according to historical experience, provided historical experience is a
dimension of intuitive experience, Adorno is unwittingly relying on
phenomenological investigation of those objects.
But, of course, my response is not the one Adorno gives. Adorno’s answer refers
to the concept’s own “longing” toward identity along with the (invariable) failure of
the concept to achieve this identity. The concept refers beyond itself, so we need not
look beyond the concept since the concept holds its own history and the reality that
its formation requires. Adorno thinks that concepts have within themselves an
inclination toward expressing or reflecting the object. The failure of conceptual
articulation to fully reflect the object in its social, historical context is, again, the
sense of nonidentity by which Adorno characterizes dialectics. As he puts it, “living
in the rebuke that the thing is not identical is the concept’s longing to become
identical with the thing.”31
The so-called “longing” of the concept for identity underscores Adorno’s thinking
about the task of philosophy. In his words, “What the philosophical concept will not
abandon is the yearning that animates the nonconceptual side…. Philosophy…must
strive by way of the concept to transcend the concept.”32 The antagonism between
the conceptual and nonconceptual (identity and nonidentity) is the requirement for
critical philosophy. This is why Adorno is so guarded against any philosophy that
31
32

Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 148.
Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 15.
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claims to achieve or be grounded upon some form of identity. This is, according to
Adorno, the foremost problem of phenomenology in all of its forms: Hegelian
phenomenology claims identity as a rational end-point resolution of the dialectic of
history and early twentieth-century phenomenology, generally, claims identity as an
intuitive starting-point.
On the one hand, Adorno regrets the way Hegel’s moments of nonidentity
progress beyond the antagonism, toward resolution, which effectively leaves the
dialectic behind. The fact that, according to Adorno, the stages of nonidentity and
the mediation of subject and object are, for Hegel, on a teleological trajectory toward
resolution means for Adorno only that we see in Hegel’s philosophy both the
expression of “a profound insight and the collapse of that insight.”33
On the other hand, Adorno’s critique of Heidegger centers upon the immediacy
that the pre-epistemological structure of ontology suggests. “Being-in-the-world” is
a description that points precisely toward a pre-conceptual unity and to the
disintegration of the subject-object distinction. Adorno thinks that the context of
pre-conceptual or pre-reflective immersion threatens a mediated structure of
experience, and when mediation is gone so is the possibility of critique.34

Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 160. There are, of course, those who interpret Hegel’s
dialectical trajectory of history differently. Spirit may come to greater self-awareness over
time by coming to terms with the irrational current of history, but whether consciousness of
objects will ultimately ever entirely be ingathered into self-consciousness (in such a way
that achieves absolute knowing) remains a point of debate.
34 Arguably, this represents a rather one-sided interpretation of Heidegger, even if we
restrict the discussion only to Being and Time. One could get this overly pre-epistemological
picture of Heidegger if focusing only on Division 1. However, in Division 2, we notice how
the care-structure (and other fore-structures) attain an authentic expression in anticipatory
resoluteness (or an inauthentic expression) which comes with greater emphasis on
conscious and self-conscious comportment.
33
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The problem is not that Heidegger’s analysis of being-in-the-world is false, or
that it lacks sufficient evidence, or even that at this stage of experience, it is
unjustified to speak of immediacy. After all, Adorno acknowledges that “the
immediacy of insight as such is not deniable,”35 and that without immediacy “Hegel’s
line that the particular is the universal would remain pure avowal.”36 The problem,
rather, is that Heidegger’s portrayal is misleading. Adorno resists philosophies that
turn immediacy into a legitimizing and synthesizing “standpoint” for some kind of
nonconceptual form of knowing. Heidegger is thereby, as Adorno puts it, “usurping a
standpoint beyond the difference of subject and object…. [But] we cannot, by
thinking, assume any position in which the separation of subject and object will
directly vanish, for the separation is inherent in each thought; it is inherent in
thinking itself.”37 He thinks that Heidegger’s philosophy has a tendency to remain in
this undifferentiated state. If it does, if Adorno’s right, then it makes sense that all
objects, their time, their history, even the world as such, are merely different modes
of Dasein. And Adorno thinks this is idealistic, or at least “unsuccessful realism.”
Philosophies that incorporate, or better, rely upon, phases of identity, which
Adorno thinks Hegel’s and Heidegger’s phenomenologies incorporate, lack
potentiality for critique. Neither rationalism (conceptual identity) nor irrationalism
(nonconceptual identity) have “the potential for a critique of our conceptual
experience,” as Foster puts it.38 O’Connor makes a similar point: Heidegger’s
eschewal of a mediated subject-object relation “deprives him of an account of a
Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 81.
Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 82.
37 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 85.
38 Foster, Adorno, 29.
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critical [moment]…in which the subject can critically differentiate itself from its
environment by subjecting it to critical evaluation.”39 I take this criticism to be
Adorno’s most important to which a critical phenomenology has to respond. It has
to be shown that phenomenology has the potential to be critical of conceptual
cognition, at least. Before I turn to phenomenology’s critical potential, I would like to
suggest a critique of the critical pathways Adorno proposes.

Nonconceptuality
Adorno frames his conception of philosophical experience upon a “second
Copernican turn”: a reversal of the Kantian view that reduces or restricts the object
of experience to subjective constituting conditions. In contrast to Kant’s view,
Adorno promises to allow for the priority of the object by exposing the way
concepts carry determinate content according to their dependence upon the
historical process. Instead of framing the object in terms of its dependence upon
subjective, conceptual conditions, he wants to reframe the concept in terms of its
dependence upon objective, historical conditions. Adorno’s reversal of Kant, of
course, mirrors Marx’s critique of Hegel. He takes this reversal to be the required
platform for a “full, unreduced experience in the medium of conceptual reflection.”40
To be clear, Adorno considers a reduced experience not only one, like Kant’s, that
collapses all the conditions of knowing into the subject (idealism), but also one that
naively underestimates the transcendental or subjective conditions for the
possibility of knowledge (“naïve realism”). An unreduced conception of experience
39
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must account for both sides of the process of knowing.
Although Adorno suggests a conception of experience in reaction to the Kantian
one, there is a part of the Kantian project that Adorno remains wholeheartedly
committed. It is the idea that nonconceptuality (in Kant’s case, empirical intuition
and in Adorno’s case, historical experience) without concepts is blind. The view
assumes that the knowing subject is most characterized by a bundle of concepts.
This means that if the subject is to have any role at all in the process of knowledge,
that role must invariably be a conceptual role. This Kantian presupposition that
Adorno seems to take over uncritically from Kant (and Hegel) ignores the
phenomenological view that consciousness is characterized foremost by
intentionality rather than conceptuality, and that the intentionality of consciousness
is not dependent upon concepts.
Adorno reaches for a “full, unreduced experience,” but because of what he says
next: “in the medium of conceptual reflection,” he loses the kind of experience for
which he reaches. Although the nonconceptual is played up as that which can negate
conceptual identity and supply a critical component, it turns out to be a rather thin,
indeterminate placeholder for everything that the concept cannot contain, and to
which we can only have access indirectly by means of concepts themselves. I am
suggesting that it is a problem for Adorno to deny any kind of knowing proper to
nonconceptual experience. The nonconceptual side of the concepts are blind
without those very concepts, but if so, by Adorno’s account, the nonconceptual side
loses verifiability. Yet all of Adorno’s critical capacity comes from this
nonconceptual domain. If its verifiability is unsuccessful, Adorno’s critique of
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phenomenology would turn against himself and jeopardize the critical potential of
Adorno’s own project.
I do not mean that nonconceptuality cannot at all be verified. I mean only that I
do not see how it can by Adorno’s account. The concept alone cannot account for the
kind of nonconceptuality that Adorno has in mind. Furthermore, it seems there is,
indeed, more than the concept alone that is at work in justifying Adorno’s claims
about nonconceptuality. There are any number of immediate intuitive experiences
that play an unacknowledged role, in the background, that serve to fill out what
Adorno says happens by means of an immanent conceptual framework.
Recall that Adorno’s response to the problem of accounting for nonconceptuality
refers to “the ‘more’ which the concept is equally desirous and incapable of being.”41
In other words, the concept’s own inclination toward expression, and the
concomitant failure of that expression, is supposed to account for the “sense of
nonidentity.” This is one of Adorno’s bases for the notion of immanent critique: a
demonstration of the failure of concepts to reflect experience immanently, i.e., by
means of reflecting on the concept. Indeed, this is the basis for the very idea of
Selbstbesinnung. But how are we supposed to establish conceptual evidence for the
“experience of the failure of concepts”?42 Are we to admit that this experience is
itself part of the concept? I think it is worth considering whether this experience of
conceptual inadequacy is noticed indirectly (i.e., something that is mediated by the
concept), or whether it is something given directly in the act of expressing (or in
trying to express) an experience, or in other intentional acts? The more fundamental
41
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question, then, is whether the experiences of longing and failing are conceptual or
intentional. If the experiences or the meaning of such experiences (for example, of
longing or failing) are mediated, then a concept is required in order for these
experiences to be meaningful. However, if that were the case, Adorno could no
longer claim that concepts have a dependency upon these experiences (or any other
socio-historical experience), but that is the idea at the very basis of Adorno’s
“reversal” of Kant’s Copernican turn. Put in a slightly different way: if all meaning is
mediated, it is mediated by means of concepts; therefore the concept has to prepare
the way for the meaning of (historical) experience. In effect, not only is there no
longer any way to account for nonconceptuality, but the subject (the concept or
constellation of concepts) is that which provides the meaning of (historical)
experience. The reversal of Kant is thereby unsuccessful.
For Adorno, there is never a time when the subject-object relation is not
encumbered by conceptual determination: mediation all the way down. O’Connor
says that, “the subject must thereby always be in a conceptual relation to the object.
Subject and object do not melt into some kind of nonconceptual unity.”43 Indeed,
nonconceptuality without concepts is blind. However, if my interpretation of
Adorno’s view of perception is accurate, the evidence does not support the Kantian
presupposition, especially insofar as one admits, as Adorno does, that there is often
a discrepancy between what I want to express and what I am able to express
conceptually. If there is something I want to express that is conceptually
inexpressible, that something, whatever it is, has to be meaningful to me even if it’s
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not something conceptualizable. Or if it is conceptualizable, it has to have meaning
prior to its conceptualization. There has to be content that I can “see” (intuit) and is
given as at least significant enough that I would want to express it, rather than a
mere empty reference to particularities that abstract concepts lack. Why indeed
would I be longing or yearning to express this so-called “excess” if, even though
inexpressible, it is not terribly important and given as important (i.e., as something
of value)?
Foster explains that immanent critique discloses “the excess of what strives for
expression over what concepts are able to say. …[and] the excess of what we want to
say over what they bring to language is made possible by a longing intrinsic to the
concept, by its yearning to put experience into words.”44 But whatever it is that
concepts do, it does not include striving, longing, yearning, or anything that involves
emotional and/or intentional comportment. A concept cannot be “desirous.” These
are metaphors of intentionality that Adorno is attributing to concepts. But this is not
a minor point, because it means that if the metaphor breaks down, this longing may
not actually be immanent to the concept at all, threatening the very source of
negation. It is one thing to claim that conceptual content holds within itself some
reference to nonconceptual experience, but it is another thing to say that the
concept is it own impetus toward that content. With the latter, I cannot agree.
Longing is not a feature of a concept; it is a feature of a person45—of people
struggling, among other things, to conceptualize their own experiences. If longing is
Foster, Adorno, 29-30.
I use “person” here both colloquially and technically. Scheler’s philosophy of the
person is based ontologically on the being of spirit, and spirit is most basically the center of
intentionality (or “act-center”) of a human being.
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something intrinsic to the concept, how would this longing be distinguishable from
the (formal) meaning content of the concept? Perhaps this is a question that only a
phenomenology of longing can disclose.
As a lived (i.e., personal) experience, longing is neither formal (because it is
personal), nor conceptual (because one need not conceptualize longing in order to
long [for conceptual expression]). It appears conceptual, however, when the sphere
of the person is excluded from consideration. I worry that Adorno tends toward the
depersonalization of knowing (by means of the full exclusion of the realm of
intentionality) for the sake of the success of the immanent dimension of critique.
That is to say, he is adopting what Husserl calls the “natural attitude,” which
considers matters from a third-personal standpoint, removed from personal
involvement. The natural attitude alienates the intentional sphere of the person
from the person’s own experience.
Far from being intrinsic to concepts or in some way dependent upon them,
longing is not only external to the concept—grounded in the intentional acts of
persons—but is also not conceptual. I argue it is part of an entire constellation of
nonconceptual, intuitive experiences relevant to the sphere of intentionality. I
mentioned before that even if it is impossible to grasp that which exceeds the limits
of a conceptually constituted structure of experience, “it is possible to experience
those limits as limits.”46 What my argument amounts to is a claim that this
experience of the limitation of the concept is not itself a conceptual experience, that
is to say, mediated by concepts. It may be an experience that refers to the experience
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of thinking, but it refers to something immediately given in thinking as an
intentional act and one that depends for its meaning at least upon the prior intuitive
experiences of longing and failing.
Longing and failing are only two intuitive experiences of potentially many that
underlie and prevent the collapse of Adorno’s analysis, but they are experiences
whose possibility he explicitly rejects. These are experiences of the intentional
structure of persons rather than features imbedded within concepts. Longing and
failing can be employed metaphorically only insofar as we experience them in a
lived manner, and having the lived-experience of longing and failing is the normal
way one comes to understand what longing and failing are, that is to say, by
intuiting essence of those phenomena in the execution (Vollzug) of the intentional
acts.

Phenomenology’s Critical Potential
While Adorno needs to account for the possibility of critique, I am urging that it
does not follow that the only possible space for the negation of conceptual identity
comes by means of the concept’s own immanent reference (i.e., to
nonconceptualities). To be sure, the phenomenologist is able to follow Adorno’s
claim that concepts have a reference beyond their formal content. Foster explains
that “Rather than simply subsuming experience as dismembered conceptual
contents, the concept [according to Adorno] becomes a riddle the deciphering of
which points to the historical world.”47 So far this is phenomenologically acceptable.
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However, he goes on to say that it is the concept alone that “discloses the world in
the form of spiritual experience.”48 The phenomenologist cannot follow Adorno
down this exclusively conceptual road. Rather, the concept provides a different form
of expression—a universalized expression—of a world previously disclosed
intuitively.
David Held’s Introduction to Critical Theory, expresses Adorno’s position
succinctly: “Without conceptuality we could not grasp [objects]. But objects do not
therefore dissolve into concepts.”49 While I appreciate what Adorno is attempting to
achieve, not only is this a rather thin line to tread as well as a difficult position to
maintain, but it ignores the phenomenological insight that intentionality, and not
conceptuality, is first required to “grasp” objects. The issue, therefore, is not about
whether objects do not dissolve into concepts, but about whether concepts are the
only way to account for the meaning of objects. So Adorno has to claim that objects
do not dissolve into concepts, despite the fact that concepts are required for the
meaning of objects, leaving the burden of proof (and a rather difficult one) upon the
concept itself. In contrast, the (non-Hegelian) phenomenologist can affirm that
objects do not dissolve into concepts, and that they do not, precisely because of the
fact that concepts are not required for objects to be meaningful. Phenomenology can
point to the non-cognitive meaning of objects as evidence for nonidentity, rather
than an obstacle to overcome.
I will argue that without pre-theoretical experience, this elusive “sense” that the
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concept carries more than formal meaning by containing an experiential reference is
unexplainable. That is to say, the sense of nonidentity is unexplainable by means of
concepts alone. It is precisely the intuitive, phenomenological experience, and
precisely because of its immediacy, that provides a gauge or measure for how
accurately or inaccurately our concepts and thinking refer to objects. Adorno even
seems to acknowledge this briefly when he writes that “the datum [i.e., the Given],
the irremovable skandalon of idealism, will demonstrate time and again the failure
of the hypostasis.”50 (SO 142). Without a different source of meaning outside of, and
prior to, the concept, the leverage of negation and critique against the formal
dominance of the concept remains weak and largely insignificant.
A demonstration that meaning does not depend upon concepts, that not all
knowledge is equivalent to conceptual cognition is the most central aim of this work.
More specifically, I hope to show that phenomenological intuition does not make
phenomenology just another kind of identity-thinking, but that, insofar as it is
nonconceptual (and more specifically preconceptual), intuition is in fact a robust
source of nonidentity which can be brought to bear critically upon the formal
expression of concepts, making possible a phenomenological critique of the
tendency to prioritize conceptual identity into ideology.
One of the main reasons phenomenology contains this critical dimension is
because, as Adorno correctly claims, philosophy must inevitably operate by means
of concepts. In an outstanding passage, Adorno writes, “Necessity compels
philosophy to operate with concepts, but this necessity must not be turned into the
Theodor Adorno, “Subject and Object,” in The Adorno Reader, ed. Brian O’Connor
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2000), 142.
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virtue of their priority—no more than, conversely, criticism of that virtue can be
turned into a summary verdict against philosophy.”51 Adorno rejects the
phenomenological rendition of intuition because it serves as a form of identity, but if
it is an identity at all, it is a nonconceptual one that cannot force its way into a form
of identity-thinking.
Insofar as phenomenology is philosophy, it must consistently deal with the
sphere of the given, conceptually, by bringing intuition to cognition. And since the
intuitive sphere is constituted by its own domain of meaning, the intuitive domain of
meaning is consistently incommensurable with its conceptual approximation
thereby maintaining a consistent sense of nonidentity. The phenomenologist is
consistently forced up against that part of his or her thinking that thought cannot
contain since the intuitive backdrop of thinking is constantly there both calling for
recognition and on the verge of slipping away due to the failure of recognition.
This is the “dialectical” space of phenomenology: the interplay between intuitive
content and the inevitable conceptual (and inadequate) way of expressing that
content. The phenomenologist consistently seeks to return to the intuitive given but
finds the return hindered by the limitations of the conceptual framework as the only
possible way of returning, philosophically. I will go so far as to say that the source of
conceptual negation is more robust than the nonconceptual space for which Adorno
allows. We can intuit much more about the nonconceptual than Adorno is willing to
admit. The nonconceptual contained within the space of concepts renders
nonconceptuality unopposing. In a sense, I suppose that I am using Adorno’s most
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famous critical tool, immanent critique, against him. I am suggesting that some of
Adorno’s philosophical commitments are inconsistent with his philosophical aims.
He supports a paradigm that does not properly serve his own interests and rejects
one that I think can be of great assistance.
To be sure, I am not suggesting that phenomenologists always, or even primarily,
use their investigations critically, and to be fair to Adorno’s critique,
phenomenologists have typically viewed their philosophical endeavor as more
expository than critical, insofar as phenomenology is understood as a method of
description. Phenomenology is a kind of philosophy that maintains a focus on simply
what shows itself by means of the certain attitudes by which phenomena are
presented. The phenomenological attitude is not inherently a critical attitude.
However, they are not mutually exclusive either. I do not claim that phenomenology
is itself a “critical theory” in the strict Frankfurt School sense of the project, but that
it has a critical capacity. The argument of this work lends itself to the suggestion
that considering phenomena phenomenologically is able to improve social criticism
inasmuch as it is possible to maintain a critical attitude within, or at least alongside
of, the phenomenological attitude.
There is a sense in which, for Adorno, the upshot of immanent critique is the
ability to avoid the reduction of experience to which, he thinks, the description of
phenomena will inevitably amount. He thinks that describing experience
conceptually, the way phenomenology does, degrades the experience. Foster states,
according to Adorno’s objection to phenomenology, that “the attempt to describe
what is outside of causal-mechanical thinking with classificatory concepts will end
xxxv

up with the empty husk of the concept in its possession, not the richness of the
nonconceptual.”52 Interestingly, this statement is an apt summation of my objection
to Adorno’s critical theory, since, in his view, nonconceptuality must be framed
entirely within the context of classificatory concepts. In fact, I argue that this
statement pertains to Adorno all the more because while phenomenology fixes the
nonconceptual within an intuitive form of knowing, making it accessible (even if not
entirely cognizable), Adorno is unclear how, by means of the concept alone, a
reference to the nonconceptual can even survive. Of the two, I find phenomenology
more capable of offering the “richness of the nonconceptual,” including the historical
features of the object, by which it can reveal the limits of conceptual determinations.
Foster’s claim that phenomenological description is left with the “empty husk of
the concept” cannot hold up against what phenomenological description has shown
to be capable of bringing to sight. In fact, one reason for phenomenology’s success is
due to the same reason Adorno gives for the possibility of immanent critique: that
concepts hold within their content an experiential reference. As long as one in fact
remains—as much as possible—within the phenomenological attitude, and as long
as a phenomenology is understood as a portrayal of an experience irreducible to the
description, then an experiential recognition, rather than simply a conceptual
understanding, is not only possible but likely.
On the other hand, as Foster again explains, “The true dialectician must be aware
of [the] betrayal by her language, and must force language to work against its
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tendency to emasculate experience.”53 Again, it is no doubt the case that this
awareness—the critical dimension phenomenology, or “critical experience”—is
often lacking in “pure” phenomenologies. However, the very phenomenological
endeavor (i.e., to bypass for a time the concept and return to the nonconceptual)
bears its own admission to the fact that the discursive part of their philosophical
task cannot serve as a substitute, nor ought to stand in, for the experience itself. The
language employed is meant to be evocative, serving as a “pointer,” as Scheler says,
in order to enable another “to see what can only be seen.” There must therefore be
either an implicit or explicit acknowledgment of a character of nonidentity in the
articulation of phenomena.

Why Scheler?
My choice to use Scheler’s philosophy as a paradigm for the project of working
out a critical phenomenology is not to suggest that only Scheler’s phenomenology
can be conducive for this project. However, my choice to use Scheler is not arbitrary
either. To be sure, there are plenty of French phenomenologists who, because of
their Marxist influences (e.g., Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, etc.) or their explicit turn from
subjective priority (e.g., Levinas, Marion, etc.), would be great candidates and worth
exploring. But among the early (German) phenomenologists, and those whose
philosophies are more true in comparison to the original phenomenological vision,
Scheler’s philosophy is of particular importance for making a connection between
phenomenology and critical theory. In addition to the two reasons I will soon
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provide, it is worth mentioning a largely unknown historical connection that makes
the Frankfurt School relation with Scheler particularly worth exploring.

Historical Considerations
The early 1920s was a period of significant new horizons for social theory in
Germany. In fact, 1923 specifically was a decisive year, witnessing three important
events. First, Georg Lukács’ History and Class Consciousness and Karl Korsch’s
Marxism and Philosophy were both published, which are known for their critical
(and controversial) reinterpretation of orthodox, or “scientific,” Marxism.54 Next, the
Institut für Sozialforschung was founded.55 The Institute, whose research Max
Horkheimer later called “critical theory of society,” became the (unofficial) school
for the advancement of the new Western Marxist tradition. And finally, in the same
year, Max Scheler embarked on a social research project at the University of Cologne
which he called the “sociology of knowledge.”56 Scheler and the Frankfurt School
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held the common goal to steer social theory away from a positivist approach toward
a philosophically-grounded interdisciplinary approach.
The social research institute in Cologne, the Forschungsinstitut für
Sozialwissenschaft, had opened four years before the one in Frankfurt. It was
originally under the direction of Christian Eckert when the school in Cologne was
converted from the status of a local academy to a university in 1919.57 Scheler was
hired that same year by an invitation from the Cologne’s Catholic mayor, Konrad
Adenauer, who lead the university’s reestablishment. The mayor’s Catholicism is
important because the new university in the Rhineland was founded in part with the
intent of being amenable to the Catholic faith.58 Toward that end, Adenauer invited
Scheler to assist as director of the sociology department specifically to represent the
Catholic intellectual tradition at the university.59 Both Adenauer and Scheler were
prominent members of the Catholic Centre Party. The other two co-directors of the
Sociological Institute besides Scheler were the liberal German Democrat, Leopold
von Wiese, and the Social Democrat, Hugo Lindemann. Selecting scholars with these
Party-affiliations was deliberate because it was important that the Cologne
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sociological institute be represented by the three parties that comprised the Weimar
coalition, as the parties most committed to Germany’s new democratic system.60
Since the time of his appointment to Cologne, Scheler’s work gravitated toward
more sociological themes. This may have been in part because of the interests and
research of his students, with whom Scheler began working out the details of a
sociology of knowledge. He presented a well-received paper at the Fourth German
Sociological Congress of 1924 to such distinguished sociologists as Ferdinand
Tönnies, Werner Sombart, Alfred Weber, Robert Michels, and Max Adler.61 It has
been noted that this lecture and his “ensuing publications…led to [Scheler’s]
selection as successor to Franz Oppenheimer as the Chair of sociology at Frankfurt
in 1928.”62 But Scheler was not only appointed at Frankfurt to replace Oppenheimer
for sociology, but also to replace Hans Cornelius as Chair of philosophy.63 Scheler’s
appointment disappointed Cornelius, who had hoped that the position would go to
Max Horkheimer. John Stuade explains the reasons the joint philosophy-sociology
position would likely have appealed to Scheler:
The faculty there included some of the brightest young men in the social
This is important for reasons in comparison to the direction of the Institute for Social
Research in Frankfurt. When Horkheimer became director, he was insistent that the
position have the status of a “dictator.” However this fact is also very ironic given their
resistance to the political dictatorship of the Nazi Party and their stance against
authoritarian personalities.
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sciences as well as many of Scheler’s old friends and acquaintances. Among the
younger men, Scheler anticipated assistance in his research on the sociology of
knowledge from Karl Mannheim and Theodore Adorno. He also looked
forward to discussing the sociology of religion with Gottfried Salomon, who
had been Ernst Troeltsch’s assistant in Berlin. Richard Wilhelm and Rudolf
Otto sponsored an Oriental Institute that interested Scheler enormously.
There he hoped to learn more about Eastern methods of meditation and selfcontrol that had fascinated him for many years.64
Scheler died on May 19th 1928, just before taking up his new post at Frankfurt.
The post was offered to Paul Tillich in 1929. One might wonder what Scheler’s
philosophy would have brought to the burgeoning intellectual atmosphere there. To
be sure, Scheler would have contributed a phenomenological voice, with a social
philosophy and ethical theory heavily influenced by this voice. Even if
phenomenologists and critical theorists could work in the same location, could it be
that their philosophies work together?

Social and Historical Reality
The differences between what critical theorists and phenomenologists refer by
what I have been calling the space of the nonconceptual should not be downplayed.
For Adorno, this most certainly does not refer to phenomena in the
phenomenological sense insofar as an object, in this case, is indifferent to reality.
Adorno’s idea of the nonconceptual points to the concept’s own bearing and
connection to a social and historical position. It refers, that is, to historical
experience. It would seem that this difference would amount to an insurmountable
aporia that would forever exclude working out points of synthesis between
phenomenology and critical theory, the phenomenological experience and historical
64
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experience could not coincide. I grant that not all versions of phenomenology are
equally able to overcome this difference. Versions of phenomenology such as
Husserl’s that focus primarily upon the subjective conditions for an object to appear
the way it appears and that base these conditions specifically within the sphere of
theoretical consciousness, could not supply the important connecting points that I
argue Scheler can provide.
Scheler’s commitment to phenomenology should not be downplayed, and as I
will argue, his phenomenology is a mainstay throughout all of this foray into
sociology and metaphysics.65 He is committed to the phenomenological idea that the
givenness of objects and the meaning of an object do not depend upon settling the
problem as to whether that object bears reality. In fact, Scheler goes so far as to say
that reality as such is not a knowable aspect of an object. According to the epistemic
criteria of consciousness, whether an intentional object is real is never decipherable
according modes of consciousness alone. Scheler therefore follows Kant’s thought
that existence is not something that is able to be logically proven. However,
although we are not able to possess cognition of an object’s reality, we are able to
have knowledge of the process of objectification, which is inextricably grounded
within the experience of reality.
According to Scheler, we can be assured of the reality of things around us, not
because their reality is knowable, but because things around us become objects of
Prevalent readings of Scheler’s work as a whole suggest that when Scheler began to
focus on metaphysics and philosophical anthropology his phenomenology diminished
drastically. I will argue, in contrast, that Scheler could not have come to his metaphysical
and anthropological conclusions without a heavy reliance on his phenomenology, and that
because of this reliance, his phenomenology has an important place in all of his later
writings. I intend to downplay the disparate “periods” in Scheler’s career.
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cognition necessarily by means of an experience of their existence. Even things that
cannot strictly speaking be called real—whether they are ideal, or “irreal,” or
illusory, or fictitious, or virtual, or spiritual, or immaterial, or perceptual
appearances, such as shadows, rainbows, or colors, or even mere hallucinations—all
have their original rootedness, as intentional objects, in the experience of reality.
Why is this possible?
Reality, for Scheler, is not given in conscious acts according to the consistent
verifiability of phenomena as Husserl maintains, but rather within our active and
practical comportment, and in particular, by means of the experience of resistances
(Widerstand) within our drive-based striving played out within practical behavior.
As I will show, the experience of reality and the experience of temporality are
grounded within the same practical behavior. On the one hand, spatiality and
temporality are given (respectively) within the experiences of the ability to move
oneself and to modify oneself and one’s surroundings; reality, on the other hand, is
given in the resistances to the efforts for movement and modification. Scheler thinks
that it takes a phenomenology of these modes of behavior and what these behaviors
yield in order to show the common roots of history (temporality) and reality.
According to Scheler, experiences that refer to unreal things still require living
within historical reality. Without encounters with real experiences to begin forming
the pathways of objectification, the phenomenologist would never come to “see”
anything; without resistances, individuals could objectify nothing and therefore
could have no “world” of which to be conscious.
Additionally, and as I will show, the accomplishments that Scheler has
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accomplished within the sphere of the sociology of knowledge suggest that the
process of objectification and the conditions for the possibility of intentional
objectivity also always involve social constitution. There is no asocial vantage point
as some interpret Scheler to have maintained. Scheler’s ability to include a robust
account of history and society and the relevant factors that influence knowledge
within what remains for him a phenomenological way of doing philosophy makes
Scheler’s philosophy tend toward what I’m calling a critical phenomenology. But it
also makes Scheler a more suitable candidate than Husserl for this particular
project. In short, I argue that what Adorno calls “a knowledge mindful of the historic
positional value of the object in its relation to other objects” not only does not
exclude phenomenological (i.e., intuitive) lived-experience but it is required in order
to have any orientation toward objects and conception of history or value.
But, even if Scheler has a particular advantage over Husserl, what about with
respect to Heidegger? What advantage does Scheler’s philosophy have over the
great existential phenomenologist for this project, who has done so much work in
showing how temporality and ontology are intertwined. Heidegger lacks candidacy
because of his rejection of the place that values and the comportment toward values
have within the sphere of ontology. I will argue that the sphere of values and the
attitude of love that discloses them are important for a successful phenomenological
critique of ideology.

Ideology Critique
A culminating element of the idea of critical phenomenology is establishing the
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basis for the possibility of a phenomenological critique of ideology. I will do this by
invoking, to some extent, Scheler’s value theory, but especially the attitude Scheler
suggests is important for the givenness of values. However, it is perfectly
appropriate to wonder why a value framework is important since critical theorists
espouse social critique without recourse to values or ethical theory. I take Scheler’s
value theory to be indicative not of an ethical theory as such, but of a metaethics, or
the condition for the possibility of ethical theory. Arguably, Scheler’s theory of
values is more of an occasion to say something about the person than about
principles of action and judgment, namely, the importance of loving as the basis of
adequacy of both knowing and valuing.
Scheler thinks that love is a quality of intentionality that discloses the world
according to the content by which we make ethical judgment, namely, values.
Valuing is less indicative of formulating propositional judgments than it is indicative
of a value-orientation one takes toward the world. This orientation or “attitude”
(Einstellung) that is at the center of Scheler’s conception of the person, is both
conditioned by a particular set of values seen as well as that which determines the
set of values that are able to be seen. Cultivating an attitude of love widens that
possible disclosure of values. Love is the condition for valuing properly.
Furthermore, since Scheler thinks that our cognitive and volitional comportment
are largely determined by what we consider to be or not to be of value, intuitive and
cognitive inadequacy is a sign of a lack of love.
Ideology, I will argue, is a theoretical outcome that is first based within improper
valuing: overvaluation of some things and devaluation of others. That is to say,
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ideology is the intellectual counterpart to certain psychological and emotional
maladies, namely, idolatry (overvaluation) and resentment (devaluation). These
kinds of inversions of value and valuing, Scheler suggests, originate within specific
conditions, which include social conditions of inequality and oppression. It is largely
within oppressive social conditions that individuals become sensitive to the values
those conditions threaten. For example, I read Marx’s theory of alienation as
basically referring to a value-inversion. He condemns certain social conditions that
threaten the existence of the higher values of workers as persons for the sake of
lower ones. The problem is that surplus value (capital) is taken to be more
important than each of the following: (1) the value of keeping the products of one’s
own labor, (2) the value of productive activity itself, (3) the value of higher human
activities (“species-being”), and (4) the value of human interaction.66
Scheler characterizes a capitalistic mindset this way, as the structuring of society
according to the privileging of lower values such as utility above higher personal
values. However, he would also insist that the way to see social problems more
clearly is not by means of a hatred of the social structure itself or by a revolution
against the upper classes that are perpetuating that structure, but by orienting
oneself to values properly, which can only be accomplished by means of love, rather
than by hatred and violence.
Love however does not exclude the possibility of social criticism, but in fact it
allows for it all the more. Love, rather than a different form of rationality, is that
which allows us to see the values threatened within the way society is structured
Cf. Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, trans. Martin Milligan
(New York: Dover, 2012), 67ff.
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and to respond to their call, given within social experience. Scheler endorses a
philosophy of openness and love which I suggest is a path that can provide a potent
critique.
However, I also want to suggest that a reference to attitude discloses another,
and perhaps more important, form of nonidentity. Scheler thinks that the adequacy
of intuition requires both lived-experience as well as a loving attitude. This is
significant because, even though it has been assumed that phenomenological
intuition constitutes a moment of identity, for Scheler, intuition cannot contain an
identity unless a person is orientated to values in the right way through love. But
such a proper orientation requires a moral perfection that no human being is
capable of achieving perfectly. This means that although we can have greater
adequacy in intuition than we can with conceptual cognition, we cannot claim
anymore the adequacy of identity.
One reason why our own individual value-orientations (what Scheler calls, “ordo
amoris”) will invariably be imperfect is because they will consistently reflect the
value-preferences and the value-inversions that are embedded within society as a
whole, the way society is structured and our own individual experiences in society,
for example, our moments of ressentiment perpetuated by individual and social
inequalities. If this is the case, I suggest that a more profound critique of society can
be achieved by means of a reflection on our attitudes and value-orientations than
that which can be achieved by means of a reflection upon our concepts. Selfreflection has to be more than about the way we think, its about the way we are
oriented and attuned to the world. Instrumental rationality is itself a reflection of
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the way society values things. Critical rationality can counter this trend by bringing
out a better way of valuing by opposing the current valuations of society.
The two forms of self-reflection (attitudinal and conceptual) are not mutually
exclusive. Just as our concepts, according to Adorno, have a history and reflect
society, so do our attitudes and the way we value. The important point is that
concepts are twice removed from society. The missing piece is in the
acknowledgement that concepts not only reflect socio-historical conditions, but they
reflect the valuing immanent to a particular history and society. This means that I
am ultimately proposing a new form of and new meaning to immanent critique. A
critique of a particular rationality of society is secondary; I am pointing to a more
fundamental critique of the particular valuation of society that lends itself to a
particular form of rationality as an expression of a change in valuation. These
aspects of society are disclosed not first by a reflection upon our own concepts, but
more originally by means of a reflection upon our own ways of valuing.
Phenomenology makes us reflect on our attitude: how is the way I fail to love
reflected in the way society fails to love? In this way, Scheler’s philosophy calls for a
renewal of our hearts as a way to affect a renewal of society.
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THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL CRITIQUE OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Immanence and Transcendence
Adorno had been preoccupied with phenomenology since his early dissertation
work with Hans Cornelius, an avowed transcendental idealist. His critique of
phenomenology evolved through three distinct stages throughout his career: first,
during the period of his dissertation on Husserl (1924); second, just after he had
joined the Institute for Social Research in 1938 with his essay “Husserl and the
Problem of Idealism” (1940), and third, his culminating effort in his Metacritique of
Epistemology (1956). All of these works turn largely on the issue of Husserl’s
idealism. Adorno means by idealism “a philosophy which tries to base such notions
as reality or truth on an analysis of consciousness.”1 But Husserl’s philosophy is not
a straightforward idealism, even by Adorno’s own admission. It is perhaps better
characterized as an unsuccessful realism. Husserl’s philosophy approaches idealism
the more he attempts “to destroy idealism from within.”2 The phenomenological
effort to return to the transcendent, objective domain of “the things themselves”
ultimately amounts to another transcendental analysis of phenomena by an
investigation of the immanent facts of consciousness. What bothered Adorno
initially is what seemed to him to be a fundamental incompatibility between
Husserl’s notions of immanence and transcendence. In Adorno’s words:
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…on the one hand Husserl demanded the founding of all thing-like being only
by going back to the immediate [immanent] facts [of consciousness]. On the
other hand he considers the things as “absolute transcendents” that might
show themselves epistemologically only in their relation to the
consciousness, but whose own being should in principle be independent of
[i.e., transcend] consciousness.3
Indeed, Adorno pushes on a notoriously troublesome aspect of phenomenology.
He is discontent with what has come to be called Husserl’s “transcendental insight.”
This insight (which Husserl maintained firmly throughout his career) is best
expressed in his Cartesian Meditations:
The Objective world, the world that exists for me, that always has and always
will exist for me, the only world that ever can exist for me—this world with
all its Objects…derives its whole sense and its existential status, which it has
for me, from me myself, from me as the transcendental Ego.4
Adorno considers incompatible Husserl’s insistence on the very distinction between
transcendence and immanence. Husserl’s notion of noema, or, intentional object,
takes on a problematic equivocacy, containing a bit of immanence and a bit of
transcendence. Its hybrid characterization ultimately amounts to being “neither
immanent nor transcendent, suspended so to speak in mid-air.”5 What remains
perplexing on this account is how to salvage the world of transcendent things when
“the world of transcendent things is entirely dependent upon immanental being (as
absolute being), and when immanental being needs no other thing to exist (“nulla

Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften I, 375. Quoted in and translated by Ernst Wolff, “From
Phenomenology to Critical Theory: The Genesis of Adorno’s Critical Theory from his
Reading of Husserl,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 32, no. 5 (2006): 558.
4 Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans.
Dorion Cairns (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999), 26.
5 Adorno. Quoted but not cited, in Fred Dallmayr, “Phenomenology and Critical Theory:
Adorno,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 3 (Jan. 1976): 371.
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‘re’ indigent ad existendum”).6
Adorno presents a rather standard objection against idealism. The critique is
sufficient as far as it goes, but it does not deal with all that it needs to in order to be
successful. There is a standard reply to this objection that is arguably a convincing
way out, which concerns the careful way that Husserl characterizes the different
sense of givenness. Husserl’s notion of transcendence is hinged on the distinction
between the presentation of something and its “presentification,” or “presentiation”
(Vergegenwärtigung). A phenomenon takes its transcendence not on account of that
which is presented to consciousness, but that which is “presentified.” While we only
directly are presented with a single side of any given object of perception, we do not
assume that the back-side of an object is not there. On the contrary, the back-side is
presentified to consciousness, even in its absence.
Presentified phenomena do not refer to aspects of objects that are simply not
given (as opposed to the aspects that are given, or presented), because, if so, the
presentified portions of an object would not contribute to the overall intuitive sense
of the object. Rather, the difference refers to different degrees of givenness.
Presented phenomena indicates a presence that is given as present. Presentified
phenomena indicates an absence that is given, as absent. In short, presentification is
presented absence. Consciousness is aware of the transcendence of objects because
intuitive acts do not fully disclose the entirety of any given object, and because
objects are given as only partially disclosed (presented).

Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological
Philosophy, First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, trans. F. Kersten (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983), 110, §49. Henceforth: Ideas I.
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Incorporating a temporal dimension, the intentional structure that is indicated
here is the interplay between absence and anticipation. Our expectation of objects
coincides with the fact that many objects are familiar objects, and that we at least
expect some coherence to our perceptual experience. We expect that an object is
going to appear in similar ways every time I encounter it. But even if we encounter
something that is unfamiliar, we still would have some expectation about the
aspects of it that are absent from our gaze.
Husserl speaks of this dynamic also as the horizonal context of intuition, both
with respect to the thing itself (which always has an “inner horizon”) and with
respect to its context (“outer horizon”). Or, he speaks of objects always being given
intentionally as “adumbrated”: one-sided and incomplete. While on the noematic
pole, phenomena have an adumbrated character, on the noetic pole, consciousness
has an apperceptive character. Apperception refers to the way consciousness is both
presented with something definite and presented with something indefinite with
respect to a single objective appearance. Consciousness is intentionally aware of the
adumbrated characteristic of presentations. We are always consciously aware that
every object is always more than what is given in intuition. As Husserl puts it,
Consciousness is at every moment a meaning of what is meant, but that at
any moment, this something meant is more than what is meant at that
moment explicitly. … Each phase of perception was a mere side of the object,
as what was perceptually meant. This intending-beyond-itself which is
implicit in any consciousness, must be considered an essential moment of it.7
Recall Adorno’s initial description of dialectics as a “consistent sense of
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nonidentity.”8 Is Husserl’s notion of adumbrated phenomena not harnessing a
similar sense of nonidentity? Husserl says that even every act of intending, and at
every moment “something meant is more than what is meant.” Likewise, Adorno
insists that an object is always “more” than the concepts employed to understand it:
“What it is,” he says “is more than it is.”9 This reference to a kind of objective
surplus, which is more than consciousness grasps is central to Adorno’s
understanding of dialectics, which “says no more…than that objects do not go into
their concepts without leaving a remainder.”10 Similarly, Husserl says that
“intending-beyond-itself” is an essential moment of intentional consciousness.
Perhaps it is possible to say that Husserl points to a dialectical pattern of
consciousness that Adorno did not acknowledge. In any case, this kind of pattern is
the very essence of what I am calling a “critical experience,” which is the condition
for the possibility of a critique of consciousness. It is not just the
incommensurability of intuition and conceptual articulation, but the self-awareness
of this incommensurability within one’s own thinking and perceiving. It is clear that,
in Husserl’s theory of perception, we are always consciously aware of the
remainder, the horizon, the adumbration of the object. This is awareness is evidence
of the difference between noesis and noema.
My claim, however, is that this critical experience is an intuitive, and therefore,
phenomenological experience (in a broad sense of the term “phenomenological,” as
an investigation of the givenness of phenomena). The sense of nonidentity is not an
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outcome of reflection, it is given immediately in the intentional acts. Furthermore,
the nonidentification of thought and thing, concepts and objects, cannot be disclosed
simply by a reflection upon concepts unless reflection pulls from the domain of
experience, whether this is a simple perceptual experience, or a historical or social
experience. The concept alone cannot contain its own point of negation. But
Adorno’s insistence that “we should begin with the concept,”11 instead of intuition
(the “mere datum”) is both unnecessary and not conducive for his own
philosophical aims.
If in attempting to uncover a “full and unreduced experience,” the critical
theorist must do so only “in the medium of conceptual reflection,” and immanent
critique, the theorist lacks a point of reference to a nonconceptual experiential
context by which to draw out the patterns of nonidentity between the object and the
concept. Adorno indeed does offer a notion of the nonconceptual, but its status is
more of a logical inference with respect to the particularity that all concepts, as
concepts, cannot contain. By discounting intuition as a viable source of knowable
content, which is also nonconceptual, his notion of the nonconceptual remains a
logical necessity, but materially vacant. I suggest that a critical theorist must bypass
the concept to start and first deal with the patterns of givenness that give content to
concepts, and use the material intuition to consider critically the formal structures
derived from the intuitions.
But there is no doubt that Adorno implies an experiential context, even if he does
not elucidate it. In fact, the absence of elucidation of the nonconceptual domain is a
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key point, since the materiality and particularity of things is undermined by the very
elucidation. Conceptualization rescinds nonconceptuality; the concept crowds out
the object. And Adorno sees the reification as a mark of immediacy, which
“epistemological tradition places…on the subject’s side.”12 He writes that
“philosophy…forgot the mediation in the mediating subject…[and] As though to
punish it, the subject will be overcome by what it has forgotten.”13 In short, the
subject has lost awareness of the way it is mediated by the object. Husserl, in
contrast, ends up with a constituted transcendence. The transcendence of the
intentional object is marked out by a set of criteria that requires subjective
constitution. Husserl is very clear that the absolute status of consciousness and
immanental being means that transcendent being depends upon consciousness, and
consciousness depends upon nothing.14 For Adorno, mediation means that
constitution goes both ways, from the object to the subject, and the subject to the
object.15 However, it also means that amidst these paths of constitution, neither is
reducible to the other. Adorno’s critical rationality is for the sake of bringing the
point of mediation back to light, and offering the preponderance of the object,
specifically with respect to the historical dependence of the subject. It is the domain
of the real (historical and social reality) that philosophy forgot, and he is rightly
suspicious of relying on consciousness for the disclosure of this domain.
Adorno uses the ambiguity between transcendence and immanence (his early
critique) to cast a wider critical net, laying charges of the myth of autonome ratio
Negative Dialectics, 186.
Negative Dialectics, 176.
14 Husserl, Ideas I, §49.
15 See, Brian O’Connor’s, Adorno’s Negative Dialectic.
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(middle critique) and prima philosophia (metacritque). The central problem of
Adorno’s metacritique of Husserl is the antinomies that follow on account of the
absolute status of transcendental subjectivity. According to Adorno, the crisis of
phenomenology is the “crisis of idealism,” which “comes at the same time as a crisis
in philosophy’s pretentions to totality.”16 Phenomenology, according to Adorno,
asserts a transcendental first principle out of which everything should arise.17 There
is a relativity of all being to consciousness, but no relativity of consciousness to
other beings. Prima Philosophia maintains the equivalence of beings with the
foundational being, and as a result eliminates whatever is incongruent with the
foundation. Adorno calls this the “original sin” of prima philosophia.
However, subjective reflection simply cannot offer an immediate foundation,
first, because “subjectivity can never hope to absorb non-identical elements,” and
because the very notion of reflection indicates mediation. Adorno suggests that any
such principle that is deemed foundational and first, is universal, and as universal,
contains abstraction, as abstract it is conceptual, and finally, as conceptual it is
necessarily mediated “and thus not the first.”18 Such a philosophy of a foundation,
with which it makes all reality equivalent with the foundation, also has a propensity
toward the construction of philosophical system—an identity without contradiction.
But the system is a theoretical system, and a theoretical system is antinomical
because it attempts to totalize the infinity; it puts into perpetual stasis, the dynamic;
and it confines the unconfinable. A system is necessarily a closed system, and
Adorno, “The Actuality of Philosophy,” 25.
Adorno, “Metacritique of Epistemology,” The Adorno Reader, ed. Brian O’Connor
(Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2000), 117.
18 Adorno, “Metacritique of Epistemology,”117.
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anything closed is without movement.19 But reality is historical—in perpetual
movement—and as such, is incongruent with its subjective ground.
It is this kind of stasis that Horkheimer, earlier, characterized a traditional
theory, in contrast to a critical theory. A critical theory is able, he says, to take
society itself as an object. Rather than turning social and historical reality into an
interconnected set of concepts, a critical theory critiques concepts on account of the
lack of adequation with the historical and social reality of the objects, as well as a
lack of awareness of this inadequation. It is attempt to bring to light that which has
been hastily overlooked. But the possibility of a critical theory, is on account of the
presupposition that concepts and objects do not entirely match. Unless we disclose
the critical experience—a phenomenology of the discrepancy of concept and
object—then it remains a presupposition, and the basis of the theory remain
uncritical of its own presuppositions.
Husserl was aware that we may see things inadequately or that we judge
incorrectly. Intentionality bears a spectrum of approximation, and Adorno fails to
appreciate this. Adorno still seems to interpret Husserl’s subjectivity along the lines
of the old Kantian paradigm of that which Husserl was in the midst of reinterpreting.
That is to say, he still takes the subject to be a bundle of concepts, and that the issue
is still about the degree to which concepts and objects align and how we can tell.
Certainly, conceptualization is a part of consciousness, but primarily consciousness
intends objects, even before the formation of concepts sets in. So to interpret
Husserl’s phenomenology as essentially a Kantian idealist mistake whereby sensible

19

Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 26-28.

9

things are given meaning bestowed by the concepts of the understanding is
disingenuous. Objects are not problematic for phenomenology: consciousness
essentially intends, and whatever it intends is an object. This so-called “totality” that
Adorno insists Husserl lays claim to is not a conceptual totality. If there is a totality
at all, it must pertain to the “world,” which is the objects and their meanings are
correlates of consciousness. It is an objective totality—but one that depends upon
consciousness for its objectivity.
While, on the one hand, the transcendence of objects are not problematic for
phenomenology, on the other hand, the reality of objects is problematic. “Object” is
simply a relative term. Things require objectification by some a subject to become
objects. It is not out of the realm of phenomenological possibility that there may be a
sphere of real things that are not necessarily objective (have not become
objectified). In fact, we will see that Scheler explains the matter basically in these
terms. However, there is no such thing—strictly speaking—as an “object” that is not
intended by consciousness. However, Husserl suggests that objects not only get
their sense from consciousness, but also their existential status. Husserl’s
phenomenology invariably idealizes reality. On account of the epoché and the
ground of consciousness, the only way for Husserl to talk about reality is as an idea.
While consciousness for Husserl is more dynamic than a bundle of concepts, in this
case, Husserl is inclined to consider reality as a concept. Thus, Adorno’s critique that
unequivalent things are forced within a kind of equivalence to consciousness is, in
this case, perfectly on the mark. Again, reality is historical—in perpetual
movement—and as such, is incongruent with its subjective ground.
10

Reality and Its Idea
An object (Gegenstand, lit. “standing-against”) in the phenomenological sense is
of course not equivalent with what is real (wirklich), and Husserl is careful not to fall
into the fallacy that one must first be certain of something’s reality before we can be
certain of something’s objectivity and meaning. All sorts of intentional objects are
not real, but bear great cultural meaning and value: Achilles, Goethe’s Faust, dreams,
and Santa Claus, etc. The ability to engage a world of sense and meaning
independent from reality is the strength of phenomenology. But its strength is also
its weakness because it poses a problem for the phenomenologist to take up reality
itself as an object of investigation. If transcendental reflection operates precisely by
disengaging from the “real” world, how does the question of reality (Wirklichkeit)20
ever have an occasion to arise?
The question arises from the fact that “reality” is a concept that has meaning for
us, and so something can only be counted as real if “it matches up to what reality
means to us.”21 Consider Adorno’s insistence that reality will always be unable to
match up with a concept of reality. There will always be a remainder or a surplus
that a concept cannot contain, and especially of the concept of reality. According to
Husserl’s transcendental insight that states that the objective world derives the
sense and status that it has for consciousness, from consciousness itself, two things
are evident:
20 It is important to note that Husserl is referring to the term wirklich, real (or often
translated as “actual”).
21 A. D. Smith, Husserl and the Cartesian Meditations, Routledge Philosophy Guidebooks
(New York: Routledge, 2003), 159.
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1. Something that has meaning for us is constituted in consciousness as having
meaning for us.22
2. Something that has the status of actually existing (for us) is constituted in
consciousness as existing.
These two go hand-in-hand since again whatever has the status of real gets that
status from the degree that it matches up to the concept of what reality means. Two
more questions arise: What does reality mean? And what sort of experience
provides the meaning of reality and unreality?
In the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl refers to perceptual intuition, or “originary”
perceptual experience, as the basis of the experience of reality. But the meaning of
reality is not merely the thing perceived as perceived; this may be a relation of
intentionality, not yet of reality. Reality is put out of play with the epoché not
because it is not important, nor because it should be doubted, but because it can
have, initially, no greater assurance for us than a mere belief, and beliefs qua beliefs
do not qualify as appropriate premises for philosophical thinking. Reality, initially,
carries only a meaning as something believed, and it is for that reason outside
philosophical justification.
This provides the impetus for phenomenological thinking about reality, because
it turns out that believing that an object that is given is also real varies in
justification. These beliefs, as intentional acts, have more or less adequacy. Claims
about reality have greater adequacy on account of the degree of “evident
verification.” Verification refers to establishing evidence; reason is that by which we
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verify or nullify. Therefore, it must be by means of reason that we verify the truth of
being and non-being (existence). Husserl writes:
…we can be sure something is [real] only by virtue of a synthesis of evident
verification… It is clear that the [truth of the reality] of objects is to be
obtained only from evidence, and that it is evidence alone by virtue of which
an ‘actually’ existing, true, rightly accepted object of whatever form or kind
has sense for us.23
A “synthesis of evident verification” is, on the one hand, intentional: it refers to
something toward which consciousness it directed, and on the other hand, it is
horizonal: it refers to a set of fulfilled and unfulfilled (empty) intentions. That is to
say, it refers to the intentional apperceptive structure of “intending-beyond-itself,”
described earlier. Furthermore, it seeks verification of those intentions that are less
fulfilled—that which is more adumbrated or more in doubt. But all of this is already
included in every act of perception: all perception as perception is intentional,
apperceptive, and seeks verification of empty intentions. Perception of reality has
greater justification the less contains the intentional ambiguity of empty intentions.
Verification is the transition from empty to fulfilled intention in evidential
experience (self-evidence) and in this transition, reality is given.24 As A. D. Smith
explains, “to believe that something is real is just to rule out all possible forms of
deception, illusion, misapprehension, hallucination, and so forth.”25 Thus,
verification does not merely ascertain the reality of things, but ascertains the nonunreality of a thing, which thereby gives us the meaning and sense of reality. In
other words, it is when perceptual experience breaks down, becomes ambiguous

Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 60.
Smith, Husserl and the Cartesian Meditations, 161.
25 Smith, Husserl and the Cartesian Meditations, 164.
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and inconsistent that one begins questioning the reality of the things perceived.
Suppose upon waking, I walk out of my bedroom, and instead of entering the
hallway, I find that that I am standing in the Amazon Rain Forest. It is the
inconsistency of the perceptual experience that I begin to consider the unreality of
what I perceive, perhaps that it is a dream. However, Husserl is not only concerned
with eradicating suspicions of unreality, but with raising the status of the belief of
reality to apodicticity (even those instances when we are not suspicious of reality of
a situation).
Is apodictic certainty of reality possible, or is it invariably belief? Aspects of
Husserl’s own philosophy make apodicticity problematic. If, for example,
“consciousness is at every moment a meaning of what is meant, but that at any
moment, this something meant is more than what is meant at that moment
explicitly,”26 then perception will never be without some ambiguity. When there is a
interplay of empty and fulfilled intentions, perceptual experience will fluctuate,
sometimes noticing these aspects, other times noticing different ones. Furthermore,
anticipation and expectation will invariably carry irreconcilable adumbration and
emptiness of intention. Indeed, the very efforts of verification imply that something
is initially empty and unverified. Husserl explains:
The evidence pertaining to Objects in a real Objective world…has an essential
‘one-sidedness’—stated more precisely: a multiform horizon of unfulfilled
anticipations (which, however, are in need of fulfillment) and, accordingly,
contents of a mere meaning [of reality], which refer us to corresponding
potential evidences.27
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In other words, all remaining unfulfilled intentions refer us the potential verification
of everything unfulfilled. As we proceed from evidence to evidence “This imperfect
evidence becomes more nearly perfect…, but necessarily in such a manner that no
imaginable synthesis of this kind is completed as an adequate evidence.”28 The
concept of adequacy for Husserl refers to evidence “in which there are no unfulfilled
components. In such cases an object is not merely self-given but completely given.
Everything that pertains to it would be given together all at once.”29 But there is
never a case where something given in the sphere of natural reality will have
adequacy. We may find things to form a synthesis with relative consistency, but
fulfillment in perfect, complete evidence is ruled out. Again, Husserl explains:
Any such synthesis of evidence must always involve unfulfilled, expectant,
and accompanying meanings. At the same time, there always remains the
open possibility that the belief in being will not be fulfilled.30
The inevitability of unfulfilled intentions disrupts the degree to which the
evidence of real things can match up to the conceptual meaning of reality. Again, the
sense of reality is put into perspective by means of a sense of something to be
unreal, namely, when intentional inconsistencies of anticipations and unfulfilled
intentions arise in the course of experience. However, to be certain of the reality of
some object is to be certain that no such inconsistencies or unfilled intentions, not
only will not, but cannot arise.31 An object can be called a real object with certainty if
and only if it is such a unity infinitely holding-good, standing up, proving itself
experientially, ad infinitum, and where the object’s not holding-good is
Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 61-2.
Smith, Husserl and the Cartesian Meditations, 52.
30 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 62.
31 Smith, Husserl and the Cartesian Meditations, 172-73.
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unthinkable.32 But, external evidence does not extend to the apodictic—to the
impossibility of disconfirmation. Thus, reality is something that has meaning for us
(logically) but a meaning that cannot be verified experientially. The logical meaning
of reality provides the idea of reality: a complete synthesis of harmonious infinities
of possible experience.33 The modes of verification indicate simultaneously that
such a complete degree of self-evidence is impossible; reality, therefore, can only
have certainty as an idea:
…an actual object belonging to a world…is an infinite idea, related to infinities
of harmoniously combinable experiences—an idea that is the correlate of the
idea of a perfect experiential evidence, a complete synthesis of possible
experiences.34
We arrive at a rather ironic situation: Adorno states that idealism is defined by
“a philosophy which tries to base notions of reality…on an analysis of
consciousness.”35 This fact is not disputed. However, the same aspects of Husserl’s
thought that were used earlier as an objection to Adorno’s critique of Husserl’s
idealism and phenomenological totalization—the transcendence of the object on
account of the adumbration of phenomena and the apperceptive character of
intuition—are also those which confirm Husserl’s idealism on account of their role
in revealing reality to be an idea. In other words, the very incompleteness of
perception and intuition both confirms and challenges Husserl’s idealism. On the
one hand, Husserl’s idealism is challenged insofar as adumbrated phenomena and
unfulfilled intentions are evidence of the transcendent character of objects. But, on
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35 Adorno, “Husserl and the Problem of Idealism,” 5.
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the other hand, idealism is confirmed insofar as that adumbrated phenomena and
unfulfilled intentions make it so that the intentional objects cannot be verified to the
degree required to be compatible with the meaning of reality. Although the
adumbration of phenomena verifies the transcendence of objects, it also prevents the
verification of the reality of the objects. When the meaning that reality has for us
refers to the level of intentional fulfillment, then the inevitable imperfection of
perceptual fulfillment (empty intention) prompts us to question the level of reality
that is grasped. So, reality is invariably, at best, only believed. But this demonstrates
all the more the importance of the transcendental reduction: that the only method
that is justifiably philosophical—that can achieve apodictic verification of objects—
is the one that disconnects with that which cannot itself have a status greater than
belief, such as reality.
We have come the core of the phenomenological problematic for the question of
a critical phenomenology. A critical theory must be existentially concretized; it must
refer to an objective social and historical reality without a problem. However,
Husserl’s analyses show that at the very point that a perceived thing matches up
with the concept of reality (which thereby verifies reality) is also the very point that
consciousness loses verification of the thing as transcendent. Additionally, the point
that we verify the transcendence of the thing is also precisely the point that the
reality of the object breaks down and loses verification. Whenever we verify reality,
we cannot verify transcendence, and whenever we can verify transcendence, we can
no longer verify reality. While Husserl’s phenomenology can have a critical
experience pertaining to the intentional object on account of its transcendence, it
17

cannot show—simply by the consciousness of transcendence—that those objects
are real. To be sure, Husserl’s phenomenology does account for critical experience,
which Adorno did not acknowledge. Even the most noetic kind phenomenology is
not a philosophy of pure equivalence or identity between subject and object. Insofar
as transcendence is verified, which Husserl verifies successfully, there is a degree of
incommensurability between the intention (the subject) and the given (the object).
However, the kind of critical experience that Husserl is able to accommodate is
limited insofar as it does not extend to the sphere of reality. Even if it is, in fact, on
account of the reality of external objects that they are presentified and adumbrated,
such a claim can only at best be a matter of belief since, insofar as there is
adumbrated inconsistencies in the phenomena, their reality cannot be verified. The
verification of their reality depends upon the extent to which they align with the
concept. But the thing that is far more telling about the lack of critical experience in
Husserl’s phenomenology is that throughout Husserl’s discussion of reality, the
concept of reality seems to serve as the unquestioned measure of the evidence of
reality. Perhaps it would have been fitting to submit the concept to critique. It is
seemingly out of the question that the concept could itself be inadequate.
To be sure, the concept of reality does arise from evidence (i.e., of unfulfilled
intentions) which, for him, is the kind of experience in which things are given as
unreal. The idea of reality is formulated from this kind of experience. However, from
the way I am interpreting phenomenology, as a critical phenomenology, it should
never become the case where a concept is not submitted to critique or revision since
there is always the chance phenomenological experience may reveal something new
18

about the phenomenon to which the concept refers. And furthermore, as it will
become clearer in the second chapter, a concept cannot ever serve as a substitute
for an experience because the concept is always only a more or less adequate
symbolic approximation of intuitive experience. It is phenomenologically consistent
that philosophical justification never be gained by how well intuition aligns with a
concept. This means that Husserl’s discussion of reality is phenomenologically
inconsistent when it attempts to verify the experience of reality or unreality by the
extent to which it aligns with a concept. This mistakes the derivative for the original.
Critical phenomenology constantly holds the concept in suspicion with respect
to how well it approximates the experience. For example, the phenomenologist
might consider whether there are other intuitions or additional kinds of experience
by which things are given as real. We will take up the problem of reality again in the
third chapter where we will consider Scheler’s phenomenological evidence for the
revised idea of reality.

Traditional and Critical Theory
Phenomenological idealism is a symptom of a deeper ailment that is carried over
into phenomenology from traditional scientific methods, or what Horkheimer first
called “traditional theory.” Descartes—the paradigmatic traditional theorist—
retreats into the mind and attempts organize the spheres of being on account of the
clarity of his own ideas. Phenomenological logic, Horkheimer thought, follows the
traditional Cartesian, scientific view of theory, i.e., the sum-total of systematically
linked propositions. Horkheimer suggests that Husserl’s Formal and Transcendental
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Logic refers to a view of theory as a self-enclosed set of logically connected
propositions, which Horkheimer takes to be indicative of the phenomenological
method in general. Phenomenology operates along the conventional lines of
traditional theory, thereby eliminating its candidacy to be considered critical theory.
Horkheimer’s brief remarks about Husserl’s phenomenology have a variety of
problems. Most importantly, by saying so little, he ultimately says nothing about
phenomenology. Horkheimer might have established what Husserl’s understanding
of theory is, but not yet what phenomenology is. And the connection between
phenomenology and Husserl’s view of theory is left unexplained. On the other hand,
there are no immediate reasons to disbelieve Horkheimer that phenomenology as
pure logic follows the traditional and scientific model of theory. In fact, Husserl’s
transcendental logic, even if not strictly speaking an empirical-analytic scientific
theory, is itself nothing less than the ultimate theory of science, and as such, is a
“theory of theory.” Husserl states that “only [transcendental logic] can be an
ultimate, deepest, and most universal theory of principles and of norms of all
sciences, and at the same time transform them into clarificatory and intelligible
sciences.”36
The charge against traditional theory is what I take to be the common root of all
of the Frankfurt School criticisms of phenomenology, namely, the attempt to
separate or disconnect theory from nature, or knowledge from interests. And this is
a particular problem for Husserl’s phenomenology because this separation is the
most prominent feature of its most central doctrine: the transcendental reduction.
Husserl, Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental
Logic, trans. Anthony Steinbock (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), 6.
36
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The very phenomenological method operates by disconnecting meanings from
things, or at least by taking hold of the meaning or sense (Sinn) and pushing aside
the thing or entity. The residual outcome of the reduction is justified according to its
purity. Husserl’s phenomenological attitude takes it impetus from the fact that it is
not part of the natural attitude. Within the phenomenological attitude, the
phenomenologist thematizes an entire network of meaningful interconnections and
relations, not between natural subjects and natural objects, but as an intentional
network of consciousness, between noesis and noemata and the various noetic and
noematic conditions of constitution. Indeed, this is phenomenology’s strength—and
we would be remiss not to acknowledge this. But, as I said before, its strength is also
its weakness, and critical theorists find its weakness greater than its strength.
Phenomenology is indeed traditional theory when considered when taken
exclusively on the basis of the phenomenological reduction. In fact, it is traditional
theory par excellence insofar as the “bracketing” or putting philosophically out of
play from the natural attitude and belief about reality is its defining characteristic.
This follows perfectly Horkheimer’s critique of theory where “intellectual processes
are detached from their matrix in the total activity of society.”37
Whereas critical theory takes seriously the connection between theory and the
social life process and the way this connection historically constitutes knowledge
and perception, traditional theory, Horkheimer notes,
corresponds to the activity of the scholar which takes place alongside all the
other activities of a society, but in no immediately clear connection with
them. In this view of theory…the real social function of science is not made
Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” in Critical Theory: Selected Essays,
trans. Matthew J. O’Connell (New York: Continuum Publishing Company, 2002), 199.
37
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manifest; it speaks not of what theory means in human life, but only of what
it means in the isolated sphere in which for historical reasons it comes into
existence.38
At no point did Horkheimer’s article (nor Habermas’ reexamination of
Horkheimer’s distinction nearly thirty years later) consider that the problem of
phenomenology as they saw it, was not specifically a phenomenological problem,
but rather a Cartesian problem. And at no point was it considered that the Cartesian
components (in Husserl’s structuring of phenomenology) may not in fact be part of
phenomenological philosophy as such.39
In “Knowledge and Human Interests: A General Perspective,” an essay that was
the basis of Habermas’ inaugural lecture at the University of Frankfurt (1965),40
Habermas argues that a traditional theory is one that, on the one hand, attempts to
free knowledge from the nexus of motivating interests (to “emancipate” reason from
nature), and is, on the other hand, a theory that dupes itself into believing that the
very enterprise of freeing knowledge from interests is possible, that is to say,
traditional theory has an ideological character.
All theory tends toward emancipation, that is, toward a freedom or autonomy of
some sort. In fact, theoria (θεωρία) not only means contemplation, but more
basically, the seeing of things. The seeing of things requires a theoros (θεωρός), a
seer or spectator. The word comes from thea (θέα) "a view" + horan (ὁρᾶν) "to see."
Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” 197.
It could be generalized that the shifts in the way phenomenology is practiced, and its
specific domain of investigation, may be related to subsequent phenomenologists’ rejection
of the Cartesian framework upon which Husserl built phenomenological philosophy.
Ironically, the Cartesian influence may have had greater appeal to German
phenomenologists than French phenomenologists (e.g., Ricoeur).
40 Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. Jeremy Shapiro (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1971), 301-317.
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The ancients took the seeing of things to require a vantage point from which to see
(“a view to see”). For example, in the Phaedo, Plato suggests that the philosopher
(the spectator) must practice dying, i.e., to engage in a life of purification, in order to
attain a position to see. This kind of life Plato proposes (the life of dying) is a life that
emancipates the philosopher (in this case, the theoros, or spectator) from the
bombardment of perceptual hindrances (the senses) and distractions (desires) of
the body by means of the struggle to separate the soul from the body. Such
separation is the meaning of both death and purification, and also guarantees the
greater viewpoint in order to witness the Logos behind appearances.
Habermas points out that theoria pertains to the seeing of the cosmos. Not to its
mutability (doxa), but to the immutable logic (logos) of the cosmos.41 And just as in
the case of theoros, the spectator, who, upon seeing the Olympian festival, abandons
himself to the celebration and engages the spectacle—that is, just as theory tends
toward action—so the philosopher is to engage the cosmic logos in order to
internalize it, and reproduce it within his or her soul. “Through the soul’s likening
itself to the ordered motion of the cosmos, theory enters the conduct of life.42
Habermas interprets this traditional view of theory within a Husserlian context
as one where knowledge is based upon a theoretical attitude. He quotes a passage
from Schelling who maintains that “only Ideas provide action with energy and
ethical significance.”43 Husserl’s phenomenology, he thinks, is consistent with the
attitude that “the only knowledge that can truly orient action is knowledge that
Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 301.
Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 302.
43 Friedrich von Schelling, Werke, (Munich: Beck, 1958-59), 3:299. Quoted in Habermas,
Knowledge and Human Interests, 301.
41
42
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frees itself from mere human interests.”44 Phenomenology as the condition for the
possibility of scientific theory is not only an explanation of why science can know
what it knows, but also a critique of the explanation the empirical sciences give for
why it can know what it knows. Phenomenology as transcendental is therefore a
critique of the “objectivism of the sciences,” namely, the presupposition that the
cause of the knowledge of the world is simply on the part of a universe of objective
facts with its own lawlike connections.45 By not ascending to the phenomenological
attitude, i.e., a transcendental one, the sciences furthermore fail to free their findings
from interests rooted in the life-world.46 Only phenomenology, which makes
operative a transcendental logic, is the “science” to finally free knowledge from
interest, thereby identifying “transcendental reflection, to which he accords the
name of phenomenological description, with theory in the traditional sense.”47
However, Habermas notes Husserl’s insistence that the separation of theory
from empirical interests does not cut theory off from practical life; phenomenology
is said to have what Habermas calls a “therapeutic power.” According to Habermas,
Husserl proposes that the purer the theory, the greater its veridicality, and therefore
the greater its transformative potential for a new humanity. However, Habermas
thinks this transformative potential is unfounded, primarily because a theory does
not have normativity simply on account of its purity and veridicality. That is to say,
truths by themselves need not contain value-judgments for the good life.
In fact, a theory loses its normative influence on human life the more knowledge
Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 301.
Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 304.
46 Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 305.
47 Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 305.
44
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is freed from interests, not on account of its purity. Habermas thinks that with the
phenomenological disclosure of the constitution of objects, it discloses in turn the
fact that every previous theory that missed the transcendental insight are invariably
bound to their own concealed interests despite their attempts to free knowledge
from these interests. In other words, phenomenology is the first to accomplish the
kind of value-neutrality that the positive sciences only merely claim.
Phenomenology is therefore the best attempt so far to effect this separation
between knowledge and interests precisely because it unlocks the constitutional
elements of consciousness, and therefore more effectively avoids “objectivism.” The
traditional theories of the classical tradition that try to do just that are in fact more
relevant to life precisely in their failure to effect the separation adequately. And the
reason the separation could not be adequately effected is because theory in the
classical tradition was always bound up with cosmology, and the theory of
cosmology is bound up with self-knowledge and the improvement of the soul by
means of the imitation (mimesis) of the logos of the kosmos. Ancient philosophies
have a practical orientation precisely because they do not accomplish a level of
purity that the philosophers wanted. Thus, “Only as cosmology was theoria capable
of orienting human action.”48 Husserl, on the contrary, takes the traditional view of
theory and purifies it of its cosmological contents, and by doing so, of its
normativity, or, as Habermas puts it, of its “pseudonormative power from the
concealment of its actual interest.”49
Pure description does not, by means of its purity, lead to proscriptive
48
49
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statements. However, we note that a statement does not lose a proscriptive or even
critical orientation on account of its status as description. Herbert Marcuse makes a
point to stress that the classical apophantic logic does not lose a critical function by
its form “S is p.” To say that “man is free,” if the proposition is true, the copula “is”
indicates an “ought.” Apophantic logic is the logic of judgment. In this case, it judges
conditions in which persons are not free:50 The proposition “S is p” not only contains
a logical opposition to “S is not p,” but a normative opposition. This point assists
Habermas’ argument because it is surmisable that classical apophantos remains
normative and practically oriented because of the connection between theory and
nature. Apophantic logic does not have the same orientation in phenomenology, but
to be sure, not because of its status as description. Apophantic phenomenology loses
a critical component because of the invariable purity of predication. Phenomenology
purifies predicative judgments from the content of the world, even if the meaning of
such judgments refer to the world; these judgments invariably refer to the world in
the phenomenological attitude, after the performance of the reduction.
So according to Habermas, in freeing knowledge from interests, Husserl
effectively denudes theory of practical significance the more that he is able to
accomplish this freeing (just as classical traditional theories have practical
significance on account of their inability to accomplish this task). This is also
because the concept of value necessarily pertains to interest, and freeing knowledge
from interests is also freeing theory from value. With Husserl’s phenomenology,
Habermas thinks we arrive at a theory with ethical neutrality that is ultimately
Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, trans. Douglas Kellner (Boston: Beacon Press,
1991), 131-33.
50
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characteristic of the very positivism (“scientific [i.e., value-free] objectivism”)
Husserl critiques.51
The second aspect of Habermas’ critique is that phenomenology, in more
effectively freeing knowledge from interests, it still does not free itself from the
ideology of theory. Phenomenology may have affected this separation more
adequately than previous theory, but even phenomenology does not completely free
knowledge from interests. There remains an interest in the purity of theory itself, an
emancipatory interest, Habermas thinks, that has its psychological source in
purification from the passions: theoria is katharsis. In Habermas’ words,
…the illusion of pure theory served as a protection against regression to an
earlier stage that had been surpassed. Had it been possible to detect that the
identity of pure Being was an objectivistic illusion, ego identity would not
have been able to take shape on its basis. The repression of interest
appertained to the interest itself.52
All theory, despite the traditional attitude of the theoretician, has knowledgeconstitutive interests, even if these interests usually go unacknowledged. Recall the
statement of Marcuse’s example mentioned earlier, “man is free.” The meaning not
only implies that persons are free, but that persons seek to be free. Husserl’s
critique of the objectivism of the sciences as having fallen from the status of true
theory by not effectively freeing knowledge from interest, is hereby turned against
Husserl’s own philosophy.53 Husserl’s phenomenology succumbs to the same
critique not because it abandons the traditional concept of theory, but because it
does not abandon it. It holds the same emancipatory intent for theory, but, in
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bypassing cosmology, this intent loses practical efficacy. It turns out that genuine
emancipation is not what past ages thought that it was: it is not primarily in freeing
(separating) knowledge from interest. The kind of knowledge that is most freeing,
most emancipatory, and the kind of emancipation that critical theory proposes, is
the knowledge that every knowledge will invariably be grounded in interest.
Emancipation is not in being free of interest, but in coming to a self-awareness of the
interest behind the pursuit of knowledge. Critical theory shares with traditional
philosophical theory an emancipatory cognitive interest, but with a very different
way of framing this interest. In Habermas’ words, it is “to determine when
theoretical statements grasp invariant regularities of social action as such and when
these [invariant regularities] express ideologically frozen relations of dependence
that can in principle be transformed.54
Critical theory, then, is critique of ideology, where ideology refers to a state of
unreflected consciousness about invariant social regularities to the point of
perpetuating illusion and relations of dependence. Critical theory means a
heightened process of critical reflection not concerning knowledge of laws
(“nomological knowledge”) whether objective laws or subjective (transcendental)
ones, but concerning “those whom the laws are about.”55 For Habermas, the
meaning-validity of critical propositions are determined essentially by “selfreflection,” which could also be understood as self-critique, that is, by
acknowledging its dependence on interest and turning against itself—“its own
illusion of pure theory.”
54
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With Husserl, this would mean to direct also against phenomenology “the very
critique it directs against the objectivism of the sciences.” This, Habermas maintains,
is the only way in which phenomenology can “acquire the [critical] power that it
vainly claims for itself in virtue of its seeming freedom from presuppositions.”56
Habermas is calling for a phenomenological self-reflection, but of a slightly
different sort than the kind of self-reflection Adorno urges. As such, Habermas
points toward an additional path for a critical phenomenology. I have spoken so far
only of critical phenomenology as awareness of the nonidentity of subject and
object, which I suggest is accomplished phenomenologically by careful
consideration of intuitive experience, rather than by omitting intuition from the
equation. In the next chapter, I will refer in detail to the ways Scheler’s
phenomenology highlights a critical experience of conceptual inadequacy. This
chapter will also respond to Adorno’s concerns about transcendence and
immanence that we saw were the earliest of Adorno’s concerns about Husserl’s
phenomenology. In the third chapter, I will address at length Scheler’s
phenomenology of the experience of reality and the clearing into the domain of the
unconscious, which as at the time uncharted phenomenological territory. It will
start to become clear that far from being separated from the interests and nature,
the conscious and theoretical domain—the domain of intentionality—is inextricably
connected to the drives, interests and goals.
This is key for when, in the fourth chapter, I take up specifically the debate about
value-neutrality in philosophy and science, to which Habermas refers. The details of
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Scheler’s phenomenology will present a clear contrast to the way Habermas
characterizes phenomenology is this essay as doing better than the sciences in
accomplishing the freedom from interests. Scheler demonstrates that human beings
are most essentially value-oriented beings, and phenomenologists are not an
exception. If Habermas’ assessment of Husserl’s phenomenology is largely correct,
then, as I hope to show, Scheler assists in bringing phenomenology to an awareness
of the domain of values and interests that underlie its epistemic claims. The core of
the person, Scheler thinks, is love—and this love is prior to all thought and action,
theory and practice, for it is love which discloses the values that theoretical and
volitional acts intend in their own way. The way Scheler’s phenomenology discloses
the connection between values and knowledge, whose separation Habermas
considers essential to phenomenological methodology, also discloses the way
phenomenology, historically, started to achieve a critical capacity.
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2
THE ATTITUDE AND OBJECT OF PHENOMENOLOGY
The Frankfurt School critique of phenomenology attempts to show that, on
account of its methodology, phenomenology establishes for philosophy, on the one
hand, a kind of identity and, on the other hand, a kind of separation. The identity
arises, according to Adorno, by means of an absence of mediation (i.e., a two-way
constitution) between the subject and the object. The subject reigns supreme over
the object, fashioning the object in the subject’s own image. Two features of the
object that usually suggest a way out of idealism, namely, the transcendence of the
object and the reality of the object, are for Husserl both conditions of the
constituting activity of consciousness.1
Horkheimer and Habermas criticize phenomenology not because of a nonmediated conception of experience, but for following—and perfecting—a
presupposition of traditional theory that theory has greater validity the more it
achieves separation from interests. In this view, theory has greater purity the more
it removes certain material or psychological conditions from the equation.
Horkheimer notes that with this model of theory, “the activity of the scholar takes
place alongside all the other activities of a society, but in no immediately clear
connection with them.”2 Consequently, “the real social function of [theory] is not

1 The phenomenological problem of reality (the differences of Scheler’s view from
Husserl’s and a response to Adorno’s objection) will be taken up in detail beginning in
Chapter 3.
2 Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” 197.
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made manifest.”3
A critical phenomenology must demonstrate phenomenology’s ability to
manifest a social function, and manifesting this social function, by Horkheimer’s
implication, pertains on some level to the “activity of the scholar.”
Phenomenologists consider the activity of the scholar in the context of an “attitude”
(Einstellung) or, a view by which something is able to be seen (intuited). This
highlights the ancient paradigm of theory: thea “a view” + horan “to see.” According
to Scheler, the seeing of something (theoria) depends directly upon the proximity
and the engagement or participation from the theoros, the “seer.” But the seer, in the
phenomenological attitude, cannot simply be a spectator, but must be a participant
in the spectacle (the phenomenon) in order to see the spectacle most fully.
If an attitude pertains to a view by which to see, then the concomitant element of
attitude is intuition (Anschauung). Indeed, much of this work is an effort to redeem
the notion of intuition from contemporary scorn, led in part by critical theory on
account of the immediacy that it requires. For Adorno, immediacy is equivalent with
identity, and therefore equivalent with a conception of experience that “forgets”
mediation. However, I argue that immediacy is not in fact equivalent with the kind
of identity that Adorno thinks generates ideology, namely, conceptual identity. In
fact intuitive immediacy is needed in order to have an awareness of the inadequacy
of one’s conceptual experience. This chapter is meant to give a fuller clarification of
how what I call “critical experience” is central to phenomenology, and how Scheler’s
phenomenology explicitly highlights this kind of experience. More generally, this
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chapter, along with the next two, will concentrate on elucidating Scheler’s concept of
intuition, according to a tripartite structure of intuitive experience that he indicates
in one of his early essays, “Phänomenologie und Erkenntnistheorie” (1915). He
writes,
In principle, the world [Welt] is given [gegeben] in lived-experience [Erleben] as the ‘bearer of value’ [Wertträger] and as ‘resistance’ [Wider-stand]
as immediately [unmittelbar] as it is given as an object [Gegenstand] (GW X,
384).4
Scheler claims that there are three aspects that are given “immediately,” or directly
in every intuition of an object: as objective, as real, as valuable. This chapter will
focus on the immediacy of objective givenness.

An Attitude of Phenomenology
Phenomenology is philosophically unavoidable. For Scheler, phenomenology is
not one method of philosophy among others. In fact, it is not originally a method at
all. Not all philosophy, after it gets started, is phenomenology, but every philosophy
must get started phenomenologically, if it hopes to begin with an authentic
philosophical orientation to the world. And every philosophy does, to some degree,
begin phenomenologically, regardless of whether the philosopher acknowledges it.
This is because phenomenology is most basically an encounter with a world, even
before it is reflection about the objects encountered, as objects. It does not matter
yet what the world is. The only matter is that there is one presented, indeed, the
only world that the philosopher has to talk about: the one that shows up. This is the
Scheler, “Phenomenology and the Theory of Cognition,” in Selected Philosophical
Essays, trans. David Lachterman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 143.
Henceforth: “Phenomenology.”
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world in every context: the natural world, the social world, or the “world of God” (in
religious experience); it is the world of utility or economy, the world in which we
work, play, become wealthy or fall into poverty; it is the world into which we are
born, and away from which we will pass. But making such distinctions about the
different senses of world arises by conceptual reflection, but phenomenology begins
before reflection does, in the pre-conceptual.
Phenomenology is the view of the world of the beginning philosopher. Everyone
begins the course of their lives in a natural way, with a natural orientation;
phenomenology, in contrast, is the philosophical way to begin, but a way that is not
originally removed from the natural or social world. And every philosopher, even
the most advanced, is in some state of beginning, alongside periods of progress and
advancement. This is because the philosopher must consistently return to the world.
She must always return there for confirmation—the only world that can provide
confirmation: her own.
However, unlike Husserl, Scheler does not identify any specific methodological
way of beginning phenomenologically. Husserl proposes that phenomenology must
begin methodologically if it is to be scientific, yielding apodicticity that is verifiable
to consciousness. Therefore, the phenomenological method must bracket whatever
is problematic for confirmation and achieve a ground for continued
phenomenological analysis. On the other hand, for Scheler, there is already so much
of phenomenological significance given even before the philosopher arrives at
questions of method or ground. Before adopting a method, the phenomenologist
must adopt a particular kind of “attitude” (Ein-stellung, literally, “a place,” “a
34

position,” or “an orientation”), according to which the world is initially encountered,
prior to attempts to organize its contents logically and linguistically.
On account of his neo-Cartesian preoccupation toward theoretical certainty,
Husserl’s interest is primarily in elucidating that which phenomenology must
exclude in order for phenomenology to proceed properly. The epoché reduces
phenomenological investigation to a very specific realm (the transcendental realm),
leaving behind all that is irrelevant to the investigation. Scheler emphasizes
extension or expansion of the phenomenological domain rather than reduction. The
initial requirement of phenomenology is simply to be with that which shows itself.
The phenomenologist rests his or her
reflective gaze…only on that place where lived experience and its object, the
world, touch one another. He is quite unconcerned whether what is involved
here is the physical or the mental, numbers or God, or anything else. The ‘ray’
of reflection should try to touch only what is ‘there’ in this closest and most
living contact and only so far as it is there (GW X, 380-81).5
That the phenomenologist is “unconcerned” with what is involved, could mean
that nothing is left out; everything is “fair game,” phenomenologically-speaking. Or it
could mean that the phenomenologist is unconcerned with the status of the things
involved, namely, indifferent initially to the reality of these things, and especially of
their metaphysical foundation. Scheler means both simultaneously. He and Husserl
are in one sense making the same point, and in another sense proposing contrasting
approaches. They agree that the object of phenomenology is simply the object that
shows up, in experience, in whatever way it shows up. Indeed, that is the only
“place” where any philosopher can begin. To say that Husserl excludes certain kinds
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of objects from phenomenological view is mistaken. The reduction does not
consider some things and push away other things; what is put out of play is the
more vague senses by which objects are naturally characterized.
But Scheler does not agree that a theoretical technique or logical procedure is
required to get to this “place,” this Stellung: the place of phenomenological contact
between experience and the world. He maintains, rather, that phenomenology is not
a procedure of logic, but rather a “procedure of seeing” (Schauverfahren): the seeing
of “new facts themselves, before they have been fixed by logic” (GW X, 380). 6 There
is a sense in which Husserl conflates the givenness of things (by means of an
Einstellung) with conceptual thinking about things (by means of a method). If that
which is thought about is already there in the first place, what, then, is a
phenomenological method supposed to do?7 On this phenomenological attitude, a
lengthy passage from A. R. Luther is fitting:
What is unique about Scheler's phenomenological approach is that it
constitutes an attitude of “openness towards...,” which permits what is
revealing itself to reveal itself as it is in itself. The significance of this
approach, or attitude, is that the openness it cultivates excludes reductionism
of any sort. It is an openness which is ready for revelation in its fullness.
More specifically, the openness here is the implicit affirmation that what
appears is precisely what it is (Wesen) and not something else, hence, cannot
be reduced to something else. The approach is not so much determined by an
applied methodology as it is by how what appears is, in fact, appearing in the
openness who is man. The effort, then, in Scheler's phenomenology is not to
reduce something to something else, or to explain something away, or to
demonstrate the proof of something, but to account for “everything” as it
discloses itself in concrete experiencing...Phenomena are everywhere
apparent, referring to one another, in a dynamism of appearing that indicates
an inexhaustible richness of potential meaning-fulfillment.8
Scheler, “Phenomenology,” 136.
Manfred Frings, The Mind of Max Scheler, 124.
8 A. R. Luther, “The Articulated Unity of Being in Scheler’s Phenomenology,” in Max
Scheler: Centennial Essays, ed. Manfred Frings (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974), 4.
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Just as Husserl initiates a so-called “Great Reversal” against Descartes,9 thereby
inaugurating a transcendental philosophy as the proper philosophy for the science
of the subject, Scheler has his own Great Reversal against Husserl’s notion of
“phenomenological attitude.” The attitude particular to Scheler’s phenomenology is
not a disinterested theoretical one, which is itself the result or outcome of a
methodological reduction, as a pure “phenomenological residuum,” achieved from
the conscious and deliberate bracketing of natural contingencies that do not qualify
for phenomenological inspection. For Scheler, the phenomenological attitude is the
point-of-departure prior to all procedural techniques, and is one of wide-open,
active interest in a grandiose world.10 It does not bracket, it embraces all that is
given in the way it is given. And whatever is “seen” is not initially given under the
rubrics of, or to be submitted to, logical scrutiny. It is seen, rather, “only in the
seeing and experiencing act itself—in its being acted out [Vollzug],” or better, in the
very execution of the act. In fact, Scheler adds, “it does not matter how one comes to
see it” (GW X, 380), provided we notice that the seeing of something is not the same
thing as the thinking about it. This kind of experience is what Scheler calls “selfgivenness” (Selbstgegebenheit).

Immediacy and Symbol
If Scheler’s “Great Reversal” does indeed pertain to Husserl as I suggest, Husserl
at least has a sufficiently critical starting point that better avoids the uncritical
Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 18.
In this way, Scheler attempts to harness the energy of the philosophical novelty in the
ancient Greek attitude of ‘wonder’ within a phenomenological context.
9
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criteria-laden philosophies and sciences by which Scheler convicts most forms of
empiricism, rationalism, and neo-Kantianism. He has in mind the tendency for any
given discipline to inquire first about the criteria that customarily guides the
discipline, before the researcher can begin work in that field. This tendency, he
thinks, is far too common even for philosophy, where philosophers tend to begin not
with what is given, but with conceptual presuppositions concerning, for example,
the reality or unreality of an object, the truth or falsity of a judgment, or the good or
evil of an act.11 When others were insisting that philosophy go “back to Kant,”
German phenomenologists were critical enough to insist instead that philosophy
should go back to experience, “die Sache selbst”; a maneuver probably inspired by
Kant and of which Kant would have approved.
Scheler contends that empiricism, for example, restricts that which would count
as given according to a predetermined (and narrow) concept of experience. If their
concept of experience (sense impression) is too narrow, then whatever might
possibly be given in experience, but which cannot be made to coincide with an
impression, is suppressed or explained away.12 Furthermore, the concepts
“experience” and “sensation” cannot themselves coincide with an impression.
Phenomenology insists that such underlying concepts themselves require
phenomenological clarification. Self-givenness is not the same as something
“necessarily true” since this kind of experience pertains to the seeing of something
even prior to predetermined categories of truth and falsity.13 What qualifies
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13 Scheler, “Phenomenology,” 140.
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genuinely as true cannot itself presuppose a conceptual symbol, “truth,” as the
criterion of its investigation, and then qualify other statements as true if and only if
they match the pre-established criterion. This is because the criterion itself always
already presupposes some more basic experience which has built up the
conceptual-criterion in question. The symbol should fulfill the experience, not vice
versa. A concept or form of thinking (category) is a symbol inasmuch as its formal
structure indicates its removal from a direct experience, and depends on experience
for its meaning. The idea of a “symbol” is antithetical to anything self-given.
Are there “criteria” for self-givenness? Perhaps the criterion is a special feeling
“which will always automatically recur like a minor miracle when something is
evident in this way” (GW X, 382).14 Scheler answers that such criteria are impossible
because it would be inconsistent with its own status as pertaining to the thing itself.
“All questions about criteria make sense only when a symbol is given in place of the
thing-itself which it symbolizes” (GW X, 382).15
Phenomenology is often ridiculed by claiming to be “presuppositionless” on this
point. Habermas, for example, says that phenomenology “vainly claims for
itself…freedom from presuppositions.”16 Everything that this could be referring to
cannot be investigated in this chapter. However, it should at least be mentioned that
the phenomenologist is critical of at least those identifiable presuppositions
(concepts that we make as criteria for experience and truth), and that this will open
a path for a fresh philosophical beginning.

Scheler, “Phenomenology,” 140.
Scheler, “Phenomenology,” 140.
16 Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 311.
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Part of what I call Scheler’s Great Reversal includes a divergence from the
Husserlian idea that the phenomenologist is a “disinterested onlooker”—indeed, a
spectator—who excludes him or herself from the object of investigation. This leads
to the phenomenological separation of knowledge and interest which is reminiscent
of traditional epistemology. However, such a separation is not as central to
phenomenology as Habermas thinks. The problem of criteria constitutes, for
Scheler, a critique of an epistemological prejudice that attempts to classify or define
“problems” or “spheres of relevance,” more than to identify “the type of person who
possesses genuine competence in that sphere and for that problem” (GW V, 70-1).17
And the person who has greater competence with respect to a certain sphere of
relevance is the one who has some experience or participation with it. He writes in
his essay, “The Nature of Philosophy”:
If one were to say that art is what the true artist produces, that religion is
what [the truly holy person lives, performs] and preaches, and that
philosophy is likewise the true philosopher’s relationship to things and his
[or her] manner of regarding them, I am afraid that many people would laugh
one to scorn. Yet I am convinced that…this [way] of determining a sphere of
relevance to the type of person is both more certain and less equivocal in its
results than any other procedure (GW V, 64).18
Scheler asks us to consider how much easier it is for us to decide whether a
person is truly an artist or truly holy than to decide what art is or what religion is.
The one who does not possess an adequate level of competence, for example,
concerning the authenticity of art, or the truth of a religion or a scientific domain, is
the one who, insisting on criteria, ultimately stands outside the problem, and who,

Scheler, “The Nature of Philosophy,” in On the Eternal in Man, trans. Bernard Noble
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), 70.
18 Scheler, “The Nature of Philosophy,” 71.
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therefore, “has no direct [unmittelbaren] contact with any work of art, any religion,
any scientific domain. He who has not labored on some domain of facts is the one
who starts off by asking for the criteria of the domain.”19
This is the meaning of Scheler’s notion of Unmittelbarkeit (immediacy). It is
perhaps better captured by speaking of what is given “directly,” or of “direct
experience.” There is nothing mysterious about direct experience. Something is not
mediated in givenness whenever there is some direct contact with it; whenever we
work or labor “on some domain of facts.” One experiences art directly by creating
art; religion directly by living it; science directly by doing it. And one who is in this
place or position (Stellung) has a better view to see it for what it is. This position is
not a physical location, but an intentional orientation: the orientation simply to see
it for what it is. And this laboring, or performing which brings us in direct contact
requires what Scheler calls “an act of experience” which yields self-givenness in the
very execution of the act, “in its being acted out (Vollzug).”20 The notion Vollzug,
then, seems to carry with it some participatory reference, and thus to what Scheler
later calls an “ontological relation” (Seinsverhaltnis) or participation between one
being and another. Knowledge, he say, is this ontological relation on account of
participation.21
But most importantly, it is love and interest that motivates the participation,
which is knowledge. That experience (Erfahrung) is required for knowledge has
been a widely accepted tenet of epistemology in German philosophy since Kant read
Scheler, “Phenomenology,” 139.
Scheler, “Phenomenology,” 138.
21 Cf. Max Scheler, “Idealism and Realism,” in Selected Philosophical Essays, trans. David
Lachterman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 292.
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Hume. Husserl is of course committed to this idea. But one of Scheler’s key
phenomenological revisions of this tradition is the idea that knowledge requires
more than empirical observation—it requires the kind of experience (Erlebnis,
“lived-experience”) that brought about by love and taking-interest. We simply will
not know whatever we do not love or have an interest in knowing, and that the
degree of knowledge is in proportion to the level of our interest. This is because
knowing requires an abandoning of oneself. Love he says is the “primal act by which
a being, without ceasing to be this one delimited being, abandons itself in order to
share and participate in another being as an ens intentionale.”22 The kind of knowing
that Scheler has in mind here is intuitive knowing (Wissen) more than conceptual
cognition (Erkenntnis).
Scheler’s understanding of immediacy is intuitive, not conceptual. Therefore,
immediacy does not refer to the identity between concept and object. It refers to a
mode of experience or mode of givenness. Experience is direct or immediate
inasmuch at it can get beyond (or, more accurately, has priority to) these criteriapresuppositions, and predetermined conceptual symbols. When it does, Scheler calls
this experience “asymbolic.” Mediated experience is symbolic insofar as it
substitutes a pre-established symbol of a thing, for the thing itself. Scheler thinks
that science is plagued by this most of all. The domains of science each symbolize
phenomena in different ways, according the particular domain of research, and in
ways that are existentially relative to the natural domain and meaningful to those
investigating within that domain. Scheler writes:
Scheler, “Ordo Amoris,” in Selected Philosophical Essays, trans. David Lachterman
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 110.
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In physics, colors become signs of the motions of a particular substratum on
which science also bases the light ray and its refraction by certain
substances. In physiology, colors are signs of the chemical processes in the
optical nerve; in psychology, they are signs of so-called sensations. The color
itself is not contained in these [determinations]… The color red, for example,
is the x which corresponds [respectively] to this motion, this nervous
process, this sensation.23
Furthermore, it is only after the fact of the experience of the x that we attempt to
organize logically and explain the experience in linguistic symbols. Thus,
phenomenological writing is not ultimately about making logical inferences, but
bringing something to sight, but which is done only by pointing to it through
symbols.24 There had to have been some experience, though, which gives the
occasion for symbols to arise in the first place. If a conceptual symbol can exist only
on account of pre-conceptual experience “of facts, before they have been fixed by
logic” (for the condition of possibility of concepts), then the existence of the symbol
itself discloses the experience of immediate self-givenness, and itself generates an
awareness of the antinomy between concept and experience that provides a critical
space in relation to conceptual experience.
Is Scheler here changing the meaning of philosophy, which is traditionally
conceptual analysis, by speaking of phenomenological philosophy as preconceptual? First, philosophy is always a kind of knowing, as is phenomenology. One
would go too far to suggest phenomenology is itself pre-conceptual. However,
phenomenology is essentially oriented toward recovering and elucidating the
Scheler, “Phenomenology,” 144-5.
This was the subject of controversy, sparked by Wilhelm Wundt’s 1910 critique of
Husserl’s Logical Investigations, which, in his view, stresses what things are not, at the
expense of saying anything, positively, that is also non-tautological: “Judgment is—just
judgment.” See the section, “Phenomenological Controversy,” in Scheler, “Phenomenology,”
152-155.
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original direct experiences which have been symbolized in some way or another,
but which has also more or less come to conceal that original experience. To take
again the example of the color red: employing an analogy of finance, “draft after
draft is drawn on red, so to speak.”25 The bank draft, of course, is only a symbol (a
place holder) of the money being transferred, just as the color red is symbolized
scientifically in the above examples. “So long as we remain within science these
drafts are negotiated in infinitely varied ways against other drafts…, but they are
never definitively redeemed.”26 Phenomenology is the kind of philosophy which has
the task of retracing, “step by step, the process of this complicated negotiation”27
and is orientated toward redeeming all the drafts by uncovering the experiential
origin of the variegated conceptual symbols. Phenomenology has this task, not only
with respect to the drafts drawn by science, but “all those, too, which the
complicated existence and life of every civilization and its symbolism draw on
human existence.”28 Phenomenology then is conceptual analysis of pre-conceptual
experience in attempting to recover that on which the drafts were drawn.
Adorno’s critique of immediacy in effect constitutes a critique of the a priori. The
notion of prima philosophia refers to a concept or set of concepts that are taken,
sometimes without question, to be an absolute foundation for subsequent logical
inferences.29 Those basic concepts assume the role of an unmediated first, which is
the role the a priori has traditionally taken. He explains that empiricism, for
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example, has a claim to the individual factical entities “here and now” only by means
of the factical in general.30 Scheler’s comments on empiricism stated earlier are
similar to Adorno’s: empiricism requires a concept of experience in order to even
make sense of the data of experience. It presupposes, in a sense, the concept of
impression which, on account of its own terms, cannot itself be accounted for by an
impression. It imposes the symbol on the experience, rather than allowing the
experience to clarify the symbol. However, the “starting-point” of the
phenomenological attitude is not conceptual, and so (at least initially) slips under
the radar of Adorno’s critique. In fact, to presuppose uncritically a variety of
concepts as foundational is itself a suitable description of what Scheler is saying
about those who do not begin phenomenologically. Adorno calls prima philosophia
what Scheler insists is the error of those who begin by asking about criteria, in order
to begin. Doing philosophy phenomenologically seems to better ensure that a
philosopher is letting experience speak for itself, critical as the phenomenologist is
that the conceptual symbols will be adequate substitutes for the objects of
experience. This is simply a restatement of the critical experience that I suggest
phenomenology holds within its philosophical approach.
Adorno states that “the first, and immediate, is always, as a concept, mediated,
and thus not the first.”31 He seems by this at least to imply agreement with Scheler
that concepts are symbols, and as symbolic, are mediated. What is “first” then, is—
phenomenologically—not a concept at all, put simply a domain of objects and their
givenness. However, Adorno seems not to have anticipated a nonconceptual
30
31
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understanding of the a priori, with respect to immediate, non-formal, intuitive
content. Forms are not intuited, even if they arise on account of intuition. What is
intuited is always the material “stuff,” the Sache. Adorno continues: “every principle
which philosophy can reflect upon as its first must be universal, unless philosophy
wants to be exposed to its contingency. And every universal principle of a
first…contains abstraction within it.”32 However, it does not follow that universal
concepts are the only way of avoiding contingent particulars. Scheler’s central
phenomenological project insists that experience yields a “material a priori,” that is
say, content that is neither universal nor contingent. On this material a priori,
Scheler writes:
In addition to the so-called formal a priori of the basic intuitive facts of pure
logic, every discipline, number theory, set theory, group theory, geometry
(including the geometry of colors and tones), mechanics, physics, chemistry,
biology, psychology—each reveals, upon a closer inspection, a whole body of
material a priori propositions which rest on essential insight.33
Adorno’s own words on Scheler’s project, which are too brief and sweeping to
constitute a worthwhile critique, follows the prevalent run-of-the-mill remarks
about starting with “eternal” things, from a background of “closed, Catholic theory,”
then imposing them into a material context, at which point they become “confused
and disintegrated.”34 These disingenuous remarks, which do not even offer a
sustained argument, do little more than betray Adorno’s own confusion about the
details of Scheler’s “material phenomenology.”
When Scheler speaks of the “Selbstgegebenheit in unmittelbarer
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Anschauungsevidenz” (self-givenness in immediate evidence of intuition), he refers
to the materiale, the non-formal content, that is given immediately on account of
Vollzug, the execution of intentional acts. From what was said above about this
concept, and by what will be explained later, we can perhaps speak of Vollzug more
broadly as the participatory engagement with something through the performance
of acts. Concepts—categories of thinking—are constructed, mediated through a
process Scheler calls functionalization.35 Essences are not universal concepts;
“conceptual structures must be built up out of essences.”36

Demystifying “Essence”
In the prefatory remarks to one of his earliest works on phenomenology entitled
Ressentiment, Scheler makes a distinction between two psychological procedures for
treating the data of experience. On the one hand, an observer may “sift the data of
inner observation conceptually and set them up as compounds, then decompose
these into ultimate ‘simple’ elements and study, through artificial variation…, the
conditions and results of such combinations.”37 This empirical approach is very
different, Scheler thinks, from a Gestalt approach that describes and understands
“the units of experience and meaning which are contained in the totality of man’s
life itself.”38

This notion will be taken up in detail in Chapter 6.
Eugene Kelly, Structure and Diversity: Studies in the Phenomenological Philosophy of
Max Scheler (Dordrecht: Kulwer, 1997), 58.
37 Scheler, Ressentiment, trans. Lewis Coser (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press,
1994), 19.
38 Scheler, Ressentiment, 19. It seems Scheler is referring here to Gestalt methods of
psychology. He also cites Karl Jaspers’ distinction between “causal connections” and
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The distinction shows that any unit of experience can be broken down or
disintegrated into a complex of heterogeneous partial contents, where each of these
component parts “pertain to completely different acts of experience.”39 However,
the artificial disintegration of experiential units presupposes a single integrated
experience from which each of these partial units receives their meaning and
unity.40 “Data which is extremely complex in terms of the [procedure of separation
and synthesis] may nevertheless be phenomenally simple, for they may be given in
one act of experience.” 41 For example, in the experience of “a friendship, a love, an
insult,” etc.
The empiricist view of experience (Erfahrung)42 as a process of separable,
repeated perceptual observations characterizes what Scheler calls the “scientific
Weltanschauung.” The one who views the world scientifically stands like a spectator,
“taking a step back,” as it were, and viewing an object by means of logical
procedures of organization: taking it apart, putting it back together, recording
empirical data along the way. Here, the modes of experience relate exclusively with
particular sensory content that receive different profiles at different time. Objects in
this sense are given as disintegrated, both spatially, from place to place, and
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41 Scheler, Ressentiment, 20.
42 Scheler often uses the term Erfahrung as a general term for all experience, of which
Erlebnis is one form. However, whenever he makes the distinction, Scheler tends to use the
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about empiricism and positivism, “Die philosophischen Lehren, die sich so nannten, prüften
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temporally, from time to time. It is therefore incumbent upon consciousness, as Kant
maintained, to organize the disintegrated sensuous or empirical elements, by means
of mental categories. The first problem that arises with the Kantian solution is that
there is no way to explain where the concepts come from, so one is forced to say
they were already structurally present, and that their evidence is found by a
transcendental argument (deduction): evidence for the subject as the unity of
apperception is the fact that it is the condition for the possibility of unified
experience. The second problem, which Hegel championed, is that if the mind is
organizing particulars by means of universals (categories of the understanding),
then there is no longer any way to tell the difference between particulars and
universals. Objects are indistinguishable from concepts. As a result, what the
noumenon is indistinguishable from the phenomenon.
In contrast to the experience of procedural observation, Scheler maintains that
what is taken as something observable must already have been given as an
intentional object. It is a condition of the “essentialness of a given content that it
must be intuited [with a phenomenological orientation] in the attempt to ‘observe’ it
[with an empirical orientation], in order to give the observation the desired or
presupposed direction” (GW II, 70).43 Phenomenological experience gives the world
as an integral whole, which is the way something is given throughout the course of
living through it. Scheler calls this Erlebnis (lived-experience). Lived-experience
takes the thing as it shows itself, whenever and wherever we just happen to see it;
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and it shows itself originally as a composite, not in sensu diviso. This is a pre-logical
experience, and therefore, asymbolic.
If we take the example of friendship along with the element of Vollzug (when the
friendship is one that is my own, of which I am a participant by the performance of
all the acts involved in being a friend) then that which has been explained above as
merely phenomenally simple becomes “phenomenologically simple.” That which
was described as a Gestalt psychological procedure becomes phenomenological.
And it is in the participation (the execution of the acts) that we are able to encounter
the essence (Wesen), i.e., the material a priori.
As material, and as a priori, essence is located somewhere in the middle,
between universality and contingency, but which is neither universal nor
contingent. An essence is not contingent because the content is ideal (not “real”),
and it is ideal content that is not universal; it pertains to a singular, lived-experience.
An essence can be given in the universal concept as well as in the experience of the
particular. But, what is more, the concepts “universal” and “particular” (the concept
“particular” is itself “universal”) have meaning only with respect to some original
essential experience, not vice versa. There is an essence of what becomes conceived
as “universal” (given in the experience of sameness) and “particular” (given in the
experience of difference). An essence can come to the fore in the experience of only
one thing, so there can be an “individual essence,” such as, for example, the essence
of this individual friendship—the friendship that Mary has with John. But an essence
is necessarily different from a concept insofar as any attempt to define an essence
gets entangled in a circular definition (circulus in definiendo) and any attempt to
50

prove it traps one in a circular argument (circulus in demonstrando), since the
content for proof and definition “presuppose the pregiven as a law in accordance
with which the proof is carried out.”44 Concepts find their fulfillment in the selfgivenness of the essence.
The essence of a friendship appears in the acts of experiencing that friendship
and only in their execution or performance, i.e., by actively participating in that
friendship, in whatever way it is experienced. But in the experience, we do not
experience the universal form, “friendship,” as such, but only the ones I am in. The
concept of an essence can be described then as an integral experiential unity of
meaning that is given in a single experience and which gives meaning to all of the
partial (contingent) content of that same experience. All the “sensations,
representations, conclusions, judgments, acts of love and hatred, feelings,
moods,…some [or other] event or situation, a particular look or smile…, etc.,”45 all of
the components of that particular friendship are given meaning from the selfgivenness of the friendship as a “whole.”46 It is according to the essence of that
friendship that all the particular components mean something. This avoids the socalled fallacies of division and composition, whereby (respectively) what is true of a
whole is also true of a part, and what is true of a part is also true of a whole.
Meaningful givenness is not equivalent with propositional truth, even if they are not
also mutually exclusive. To confirm or deny the logical validity of experiential
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46 To speak of a composite “whole” is a rather misleading because the idea presupposes
parts. A whole is the whole of the parts. Rather, Scheler thinks that the thing is given first
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givenness puts the cart before the horse, so to speak; even a logically valid
proposition means something only on account of some givenness. The essential
“whole” therefore should not necessarily be interpreted as a composite of a variety
of “parts” that are therefore analytically distinguished from the whole, nor is the
whole something that is achieved through repeated experiences of each of its parts.
Such an idea of a “whole” would necessarily be logical-formal. Rather, the essential
“whole” can be given in any one particular component “partial” experience, even if
the essence is not reducible to that particular experience. Furthermore, the essential
whole also does not mean the whole of all friendships, their common purpose,
function, or final cause as friendship, but the “whole” of this friendship. The concept
“friendship” must necessarily be derived (i.e., functionalized) on account of the
essence of one or more friendships, personally experienced.
So the essence of this friendship is not equivalent with the contingent factors
(the day-to-day variegated experiences with the friend) because the integrated
experience is that which provides the meaning for the contingent factors. Neither is
it equivalent with the universal concept of friendship, that pertains to all
friendships, with various people. This is because the essence is given in the
experience of this friendship, and more importantly, being a part of, or involved
with this friendship (and only this one) in the day to day events and situations.
However, despite the essence’s relation to a single experiential given, its
independence from contingent factors allows the possibility for the
phenomenologist to explicate something universally true about all friendships, on
account of this single experience. This is because the givenness of the essence of
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friendship is that which is the basis for the building of the universal conception of
friendship. The critical function of phenomenology is underscored by this fact. Again
the phenomenologist does not integrate or “look for” the symbol within in the
experience, but uses the experience to change the symbol; the phenomenology
allows for an awareness of the discrepancy or nonidentity between the concept and
the given. All formal concepts are derived from material givenness in the first place:
part of the task of a critical phenomenology is to critique and reinterpret inadequate
conceptual articulations by means of the adequacy of nonconceptual experience.
But there are some interesting implications of this idea of knowledge as
participation. Is it possible in Scheler’s view for someone who is not, for example,
Chinese, or at least someone who has never been to China, to have an adequate
understanding Chinese culture? Would it therefore be impossible to critique that
culture? Or for someone not religious to understand religion, and therefore to
critique it? It is important to reiterate that this chapter does not attempt to
investigate cognition proper, but focuses on the sphere of givenness, and the
conditions for essential or self-givenness. For there to be any givenness, there must
necessarily be some direct experience. It is possible, on some level, for an American
to understand Chinese culture by means of a direct experience, first, if the American
visits China and therefore has his or her own intuitive lived-experience of the place
and way of life. Second, insofar as an American and an Chinese person might have a
common cultural experience, at least inasmuch as both are types of a human way of
life. However, an understanding of Chinese culture by someone who is not Chinese,
or American culture by someone not American contains some level of remoteness
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(and possible inadequacy) if there is no direct experience. In these cases, the
givenness of an essence of Chinese or American culture is off limits. Without direct
experience, a researcher could only investigate a foreign culture by means of an
overlay of symbols and linguistic representation. Understanding is achieved in this
way only by piecing together symbolic elements, and so any understanding will at
best be partial. The givenness of an essential whole is hidden.
For a more concrete example, John Medina recently began a research project
which he calls “Brain Rules.” He attempts to use molecular biological explanations of
neuroscience in order to isolate specific “rules” which he claims can educate parents
“on how to raise smart and happy children.” The question arises: what can scientists
who are not parents (supposing for argument’s sake they are not) say to parents
about parenting? Science can say a number of accurate and very specific things
about certain parts of a child that may be useful for parents to know. However,
science is necessarily unable to replace the experience and intuition of parenting
with its investigation, even if its data is perhaps more empirically accurate. Scientific
data must always relate back to the parent/child relationship in order to “have
sense,” i.e., to make sense and be meaningful. Indeed, John Medina states that “as a
dad, I think few things are more important than how we raise our kids.” He refers to
his direct experience of parenting (a phenomenal component) as a context which
provides an additional significance for his research. He also assumes that his
experience as a dad is a common enough experience for his scientific research to be
significant for other parents. There is something about his own lived-experience as a
dad that is also not contingent only to his experience. In this sense, his scientific
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research depends for its significance on the essential content of the parent/child
relationship.
But how is it possible for a concept of experience be considered a priori, if the
very term indicates a content prior to experience? Scheler distances the meaning of
a priori from its Kantian heritage who accounts for the a priori with respect to the
categories of the understanding as transcendental structures of synthetic
experience. “The human mind has no such world-constructing gift (GW V, 196),”47
Scheler insists. “Our mere thought and cognition are incapable of ‘creating,’
‘producing,’ ‘forming’ anything—unless it be figments and cyphers” (GW V, 195).48
However, Scheler thinks that the distinction between the a priori and a posteriori
“must still be jealously guarded” (GW V, 196). He reformulates the meaning of the a
priori to include, primarily, a non-formal [materiale] component. The non-formal
(essential) aspect is primary because it is from the non-formal content that formal
(conceptual) categories are derived.49 “In these cases, a priori in the logical [formal]
sense is always a consequence of the a priori [in the intuitive (material) sense] which

Scheler, On the Eternal in Man, 200.
Scheler, On the Eternal in Man, 199. It is interesting to note Scheler’s remarks on the
Kantian tradition: “If we look more closely at our Kantians, Fichteans, etc.—at any of those
who would have it that cognition ‘forms,’ ‘shapes,’ ‘produces,’—we soon notice that these
are people who for the most part lack all practical contact with the world. No wonder! What
need have they to will, act, form or shape, since they believe they can—or must—perform
by dint of mere cognition things which are exclusively the province of will and action? Their
epistemological voluntarism leads to atrophy of the will proper” (GW V, 196/On the Eternal
in Man, 200. fn. 1)
49 Scheler does, at times, use the term “Wesen” to indicate both formal and material a
priori (or, “pure facts” in the broader sense and the narrower sense, respectively. See,
Scheler, “Theory of the Three Facts,” 220/GW X, 447-48). However, since his usage not
always consistent, I will use the term “essence” to refer to the material a priori and “concept,
or conceptual category” to refer to formal a priori. The reason is because material a priori
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constitutes the objects of judgments and propositions.”50 And this is where we find
an answer to the question: as pre-logical, asymbolic, and intuitive content, the
material a priori “is not altogether independent of the experience and perception of
objects, but only of the quantity of experience,”51 namely, from the variegated
homogenous partial experiences, or the different, repeated experiences of induction.
A single, unified experience, on account of a lived interaction with something, is
required for immediate intuition of essence. This experience qualifies as a priori
because it is independent from sense experience or inductive experience. The
material a priori (essence) is the experiential content of Erlebnis, but, in keeping
with the tradition, it has independence from Erfahrung. Furthermore, Scheler adds,
“a priori contents can only be exhibited (aufgewiesen). There is no enchanted
procedure, not even that of bracketing, which “can ‘prove’ or ‘deduce’ [material] a
priori contents in any form whatsoever” (GW II, 70-1).52

Immanence and Transcendence
Scheler’s phenomenology was not exactly orthodox phenomenology in his day.
Husserl had written to Roman Ingarden naming Scheler and Heidegger his two
“philosophical antipodes.”53 The tension with Husserl is rather difficult to detect in
Scheler’s writing, first, because for whatever reason, Scheler often veils his
Scheler, “Phenomenology,” 142.
Scheler, On the Eternal in Man, 200, fn. 2.
52 Scheler, Formalism, 50. Scheler speaks similarly about our knowledge of God, who can
only be pointed to (aufweis) on account of religious phenomenological experience, and not
strictly speaking, proven or demonstrated. As such, any evidence of God that is possible is
only available for the one with religious experience, and is entirely unavailable to those
without this experience of God.
53 Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement. A historical introduction vol. I
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), 283.
50
51

56

statements that clearly would (also) pertain to Husserl, as criticisms of others. For
example, Scheler’s criticisms of both the empathic and the analogical arguments for
the “perception of other minds,” which I will explicate later in more detail, pertain to
a large extent to Husserl, though Scheler speaks explicitly only of Theodor Lipps and
Erich Becher, respectively.54 Second, Scheler uses Husserlian language, but not
uncommonly with a different meaning than Husserl has in mind. Scheler and
Husserl agree, for example, that there is “immediate” intuition; that there is
“immanent” and “transcendent” intuitive content; that immanent experience is
“Erlebnis”; and that one kind of intuition “founds” another kind. All of these central
terms carry sometimes radically different meanings between the two thinkers.
One of the central distinguishing features of Husserl’s and Scheler’s
phenomenological approaches pertains to the issue of “foundation” (Fundierung).
Scheler and Husserl agree that in every act of perception there is both empirical,
sense content (the thing in its component parts) and an essential, or meaning,
content (the thing as a whole). However they disagree on which content is more
“originarily” given, or foundational. Scheler accuses Husserl of falling into the same
false premise (his term: “proton pseudos”) of empiricism, namely, “the
presupposition that sensory contents furnish the foundation of every other content
of intuition.”55 Husserl maintains that sensuous intuition is the founding act for all
pure categorial intuition. Sensuous perception is characterized as “straightforward,”

54 Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, trans. Peter Heath (New Haven: Yale University
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as that through which one grasps the whole object directly and immediately.56 In
contrast, Scheler’s own position maintains that “the pure fact [reine Tatsache, i.e.,
essential meaning content] must have the character of an ultimate foundation of the
merely sensory components of natural facts.”57
It was said before that empiricism embodies a contradiction on account of its
inability to explain the concept of impression by means of an impression. When
empiricism makes sensations the foundation for concepts, there is nothing to
provide intelligibility and organization to sense content. Scheler is closer to Kant on
this problem, than he is to Husserl. Kant establishes “the law of the formation of
natural perceptual givenness…in part correctly, in part falsely.”58 Scheler agrees
with Kant, on the one hand, that “the ‘structure’ of experience precedes all sensory
contents,”59 and that the range of possible sensory data is circumscribed by this
structure. But, on the other hand, Scheler disagrees that this priority is owed to
conceptual (formal) content specifically. According to Scheler, phenomenological
experience (Erlebnis) provides the structure of all other forms of experience and
their content; the “structure” is itself the self-given essential (material) content.
Essential meaning content is that by which we select for observation whatever sense
content enters within the field of perception.60
“Foundation” here is therefore not interpreted according to the order of
Husserl, Logical Investigations II, trans. J. N. Findlay, ed. Dermot Moran (New York:
Routledge, 2001), 286-89.
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the domain of the material a priori.
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temporality. Otherwise, founding becomes confused with causing.61
Phenomenologically, “to found” is understood according to the order of
intentionality, which is to say, the relational order of meaning. Essence is the
meaning of the whole which determines which parts about the whole will be (later)
selected for further investigation. There is an “order of foundation” whereby
intuitive contents are ihrem Wesen nach aufeinander aufbauen (GW X, 449) (“built
upon one another according to their essence”).62 Certain essential intuitions, as
principles and forms of selection, must have taken place in order for other related
content to be intuitively given, including related empirical intuitions or “sensuous
intentions.”
For example, “Spatiality,” Scheler writes, “is given prior to, and independently of,
figures in space, the place and position of anything whatever, and more than
anything else, the qualities these things have.”63 The phenomenon of spatiality
fulfills conceptual symbols or propositions about spatiality (i.e., “redeems the
drafts”). Concepts or propositions do not fulfill the phenomenon. Indeed, spatiality
must be given in intuition to be able even to cognize some empirical thing as spatial.
In this way, every act of sense perception presupposes a host of intuitions in order
for the perceptions to make sense. There must already be in play, for example,
intuitions of sensibility, materiality and corporeality; subjectivity and objectivity;
contingency and necessity, relationality and vitality, unity and plurality, similarity
and equality, not to mention even prior intuitions of spatiality and temporality;
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motion, change, and alteration, etc., which are foundational to sense of sensory
intuition and its content, and which are given meaning by being embedded in this
pre-given integrated experience.
Even if Scheler is right that Husserl makes a similar error about foundation as
empiricists do, Husserl does not have the same problem issuing from the error, as
empiricists do. This is because, for Husserl, the transcendental structure of
consciousness accounts for coherent perceptual experience. The problem the error
causes for Husserl resides elsewhere. Since sense perception is said to furnish the
foundation of the “pure” content of phenomenological (categorial and eidetic)
intuition, then something immanent and something transcendent,
phenomenologically, would have to be distinguished by means of contingent
variations or fluctuations within sense content. We saw in the previous chapter that,
for Husserl this is the case. And since sense content can furnish only various side
perspectives, then for Husserl transcendence and immanence are ultimately
distinguished according to perceptual indeterminacy, namely, on account of the
degree of adumbration in the perception. The problem is not that immanence and
transcendence are indistinguishable, like Adorno thought, but the way they are
distinguished. Scheler calls into question the procedure of determining adequacy
merely on account of perceptual features.
Scheler and Husserl both hold that the logical form of immanence consists in the
intentional experience which yields a given that is congruent with the intention,
namely, when what is meant (the intention) is fulfilled by what is given, and when
what is given is fulfilled by what is meant. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind
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that immanence and transcendence first of all designate a level of intentional
adequacy. But only a specific interpretation of immanence and transcendence
suggests that transcendence necessarily pertains to “external” phenomena and
immanence to internal phemonena.
According to Husserl, something immanent is characterized by perfect and
lasting perceptual congruence, in which there are no unfulfilled or adumbrated
components. This adequacy cannot be achieved with the perception of something
external because of the object’s changing modes of appearance, in the case, for
example, of something with sides or tonal fluctuations. Recall this is what gives
Husserl problems about the reality of objects. “we can be sure something is [real]
only by virtue of a synthesis of evident verification,”64 but not only is this kind of
verification of external (sided) objects impossible, but so is the expectation that
such external objects would remain fulfilled by the intention, infinitely.
Transcendence, then, necessarily pertains to external perception, because, as
Husserl writes, “of necessity a physical thing can be given only ‘one-sidedly.’”65
Thus, a noematic perceptual core “of what is actually presented is surrounded by a
horizon of ‘co-givenness,’ which is not givenness proper, and more or less vague
indeterminateness.”66 In contrast, the perception of something internal does not
suffer from this ambiguity and variation in appearance. Internal perception (of
subjective, mental things or states of consciousness, namely Erlebnisse: “mental
processes”) yields adequate fulfillment, and its contents are therefore for Husserl
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deemed immanent. What is immanent “has no sides that could be presented
sometimes in one mode and sometimes in another.”67
Scheler suggests that we cannot simply equate transcendence with external
perception and immanence with internal perception; it will take more to justify
immanent givenness.68 Since Husserl takes sense perception as foundational,
transcendence means when givenness exceeds the intention, and that, therefore,
something transcendent indicates a situation where what is given is something
more than what is intended. Since an extended physical thing cannot be empirically
given all at once (because apperceptive or horizonal co-givenness “is not givenness
proper”), the presentified givenness exceeds what is presented in the intention.
Transcendence happens, then, on account of an excess with respect to the
perceptual characteristics of the intentional object (e.g., having sides, tonal
fluctuations).
Scheler makes a surprising revision to this interpretation, and one that I take to
be a decisive difference that lends toward a phenomenological view of ideology.
Immanence and transcendence pertain more to the quality of the act or intention
than to the perceptual characteristics of the object. Transcendence not only
indicates a situation when givenness exceeds intention, but when intention exceeds
givenness. Rather than excess on the part of the intentional object, inadequacy is also
explained by excess, or better, overreaching, on the part of the intention itself. And
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this overreaching occurs primarily when intentions are framed according to
concepts without reference to essential intuition. What is intended is always more
than what is given when what is intended is intended with a predetermined set of
symbols that intentionality is looking to be fulfilled by the given, in the intention.
When we take the world simply in the way that others have symbolized it and we
adapt our perception and intuitions according to these symbols, rather than allow
our experience to speak for itself, or to (phenomenologically) “redeem the drafts”
drawn from these experiences, then our perceptions and intuitions are
transcendent. “This meaning-something-more and meaning-something-beyond
what is phenomenologically immanent is what we call the transcendence of the
act.”69
Recall that Scheler takes the singular experience of Erlebnis to be intentionally
more foundational than the different experiences of (sided) empirical perception.
Empirical perception does the work of observing in its parts something that is
already, originally given. And it observes the thing as disintegrated, or composed of
parts that have been artificially decomposed from the basic experience of the thing
as a whole. But more importantly, this mode of perception ultimately takes the
attitude of the one “who stands outside, who has no direct contact with any” of the
things themselves. This seems to align with what Husserl proposes for the
phenomenological attitude when he sets up as critically eminent the “disinterested
onlooker, above the naïvely interested Ego.”70 The latter, he says, as “‘interested’ in
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the world,” is thereby “naturally immersed in the world,”71 which he takes as an
impoverished form of givenness.
If we dismiss the attitude of a disinterested onlooker and take instead the one
interested and actively immersed in the world, as Scheler does, the contents of the
world reveal themselves differently, and not inadequately. They seem not to be
given one-sidedly, but given as integrated units of meaning, and intentionally
independent from the empirical contents of observation. Scheler maintains that
something immanent and something transcendent cannot be distinguished on
account of varying modes of appearance alone, according to the direction of
perception (either internally or externally). Rather, if we adopt what Scheler calls
the phenomenological attitude, as opposed to the scientific one, then the contents of
all experience (beyond the categories of internal or external) can be given either as
immanent or transcendent (interpreted as degrees of adequacy). In this case
something “external” can be given adequately (when it is not given as external, but
in the act of experiencing) and something “internal” can just as well be given
inadequately. Immanence and transcendence is not a condition of the kind of object
(mental or physical), or the place of the object (internal or external); it is a condition
of the way any and every object is seen according to the mode it is experienced.
Adequacy of cognition depends, once again, on some active engagement with it,
already independent from the attempt to observe it.
A telling example is found in Scheler’s response to the so-called problem of the
“perception of other minds.” Scheler challenges the position that what is given in the
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perception of others is first and foremost their body. Husserl, for example, claims
that such perception is accorded to a series of apperceptive (not deductive)
transfers, or stages of “analogical apperception.” Through a connection of the
consciousness of our own ego, we come to an awareness of our own lived body
(Leib) as that through which consciousness can perform. One’s own lived body is
analogically transferred to the material body (Körper) of another. It is by means of
the appearance of the body of another that further apperceptive transfers build up
the awareness, first, of that body as a lived body, and then from a lived body, to the
awareness of an “alter ego.”72
Scheler maintains, in contrast, that the very question of the perception of other
minds is misposed. Our foundational perception of others is neither with respect to
their bodies, nor with respect to their “selves,” “minds” or “souls.” What we perceive
is an expressive unity as an integral whole, that is to say, “a unity belonging to the
whole of this living organism as an individual whole.”73 A person’s joy is given in
laughter, one’s sorrow in her tears, one’s love in a look of affection, and one’s rage in
the gnashing of teeth.74 Furthermore, even before I notice another person’s eyes, “I
see that ‘he is looking at me’ and that ‘he is looking at me as though he wished to
avoid my seeing that he is looking at me.’”75 It is impossible to reduce such
expressive unities, or “patterns of wholeness,” into a sum of partial sensory
appearances in the mode of an “external perception,” without doing damage to the
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original wholeness. “Sensory appearances are given only insofar as they function as
the basis of these patterns, or can take upon the further office of signifying or
representing such wholes.”76 Colors, sounds, shapes are not merely sensations but
qualities appearing in conjunction with sensations. And if we are to take such
complex of sensations without their qualitative arrangement, then, Scheler adds,
“we reach the remarkable conclusion that we can perceive the bodies of other
people but not their selves.”77
These so-called qualitative patterns of wholeness are given within the context of
mutual interaction and togetherness with others, not as some “onlooker” who takes
the other as an object of perception rather than as a friend or enemy, a brother or
sister. It is only by disengaging from the more original context of personal
interaction, which is the normal way people are perceived, that we even become an
onlooker at all: that I am a subject and you are an object (or, objectively, another
subject). For Scheler, the “attitude of internal or external perception” happens
derivatively, “in the second place.”78
Furthermore, acts of internal and external empirical perception have a
symbolizing function; they will invariably symbolize stimuli in the field of
perception as something, for example, as an individual’s body or the individual’s
self. The congruence between intention and givenness is primarily disrupted when a
“researcher” reflectively retreats from the world, turns the world into an “object” of
research, and is out to fulfill various criteria by means of the world. In this case, “the
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object is present as ‘only intended,’ merely as what is required to fulfill a sign or a
symbol.”79 The congruence of intention and givenness is disrupted by the
observation itself insofar as empirical observation relates to the world by dint of
conceptual distance from the world.
As already stated, Husserl takes the perception of something immanent as
necessarily belonging to internal perception. It is therefore necessary that internal
perception precede external perception (immanence precede transcendence) since
the essential laws of consciousness are the laws of the objects of consciousness.80
The resulting claim, which Descartes champions, is that our own self is that which is
immediately given. But what is more “self-evident” than the fact that I think my own
thoughts, or that I cannot feel any other feelings than my own?
Scheler suggests that metaphysical theories have created unnecessary
complications to these questions. For example, once we postulate a “real
substratum” for the experiences which one may happen to have, then one is unable
to have any other thoughts or feelings that do not belong to this real substratum.
Two real substrata, or two “souls,” Scheler writes, “certainly cannot enter into one
another or switch from one to another.”81 According to phenomenological evidence,
however, there is great certainty also that “we can think the thoughts of others as
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well as our own, and can feel their feelings (in sympathy) as we do our own.”82 We
tend to distinguish our own thoughts from the characters in stories we have read or
heard. We distinguish our own feelings from those of a group or those we can later
tell have been unconsciously contracted from that group. However, in all of these
cases, sometimes our own thoughts and other’s thoughts are not easily
distinguishable. One could be in doubt as to whether some thought or feeling is
one’s own or another’s, and therefore they may be indistinguisable. For example, an
individual’s own thought may not be presented as his or her own, but as “ours,”
namely, a prevailing idea of the community. Or, one may project one’s own thought
onto another, when one “reads into” a text what he or she thinks.83
Perhaps, most commonly, one accepts the thought of others as his or her own.
We can reproduce thoughts and feelings vicariously without being conscious of it.
Someone, for example, may tend “to live more in the community than in his own
individual self.” Scheler speaks specifically of the life of a child, though the following
may pertain into adulthood:
Imbued as he is with ‘family feeling,’ his own life is at first almost completely
hidden from him. Rapt, as it were, and hypnotized by the ideas and feelings of
this concrete environment of his, the only experience which succeed in
crossing the threshold of his inner awareness are those which fit into the
sociologically conditioned patterns which form a kind of channel for the
stream of his mental environment. … What occurs is an immediate flow of
experiences, undifferentiated as between mine and thine.84
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In such cases, something that is so-called “internal,” i.e., the self and his or her
own experiences (Erlebnisse), may also be “transcendent.” A mental event is not
always immanent (an adequately fulfilled intention). A phenomenology of the ego,
proper, does not therefore consist in empirical (internal) perception, but in the
experience of the ego’s “interwovenness” (Ineinandersein, lit., being-in-one-another)
precisely in the lived-experience of the totality of one’s life itself: the ego is seen (not
observed) in the lived-experience of autonomously living as a self (which is itself a
great achievement!). It is this integrative experience of a life as a whole, Scheler
maintains, that makes any of the partial contents of observation meaningful in the
first place.
Thus it would be a great mistake to think that the mental sphere [or
whatever is given in internal perception] coincides with the immediately
given, which does not permit any genuine illusions…. It would be a mistake to
think that inner perception has some sort of evidential advantage of
‘external’ perception…. Instead, every possible sort of [pretense-self]
(Scheinichs) exists, for example, the “Hamlet-self” of an actor on the stage, the
self of social roles, or one of the selves of a divided consciousness
(schizophrenia).85
The problem therefore is not with the objects observed or the direction of
intention in either external or internal perception. The problem, rather, pertains to
the fact that anything given in the experience of observation, as observation, not
only appears as heterogeneous partial contents that cause fluctuations as modes of
appearance, but, when something is merely observed, the thing is only given to
fulfill the symbols that intentionality is already out to fulfill. The problem, in other
words, is precisely the problem that Adorno expresses: we take our concepts as if
they identify with the object, but we are unaware of the manner by which the
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Scheler, “Phenomenology,” 147.

69

concept clouds the nonidentical (nonconceptualizable) elements of the object, and
how the concept will invariably articulate an object without those objective
components (the nonconceptual domain) which has traction for criticizing
consciousness.
This central aspect of Adorno’s critical theory has an important place in Scheler’s
phenomenology as well, but while Adorno takes the mediation that this point
suggests to be inherent to all experience, Scheler thinks that it is in immediacy (of a
nonconceptual sort)—the direct experiential contact with the object—that provides
the possibility of the kind of self-awareness Adorno wants. It is by means of a
mediated distance of subject and object that makes us rely more on conceptual
forms and widens the space of ideology. It is an experience of thing in a new way
(with another attitude) that makes us encounter the limits of concepts more than a
rationally articulated critique of them.
Scheler’s point is that if observation entails distance, and distance is filled up
with conceptual symbols, then observation “always gives its object more or less
symbolically, and always as an object which transcends the content of perception.”86
Symbolism is inherent to empirical observation because it “always selects its object
in advance in accordance with those features which are important for a possible
explanation.”87 Members of political parties, for example, perceive one’s political
situation on account of predetermined, and unquestioned political theories that
have turned into theoretically justified prejudices (ideology).88 However, coming to
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the political situation by means of the theories detracts from the authenticity (the
immediacy) of the experience of the situation itself. The concept conditions the very
perception of the situation. Partisan divides are perpetuated by the difference of
concepts brought to the crises, and without an awareness of the ways these
concepts may fail to adequately assess the crises. Certainly this pertains beyond
politics. “Evolutionists,” are out to find in advance certain features of nature that
best explain the evolution of species; their critics, the “creationists,” are out to find
in advance those features of nature that explain nature differently, by intelligent
design, for example. Cognitive interests have a tendency of tainting the
conclusions—but not necessarily by means of the interests, but by means of the
concepts which influence the attitude according to which something is seen.
Every scientific investigation makes sense in the essential intuition, but the
intuition increasingly breaks down and is symbolized when experiment and testing
(which already presupposes the meaning of the thing tested) intends more than
what is there (i.e., fulfilling a symbol). It is at this point that we begin interpreting
rather than seeing. As such, the researcher ultimately stands at a distance from the
experiencing act itself, and is not adequately within (i.e., immanent to) the act of
experiencing. Whatever is immanent to an act of experiencing “does not simply
stand there and let itself be observed so that now this feature, now that, stands out
in relief without any alteration in the object.”89 The disinterested onlooker, as
disinterested, also remains distant from the object, standing apart from the world
and, therefore, apart from the “very sources in which the contents of the world

89

Scheler, “Phenomenology,” 138.

71

reveal themselves.”90

Interpretation and Intuition
The question was raised earlier whether there is any criteria for self-givenness.
Scheler cavalierly dismisses the claim on account of the contradiction between
criteria and self-givenness and he fails to consider a defense of self-givenness in the
face of the contradiction. This is a substantial objection that Scheler does not take as
seriously as he should. On the one hand, the fact of self-evidence (the self-givenness
of things) seems to be self-evident (indubitable). The criteria alone, as symbolic,
points beyond itself to a basic experience before any criteria pertains. On the other
hand, it is a significant question whether the phenomenologist is not simply looking
to fulfill a symbol when out to find an “essence”; wouldn’t one merely be taking
things according to the conceptual criterion “essentialness”? Phenomenology in
other words, may have its own symbolizing intention that is imposed on the
givenness of things. Perhaps that which is considered to be an “essence” is not
something given, but something constructed to fulfill the phenomenologist’s
cognitive interests. Moreover, and perhaps more significantly, we might question
whether a human being can ever ultimately evade the influence of symbols enough
to return to the things themselves in such an immediate way that it is independent
from traditionally, and socially ingrained signs. Perhaps part the point of Adorno’s
critique of immediacy to the highlight its mythical status. We are always already
socially constituted, so the suggestion that we can come to experience in a way that
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bypasses bringing certain symbols is naïve.
To put this problem in context, consider the so-called linguistic or hermeneutic
turn by which Hans-Georg Gadamer and others affirm the role of tradition and
language in understanding, and the consciousness of being exposed and affected by
history, in which we are invariably situated. This seems to suggest that we will also
invariably stand at some kind of historical and tradition-constituted distance from
that toward which consciousness intends. Paul Ricoeur calls this “distanciation”
alienating since, although it preserves, methodologically, the possibility of scientific
objectivity (in the natural or human sciences), it nevertheless seems to destroy “the
fundamental and primordial relation whereby we belong to and participate in the
historical reality which we claim to construct as an object.”91 Gadamer also
maintains that one must ultimately choose either the alternative of a
“methodological attitude” and forsake the historical density of truth, or adopt “the
attitude of truth” and forsake objectivity.92 Ricoeur’s “hermeneutic phenomenology”
attempts to collapse the antinomical character of the alternative by unifying two
elements: “belonging” and “distanciation.” Such a project, Ricoeur notes, does not
ruin phenomenology as such, but only “the idealistic interpretation by Husserl,” and
the foundation of transcendental subjectivity. If intentionality is interpreted as a
consciousness of something away from self-consciousness, then intentionality is a
mode of consciousness that surpasses its own subjectivity and stands outside of

91 Paul Ricouer, “The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation,” in Hermeneutics and the
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University Press, 1981), 131.
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itself, towards meaning, “before consciousness is for itself.”93 If “the meaning of
consciousness lies outside of itself,”94 then the notion of belonging (Zugehörigkeit)
has a central place in phenomenology, and without this element of belonging, “there
would be no relation to the historical as such.”95 The relation of belonging, Ricoeur
claims, is an ontological relation, which encompasses the subject-object relation, but
which reveals one’s situation in, and indebtedness to, history, which Ricoeur
negatively characterizes as “finitude.”
Ricoeur’s notion of “participatory belonging” is not unlike Scheler’s
characterization of the phenomenological attitude and the notion of Vollzug, or
execution (of an intentional act), which I am loosely translating as participatory
engagement. However, Ricoeur’s characterization of belonging overlooks a
fundamental aspect of the phenomenological attitude. The weakness of belonging is
its negative meaning which renders human beings in a necessarily inadequate
cognitive situation on account of their finitude and therefore emphasizes that which
it takes away, namely, the objectivity and universality in understanding. However,
participatory engagement in the execution of the act does not take away, but gives
us an insight into the things or set of things with which we participate.
Ricoeur misses a distinctive epistemological component to belonging; we not
only belong to a historical position, but we belong to a locus of things that comprise
our world, and in that belonging (for example, the artist’s belonging to her art, the
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friend’s belonging to a friendship, etc.) something is directly given in the very
participatory relation that belonging entails. Ricoeur seems to suggest the only way
to hold on to phenomenology, while bypassing Husserl’s idealism, is by throwing out
the category of immanence in intuition all together. As a result, Ricoeur maintains
that any “return to intuition” is countered by the fact that all understanding is
mediated by interpretation, and that, therefore, belonging is essentially a
hermeneutic experience: “we belong to an historical tradition through a relation of
distance, which oscillates between remoteness and proximity.”96 The proximity is
never proximal enough to circumvent the necessity of Auslegung (“exegesis,
explication, interpretation”). Ricoeur pulls from Heidegger’s analysis of
understanding: “the Auslegung is the ‘development of understanding’ in terms of the
structure of the ‘as’ (Als).”97 Ricoeur refers to Auslegung, as the unsurpassable
presupposition of the method of phenomenology.98 However, all explication, the
very recourse to the predicative, “as,” does little more than attempt, in the very
process of explication itself, to point to a pre-predicative experience by means of a
symbol. As Heidegger puts it,
The ‘as’ makes up the structure of [explication] of something that is [already]
understood. It constitutes the interpretation. In dealing with what is
environmentally ready-to-hand by interpreting it circumspectively, we ‘see’
it as a table, a door, a carriage, or a bridge...; the ‘world’ which has already
been understood comes to be interpreted.99
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My sense is that Ricoeur conflates what for Scheler and Heidegger are two
distinguishable levels of understanding or knowing—the one cognitive and the
other intuitive. Intuition does not do away with interpretation, nor does
interpretation do away with intuition. As communicative beings, we cannot stay on
the level of intuition. Communication requires that we venture into interpretation
and linguistic articulation of phenomena. However, interpretation and
communication are always within in a level of proximity to a pre-linguistic intuitive
dimension of knowing. As Heidegger suggests: explication is in relation to
something already understood.
There are two points at work here capable of advancing a critical
phenomenology as I see it. On the one hand, Ricoeur is correct that interpretation is
inevitable. As I noted in the introduction, insofar as phenomenology is philosophy, it
must consistently deal with the sphere of the given, conceptually, by bringing
intuition to cognition. Phenomenology deals, after all, not only with phenomena, but
logos. And it is precisely in the antinomical relation between phenomena and logos
that critique emerges. A critical capacity within phenomenology would be lost if the
sphere of intuition is treated with the same level of explication as cognition, and vice
versa. The phenomenological critical function is in the difference, the antinomy,
between intuitive having-of-something and cognitive taking-of-something as
something.
So the phenomenological account of essence need not determine apodictically
that such a content defies every and any social or cultural constituting features. Any
so-called “criterion” of self-givenness need not depend on the ideal adequacy of
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intuition, rather, evidence of self-givenness can be detected in the very difference
between intuition and explication. But the evidence is not just in the mention of it, it
is given in the critical experience itself, namely, in the act of attempting to articulate
an experience which defies articulation, or an object’s identification with concepts.
In the final chapter, we will survey ways that content of intuition can be
deceptive, deluded, or even falsified. There are certain social conditions that can
indeed affect the way phenomena are given. Intuition therefore does not guarantee
adequacy that holds good consistently on the level of immanence. As far as I know,
no phenomenologist maintains that intuitions are never illusory or perfectly
fulfilled. The evidence I suggest is in the difference between the given and the
articulation: the difference between experiencing sweetness and expressing it; the
discrepancy between the joy of intimacy and talking about it. Even if the experience
of sweetness and the joy of intimacy are still to some degree linguistically
conditioned, this need not be a problem, just as long as we can experience a
discrepancy between intuition and conceptualization (phenomena and logos).
The problem with the hermeneutical antinomy between truth and method,
distanciation and belonging, is that it maintains the presupposition of traditional
theory; the antinomy is an antinomy in relation to the traditional (scientific) model
of theory that attempts to justify understanding in relation to methodology and
universal objectivity, and therefore, to a scientific worldview. The antinomy seems
to presuppose that only some distanciation and disconnection provides
understanding, even if this understanding is always incomplete. Scheler’s insistence
that distanciation does not provide insight, but only a network of symbolization of
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insights, counters this hermeneutical antinomy. The problematic converges
precisely on the notion of Auslegung, and the identification of understanding with
explication; however, explication, interpretation, and universalization are always
symbolizations of a singular essential experience.
Phenomenology is not, strictly speaking, theory at all, nor does it strictly count
as epistemology, in the way epistemology has been traditionally understood as a
“theory of cognition” (Erkenntnistheorie). To be sure, Scheler’s phenomenology
certainly includes, or at least points to, a theory of cognition, but broadly speaking,
phenomenology cannot be theory, if theory is limited to “theoretical cognition.”100
Phenomenology is partially pre-theoretical. Scheler writes,
any such theory presupposes the phenomenological investigation of essence
of that which is given. Cognition and valuation are themselves particular
forms of a ‘consciousness-of-something’ built up from the immediate
consciousness of self-given facts. … [Epistemology] therefore is a discipline
which does not precede or ground phenomenology, but follows it.101
According to Scheler, phenomenology pertains to “the relation between
conscious thought…and a world already unified and held together by prelogically
given essences and their connections.”102 This view avoids the claim that theory
constructs the intelligible world, i.e., that thought is that which organizes an
“unorganized mē on.”103 Scheler maintains, in contrast to the Kantian
epistemological paradigm that that thinking itself requires pre-unified “facts,” which
thought organizes only logically, and symbolically. As such, Scheler’s
phenomenology avoids theoretical separation from the world that shows up
Scheler, “Phenomenology,” 159.
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meaningfully in pre-theoretical intuition; consequently he avoids a place in the PostCartesian pantheon of traditional theorists.
Theoros sat at a distance in order to be a “spectator”—to have the suitable
vantage point. But phenomenology insists that if Theoros wants theoria (θεωρία),
i.e., “a view to see,” he must participate in the spectacle: “that which is seen and
experienced is given only in the seeing and experiencing act itself, in the being acted
out [Vollzug]; it appears in this act and only in it.”104 Theory, in this sense, “has an
ontological meaning from the start”: the ontology of person and world—of the actor
(the person as bearer of acts [Aktträger]) and being (what is simply “there”)—
precedes epistemology.105
A view to see (theoria), in other words, does not require logical distance, but
requires immediacy and immanence. Any distance at all will be filled with symbols,
and distance is essentially linked with a disinterested standpoint. The coincidence of
what is intended (in the act) and what is given (in the object) requires first and
foremost, not theoretical objectivity, but “the closest and most living contact”106 of
what is there. Theoria (seeing) requires praxis (doing) inasmuch as doing connotes
involvement. There is a sense in which one does not seek out to find essences, but
that they show themselves in the very engagement with the world, provided the
world is encountered with a certain attitude. The essence of friendship in the act of
being and having a friend; the essence of art in artistic acts; the essence of religion in
religious acts of repentance and prayer, etc. Any phenomenology of society, of
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history, of reality, etc., does not distance itself from the content, theoretically. It
cannot settle for predetermined conceptual symbols.
Sometimes Scheler’s insistence on speaking of an essential foundation of
perception seems to detract from the preponderance of the object that I am calling
for phenomenologically. Scheler’s point is that we only select out of a pre-given
intelligible whole for closer judgment and evaluation, and we select those things
that are of most interest. I suggest that intuitive experience be recast in terms of a
dialectical model, rather than holding to a foundational one, but doing so in a way
that preserves Scheler’s insight, and that is more phenomenologically consistent.
In speaking of foundation, Scheler seeks in part to avoid allowing perceptual
variations (perceiving more of a thing, in different ways, contexts, etc.) to alter the
validity of the intuited essence: if a change in perception means a change in the
essence then not only would they be indistinguishable, it would make an essence
just as contingent as perception, thereby nullifying its status as essence. It seems
however that knowledge of essences do indeed develop, and that this development
is historical. Scheler writes that, with knowledge of any essence, once gained, “it
cannot…be modified (negated) by any subsequent experience.”107 However, it is
possible that “essential knowledge is enriched and developed.”108 Isn’t this
enrichment at least in part on account of subsequent experience? Whereas there is
an intuitive (and intentional) basis for empirical perception, there is also a
perceptual (and temporal) basis for intuition.
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I propose that this epistemological problem be reinterpreted by taking more
seriously the temporal order of givenness, instead of privileging the intentional
order of givenness at the expense of the temporal. Here we can take a point from
Ricoeur on distanciation, which he calls the “dialectical counterpart of the notion of
belonging”109 due to the inevitable oscillation between remoteness and proximity.
This applies also to self-givenness. Scheler often overlooks the inevitability of
symbolization; we cannot be removed from conceptualization and language, nor
should we. The givenness of something immanent, immediately may have its place,
but such an insight lasts for a moment and in the next moment it is gone from view;
it passes just as quickly as it comes.110 Time takes it away, and the only way of
preserving in any lasting way that which is directly given is in objectifying the thing
either empirically (through observation) or symbolically (through pointing to it
through linguistically). Accordingly, there is no foundation, rather a dialectical
interplay (in intentionality) between intentional experience and perceptual
experience. I call this an intuitive dialectic or dialectic of givenness, which reveals a
reciprocal dynamic or mutual interchange. Subsequent perception contributes to
enriching the essential meaning and the (development of) meaning content
contributes to an enrichment of knowledge of perceptual content. The temporal
order of givenness reveals the historical (and dialectical) process of understanding.
On the one hand, I propose a dialectical process making meaning content remain
ever closer to perceptual content. And on the other hand, I suggest this does not
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destroy intuitive immediacy due to the fact that immediacy comes with a certain
active engagement with the thing: both the sense content and the meaning content
have to be given immediately, even if prior to any observation or conceptualization.
Scheler is concerned with preserving the a priori which is given in a single
experience, and independent from the repeated experiences of induction. However,
it is possible to hold that whatever is given in a single experience pertains, but that
this essential content can be developed (not negated) through the historical
sequence of other singular experiences.
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3
PHENOMENOLOGY AND REALITY
Phenomenology has its first stake in a critical enterprise on account of the
antinomy between phenomena and logos. Phenomenological investigation cannot
strictly speaking be considered a traditional theory insofar as intuition maintains a
critical relation with respect to a logical articulation of givenness. Indeed, the
phenomenological attitude maintains a close connection with intentional objects
vis-à-vis the intuitive domain of intentionality, and the participation in the world
vis-à-vis the execution of intentional acts. Despite this critical domain, an additional
issue is that objects are taken by the phenomenologist as phenomena, and as
phenomena, the question of their reality is not settled. The phenomenologist (in a
the Husserlian vein) can make distinctions of givenness (i.e., transcendent and
immanent, contingent and non-contingent, formal and material, categorial and
essential, etc.), but she cannot make distinction with respect to spheres of being. An
inability to maintain and define distinctions about reality puts strain on the ability
for forge phenomenologically a critique of society.
In the context of Adorno’s critique of Husserl’s idealism, critical experience is not
a problem for Husserl on the level of transcendence of the object. Adorno fails to
acknowledge this. However, the issue of the reality of the object is
phenomenologically inconclusive and so cannot receive philosophical justification.
Since reality for Husserl is not a point of incommensurability with respect to, for
example, the concept of reality, real things cannot offer a critical space by which to
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critique the concept of reality. Husserl uses the concept, according to the meaning
reality has for us, as the standard of judging real being. If this Husserlian view
cannot be challenged, then phenomenology must consider the givenness of society,
but is necessarily prevented from a consideration of social reality.
To be sure, Scheler is dedicated to much of Husserl’s phenomenology. Indeed,
the difficulty Scheler faces for responding to the Frankfurt School challenge is his
unwavering insistence, even until his final essays, that phenomenology always seeks
to “de-realize” (ent-wirklichen) the world, or to “‘ideate’ (ideieren) the world” (GW
IX, 43-4).1 Phenomenology “disregards any positing (belief or unbelief) of the
particular coefficient of reality with which the content of the act is given” (GW X,
395).2 Scheler says in his late work Erkenntnislehre und Metaphysik that despite the
benefits of Wesensontologie (ontology of essence) which yields evidential, adequate,
a priori, and immanent knowledge, its disadvantage (Nachteile) is that it gives an
existence-free essence (“daseinsfreies Wesen”) (GW XI, 49).
However, Scheler offers a remarkably different view, on phenomenological
terms, with respect to the question of reality. This difference corresponds to
Scheler’s shift of the phenomenological domain away from the theoretical sphere, or
at least by broadening the domain to include not only pre-conceptual content, but
also, as will be shown in this chapter, pre-conscious givenness—the givenness of the
lived body and the ecstatic structure of drives. New types of givenness provide a
sphere of historical reality which is the condition for the possibility of taking things
1 Scheler, The Human Place in the Cosmos, trans. Manfred Frings (Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 2009), 39.
2 Scheler, “Phenomenology and the Theory of Cognition,” Selected Philosophical Essays,
trans. David Lachterman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 156.
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as objects.

The Question of a Phenomenology of Reality
Scheler claims that reality (Realität) is given in an element of experience that he
calls resistance (Widerstand). To return to the passage with which we began the
previous chapter, Scheler claims: “the world is given in lived experience…as
‘resistance’ as immediately [i.e., with the same kind of immediacy] as it is given as an
‘object.’”3 Does this experience of resistance, in which reality is given, a
phenomenological givenness? If so, one may understandably wonder what it is
exactly that is given. Is it phenomena as real, or the “essence” of reality. If an essence
is given purely, which in part means it is given independently of sensory content,
then it would mean also that it is given as “de-realized,” or with its very factor of
reality “suspended.” But what could it mean for “reality” to be given with reality
suspended? Such “de-realization” seems to pertain only to an idea of reality.
Furthermore, if what is given in the intuition of reality is its essence (as perhaps a
character of an intentional object), then it would not make sense that Scheler would
bother to distinguish, in the above passage, the intuition of essences (in the
immediacy of the “object”) and the intuition of reality (in the immediacy of
resistance). If a phenomenological view of the world necessarily suspends the
coefficient of reality, then any “phenomenology of reality” is a terminological
contradiction.
There are a couple ways to qualify this problem in order for it to be addressed. It
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is important to be cautious in speaking about procedural techniques of
phenomenology as if phenomenology is simply a method of bracketing, and that it is
in the bracketing that the thing itself is given. Phenomenology is an investigation of
what is given in encountering something directly, that is to say, when an act “of such
and such an essence” encounters “a content having such and such an essence.”4
“Reality” is suspended in the givenness of essence, not on account of some problem
with reality as such, but insofar as the real, contingent, or empirical factors of
something, and the deliberate observation of a thing as these factors, disrupts the
congruence of intention and givenness, causing transcendence of the act.
Consider the example of an alarm tone, phenomenology is intentionally oriented
toward the tone of the alarm simply according to what it is, namely, as a tone. The
tone in this case is given indifferently to other considerations, such as it practical
significance, its empirical conditions, or its existential status. However, this
congruence is disrupted when, in natural perception or in a scientific orientation,
we are already intentionally engaged in taking something given as something which
it symbolizes. This may happen, for example, in the case of a practical judgment: the
tone of the alarm as (i.e., symbolizing) “time to get up,” or in the case of a scientific
judgment: the tone of the alarm as (i.e., symbolized by) sound waves causing the
sensation of hearing. One could also maintain that reality is transcendent on account
of a judgment that posits the reality or unreality of something (i.e., an “existential
judgment”): the tone of the alarm as real.
Scheler never claims that the phenomenological mode of philosophy disregards
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experiences of reality, phenomenology merely “disregards any positing (belief or
unbelief) of the particular coefficient of reality.”5 The factor of reality is already
given along with the other content given in intentional acts.6 Scheler makes the
following claim about the derivation of existential judgments:
[The] coefficient of reality itself and its essence remain the object of
investigation. We do not bracket them, but rather the explicit or implicit
judgments in which they are posited. Thus we do not bracket the possibility
of positing them, but only the positing them in some one mode [namely, in
the phenomenological attitude].7
Judgments about whether things are real or unreal presuppose the givenness (of the
essence or meaning) of reality itself in lived experience. Reality must already be
meaningful before existential judgments can be made. There is nothing at this point
that is different from Husserl’s phenomenology since, for Husserl, even if the reality
of something cannot be phenomenologically deciphered or posited, reality still has a
meaning from a determinate set of evidence.
Scheler revisits the “paradox” of the existential proposition in his late essay
Idealismus—Realismus. When delimiting the proper questions for treating the
problem of reality effectively, Scheler makes clear the various questions that are not
proper questions for uncovering the sense of reality, but with which reality has
nevertheless traditionally been dealt. His primary criterion for ruling out previous
ways of treating reality is whether the questions themselves presuppose, as a
criterion, the very matter that is to be explained. When they beg the question in this
way, these attempts inquire initially about the conditions required in order for
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something to be called real. Neo-Kantian schools, Scheler remarks, tend to begin the
investigation of reality with a definition of real being: “an object’s standing under
certain lawful conditions of fact.”8 Beginning from the definition, they move to
demarcate, for example, what the being of reality is, and how the reality of the object
comes to be. If the assessment is accurate, this procedure is a great example of what
Scheler would consider transcendent givenness insofar as it starts with a set of
linguistic symbols and their conceptual meanings, and, from a symbolic point of
departure, seek confirmation of the experience by means of the symbols, rather than
confirming the symbols by means of the experience. Such lawful conditions may
coordinate certain kinds of things with the factual condition of being real, but “that
there is reality and that a real world exists at all can never be inferred from any such
conjunctions of ideas.”9
Husserl falls into this question-begging mistake as well. Although the meaning of
reality is initially established upon conditions of evidential givenness (fulfillment
and unfulfillment of intention), the concept, once determined is made inflexible and
becomes the new measure for what is and is not accepted as real. When, according
to the idea of reality, it is discovered that certainty of reality is not possible, the
option of reconsidering the adequacy of the idea is not considered. The concept, for
Husserl, does more work than is phenomenologically appropriate.
This question of first inquiring about what kinds of conditions, whether factual
or cognitive, are required for the reality of an object to subsist or in order to ascribe
8 Scheler, “Idealism and Realism,” Selected Philosophical Essays, trans. David Lachterman
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 314. Scheler cites specifically, Rudolf
Hermann Lotze.
9 Scheler, “Idealism and Realism,” 315.
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reality to an object, Scheler thinks, have regrettably dominated epistemology. That
is to say, epistemology operates by asking first what kind of criterion is required to
accurately determine things, and in this case, the reality of things. But the very
question, first, already presupposes the givenness of reality, and second, attempts to
deal with the question without some direct experience with the domain, thereby
asking what kinds of conditions must apply in order to establish a logical (and
therefore analytical) connection between things perceived and the predetermined
concept-symbol, “reality.” This is what makes the so-called “existential judgment”
paradoxical. At the same time, it both is and is not a synthetic judgment. It is
synthetic insofar as it is a judgment about existence, and because “the predicate of
existence is never contained in the subject of the judgment”:10 essence does not
entail existence. But it is not synthetic because it is not an ampliative proposition. In
the judgment, “the bird exists,” the predicate does not offer anything new about the
subject. “Rather, reality is predicated of the sum total of all the attributes that may
[already] belong to the subject,” the bird.11 An existential judgment therefore makes
sense if and only if there is some awareness beforehand in that which the factor of
reality consists.
This applies as well to Husserl’s transcendental reduction. One could claim that
the bracketing of real conditions presupposes a sense of what is experienced when
something is experienced as real, i.e., the conditions that apply for any real thing.
But for Husserl, the epoché is implemented on account of the fact that judgments
about the reality of perceivable things are only at best believed, and therefore not
10
11

Scheler, “Idealism and Realism,” 314.
Scheler, “Idealism and Realism,” 314.
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suitable to fulfill phenomenological apodicticity. So, on the one hand, the
phenomenological reduction amounts not to the suspension of the factor of reality
itself, but the suspension of mere existential judgments, which Scheler reprimands
as not only insufficient, but characterizes as “child’s play” (kinderleicht) (GW IX,
207).12 On the other hand, not only the bracketing of the judgment, but also the
judgment itself (the natural belief that something is real or unreal), presupposes the
givenness of reality.
The questions that Scheler insists are the correct ones in order to uncover the
givenness of reality are phenomenological questions, and they must be
phenomenological if one seeks to get to the lived-experience of reality itself rather
than inaugurating a new discussion about reality on account of a new conceptual
criterion or “theory.” Instead of presupposing symbolic criteria that rely on theories
of knowledge, one must recover an original experience of reality. There are two
questions that must initially be asked:
1. “what is experienced [erlebt], when [something] is experienced as real?”13
2. “In what sorts of acts or modes of human behavior is the factor of reality
originally given?”14
These questions, he continues, are the questions of “the phenomenology of the
lived-experience of reality” (der Phänomenologie des Realitätserlebnisses).15 But the
problem remains: is there an “essence of reality” that would be given in

Scheler, “Idealism and Realism,” 316.
Scheler, “Idealism and Realism,” 313.
14 Scheler, “Idealism and Realism,” 313.
15 Scheler, “Idealism and Realism,” 313.
12
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corresponding a phenomenology of reality? If phenomenology pertains to the
givenness of “pure facts,” free of some empirical (or existential) constitution, how
can existence be given without existential constitution? A response can be given
according to the difference between conscious and ecstatic experience.

Conscious and Ecstatic Experience
The difference between two distinguishable moments of phenomenological
experience was at best implied in the previous chapter because the two moments
were held together in a single, unified experience. Phenomenology is a fusion
between spiritual activity and vital process. Scheler calls phenomenology both “an
attitude of spiritual seeing,”16 and an “intensely vital…contact with the world.”17 He
says, that phenomenology is “reflection,” (indicating inwardness) on “the closest
and most living contact” (indicating outwardness) with what is there.
Phenomenology has a reflective element as well as what he called an “ecstatic” one.
The main point of this chapter is that conscious-reflection depends for its content
upon an ecstatic contact. Phenomenology is the “spiritual seeing” of that is which is
given directly in a “vital contact with the world.”
On the one hand, ecstasis means standing outside of oneself. This refer to more
than merely the intentional structure of conscious acts (the consciousness-ofsomething). Besides, acts of reflection (which is held in contrast to ecstasis) are
intentional acts. The ecstatic moment of phenomenological experience pertains to
the love or taking-interest in something that is the occasion for our active
16
17

Scheler, “Phenomenology,” 137.
Scheler, “Phenomenology,” 138.
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participation in the world. It is the ecstatic moment that establishes the “ontological
relation” that defines knowledge, and in which theoretical cognition is rooted.
Instead of Interesse, Scheler more commonly uses the term Streben, striving or
conation. When we are conatively outside ourselves, we are more immersed within
the our environment. And as immersed, one experiences resistances that stand
against (Widerstand) the strength of vital drives. On these occasions, reflection pulls
away and stands back from those resistances in order to consider them objectively.
A “subject” becomes conscious (or conscious again) of an “object” that stands against
(Gegenstand) consciousness.18 There are two ways then that something “stands
against,” either as a force of resistance or as an object, each, as per our guiding
passage,19 are given immediately. A conscious subject distances itself from some
resistance to an endeavor, turning it into an object, and in turn creating the very
conscious distinction between itself, the subject (as itself) and the object (as not
itself). Scheler states, “the kind of being…which contents possess when they are
reflectively had in their givenness in conscious acts—when therefore they become
reflexive—is the being of being-consciously-known.”20 Anytime we are within
ourselves, we remain, to some degree, standing outside of the relevant “domain of
facts,”21 and anytime we remain immersed in that domain, we are, to some degree,
“outside” of ourselves, so to speak. More precisely, phenomenological experience is
The parallel between the literal meanings of Widerstand (resistance) and Gegenstand
(object) is significant. A resistance is not yet an (intentional) object, but the experience of
resistance is required to intend something as an object.
19 “In principle, the world is given in lived-experience as the ‘bearer of value’ and as
‘resistance’ [Wider-stand] as immediately [unmittelbar] as it is given as an object
[Gegenstand]” (Scheler, “Phenomenology,” 143).
20 Scheler, “Idealism and Realism,” 295.
21 Scheler, “Phenomenology,” 139.
18

92

conscious reflection about that with which one is engaged ecstatically.
The implicit spiritual and vital moments connect with the two explicit aspects
constitutive of phenomenological experience: immediacy and immanence.
Immediate or direct experience highlights the vital contact important for
knowledge; ecstasis and immediacy go hand-in-hand. Immanent givenness, on the
other hand, highlights the conscious component for acts of knowing. Despite the fact
that any immanent givenness necessarily entails some immediate or direct contact
(in intuition), it is nevertheless possible for something to be given immediately
without it being given immanently (when something is given as transcendent).
Immediacy is a broader category than immanence: immediate givenness pertains to
both intentional beings as well as real ones, while immanent givenness pertains only
to intentional objects. This will be detailed more later. The important thing at this
point is that, according to Scheler, knowing is not defined as an exclusive function of
consciousness. Consciousness does not have a monopoly on knowledge. Rather,
knowledge is
a concept which is prior even to that of consciousness. … Knowledge [Wissen]
is an ultimate, unique, and underivable ontological relationship
[Seinsverhältnis] between two things. I mean by this that any being A ‘knows’
any being B whenever A participates in the essence or [such-being (Sosein)]
of B.22
And to reiterate, love, interest, and conation pertain to that ecstatic moment “by
which a being, without ceasing to be this one delimited being, abandons itself in
order to share and participate in another being.”23
Scheler expands the meaning of knowing beyond the range of consciousness,
22
23
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which he takes to be a correction of the idealist starting-point of “the principle of
immanence-to-consciousness.”24 Cognition (Erkenntnis) is itself a derivative form of
knowing that “comes out of its original ecstatic form of simply ‘having things,’ in
which there is no knowledge of the having or of that through which and in which it
is had….”25 In this case, it is “highly contestable” that “a relation to the self [IchBeziehung] is an essential condition of all processes of knowledge.”26 The “self” in
this context is the self of the conscious subject or ego, and that which Adorno rejects
as “the first.” Scheler agrees. The form of knowledge which precedes and excludes
any form of being-conscious, Scheler calls “ekstatische Wissen” (ecstatic
knowledge).27 It is conceivable, for example, that a child has ecstatic knowledge of
that which consciousness later comes to symbolize as “comfort,” as “security,” as
“fatigue,” or as “hunger.” And it is not inconceivable that what is given in the
correlating lived-experience, even at such a young age, is the essence of comfort,

Scheler, “Idealism and Realism,” 293.
Scheler, “Idealism and Realism,” 294.
26 Scheler, “Idealism and Realism,” 294.
27 Scheler, “Idealism and Realism,” 294. In a footnote to a lecture, entitled “Die Formen
des Wissen und die Bildung,” presented to the Lessing Institute, dated January 17th, 1925,
Scheler remarks that “For seven years, I have been proposing the following ideas in my
lectures, as a basis for my theory of knowledge. Consciousness is only one form of
knowledge. There also exists preconscious, ecstatic knowledge.” Max Scheler, “The Forms of
Knowledge and Culture,” Philosophical Perspectives trans. Oscar Haac (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1958), 134, n. 24. The note goes on to summarize his positions on resistance and
reality. A couple remarks about this footnote: first, if we can trust the date of the lecture as
an approximate date of composition, Scheler seems to indicate an ecstatic basis to his
epistemology that was not operative in his earlier works, such as his early essays on
phenomenology. However, I interpret Scheler’s later essays as containing more inclusive
themes, but which do not negate and are consistent with his early essays. Second,
Heidegger’s remarks on Scheler’s account of reality and resistance seems to have come
solely from this single footnote and not from the further development of these themes in
“Erkenntnis und Arbeit” and “Idealismus—Realismus.” This seems to be the case since the
footnote is the only source Heidegger cites. I raise issues pertaining Heidegger’s treatment
later in the chapter.
24
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security, fatigue, or hunger and this is the case precisely because of the young age.
The knowledge of very young children is almost guaranteed to be free and
independent from a kind of systematic empirical perception and from approaching
objects with preconceived ideas that obstruct immanence.
The epistemological criteria of phenomenology: immediacy and immanence, are
given a metaphysical basis with respect to the interpenetration of spirit and life
(Geist und Leben).28 Life, in the form of vital drives (Drang), has an inherent ecstatic
role, which maintains this living contact with the world. Drang is pure vital
directedness or impulsion without itself being aware of its directedness. But the
givenness of essences, or ideal units of meaning, pertains to the role of spirit which
has an ascetic role instead of an ecstatic one, whereby that which is encountered in
immediate givenness is purified or “de-realized.” Scheler writes, “the human being is
a creature that, by virtue of its spirit, can take an ascetic attitude toward its fervent
and vibrating life.”29
Concerning again the givenness of reality, it is given immediately in the ecstatic
lived-experience of resistance, but reality itself resists the act of spirit to cognize
insofar as cognition belongs to ascetic de-realization, or the suspension of reality.
Reality, therefore, can never be an “object” of an immanent mode of cognition.
Furthermore, reality itself is also, strictly speaking, not “known” ecstatically insofar
as knowledge pertains to the participation in the “Sosein” or such-being of

28
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something.30 Knowledge is an ontological relation, not a causal one.31 However, the
reality or existence (Dasein) of something “can never stand to the real bearer of
knowledge in any but a causal relation. The ens reale remains, therefore, outside of
every possible knowledge-relation.”32 On the one hand, it is possible to have an
experience of reality itself, without symbolizing it in some way, but on the other
hand it is not possible to raise that experience to the level of cognition without in
some way symbolizing reality. All knowledge of reality relies on symbols that
intentionally take the place of the experience. The givenness of reality is not an
essential givenness insofar as essence is always a “pure fact.” A real being cannot be
“purified” of its own reality.
Immediacy and immanence are held together in a single phenomenological
experience because their meaning is established upon the same condition, namely,
the presence or absence of symbolic criteria. The influence of such symbolic
intention both mediates intuitive givenness and causes transcendence in cognition.
However, these conditions apply only in the case of the consciousness of something,
namely, of Sosein. Dasein, existence, is always given immediately in a lived

The term “Sosein” refers on the one hand to the essence of a thing as well as to what
Scheler simply calls zufälligen (phenomenal contingency). It might be helpful to refer this
notion to the Husserlian distinction between the noematic core, which is in this case the
ideal meaning content or essence, and the noematic characteristics, which vary according to
phenomenal givenness. If so, the Sosein would refer to the complete intentional object,
including both its essential meaning content as well its contingent sensory content, which
were sharply distinguished in the previous chapter. Due to the fact that “essence” is not an
accurate translation, and “nature” bears metaphysical references that do not apply, the term
will primarily be used here untranslated. I do however translate the term “character” in
certain cases.
31 A knowledge-relation, as an ontological relation, can affect a qualitative alteration on
the part of the knower, but cannot cause a quantitative, and therefore measurable causal
effect.
32 Scheler, “Idealism and Realism,” 293.
30
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experience, but can never be given immanently; nor, for that matter can it, strictly
speaking, be “transcendent” since immanence and transcendence are modes of the
consciousness of something. They are logical designations of intentional objects, not
of real objects (as real). Scheler writes:
The original experience of reality, the experience of the resistance of world,
precedes, therefore, any and all consciousness; resistance precedes all
representation and perception. Even the most invasive sensory perception in
never conditioned through stimuli and ordinary nervous processes alone.33
Concerning the possibility of a phenomenology of reality, there are two things to
say: first, to be sure, reality is given immediately in some form of lived-experience,
but in a lived-experience that is not strictly speaking phenomenological since, in this
lived-experience, there is never any givenness of a “pure fact,” or essence. “Reality,”
Scheler writes, “is ‘transintellgible’ [transintelligibel] for every possible knowing
mind. Only the what of the existing being (Dasein), not the being [i.e., existence]
(Dasein) of the what, is intelligible.”34 However, I mentioned earlier that, although it
is possible to experience reality directly, (and therefore asymbolically, since symbols
only pertain to consciousness), it is not possible to cognize reality (ecstatically or
consciously) without symbols. We do notice, though, that Scheler does speak of
reality symbolically (conceptually) in ways that open phenomenological
investigation. For example, he speaks of reality as “effective causality,” and in terms
of his primary symbol, as “resistance.” But these symbols are employed to serve as
pointers for the experience, not as a deceptively simple substitute for the
experience. A phenomenology of reality is in effect a phenomenology of resistance.

33
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This way of interpreting the problem is actually more true to what Scheler intends.
Scheler never actually claims to embark on a “phenomenology of reality,” but rather
a “phenomenology of the experience of reality.”35
Returning now to the questions by which Scheler claims he will proceed, he asks
first, “what is experienced [erlebt], when [something] is experienced as real?”36 The
answer pertains to the experience of resistance. Resistance is experienced when
something is experienced as real. The second question, “In what sorts of acts or
modes of human behavior is the factor of reality originally given?”37 is answered by
the conduct of our drives and strivings (conation). The factor of reality is originally
given in our drive-based conation. Therefore, Scheler sets out not strictly to perform
a phenomenology of reality, but of a phenomenology of the two central elements
that comprise any lived-experience of reality: the human drive-life and the
resistance to it.
Scheler explores this matter not because reality is a problem for human
experience, or that reality is inaccessible, or that it cannot be “proven.” Rather,
reality has been turned into a problem by philosophers who wrongly presuppose the
givenness of things entirely independent from their existence. And this
presupposition enters into phenomenology insofar as Erlebnis is interpreted to
pertain only to conscious experience. For Scheler, in contrast to these thinkers,
reality poses no problem so long as lived-experience is interpreted to include an
ecstatic context of vital drives. It is therefore imperative not to lose sight of the fact

Scheler, “Idealism and Realism,” 313.
Scheler, “Idealism and Realism,” 313.
37 Scheler, “Idealism and Realism,” 313.
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that the very question of a “phenomenology of reality,” only makes sense from
already having a sense (Sinn) of that in which reality consists. Reality already means
something; it has already been given long before philosophers begin asking
questions about knowing it. This does not indicate that there’s not anything to say
about it, but when something is said, it can only be by means of symbols that
consciousness employs in order to point to the experience of reality. This is the
ultimate phenomenological task: to uncover the original experience and that which
is given in the experience. In the previous chapter, it was shown how Scheler
describes the phenomenological task as that which redeems all the drafts drawn
from self-givenness, and that phenomenology does this by descriptively pointing to
lived-experience. Reality may be “known” consciously by means of symbols, but it is
already given ecstatically well before that. Conscious reflection is derived from
ecstatic participation. We begin ecstatically immersed, and emerge consciously
reflective.
If phenomenology begins with conscious reflection, it excludes the more
originary experience that gives the occasion for reflection to arise in the first place.
Reflection about reality arises in the resistance-experience of non-conscious ecstatic
lived-experience, and reality becomes a problem for consciousness in the reflection
upon, or objectification of, reality, or when consciousness takes a symbol to stand in
for the thing itself. If, echoing Marx, Scheler were to have a critique of the ideology of
German philosophy since Kant, it would most likely pertain to the illusion that
knowledge begins and ends with consciousness or self-consciousness. A philosophy
that begins with conscious experience, begins too late. It begins with derived
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content and overlooks an entire pre-conscious nexus of experience. Scheler writes,
We must reject entirely the frequently encountered assertion that
consciousness is a “primal fact,” that one ought not to speak of an “origin” of
consciousness. The very same laws and motives in accordance with which we
think of consciousness’ raising itself from one level of reflection to the next
will apply when we think of consciousness itself originating out of a
preconscious…condition of the being of the contents of consciousness. …
Only a very definite historical stage of overreflective bourgeois civilization
could make the fact of consciousness the starting point of all theoretical
philosophy….38
To begin philosophy with conscious experience makes philosophy begin precisely in
the symbolization of reality. And it is in its very symbolization that reality becomes a
problem for philosophy.
Furthermore, there is not any knowable “whatness” to Being qua being, there is
only the whatness of certain experienceable beings, and every attempt to
conceptualize Being qua being by means of, for example, “Form,” or the “Good,” or
“pure act,” etc., (1) reduces being to something else, (2) symbolizes being and
conceals an experience of the thing itself, and (3) may indeed pertain to the
experience of form, goodness, actuality, etc., but presupposes some sense of what
being already is. Scheler introduces a level of much needed honesty concerning the
philosophical tradition of this question, namely, that reality must be symbolized in
order to be conceptualized (indeed, the conceptualization is a symbolization).
However, it is possible to say something about reality by investigating the
experience in which it is revealed. Heidegger attempts to uncover the meaning of
Being by means of the being that is most our own, and therefore the being closest to
our own experience. But this shows that Heidegger’s existential analytic is not
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strictly speaking an investigation of Being by means of an investigation of this
specific being, called Dasein, but a process of pointing to Being by means of an
investigation of the experience of this being that is closest. This is important because,
in the end, Heidegger also uses a symbol, Sorge, that encapsulates not the Dasein
(existence) of its Sosein, but the Sosein of this existing thing, he calls “Dasein.”
Heidegger may have shown masterfully how Sosein and Dasein are intertwined, but,
as he admits, he cannot ultimately avoid the question concerning what Dasein is.

Transcendence and Reality
Scheler seems to offer disturbing news. Not only is a phenomenology of reality
not possible, but reality itself, strictly speaking, is unknowable to any and every
standpoint or worldview, whether natural, scientific, or phenomenological; to
metaphysics or religion; and to any conscious or ecstatic forms of knowing, etc. The
domain of real being is in the furthest reaches of the domain of the nonconceptual.
Unlike the sphere of the material a priori, the reality of beings pertains to a part of
nonconceptual content that cannot be known.
Adorno similarly employs a sphere of the nonconceptual which pertains to that
which can be experienced, but cannot be known, precisely because it is
nonconceptual. Since all nonconceptualities, for Adorno, are not known, it is difficult
to decipher what they contain, but we do know toward what they refer, namely, to
the reality that is required for the formation of concepts.39 If, in Adorno’s view, it is
possible even to talk of an “experience” of the “nonconceptual whole,” (i.e., the
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whole of historical reality), the kind of experience would still more or less pertain to
a conceptual experience, because the nonconceptual comes into view from the
concept itself; more specifically, from the fact that concepts “mean beyond
themselves.”40 Concepts have an “implicit history,” which Adorno thinks can be
detected in the concept. The concepts harness features “reflected through its
relationship to its social and temporal context.”41 Therefore, Adorno suggests that
“insight into the constitutive character of the nonconceptual in the concept would
end the compulsive identification which the concept brings unless halted by such
reflection.”42
Despite the similarity in Scheler’s and Adorno’s views that reality constitutes an
unknowable, but experienceable domain, there seems to be something backwards
about relying on the concept in order to catch a glimpse of the nonconceptual, and to
ground a philosophically-relevant experience of reality. This is especially the case
because concepts do in fact arise from the context of social and historical reality.
Why then is it necessary to look to the concept in order to ground an experience of
that which necessarily precedes the concept?
For Scheler, reality is unknowable not because it is nonconceptual; not all
knowing (Wissen) is cognition, or conceptual understanding. Essence and value
(material a priori) are nonconceptual, but knowable. Reality is unknowable because
the reality of an object does not factor into the intentional relation between
consciousness and the object. Any and everything that we can see or say about the

Adorno’s references Emil Lask. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 12.
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42 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 12.
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reality of a thing will invariably fall back to the “character” or “such-being” (Sosein)
of the real thing, and will not pertain to a thing’s existence (Dasein) per se. However,
the inability to have knowledge of existence does not inhibit a conspicuous livedexperience of reality. We remain steadfast in our assurance of the reality of things
around us, not because they are, as real things, objects of knowledge or cognition,
but because things around us become objects of cognition by means of an
experience of their existence. Any and everything that consciousness can see or say
about the Sosein of something necessarily begins in an experience of existing things.
The reality or existence of a thing does not require any elucidation; it is already
presupposed in the very fact that we have a range of objects consciously in view.
Even things that cannot strictly speaking be called real—whether ideal, or “irreal,”
or illusory, or fictitious, or virtual, or spiritual, or immaterial, or perceptual
appearances, like shadows, rainbows, or colors—all have their perceptual
rootedness, as objects of consciousness, in the experience of reality.
The fact that things arise for us as intentional objects because of an experience of
reality does not mean that essence entails existence, or that an ideal being is also a
real being. In fact Scheler seeks to avoid both the Neo-Kantian “idealism of
consciousness”43 and the “critical realism” of Nicolai Hartmann and others by
preserving the cognitive separability of Sosein and Dasein. Both idealism and realism

Scheler mentions as notable examples: Heinrich Rickert, the “Marburg logicians,”
Ernst Schuppe, Hans Cornelius, and the “positivistic Idealists.” (“Idealism and Realism,”
290). Among these, it is important to notice the mention of Hans Cornelius who was
influential for both Adorno and Horkheimer, but whose idealism was ultimately rejected by
both critical theorists.
43
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makes the same “formally true, but materially false” conclusion, in different ways:44
idealism, on the one hand, makes the unnecessary inference that because Sosein can
in principle be immanent to consciousness, so must also be Dasein. The result of this
position, Scheler writes, is that “there is no existence transcendent to or
independent of consciousness.”45 Critical realists, on the other hand, also
unnecessarily infer that because Dasein cannot be immanent to consciousness,
Sosein cannot be either; they conclude that “the [Sosein] of an object as well must
always and necessarily be independent of, detached, and separated from
every…consciousness.”46 In this case, consciousness tends to be conceived not as an
act or intention, but as a “big box” in which contains, necessarily, only images or
symbols of things.47
Scheler is not content with this all-or-nothing scenario: the immanence of Sosein
does not entail the immanence of Dasein, nor does the transcendence of Dasein
entail the transcendence of Sosein. Scheler suggests that although it is legitimate to
speak of the immanence of the Sosein of something, against the critical realists’ claim
that consciousness is the house of images or representations of things, it is
nevertheless also legitimate to deny this kind of immanence to the existence of
something, against the idealists. The crucial factor that is missing from the idealist
and realist positions, which lead to their respective false conclusions, is a developed
conception of intentionality. Scheler appeals to this basic feature of phenomenology
Scheler, “Idealism and Realism,” 289-90.
Scheler, “Idealism and Realism,” 290.
46 Scheler, “Idealism and Realism,” 290.
47 Scheler, “Idealism and Realism,” 291. Scheler explains the thesis of Hartmann’s critical
realism and his objections to it in more detail in the section “Cognition and Its Standards,”
“Idealism and Realism,” 308-12.
44
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as a way to underscore the distinction between an intentional relation and a real or
causal relation.48 Not all beings are objects, i.e., “objectifiable beings,” that submit to
intentional relations. An act-being (Aktsein) is an example of a non-objectifiable
being, which possesses its mode of being not as an object that an act intends but
only in executing intentional acts (Vollzug). Real being as real is another nonobjectifiable being, but for different reasons.
By way of illustration, Scheler notes a difference between on the one hand
Leibniz’s observation, cogitatur ergo est (something is thought, therefore, it is)
which he thinks is “no less evident than cogito ergo sum,”49 and on the other hand
Bishop Berkeley’s esse est principi (to be is to be perceived). Both Leibniz and
Berkeley fail to make this distinction between act and object. However, Leibniz’s
insight is superior because it does not to contain within it an inherent reference to
existence or reality; the “something thought” pertains, according to Scheler, to
“being of whatever kind or form, including even ideal being, fictive being, conscious
being.”50 In contrast, Berkeley’s observation is erroneous because it makes any
being dependent for its existence (esse) on the act. Scheler does not take the
interpretation of these phrases far enough to demonstrate his case convincingly. But
whether or not his point correctly pertains to these observations in the way he
thinks they do, Scheler’s main observation still holds: it is erroneous to assume that
the existence (esse) of an object, in order for it to exist, requires an act (Scheler’s
Scheler often uses the Latin, “ens intentionale,” “ens reale,” in order to credit this
distinction as originally Scholastic. The Scholastic, he writes, “on the basis of this distinction,
[distinguished] between an intentional act and a real relation between the knower and the
thing known.” Scheler, “Idealism and Realism,” 293.
49 Scheler, “Idealism and Realism,” 291.
50 Scheler, “Idealism and Realism,” 291-2.
48
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interpretation of Berkeley), but it is accurate to claim that an object, in order for it to
be an object, requires an act (Scheler’s interpretation of Leibniz).
Furthermore, Berkeley fails to recognize what Scheler calls “the transcendence
of the object” (Transzendenz des Gegenstandes) (GW IX, 190-193). This kind of
transcendence is different from what has already been discussed in the previous
chapter as the givenness of “something transcendent,” which Scheler sometimes
refers to as “the transcendence of the act”51 (Transzendenz des Aktes) (GW X, 457).
Transcendent givenness pertains to conditions of the adequation of evidential
givenness and specifically to cases when such evidential givenness, for whatever
reason, is not met; these reasons differ for Husserl and Scheler, as was discussed in
the previous chapter. The transcendence of the object, in contrast, refers to a
principle inherent to intentionality itself: to “the consciousness of transcendence
peculiar to all intentional acts.”52 Specifically, it reveals the feature that an
intentional act always and necessarily has reference “beyond the act and the content
of the act, and intends something other than the act, even when what is thought is in
turn itself a thought.”53 It was shown also in the previous chapter that Ricoeur
articulates this idea of transcendence against Husserl’s reduction. Ricoeur writes
that “the thesis of intentionality explicitly states that if all meaning is for
consciousness, then no consciousness is self-consciousness before being conscious
of something towards which it surpasses itself.”54 He goes on to ask, “is this not what
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the central discovery of phenomenology implies?”55 In this statement, Ricoeur is
referring specifically to the status of phenomenology at the time of the Logical
Investigations, but overall, the discovery of phenomenology implies a number of
things, and some things are arguably more central to phenomenology than this
conception of intentionality. Indeed, the central discovery of phenomenology for
Husserl could perhaps be placed instead upon the constituting achievement of
consciousness, and therefore, upon the transcendental status of consciousness,
which constitution requires. Husserl glorifies the absolute status of immanental
being: “the world of transcendent things is entirely dependent upon immanental
being (as absolute being), and when immanental being ‘nulla “re” indigent ad
existendum,’ [needs no other thing to exist].”56
We might recall that it was precisely on this point that made Adorno discontent
with Husserl’s phenomenology. He thought that Husserl uses transcendence and
immanence not only ambivalently, but contradictorily: it is a contradiction, on the
one hand, to make the meaning and existence of things dependent upon the
immanental being of consciousness, and on the other hand, to consider objects in
the world to be transcendent (to consciousness). If all “transcendent” things depend
on immanental being for their very being then what is it that makes them
transcendent?
I mentioned that Husserl’s problem is not quite what Adorno has in mind, or at
least Adorno applies it to where it does not pertain. On the one hand, the perception
of something external (transcendence of the object) is based upon the givenness of
55
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something transcendent. In other words, transcendence in both senses have the
same criteria: whenever the givenness of objects is more than what is meant,
indicating unfulfilled intention and adumbrated perceptual features. However, on
the other hand, what Scheler distinguishes as the transcendence of the act versus
the transcendence of the object would, for Husserl, be indistinguishable, and this
affects the extent to which Husserl is able to respond to Adorno. By Husserl’s view,
only some objects can therefore be considered transcendent to consciousness,
namely, the ones that are given to acts of external perception one-sidedly, and with
adumbration. Other objects, such as mental objects (e.g., acts of different essences),
ideal objects, irreal objects, are not adumbrated in (internal) perception in the same
way the other object are, and so these are not transcendent to consciousness in the
same way. This means, first of all, an object is transcendent only in the perceptual
inadequacy. It is better for there not to be transcendence; hence the need for a
reduction: a phenomenologically reduced intentional object can be given
adequately, and therefore, immanently. Phenomenological investigation is thereby
forced back into consciousness and its constituting features.
Secondly, Husserl maintains that consciousness and its own acts can become
objects to acts of reflection. Or in other words, acts are also objectifiable beings.
Husserl writes that “Any mental process which is an object of regard can, with
respect to ideal possibility, become ‘regarded;’ a reflection on the part of the Ego is
directed to it, it now becomes an object from the [transcendental] Ego.”57 In
contrast, Scheler states that mental processes like intentional acts, without
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exception, intend “something other than the act, even when what is thought is in
turn itself a thought.”58 A thought for Husserl certainly could be an example of
“something immanent.” But for Scheler, a thought that is intended, and objectified,
cannot be the same thought that intends it. The thought intended cannot be the
thought that intends, and the thought intended has transcendence insofar as it is
intended, even if the thought is given qualitatively as something immanent
(adequately given). An act, at the moment of the execution of the act (Vollzug), can
never be objectively represented.
Scheler’s conception of the inherent transcendence of all intentional objects (on
account of the difference between transcendent givenness and transcendence to
consciousness) responds to Adorno’s criticism of phenomenology with greater
resolution than Husserl is able. For Scheler intentionality is necessarily in reference
to objects which are, without exception, pointing beyond the “transcendental ego,”
and thereby surpassing the subject or person performing the acts. There is therefore
no longer any need to find “all thing-like being only by going back to the immediate
[and immanent] facts [of consciousness].”59 The intentionality of consciousness is, to
be sure, the occasion for encountering objects in the world and in that sense,
objects, in order to be objects, depend on acts; however, this can happen not by
retreating back into the transcendental structure of consciousness, but precisely by
“pointing beyond” or “surpassing” it.
Adorno’s more important challenge to phenomenology is with respect to the
Scheler, “Idealism and Realism,” 296.
Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften I, 375. Quoted in and translated by Ernst Wolff, “From
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ambiguity of its claims about reality. Since for Husserl, all verification must be
grounded in an intentional relation, Husserl ends up idealizing reality. As Husserl
thinks is the case with acts, reality must submit to the same kind of objectification as
everything else. Determinations of the real and unreal are intentional
determinations concerning the way consciousness intends objects. What makes the
difference, is that for Scheler, both intentional acts and the reality of objects cannot
follow the paradigm of the consciousness of transcendence. For Scheler all
intentional acts have an inherent transcendence toward objects, but not all
experienceable things are also objectifiable in the same way. For Husserl, this is
reversed: not all intentional acts refer to what is objectively transcendent (some
things can be objectively immanent), but all experienceable things must be
intentionally objectifiable. Recall that for Husserl, Erlebnisse refer to conscious
experience (the experience of “objects”) because there is no other possible kind of
experience; this is not the case for Scheler.
Existence, like acts, is independent from the consciousness of transcendence of
objects. This means that, as Scheler explains, “the principle of the transcendence of
the object is completely independent of the existential status of the objects
themselves and, thus, independent of the question whether they are produced by us
or subsist on their own.”60 After listing some contemporaries who have
misunderstood this, including, Wally Freytag, Edith Landmann, Paul Linke, Scheler
thinks this has been misunderstood “even by Husserl himself.”61 For Husserl,
something that has meaning for us is constituted in consciousness as having
60
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meaning for us, and something that has the status of actually existing (for us) is
constituted in consciousness as having the meaning of existence.62 Whatever,
therefore, has the status of real gets that status from the degree that it “matches up”
to the concept of what reality means. And this matching must be based solely upon a
synthesis of evident verification which pertains to intentional criteria of
verification.63 Husserl reneges on the distinction between intentionality and reality
that gets transcendental phenomenology off the ground in the first place; he
commits a category mistake by attempting to submit real relations as if they pertain
to intentional relations. In other words, Husserl tries to apply criteria of verification
on the level of intentionality to a domain of being that wholly resists this kind of
verification. Scheler states:
…the fact of the consciousness of transcendence is not even remotely
qualified to solve the problem of reality. … If something is an intentional
object, we cannot recognize from this fact alone, whether it is real or not. If
the perceived cherry, the conceived triangle, a friend’s visit anticipated in a
dream, Little Red Riding Hood, a freely planned project, a felt value, have
entirely different characteristics and predicates than do mental processes
and the actual contents in which these objects appear, then the distinction
between intentional and mental holds equally of both the real and the irreal.
Thus, the problem of what is real is not touched by the fact of the
transcendence of the object.64
It should be said that the transcendence of the object does not, in principle,
exclude the reality of the object, but that it simply cannot by itself discriminate
between the real and unreal. Intentional transcendence can bring the ecstatic
givenness of reality “into ‘objective’ form, and can therefore elevate that which is
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given in this way as real to the status of a real ‘object,’” but this is all that it can do.65
We must look elsewhere, beyond the structure of consciousness in order to point to
the givenness of reality in a non-contradictory way.
An additional source of verification is needed that is consistent with
phenomenological verification, not necessarily with respect to the intentional
verification of consciousness, but one that pertains within the sphere of Erlebnis.
Scheler does not discriminate between suitable and unsuitable experience, but
includes the whole range of human experience as lived experience, both the
intentional experience of objects as well as the ecstatic experience of resistance.
Ecstatic experience is not only prior to conscious activity, but, by means of
resistance, is the source of the very emergence of conscious activity. Conscious
knowledge, Scheler writes,
comes out of its original ecstatic form of simply having things…, when the act
of being thrown back on the self comes into play. This act grows out of
conspicuous resistances, clashes, and oppositions…in which the knowledge
of the knowledge of things [conscious reflection] is added to the knowledge
of things [ecstatic knowing].66
And whatever is here called “real,” is anything that is given in the experience of
resistance. Something is real, or exists, if and only if it can provide resistance to the
strivings or drives in the practical engagement within the surrounding world, not
only to human beings, but to all living creatures. It is to this experience that we have
to look to solve the problem of reality.

Reality as Resistance
65
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Conation and Reality
It is important to begin with some distinctions. Everything that is ecstatic is
always pre-conscious. However, not all ecstatic experience is also ecstatic
knowledge, insofar as knowledge is that which includes some participation
(Seinsverhaltnis) in the Sosein of a thing. What we are after is the experience of
Dasein (existence). But existence or reality cannot be an object of knowledge—
neither conscious nor ecstatic—even if the experience of reality is later represented
symbolically as x; for example, as “causality,” or as “resistance.” Resistance
(Widerstand) is that by which reality has an opportunity to arise for us, and in this
case, by means of an original ecstatic experience. “The experience of reality is…not
an ecstatic ‘knowledge of,’ but an ecstatic ‘having of’ reality.”67 But as I will show the
ecstatic experience of reality relates inextricably to certain kinds of ecstatic
knowledge, namely, of spatiality and temporality. The aim here is not only to
propose a response to Adorno’s criticism of phenomenological idealism, but to
establish the domain of historical reality specifically as a deeper, but important
aspect of nonconceptuality in Scheler’s phenomenology.
All resistance presupposes a conative experience, belonging to the sphere of
striving. Conation (Steben) refers less to the distinction between conscious and
ecstatic, and more to the distinction between the “having” of something and the
“striving,” or goal-directed movement, toward the having or the realization of
something.68 The conative striving for something is the precondition for “having” it;
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therefore, the “having of” reality requires conation. But what kind of conation?
There are different levels of human conation, beginning from the level of a “dumb
urge” (something “whelling up in us”) up to the level of intentional acts.69 Indeed, it
is arguably the case that every sphere of human experience contains some conative
movement.70 In the case of the transcendence of the object described earlier, one
could say that intentionality has an inherent conative component which accounts for
intentionality transcending the self. Scheler states, “intentio signifies a goal-directed
movement toward something which one does not have oneself or has only partially
and incompletely.”71 The first time Scheler ever refers to the experience of
resistance,72 he does so in the context of the conation of intentional willing, which he
describes as the “conation in which a content to be realized is given.”73 In fact, in this
early piece, he goes so far as to say that “that which [resists] is given only in an
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intentional experience and only in willing.”74
Over time, Scheler downplays the intentional (and exclusively volitional) context
of resistance and begins to highlight non-intentional forms of resistance, which
became far more significant for his philosophy. His later writings do not speak of
resistance exclusively in the context of intentional willing, but that intentional
(conscious) resistances have their source of movement in deeper (ecstatic) forms of
conation, namely, resistances on the level of life and drives. The human drive-life is
the motivating basis for the intentional acts of the spirit. However, Scheler’s main
point in both intentional and vital forms of conation is the same: that resistance
arises specifically in one’s practical engagement with the world, that is, in the
context of goals, purposes, projects and action. The only kind of willing that is able
to meet resistance is when “the willing of a project advances to the willing of a deed,
to the intention and impulse for movement. In this case, however, the willing has
already merged with an impulsive drive, namely, the one from which it has removed
some obstruction”75 in order for the action to be performed. For this reason, Scheler
continues, “it cannot be ‘spiritual’ [or pure] willing [that] experiences resistance.”76
Indeed, in “Idealism and Realism,” Scheler asserts that “the factor of reality is the
resistance to our continually active, spontaneous, but at the same time completely
involuntary, impulsive life.” This statement contrasts the experience of resistance
not only with conscious acts of willing, but also with a mere peripheral sensory or
perceptual experience. Resistance is rather a unified and central experience
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irreducible to kinesthetic movement; it is experienced “at the level of my ‘self’ which
may be provisionally defined as the ‘center of vital drives.’”77 Nor is resistance a
central experience that is mediated by sensations; it is rather the other way around:
sensory resistances are mediated by drives. The human drive-life is always that
which is behind the occasion for sensations. Sensations are experienced in the
course of everyday projects, and so therefore, presuppose conation. Scheler’s
example of heaviness is a telling example. One experiences something as heavy in
proportion not only to physical strength or sense-stimuli, but especially to the
degree of exertion and deployment of force. However, he explains, exertion cannot
be reduced to “sensations of tension in the muscles and sinews.” Rather, “exertion is
the centrally experienced resistance offered by the heavy object in the deployment
of the driving impulse [to lift].”78 Sensations occur on account of the drive, not the
drive on account of sensations.
It is important to note, however, that the experience of resistance does not
exclude sensory or perceptual impressions, even if the experience is not reducible to
them. Recently, Manfred Frings has equated Scheler’s theory of resistance with a
kind of “Heraclitean discordance among entities of the world.” And that, therefore,
“there cannot be social resistance [and an experience of (social) reality] in a
completely egalitarian society which would be devoid of classes, conflict, strife, and
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differences.”79 However, Scheler’s notion of resistance does not require such heavy
opposition or strife on the level of social injustice. There are always minimal but
steady resistances in a world without discord because resistance is not only in the
experience of unfulfilled drives, but also in their fulfillment, such as the fulfillment of
the drive to lift in the actual lifting of the heavy object. It is in the fulfillment of the
drive, the actual lifting, where the resistance is experienced. Perceptual resistances
to my hand as I am, for example, giving a handshake can offer an experience of
reality just as much as a punch in the face, as long as we remain aware that the
experience of the former is in the fulfillment of the drive which prompts one to
shake someone’s hand, and is not reduced to the peripheral sensations and
kinesthetic movement. Thus, reality will still be given in the context of a perfectly
harmonious social situation provided such a society is an actually existing one. The
condition for encountering resistance and reality is simply the fact of existence, and
does not require a state of social discord.
Resistances may also be experienced in the reality of the “internal world.”
Scheler discusses the “reality of something past,” or of something in the past.
Typically, the relation to past events is put in terms of conscious remembering, or
some relation to thinking and memory. Scheler instead suggests that even before we
ever bring something to mind, consciously, as a “memory,” we may experience
something in the past “through a resistance and pressure exerted on my present
lived-experience.”80 Past experiences then are not primarily given in memory
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images, but as a resistance in proportion to a drive to change something that can no
longer change. “Thus, even the actuality of the past makes itself felt primarily not as
an ‘object’ but as the resistance given to my life when it is trained on the future.”81
It should be emphasized however that a key element of Scheler’s theory of
resistance, as it would relate to this example, would maintain that it is primarily the
resistances of past experiences that impose themselves against the drive to modify
and the anxiety about the unmodifiable that is itself an example of the occasion for
bringing a memory to mind in the first place, by means of a conscious act of
remembering. Scheler explains it in the following way:
It is the…ecstatically experienced resistance that first occasions the act of
reflection through which the impulsive drive can now become a matter of
consciousness. Becoming a matter of consciousness (and the concomitant
[reference] to a ‘self’ [Ich-Bezug]) is, in all the manifold levels and grades in
which it occurs, always the result of our suffering the resistance offered by
the world. Real being is, therefore, always given to us along with anything
whatsoever which is immanent to consciousness. Thus, the experience of
reality and the advent of the being of that which is immanent to
consciousness are of at least the same degree of originality.82
A couple points concerning the passage:
(1) The last sentence is a variant of the passage that I have used as guide for this
chapter and the previous one: “the world is given in lived experience…as ‘resistance’
as immediately as it is given as an ‘object.’” However, even if real being always
accompanies everything transcendent to consciousness, this does not mean that
everything transcendent to consciousness is itself always real (like the point made
above that essence does not entail existence). The point is that the occasion for us to
turn something into an object of cognition (to objectify) which is a very deliberate
81
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effort, always presupposes a resistance that prompts us to objectify something,
which in turn presupposes an accompanying conation or drive that is meeting
resistance. Through the course of one’s being and acting in the world, some of these
acts are obstructed or go unfulfilled. This pertains more to drive unfulfillment than
to intentional unfulfillment. The actor is, as it were, “thrown back upon the self,”83
and is forced to make an object out of that which resists his or her endeavor and
project. This objectification is necessary for overcoming obstacles and learning how
to adapt to the world. The arrival of consciousness and self-consciousness emerges
out of these “conspicuous resistances, clashes, and oppositions—in sum, out of
pronounced suffering.”84 There is sometimes discrepancies of the reality of the
object. For example, a thirsty wanderer lost in the desert, who sees before him a
pond of water, even if the pond is only a mirage or hallucination, will turn the
mirage into an object and see it as water (or better, as relief of thirst). However, this
occurs only because of his drive for water, and on account of the resistance the
wander meets in fulfilling the drive to quench his thirst. This scenario requires that
the wanderer has had some experience with real water in the past.
(2) Consider Scheler’s seemingly exaggerated verbiage of “suffering [Erleidens]
the resistance of the world,” or, as he puts it elsewhere, “suffering [Leiden] at the
hands of real being.”85 We may be able to read this more tamely as “undergoing,”
however, after the birth of my daughter and being a witness of her first few years of
life, I am now confident that the “pronounced suffering” of resistance that Scheler
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suspects gives way to consciousness is perfectly fitting. The first years of a child are
dominated by suffering at the hands of the real world: when she bites down on hard
thing, or loses her step while running and crashes to the concrete, or tumbles from
her chair in the process of learning how to sit on it. Even in cases where they are not
left to their own devices, children are constantly being guided toward the right
things and away from the wrong ones, and sometimes rather aggressively. The
constant barrage of “do nots” from parents is a source of resistance. Does this
suffering and constant reminder of the real world ever really cease, even into
adulthood? It certainly decreases, but only after we learn to anticipate resistances
and gain, through practice and strength, the ability to be in the world more easily
and efficiently. We incorporate certain coping skills of that with which we have the
most practice and expertise. My hypothesis, though, is that children cry so much not
necessarily because they are particularly prone to crying, but because there is a real
world there to which they must adapt, and without any idea about how to adapt, and
even without a reflective consciousness of the world itself. Despite this, children run
headlong into the world; their conation overcomes prudent restraint. Indeed,
prudence and restraint is itself something that comes with “suffering at the hands of
the world.” Without inhibition or warning, they throw themselves into it. Even the
resistances offered to their overflowing drive energy by their own physical
inabilities is a consistent givenness of the reality of their bodies.
To make a comparison here with Husserl’s conception of the verification of
reality, one might be prompted to ask when the reality of something is experienced
most strongly. Husserl, if he were to have his way, but which he does not get even by
120

his own admission, real things would be most real when they have complete
intentional verification, and as such, no unfulfilled or unanticipated components.
Things would present themselves as most real when there is a perfect identification
of the meaning of reality (i.e., what is expected from perceptions of a real world) and
the given state of affairs; when things are fully presented, and are given entirely as
they are expected to be presented. And what we would expect in the perceptions of
reality is consistency. But not only for things to remain constant and stable in
perception, but for the opposite to be impossible.86 Real things must “hold good” for
me, infinitely. Husserl’s point is a good one. If I go to sleep in Pittsburgh and wake
up in Yemen, I may question the reality of the state of affairs. However, I may
wonder whether it is a dream until the resistance experiences impose themselves
enough to convince me of the reality that I am indeed in Yemen. Furthermore, it is
possible to dream perfect consistency. I could have a dream that I woke up in my
bed in Pittsburgh and go through my morning routine exactly in the way I normally
do. Perceptual consistency does not necessarily indicate reality.
Scheler seems to be indicating that reality is experienced most powerfully when
something obstructs the path of our anticipated plans or practical pursuits; that is to
say, in opposition to Husserl, when things do not go as expected. This is because we
do not initially anticipate resistances, and if we do, it is because we’ve encountered
them enough to factor them in. But my daughter does not run down the sidewalk
expecting to fall, if she did, she would not run as fast, or not run at all. Therefore, it is
precisely in what she is not anticipating that she experiences reality. Furthermore,
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the resistance (and reality with it) is not experienced as strongly unless the fall is a
painful one. If the world consistently follows the path of expectation, without
contrast, then there wouldn’t be any way of distinguishing the object from
consciousness—and this is precisely Adorno’s critique of Husserl. But we have the
strongest sense of reality when our ideas fail to match up with our expectation in
experience. Reality comes in powerfully when we are “blind-sided.”

The dialectic of resistance
Scheler’s description of the emergence of conscious acts from the “conspicuous
resistances, clashes, and oppositions,”87 introduces a reciprocal dynamic which
Husserl had conceived as a one-sided relation between an absolute subject and a
relative object. Scheler and Husserl agree that an object depends on an intentional
act in order to be an object. I have already discussed Scheler’s reasons for protesting
against the claim that there is an intentional reference to an object’s existential
status. Due to the fact that Husserl makes both an object’s meaning and existence
depend on consciousness, all objects depend on acts (as the objective foundation) to
be objects, but acts never depend on objects to be acts. Since Scheler does not
consider the experience of reality or existence as an intentional experience, the
experience of reality refers to a different kind of Erlebnis, namely, ecstatic
experience. But the very idea of an ecstatic experience indicates some livedexperience independent of conscious experience, and therefore, some point of origin
of consciousness and intentional acts. Therefore, according to Scheler, not only are
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(intentional) objects dependent on (intentional) acts in order to be objects, but that
also acts (consciousness) are dependent on (real, existing) “objects,” or things, in
order to be acts. However, whereas the former refers to a phenomenological
dependency, the latter refers to a metaphysical or causal dependency. Resistance is
the occasion for the emergence of acts, in order for acts to intend those resistances
as objects. This is but one part of what I mean by the dialectic of resistance.
Some reference should be made as well to Heidegger’s critique of resistance.88
The critique is basically very simple. His main point is that if resistance occurs in the
midst of our striving or endeavor for something, this presupposes the “something”
for which we are already striving, willing, desiring, etc. One must necessarily already
be “out for” something in the world in order for resistances to arise. Heidegger then
draws two conclusions about Scheler’s theory from these remarks: (1) the things in
the world, and the world itself, toward which one endeavors remains “ontologically
indeterminate.” (2) The experience of resistance is ontologically possible only on the
basis of a disclosed (and therefore, ontologically determinate) world.
To preface a response, it should clear that the term “world” (Welt) for Scheler
technically means a nexus of meaningful objects. Only a conscious and intentional
(personal) being (Geist) can have a world. Human beings do not begin (as children)
in a “world,” with a consciousness of objects; they begin rather within an

Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macqaurrie and Edward Robinson
(New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1962), 252-4. As I noted previously, Heidegger
derives his critique solely from Scheler’s summary rendition of these ideas in the notes of
“Die Formen des Wissens und die Bildung” (1925). In this citation, Heidegger mentions that
Scheler has provided a more detailed account of resistance and a critique of Dilthey’s
account in the sixth section of “Erkenntnis und Arbeit.” Heidegger, however, did not revise
his initial critique.
88

123

“environment” (Umwelt), which refers to the nexus of vital and practical relations
prior to the formation of an objective world. There is no distinction between a
subject and object on this level, nor is there, for that matter, a so-called solus ipse.89
All living beings have an environment; only personal beings have worlds. As such,
what Heidegger means by “world,” in the sense of “being-in-the-world,” refers more
closely to what Scheler means by environment. If by ontologically indeterminacy,
Heidegger is referring to a problem with Scheler’s theory, which seems to be the
case, then Scheler’s own words on the matter are sufficient: “to say that I have not
defined the mode of being of life or that I have shored it up with some
underpinnings only as an afterthought—after I have given lecture courses for years
now about the mode of being of life—is, as far as I’m concerned, as false as could
be.”90
The second conclusion requires more attention. It was already stated that the
“having of” something, such as the having of reality in resistance, presupposes some
level of conation or striving. However, it is not the case that there must be
something independent from oneself in order to be inclined toward it, or to have the
inclination, as if the thing causes the conation. It is clear that not only does some
food not have to be there in order to get hungry, but hunger does not even
presuppose that any food exists to consume. In this sense, the “object” or goal of
conation is immanent to the conation. Scheler writes that “the goal lies in the very
This point gets significant attention by Scheler in his review of Being and Time. This
review is the fifth part of Scheler’s Idealismus—Realismus (GW IX, 254-93). The review has
been partially translated by Thomas Sheehan as “Reality and Resistance: On Being and Time,
Section 43” and is contained in his book, Heidegger: the Man and the Thinker (Chicago:
Precedent Publishing, 1981), 133-43. The translation is of GW IX, 259-68.
90 Scheler, “Reality and Resistance,” 137-8.
89
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process of conation. It is not conditioned by some act of representation, but is as
immanent to the conation as ‘content’ is to representation.”91 This shows that we
are always already out for things even before there is a determinate thing for which
we are out: we are out for something to satisfy hunger (which Scheler calls the
value-content), before we have an idea just how or with what we will satisfy it
(which Scheler calls the picture-content).92 A representation is not required for
there to be some conation toward a goal or value. But Heidegger certainly does not
mean by “world,” a nexus of representations, and though this is important, it does
not fully respond to the criticism. On the one hand, it is clear that the hunger-drive
does not presuppose food. However, on the other hand, hunger has an inherent
reference to food, which is beyond the conation itself. When we get hungry, not just
anything will do. We don’t want clothes, or books, or friends; we strive for food,
even without knowing what food is, or where there is some to get. This shows there
is an inherent referential structure within conation itself, beyond conation. Scheler
would not deny this. In fact, he says something similar with respect to an
individual’s inherent reference to others. A lone man on an island, someone like
Robinson Crusoe, but one who was never before acquainted with a community,
would still feel that something is wrong, or something is missing by being alone, and
this loneliness itself indicates not only that he should be in community, but even
that there is a community to which he belongs. It is not inappropriate to relate the
two analogously. Hunger does not only indicate that it should be satisfied by food,
but that there should be food to satisfy it.
91
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Having granted this situation, it seems Scheler would think that such a
referential totality is not enough to constitute a “world.”93 Furthermore, Scheler
would insist that such a nexus of references could, at best, constitute a value-world
(before the value-references are represented as values), but of course such an idea
Heidegger would adamantly deny. The main point, however, is that this world
contains no objects and does not exist (which may make one wonder what exactly is
disclosed about it). Even if hunger indicates that there should be food, it does not
and cannot guarantee that any food exists, nor even the reality that there is not any
food. Robinson Crusoe may feel that there is a community to which he belongs, but
the community that once existed may not exist anymore. Even if conation refers to a
real world, Scheler’s point remains that it cannot be given as real without resistance.
Whatever merit Heidegger’s criticism has, it does not touch what Scheler claims
resistance discloses about the world: its reality. Whatever the world means prior to
the disclosure of reality can only be constituted by a rather vague conation toward
values, and only toward lower (vital, pleasure, use) values.
A “world” for Scheler in the fullest sense of the term is completely constituted as
simultaneously a value-world, an objective world, and a real world. Scheler claims
that the things that compose the world are of value, objective, and real,
simultaneously, but if they are not given this way, certain things have to be given
first in order for others to be given (according to the order of givenness). This sense

Scheler makes the charge of indeterminacy against Heidegger concerning his notions
of world and worldliness as Heidegger does against Scheler’s concept of life. At best, one
would have a sense of movement, spatiality, and temporality prior to resistance, “but in no
way a ‘world,’ let alone one world. … The ‘referential totality of significance’ seems to me a
very vague and ill-defined concept.” Scheler, “Reality and Resistance,” 138.
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of “world,” however, is a reciprocal and dialectical achievement. I have been
attempting to show through the opening chapters of this work the various
dialectical levels in play. In the previous chapter, I wrote of an intentional dialectic
in the sphere of givenness and intuition. This is not strictly speaking an historical
dialectic, though a temporal component is affirmed as a factor. There, I suggest a
dialectic is noticeable throughout the course of the givenness of reality. I also
maintained that it is unnecessary to decide whether either Scheler or Husserl is
more correct on the issue of a foundation of givenness, which is supposed to decide
whether either sense content or meaning content is more “foundational.” The two
positions are not mutually exclusive because sensation and meaning always already
involve each other, and both Husserl and Scheler agree with their interrelation, even
if they are unwilling to speak of their interdependence. Likewise, in contrast to both
Scheler’s and Heidegger’s claims, there is no need to decide whether resistance or
the conation toward the world is more “foundational.” Conation and resistance
always already involve each other. Being “out for” something will meet resistance
and the resistance discloses the reality of the things we are out for. To claim one or
the other as “foundational” or is an independent variable, presupposes a subjectobject polarity that the very theory, in both cases, disregards. A world can only
emerge through the course of resistances, and resistances require a worldly context.

Temporality and History
This worldly context, which pertains only to drive-based conation, is at best a
practical world. However, it is a practical world prior to its conceptualization as a
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practical world, before it is an objective world that can be an object of intentional
acts. My final point is that, as a practical world, the world is not only necessarily a
real world, but it is also necessarily a historical world; that is to say, all projects, as
pursuits of modification are necessarily temporal. The specific things that we are
able to take as paths of practical action are all contained within the general form of
becoming (Werdesein). This form of becoming is temporality. And becoming has two
aspects of variation: the variation of movement (Bewegung) and the variation of
modification (Veränderung). In the tendency to move, and the experience of the
power or potentiality to move, even prior to the movement itself, there is an
experience of a different location to which I can move and another place to occupy.
Accordingly, we come to an awareness of a general “simultaneous apartness”
(gleichzeitiges Auseinandersein, lit. being apart at the same time), which is the
essence of spatiality. The essence or phenomenon of spatiality is self-given only on
account of the lived-experience of the essence of motion (i.e., apartness). Spatiality
is the variation of motion characterized both by simultaneity and reversibility. This
means that spatial movement refers to a manifold of simultaneously given places to
move and the ability to return to the previously occupied places after movement
(the movement can reverse its course). Furthermore, the awareness of spatiality is
not reducible to perceptual awareness, but the perception is conditioned by the
drive to move. Indeed, one would perceive simultaneous apartness only in relation
to the tendency and power to move, not vice versa.
Spatiality has an original ecstatic givenness, which only later becomes a form of
the ordering of places, and is that which turns a place (I can occupy) into a space
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(that can be thought and measured independent of my occupation). But spatiality is
not objectified until, through the course of movement, one encounters resistances
and is thrown back upon oneself and forced to reflect upon what it is that has
resisted one’s movement. Scheler explains this in the following way:
If a center of impulse meets with resistance several times, the resistant x,
y, z, etc., insofar as they are grasped in their relationship to one another, are
represented in a space which affords scope to their possible effects upon and
movement toward one another. We can also say that the schema of the
[“surrounding experiences” (Herumerlebnisses)] which [were] previously
related to the individual…is now objectified; it thereby becomes independent
of the existence and characteristics of the individual man. … The space of the
surrounding world [or “environment-space” («Umwelt»raum)], which is
relative to the organism, now becomes a world-space [«Welt»raum]. … Just as
the one subjectively given space is only the sum total of our possibilities of
spontaneous movement, so “objective” space is only the sum total of the
possibilities of movement and changes of position on the part of the bodies
themselves.94
One of Scheler’s central purposes of this passage is to show that the experience of
resistance or reality precedes the objectification of space or spaces and the
calculation of them geometrically, or the conscious ordering of objects and the
extension of objects in relation to a so-called “empty” space.95
Spatiality, then, is defined as a separation without succession (the simultaneous
apartness of places) relative to the power of self-movement. Simultaneity, or the
Scheler, “Idealism and Realism,” 338-9.
Scheler makes great effort to dispel what he calls the “illusion” of the theories of
“empty space” (and “empty time”). I am unable to give the complete refutation here,
however, his central claim is that that which is objectified about space and time as “empty”
is derived from the subjective experience of the unfulfillment of drives. The “phenomenon
of the void” (non-being) is an objective derivative of the “void of the heart.” (Scheler,
“Idealism and Realism,” 331-5). In fact, Scheler suggests that all our various objective
determinations of different spaces (continuity, three-dimensionality, and limitlessness) are
all derivatives of drive-conditions: Continuity of space arises from the continuity of
movement. Three-dimensionality refers to the three possible directions of movement: rightleft; up-down; backward-forward. Limitlessness, though unintelligible conceptually, arises
from the ability to continue self-movement in a single direction as long as we like (Scheler,
“Idealism and Realism,” 337-8).
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absence of succession, entails reversibility. However, the phenomenon of apartness
entails neither simultaneity nor reversibility. There is another phenomenon of
variation that is also based upon the givenness of “apartness,” but which is both
non-simultaneous and irreversible: this is the essence of temporality. Temporality is
separation with succession; it is an “‘apartness’ of ‘becoming’ [Werdensein].”96
Temporality is given in transition (Überganges), or better, in the power to affect a
qualitative alteration or modification, in two ways: a transition from essence to
existence (von Sosein in Dasein), or a transition from a being with such and such a
character to another character (von Sosein in Andersein). The experience of
temporality, in other words, is contained in the experience of the ability to realize
(i.e., bring into existence) and refashion or re-characterize (i.e., modify qualitative
conditions) aspects referring to one’s own self or circumstances, spontaneously (i.e.,
by oneself). All temporal variation is characterized by irreversibility. Unlike spatial
movement, the modified self cannot return to the previous state from which it
started.
Scheler describes the ecstatic experience of temporality in the following way:
“To have or to want to do ‘first’ one thing, ‘then’ another, to have barely enough time
to do it, to have ‘already taken care of it,’ this dynamically experienced ordering or
projects, not objects, is the basic experience of temporality.”97 Indeed, Scheler
continues, “A creature that did not modify itself would have no access to time.”98
Throughout the course of these practical pursuits and projects, one inevitably

Scheler, “Idealism and Realism,” 340.
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98 Scheler, “Idealism and Realism,” 340.
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encounters resistance by means of obstructions and obstacles in trying to complete
these tasks. And in the course of these resistances, the actor begins to notice
determinate characteristics or modalities of the status of his or her projects: “that
which I am doing right now,” that which I am no longer able to do,” or “that which I
am still able to do.” These practical modalities are later conceptualized as “present,”
“past,” and “future,” respectively.
Among these practical modalities, future-time occupies a privileged position
since its meaning refers to the entire field of possible realization or modification.
The future is the openness of possibilities into which anticipatory conation
penetrates, but which experiences with it no resistance in the anticipation of
realization or modification. Future means: “that which [one] can ‘still’ manage,
which [one] can ‘still’ keep under control, that for which [one] can ‘still’ care
[Sorgen].”99 The future is the possibility of spontaneous self-becoming through
spontaneous self-modification. However, the modality of future, is called “future” or
conceptualized this way only after the givenness of the present and the past.
Resistances or obstructions to projects “throws someone back…upon the present,
and, further, upon what is given as ‘already having been’ [i.e., the past].”100 It is
about that past that one experiences the most resistance since that which is given as
past refers to “that over which we no longer have any power, that which our
powerlessness runs up against.”101
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“It is the experience of reality and of resistance to our striving for selfmodification which forces this objectification of temporality as the [form of the]
possibility of the modification of real things.”102 There is something rather
remarkable about the way Scheler frames the dynamic of time: it is in the course of
the human endeavor to bring something into existence (qualitative self-modification
or recharacterization) that we encounter existence. It is in the effort realization that
one discovers reality, and it is found precisely as a resistance to the very attempt to
bring about a new reality or a change to reality. This is the final aspect of what I call
the dialectic of resistance. Through this section I have articulated three aspects; it is
worthwhile to pause to summarize all three in the context of temporality.
1. The reciprocal dynamic between act and object. Along with the
(phenomenological) dependency of objects upon intentional acts, there is a
sense in which the very structure of acts depends (metaphysically) upon the
resistances with the reality of objects. Acts and objects always already entail
each other, even if in different ways. Neither acts nor objects are all-together
foundational, but each have a process of becoming, and they come-to-be
dialectically. This specific dialectic yields the emergence of consciousness
and an objective world.
2. The reciprocal dynamic between resistance and conation. Just as it
impossible to posit a “world” toward which we strive, prior to the emergence
of the reality of the world through resistance, so it is impossible to posit
resistance and the givenness of reality prior to the context of strivings. The
102
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tendency toward things that are inherent to drives, and the resistances this
tendency meets in the course of striving for fulfillment accounts not only for
an objective world, but particularly for an objective world that is also a real
world.
3. The reciprocal dynamic between reality and the process of realization. This is
closely related with the previous dialectic in that it refers to a conative
process meeting some resistance, but it yield the emergence of the becoming
of the world in time and history, namely, that which is experienced in the
resistances to the effort to make something come-to-be, or to make the
modifications of oneself come-to-be. This aspect of the dialectic of resistance
is the closest so far to a critical theorist conception dialectic as that which is
imbedded in the movement of history. In Scheler, I suggest we notice a clear
and similar dialectic between the attempt to change ourselves and our
conditions with the status of the way the conditions are at any given time.
The attempt to create a new reality meets resistance with the present reality.
This has all sorts of social implications which will be a task of the succeeding
chapters to work out. It is noticeable at least at this point that if we can
fashion or refashion the world and society exactly as we see fit, without
resistance, then the world would be indistinguishable from an imaginary
world, a u-topia (“no place,”): a world that does not exist.
Temporality is becoming; it is the ecstatic experience of the transition between
non-simultaneous happenings. Moreover, the process of life itself has the
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ontological status of becoming.103 Temporality, which refers to the very process of
becoming, cannot therefore be part of this process. Or in other words, cannot be
existentially relative to living things alone. As such, temporality must be the form of
the life-process itself; that which encompasses the entirety of the process.
Temporality is distinguished from spatiality on this point. Only living beings can
experience the ability to move between simultaneously separate places. But not all
becoming is spatial. On the one hand, temporality, like spatiality, does include a
reference to apartness or separation of “happenings.” However, the experience of
spatiality only refers to the happenings of occupying (or the power to occupy)
specific places, as opposed to other possible ones. The experience of the power to
modify (to strive for modification and realization), on the other hand, does not
require spatial movement, nor is it existentially relative only to the movement of
living beings. Rather, it is possible for there to be non-spatial becoming, such as, but
not limited to, physical or psychological healing; the development of consciousness
or forms of thinking; the enrichment of culture; the realization of moral (good and
evil) and non-moral (beauty and knowledge) values; the flourishing of the person,
etc.
The character of the irreversibility of modification is evident in these cases.
Furthermore, the content of the history of a people is not confined simply to the
story of their spatial becoming, that is to say, not limited to the time of their
reversible movement from place to place either of the a whole community or of each
individual. Rather, history is a unique narrative of the irreversible becoming (the
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development and degeneration) of persons and cultures. Insofar as history is
temporal, it refers to the tale of qualitative alteration. It is not only a story of a
people’s life, but in the course of their life, it is the story, more importantly, of the
becoming of spirit (Geist), with respect to individual persons or their collective
person (Gesamtperson), where the being of the person is in part a spiritual being.
According to this understanding of temporality, there necessarily arises a
qualitative difference or difference of character in every moment of time,104 a
character to which an individual person or community cannot simply revert back.
Again, temporality is not relative to the being of life. Rather, as the form of the
being of life, time is “absolute” with respect to life. Scheler’s notion of “absolute
time,” however, may be initially misleading. For example, it does not indicate
Scheler’s agreement with Newton’s theory of absolute time which is necessarily
imperceptible and only measurable mathematically, nor does it indicate a rejection
of Einstein’s theories of relativity which demonstrate that the perception and
measurement of motion and rest is necessarily relative to a specific frame of
reference from which one is perceiving and measuring. Scheler admits that what he
calls absolute time is in fact relative to spirit, by which a person is able to “see the
life process itself and the form of its becoming.”105 He also admits that “there are as
many absolute times as there are individuals, societies, and organic unities.”106
What, then, makes time in this manner, absolute? It is absolute because it is the
fullest expression of temporality, and like temporality, refers to the entire process of
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becoming and not only a single kind of becoming. It is also considered absolute
because it is contrasted with “physical time.” That which both Newton and Einstein,
as physicists, are able to say about time is not only relative to persons, or to living
things, but is relative specifically to physical things, and even more specifically, to
the reversible and simultaneous motion of physical things.
We can expect at least three things from a physical theory of time. First,
temporality is indistinguishable from spatiality since any determination of time can
only be measured according to spatial determinations, that is, with respect to the
time it takes for something to move between different spatial locations—from where
it is now, to where it will be. Second, that which the physicist calls time is
necessarily devoid of a past, present, and future since these only make sense in
relation to a living being, and a living present; such modalities are not as much
relative to a living being’s location, but is relative to that being’s life. That which the
physicist may call “past,” “present” and “future” only refers to a linear succession of
now-points that fall “before” the now and “after” the now. Third, as a mere continual
sequence of now-points, “one and the same event can, in principle, ‘recur’” in time.
Not only is the motion of physical time reversible, it is repeatable. Physical time is
measurable because it assumes a set of events connected only by causal relations.
Consequently, there can be events or “happenings,” but these events bear no
“history.”
We cannot begin to understand Scheler’s notion of absolute time until we
disengage it entirely from these antithetical notions which pertain to physicalrelative time. According to Scheler’s absolute time, events follow “a rhythm
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immanent to the events themselves.”107 As such, it is perhaps possible to understand
the meaning of absolute time not only as “vital time” (in contrast to physical time)
but also as immanent time, where the contents of history are immanent to or
inseparable from their historical position. Indeed, the very meaning or essence of
absolute time is a “time in which temporal positions and locations, on the one hand,
and temporal contents, on the other, are necessarily connected with one another.”108
Absolute time is essentially historical, and is the essence of history. Scheler writes,
“It belongs to the nature of history that a past is at every moment still active and
living, and that the contents of this past are variously brought into relief by the tasks
belonging to the future.”109
According to what has been said with respect to the relation of reality and time,
it is necessarily the case that everything that is taken as object—every object one
knows or ignores, prefers or rejects, loves or hates—is an object of historical reality.
All objects are both real and temporal. Even if an object of knowledge is an ideal or a
theory, the very fact that it is something that has arisen for us as an object means
that it has arisen from the a drive-context of modification, through the dialectic of
resistance. Throughout these initial chapters, I have attempted to show the way in
which Scheler’s phenomenology leads him, in a continuous way, from phenomena to
an historical reality irreducible to phenomena. I have demonstrated also what I take
to be the dialectical levels at play within this process. A crowning achievement of
Scheler’s philosophy, as we have seen so far, is not only to arrive at an encounter
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with history and reality that are irreducible to phenomena, but to do so in a way
that is also not antithetical to phenomenology. Scheler has followed a
phenomenological path the entire way through. As I take the context of this
achievement and their dialectical features into the context of society, with the next
chapter, it should be assumed that it will not be enough for Scheler to investigate
society as a mere phenomenon, but which also does not discount or neglect the
phenomenological givenness of society. Scheler will set out to investigate social
reality, that is to say, society as an aspect of historical reality, and he will do this in
this sociology of knowledge with attention to the way social reality conditions
cognition.
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4
SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE DISPUTE ABOUT VALUES
From all that has been explored, it is likely that claims about phenomenological
idealism and now be laid to rest. Phenomenology is not a method of logical
immanence; it is a living philosophical enterprise constantly engaged in uncovering
the original contents of experience and the essence of these contents. Thinking is
immersed within the sphere of life, namely, the drive-life that receives and provides
resistance in a real and historical context, for there can be no “object” without
resistances to the practical projects of human life. The existence of an object is the
primary condition for the possibility of something becoming an object of
philosophy, even if a philosopher’s knowledge of the object is not itself limited to the
object as existing.
Due to the expansiveness of the phenomenological domain, Scheler was
confident that other fields of research could be renewed and revitalized if
investigated phenomenologically. To investigate them phenomenologically means,
among other things, to maintain a consistent regard toward what shows itself
originally in the execution (Vollzug) of acts with regard to a specific domain of
objects, and without presupposing pre-established conceptual and methodological
criteria. Indeed, phenomenology, he thought, is a good way for scholars to avoid
preconceived ideas and ideological thinking. This is simply to research with a
phenomenological attitude. Such an “attitude” is a mark of the researcher, not the
method of research; it is therefore not incompatible with any method of research.
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In his work, “Erkenntnis und Arbeit” (1925), Scheler thought that philosophy
was only then beginning to realize that what had been called “epistemology” in
philosophy throughout the modern period relied upon methods of the positive
sciences, and among them, primarily methods adapted for the mathematical natural
sciences and historical research (GW VIII, 201). To the detriment of philosophy,
“epistemology” had for so long recognized only a single kind of knowledge. He
writes that,
What “knowledge” means in religion, art, mythology, and language and how
this knowledge is to be classified in the system of all knowledge are
questions that are only now beginning to be asked and suspected, now after
the long dreary period when philosophy had degraded itself to be the
handmaiden of this or that specialized science (GW VIII, 201).1
Scheler expressed enthusiasm that new epistemologies for all kinds of fields
were beginning to develop: epistemologies of the natural worldview, of biology, of
objective spirit and subjective spiritual acts, objectifying psychology, observation of
the self and other (der Selbst- und Fremdbeobachtung), and of metaphysics itself
(GW VIII, 201). Scheler’s support for the practice of tailoring particular theories of
cognition for specific domains of research meant that social research should also
have its own “epistemology” irreducible to methods of natural science and that it
could achieve this by utilizing phenomenology in order to take a fresh look at the
objects it researches. Furthermore, if it is proposed, as critical theorists do, that
immanent critique or some form of self-reflection is important for social research,
one can hypothesize in light of Scheler’s statements that phenomenology is not
antithetical but an assistance even to these kinds of social research.
Translation adapted from, Scheler, Cognition and Work, trans. Zachary Davis
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, forthcoming). Unpublished manuscript.
1
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Indeed, sociologists had been debating the methodological approach of its
discipline for some time, but especially since the end of the nineteenth century. A
Methodenstreit, or dispute on methods, began between Gustav Schmoller from the
German historical school who insisted upon an historical approach to political
economy. In 1883, the Austrian School’s Carl Menger criticized Schmoller’s views
and advocated the independence of economics from historiography. Economics
became, thereafter, one of the first social disciplines to acquire independence from
sociohistorical research and acquire more positivistic methods.2 Carl Menger’s
Principles of Economics is best known now for its economic theory of human action,
or “Praxeology,” and its formative influence on the Austrian libertarianism of
Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig von Mises, and more recently the “anarcho-capitalism”
of Murray Rothbard and others.
The legacy of this initial dispute continued within different sociological
controversies. I focus on two methodological disputes surrounding the growth and
development of the social sciences in Germany in the twentieth century.3 First, the
“value judgment dispute” (Werturteilsstreit), initiated in 1909 by Max Weber and
others at the Vienna general meeting of the Verein für Sozialpolitik. A newer
generation of sociologists made another go at Schmoller on whether the Verein
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should remain a “forum for political evaluation and goals.”4 It was affirmed that it
should, but it also gave rise to another organization concerned with “value free
scientific research.” The new German Sociological Association that began in 1910
was intended to have this function.
Though the issue about value judgments never ceased to be controversial, it was
only again officially revisited by the German Sociological Association in Tubingen at
the 1961 Congress, but now involving the Frankfurt School. The initial exchange
between Karl Popper and Theodor Adorno, followed by subsequent commentators,
has since been called the “positivist dispute” (Positivismusstreit).
For Scheler—a philosopher who had made a name for himself with his peculiar
approach to a material value ethics, and now teaching in a Sociology department at
Cologne—the concern that was arguably greater than the place of value was the role
of philosophy; only after the scope of philosophy is settled could the question of
value be raised. Scheler was hired at the University of Cologne in 1919, the year of
the publication of Max Weber’s essay “Science as a Vocation” which insisted on the
value neutrality of science. A year later, when Scheler’s Vom Ewingen im Menschen
was completed, he included in this volume his essay “The Nature of Philosophy,” in
which Scheler argues for the autonomy of philosophy. It is evident that Scheler was
not simply writing to other philosophers but primarily to the perpetrators of the
false dichotomy between Wissenschaft and Weltanschauung (science and
worldview) and those wanting to align philosophy with either one. He comes down
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hardest on those who want to call philosophy science. This includes Husserl, as well
as Baden School Neo-Kantians: Windelband and Rickert, and by extension Rickert’s
disciple, Max Weber, whose exclusion of value entails an exclusion of philosophy.
But Scheler’s essay also has great relevance as a response to Habermas who, as I
explored in Chapter 1, suggests that phenomenology takes the value-free
objectivism of science beyond science itself by perfects the task of separating
knowledge from interests.
In what follows, I will explore the controversies of this methodological crisis
period, highlighting Scheler’s response. Finally, I will introduce the Postivismusstreit,
the Frankfurt School concerns on the issue of philosophy and value and a
comparison with Scheler’s.

The Crisis of Philosophy
Even with the prevalent acknowledgment of Kant’s influence on subsequent
philosophy, it is not often acknowledged that his Prolegomena to Any Future
Metaphysics had in fact accomplished precisely what it sought. Any subsequent
metaphysics, every philosophy, nay, all relevant research that wanted to be taken
seriously by the wider world of scholarship wouldn’t dare not to acknowledge the
Kantian Revolution. Kant challenges the rationalist assumption that the level of
reality of an object is determined precisely by its level of intelligibility and proximity
to a formal realm accessible only by the mind. While Plato, for example, took
concepts to be the best approximation of reality, Kant separates concept and reality
and the two find some limited approximation only in judgment. Moreover, while
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Plato held intelligibility to be the measure of reality, which makes material being,
because of its incessant flux, a rather poor example of the real, Kant, influenced by
empiricism, equates reality with empirical content, but which “in itself” is
unintelligible.
Although Kant’s separation of concept and reality and Hegel’s subsequent
historicization of knowledge have had tremendous influence on the development of
philosophy, they were ironically also key contributions to a crisis of philosophy. By
the mid-nineteenth century, naturalist scholars (including Ludwig Büchner, Jacob
Moleschott, and Karl Vogt) “argued for the end of philosophical dominance over the
natural sciences. Instead, they called for the universal validity of scientific method as
the only legitimate path to truth.”5 The battle for prominence and legitimation
between philosophy and positive science intensified surrounding the question
whether philosophy is the “science of the sciences,” or whether the scientific method
satisfied within itself all philosophical requirements.
It was not long until the reality and concept opposition became the grounds for
an intellectual antagonism between rationalism and irrationalism. The strength of
positivism in diminishing the role of philosophy by exclusivizing scientific
methodology, pressured Neo-Kantians to revise the purpose of philosophy, and to
do so scientifically in order to legitimate it. The two important bastions of NeoKantianism, in the Marburg (e.g., Cohen, Natorp, Cassirer) and Baden (e.g.,
Windelband and Rickert) territories of Germany, made valiant efforts of legitimizing

Charles Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1995), 22. See also, Herbert Schnädelbach, Philosophy in Germany, 18311933 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), Chap. 3.
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philosophy. The Southwestern Baden School, especially, reacted by making
philosophy different in stature, but the same in character, as the sciences.
Philosophy was, for them, a science; not just one science among others, but the
ultimate one, the “Wissenschaft der Wissenschaft”6—the science which dictates to
the positive sciences their logical and methodological limits.7
Likely in part a response to this late modern crisis-period, a movement of
irrationalism arose distancing itself from both philosophy and science and tapping
into more artistic modes of expression. Although the movement, like Romanticism,
occurred largely as a literary and artistic one, some philosophers propagated the
view by emphasizing non-rational dimensions of experience, such as vital urge,
feeling, or will. And also like Romanticism, the irrationalist trends drew in
philosophers who used the context to emphasize the movement’s philosophical
dimension and as leverage to assert the difference between philosophy and science
insofar as there was philosophical significance to these modes of expression. We
may point to Nietzsche as a primary transmitter of this view philosophically into the
twentieth century and for the succeeding Lebensphilosophie and psychoanalytic
lines of thought. The sociology of knowledge could also not have arisen without the
movement’s impetus.
Karl Mannheim identifies the origins of irrationalism sociologically as deriving
from the insight that the individual mind cannot be conceived independently from
the group and also from a collective unconscious. He explains that, in the past,
6 Heinrich Rickert, “Einführung in die Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik,” Heidelberg
Manuscript., 59, 4-4a.
7 See Schnädelbach, Philosophy in Germany, 1831-1933, and Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey,
and the Crisis of Historicism.
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modern epistemology and psychology implemented a powerful tradition of
theoretical individualism. A similar individualism also characterizes non-historical,
analytic sciences. Sociology, according to Mannheim, needed to correct this tradition
by insisting that “knowledge is from the beginning a co-operative process of group
life…within the framework of a common fate, a common activity, and the
overcoming of common difficulties.”8 This insight reveals that knowledge always
points to a “community of experiencing prepared for in the subconscious.”9 He
explains further:
once the fact has been perceived that the largest part of thought is erected
upon a basis of collective actions, one is impelled to recognize the force of the
collective unconscious. The full emergence of the sociological point of view
regarding knowledge inevitably carries with it the gradual uncovering of the
irrational foundation of rational knowledge.”10
It is important for social research to begin not with a single individual but within a
socio-historical context, from which the modes and patterns of thought the
individual takes up are already prepared by a collective unconscious. “Unmasking”
these social-determining factors of thinking, ideological or otherwise, is, according
to Mannheim, the task of a sociology of knowledge.
The rise of positivism forced philosophers to take sides about the purpose of
philosophy: did philosophy align with the side of the concept, logic, and “objective”
science, or the side of reality, life, and “subjective” Weltanschauungen? An aggressive
campaign against Neitzsche and Lebensphilosophie is most clearly seen in Rickert.
According to him, Lebensphilosophie and Weltanschauungsphilosopie were
8 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge,
trans. Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (New York: Mariner Books, 1955), 30.
9 Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, 31. My emphasis.
10 Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, 31.

146

dangerously committing philosophy to an antiphilosophical position.11 Rickert
states vehemently in his Die Philosophie des Lebens, “If it achieves dominance, it is to
be feared that the misological modish philosophy of life will lead to the death of
philosophy as a science. I believe, therefore, that I serve the life of philosophy when I
attack this ‘philosophy of life.’”12
Rickert was an influential Freiburg colleague of his contemporary, Max Weber.
In a lecture at Munich University in 1918, Weber kept with the Neo-Kantian
tradition by heralding a voice against the post war anti-scientific climate, defending
the rational objectivity of science. The lecture was published the following year
under the title “Science as a Vocation.” Not only was it directed toward the
irrationalism characteristic of the German youth, but also to “a few big children” in
the professoriate. At one point, Weber hearkens back to the image of the cave in
Plato’s Republic where the philosopher is led to the light of the sun. “The sun is the
truth of science, which alone seizes not upon illusions and shadows but upon the
true being.”13 However, he continues:
Today youth feels rather the reverse: the intellectual constructions of science
constitute an unreal realm of artificial abstractions, which with their bony
hands seek to grasp the blood-and-the-sap of true life without ever catching
up with it. But here in life, in what for Plato was the play of the shadows on
the walls of the cave, genuine reality is pulsating; these are derivatives of life,
lifeless ghosts, and nothing else.14
Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism, 87.
Rickert, Die Philosophie des Lebens, xiv. Translated and cited in Bambach, Crisis of
Historicism, 87.
13 Max Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” From Max Weber, ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright
Mills (New York: Routledge, 2009), 140.
14 Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” 140-1. It is a mistake to presume that with this
passage, Weber gives an endorsement of Plato’s view of reality, or that he takes
irrationalism to be incorrect simply on the basis of it departure from Plato’s view. For his
purposes, he is attempting to present the contrast in the starkest possible terms.
11
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It is worthwhile to consider, as John Staude does, what Scheler’s reaction was “to the
anti-rationalist tendencies in Weimar Germany?”15 My assessment interprets
Scheler position to these trends differently than Staude does, who considers Scheler
one of Weber’s ally. As I read Scheler, he endorses the Kantian dichotomy between
reason and reality that is operative in Neo-Kantianism and implied in irrationalism.
This is because it is not fitting to call the totality of being, “real being” since beings
that are real constitute only a single sphere of all being, nor is it fitting to suggest
that only rational beings have access to reality. Reality is rather that which provides
resistance to practical conation, something of which animals, arguably, have a
keener experience, and human beings experience insofar as they are animals—not
insofar as they are rational.
Traditionally, within the Platonic paradigm, that mode of being that can provide
resistance, namely, material being, is the least real within the so-called “great chain
of being” precisely because it is the most remote from formal reality. For Scheler, on
the other hand, the formal intelligibility of being does not constitute the realness of
real beings. There is nothing about the logical coherence or rational development of
history (Hegel and Marx), that will by itself convince us of the reality of the
perception of material or organic processes. Something’s reality will in no way be
given in experience simply on account of its logic or intelligibility. In fact, in one very
important respect, Scheler’s understanding of reality inverts the entire traditional
view about the real. Whereas the tradition would say that the real is the knowable
John Staude, Max Scheler (1874-1928): An Intellectual Portrait (New York: The Free
Press, 1967), 149.
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148

(the rational, the intelligible), Scheler insists that the real is necessarily
unknowable.16 Consciousness does not participate intellectually with the existence
(Dasein) of a real being, but only with the being-thus (Sosein), the intentional
correlate, of a real being. Moreover, the “being-thus” including the essence of
something can be given in an hallucination or illusion just as much as in an
experience of something real. The distinguishing factor is not its intelligibility but its
ability to provide resistance. Nor does this indicate that reality is “irrational,” but
that the very application of rationality or irrationality to existence amounts to a
category mistake. The bare existence of a thing is neither intelligible nor
unintelligible for it is only the being-thus or what-ness (Sosein) of a thing that can
lay claim to intelligibility, not the being-there or that-ness of it (Dasein).
The aspects of Scheler’s thought presented in previous chapters that highlight
the importance of vital, pre-logical, and pre-conscious modes of experience already
testify to the affirmation Scheler would have given, and did give, to
Lebensphilosophie. He also tended to highlight the thought of other non-German
philosophers who elevate the importance of non-rational elements, for example, St.
Augustine and Pascal, who Scheler interprets as emphasizing the autonomy of

Ironically, this shows both Scheler’s proximity to and distance from Kantian
philosophy. It shows on the one hand that reality is separate from rational categories in its
givenness. But on the other hand, to say that reality is unknowable does not mean that real
beings are unknowable (for they are knowable in their Sosein) nor that conceptual
categories are required for the intelligibility of things; only that the realness (Dasein) of
beings is unknowable. The difference is in Scheler’s and Kant’s conceptions of reality. Kant’s
conception is dealing with the spectre of Plato (and rationalism), and so it includes
something like a Ding as Sich, but Scheler does not deal with this metaphysical notion of
reality as form, and so interprets reality phenomenologically as resistance-experience, and
experience that non-rational beings tend to have more powerfully than rational ones.
16
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love,17 and Duns Scotus and Maine de Biran, who emphasize the autonomy of the
will. Furthermore, the reason Scheler had always put great importance on the figure
of St. Francis of Assisi is because of his attunement to nature that was
uncharacteristic of the rationally-charged heritage of Western Christianity. This
trend to expand philosophically relevant experience beyond rational categories
continued until Scheler’s final essays. And thus, the development of a
physiologically- and vitally-charged metaphysics and philosophical anthropology
only deepened.
Staude wrongly diagnoses Scheler’s reaction to irrationalism. He writes,
“Whereas before and during the war [Scheler] had attacked the Western scientific
tradition, now [after the war] Scheler firmly repudiated the Lebensphilosophie of the
conservative revolution.”18 Staude goes on to say that Scheler forsakes religion for
social science,19 and that he abandons his venture for solidarity for the sociology of
knowledge and the systematization of the totality of viewpoints.20 According to
Staude, Scheler had since become a “spokesperson of rationalism,”21 and an “apostle
of reason.”22 These statements significantly overstate the case and make Scheler’s

In his essay, “Liebe und Erkenntnis,” which primarily focuses on St. Augustine’s
philosophy, Scheler arguably overstates just how much St. Augustine pushed for the
independence of love from reason. See, Scheler, On Feeling, Knowing, and Valuing, ed. Harold
Bershady (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
18 Staude, Max Scheler, 149.
19 Staude, Max Scheler, 137.
20 Staude, Max Scheler, 145.
21 Staude, Max Scheler, 150.
22 Staude, Max Scheler, 152. Staude’s interpretation of Scheler’s late philosophy stems
from an older and arguably, very destructive interpretation that attempts to align reversals
and crises in Scheler’s intellectual life with reversals and crises in his personal life. Peter
Spader treats this “psychological” interpretation of Scheler’s thought very well in Scheler’s
Ethical Personalism: Its Logic, Development and Promise (New York: Fordham UP, 2002). My
concern is that what has been advertised as a way to explain changes in Scheler’s thought by
17
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reversal (if such evidence even exists) too radical. However, it is just as inaccurate to
speak of Scheler’s philosophy, as Peter Hamilton does, as an “anti-positivist
crusade,” which wages “a war against the ‘cult of science’…[that] was responsible for
the conflicts and social pathologies of modern life.”23
Staude points to two portions of Scheler’s writings as evidence for his
interpretation. First, in the second edition of The Nature of Sympathy (1922),
Scheler recants part of his criticism of the modern humanitarian movement that he
makes in an earlier piece on ressentiment and moral value-judgment before the
war.24 In the section that Staude cites, Scheler writes that previously he had
put forward the opinion that the ‘modern idea of benevolence’
(humanitarianism, philanthropy, etc.) has been ‘worked up’ entirely from
motives of resentment against patriotism and the Christian love of God and
the person. This amounts to repudiating it as a genuine, ‘autonomous’
movement of love with a positive basis of its own in the fabric of the human
spirit, and regarding it merely as a gesture of defiance and protest against the
Christian conception of personal and divine love on the one hand, and
patriotism on the other.25
Scheler then makes the admission that “it is only this exaggeration [and
polemical employment] of the value of benevolence which proceeds from

means of what was going on in his life, has become an excuse to discredit and disregard
aspects of his thought as a symptom of the questionable way Scheler was living. As Spader
put it, “…to claim that [Scheler’s personal] turmoil [is] the sole reason for the change in
thought does not aid us in understanding his thought. Instead, it negates the need to
understand the development in his thought as a new step in his ‘struggle’ with the
philosophical problems he was addressing” (Ethical Personalism, 180). In this case, due to
the fact that it was around this time that Scheler divorced his second wife to marry another,
it seems that, for Staude, this event had to have some profound correlate intellectually. To
the detriment of scholarship, Staude exaggerates this so-called “reversal,” which lacks
sufficient evidence.
23 Peter Hamilton, Knowledge and Social Structure: An Introduction to the Classical
Argument in the Sociology of Knowledge (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), 75.
Hamilton cites Staude’s Max Scheler.
24 Scheler, Ressentiment,
25 Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, 99-100.
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resentment, not the sentiment itself either in essence or in origin.”26 Scheler’s
retraction, however, gives no mention, as Staude suggests, the “he had gone too far
in his repudiation of rationalism,” or that, in the face of threatening mass
movements and ideologies, “the guiding light of reason must not be disparaged or
snuffed out.”27 I am at a complete loss how Staude manages to derive this
interpretation from the passage he cites in The Nature of Sympathy. The words
“rationalism” or even “reason” are never mentioned in that portion of the text.
Staude also points to Scheler’s later essay, “The Forms of Knowledge and
Culture,” a published address to the Lessing Institute in Berlin on 17 January, 1925,
as symbolizing “this abrupt reversal in his intellectual career” toward rationalism.28
For Staude, Scheler’s comments on the social and political malaise of the time are
indicative of a turn in his philosophy. Scheler states that the “civilized world is in
grave danger of slowly and inaudibly sinking and drowning in the gray, shapeless
dawn of non-freedom and hollowness…”29 It’s true that Scheler bemoans the
degradation of liberal democracy into “a sullen democracy of masses, interests, and
sentimentality,”30 and that he proposes that the only way to prevent democracy
from falling into dictatorship and “salvaging cultural and scientific values,” is by
means of a kind of enlightened absolutism and “the help of a small, highly educated
elite”31 that was characteristic of early modern European politics. What is it, though,

Scheler, Sympathy, 100.
Staude, Max Scheler, 149, 150.
28 Staude, Max Scheler, 151-2.
29 Scheler, “The Forms of Knowledge and Culture,” Philosophical Perspectives, trans.
Oscar Haac (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), 14.
30 Scheler, “The Forms of Knowledge and Culture,” 16.
31 Scheler, “The Forms of Knowledge and Culture,” 17.
26
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that provides the connection from Scheler’s tendency toward authoritarian politics
to a change in his philosophy? The rest of the essay, which is a summary explication
of his philosophy of spirit and life, where we find statements in support of love and
emotional functions—a “culture of the heart”—that one versed in Scheler’s early
work would expect. At most, there is some discrepancy between his emotive and
conative philosophy and the political picture he illustrates, but it does not indicate a
shift philosophically, as Staude suggests.
It is true that Scheler’s relation with Lebensphilosophie had always been rather
ambivalent. Nietzsche was his constant companion, but also a source of agitation.32
Scheler was inspired by Dilthey’s stimulating lectures as a student in Berlin, and was
so captivated by Bergson’s writings that he made an effort to have them translated
into German. Staude relates how Scheler agreed with Bergson that
“intellectualization alienated man from Being. The hard cold stare of the impersonal
intellect…could grasp only the external contours of being.”33 In fact, it remains a
question whether Dilthey and Bergson were ultimately more influential for Scheler’s
theory of Erlebnis and intuition than Husserl was.
Despite this influence, there was never a sustained phase of Scheler’s thought
that could be considered anti-rationalistic. He had always been outspoken against
Nietzsche’s absolutization of vital values against cultural or religious ones; Dilthey
was too much of an historicist; and Bergson, too mystical. The central place Geist
had for Scheler’s conception of the person had always been a point of contention
with Lebensphilosophie, and even until his final essays, Scheler holds that doing
32
33

Staude, Max Scheler, 247.
Staude, Max Scheler, 21.
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philosophy, in Platonic fashion, requires an “ascetic” attitude toward the factor of
reality and vital drives. He writes in his essay “The Nature of Philosophy” that if
someone “is to reach the threshold of knowing the philosophical object,” it is
required that that person achieve, among other things, a “self-mastery as a means of
restraining and objectifying the instinctual impulses.”34 The dispositions that
obstruct philosophical knowledge most, for Scheler, are hatred, arrogance, and
intemperance. But Scheler is not endorsing a rational mastery over base desire; it is
a cultivation of a spirit of love that removes obstacles to knowledge. All of his major
works, from the earliest to the latest, attempt to weave a careful balance between
spirit and life and I resist interpretations that show Scheler at one time more
vitalistic and another more spiritualistic (or even “rationalistic”).
Scheler would not have been a full-fledged advocate of the call for a “deliverance
from the intellectualism of science in order to return to one’s own nature and thus
to nature as such,”35 which is the way Weber characterizes the goal of the German
youth. Nor would he have been altogether opposed to it. Scheler initially had great
hope in the youth movement “as a source of new vitality for the ‘sick, lethargic,
defeated German nation’”; but he also believed that “raw enthusiasm was
inadequate to meet the problems of the day.”36 When Scheler met with some of the
youth, he was disappointed to see them so undisciplined and irresponsible.37 Also,
Scheler would certainly have resisted the youth movement inasmuch as their
impetus was primarily reactionary and driven by ressentiment.
Scheler, On the Eternal in Man, 95.
Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” 16.
36 Staude, Max Scheler, 118-9.
37 Staude, Max Scheler, 119.
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With that said, however, it is also very misleading to suggest, as Staude does, that
“Scheler sided with Weber against his youthful critics.”38 Erich Wittenberg,
commenting on the on-going Methodenstreit in 1919 (calling it a Wissenschaftskrisis)
finds Scheler’s intervention into these debates to be particularly noteworthy
precisely on account of Scheler’s disagreement with Weber.39 However, due to the
fact that the issue that Scheler takes with Weber is one focused on value and
philosophy, the critique is more relevant to the value judgment dispute. Wittenberg
explains that for Scheler, the crisis of Western culture “can no longer rest solely
upon a scientific basis.”40 In Scheler’s estimation, Weber elevates science to the
point of a detrimental subordination and neglect of philosophy, and in the process
submits the domain of values to the realm of the irrational.

Phenomenology and the Werturteilsstreit
Science and Valuation
The post-Hegelian crisis of philosophy divided philosophers into rivaling camps
with respect to conceptions of the very purpose of their own discipline. The
question of value was thought to provide legitimation to philosophy struggling to
find its place. If philosophy had a stake in an explication of value, then it could be a
science with an ability to evaluate and thus be distinguished from the value-free

Staude, Max Scheler, 149.
Erich Wittenberg, “Die Wissenshaftskrisis in Deutschland im Jahre 1919. Ein Beitrag
zur Wissenschftsgeschichte,” Theoria, vol. 4, 1938, pp. 235-264. The paper is partially
translated by Erica Carter and Christopher Turner, in Peter Lassman and Irving Velody, Max
Weber’s ‘Science as a Vocation,’ ed. Herminio Martins (Unwin Hymans, 1989), 112-121.
40 Wittenberg, “Die Wissenshaftskrisis,” 254. Quoted in David Frisby, The Alienated
Mind: The Sociology of Knowledge in German 1918-1933 (New York: Routledge, 1992), 176.
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sciences. For Windelband and Rickert, philosophy could only achieve differentiation
if it could make claims of methodological validity concerning the sciences. Taking
the Kantian rational approach to values, philosophy is for them precisely the
“science of values.” Bambach explains that “Kantian logic would prove a much
needed anodyne for the ‘disease’ called ‘historicism.’ … In effect [they] attempted a
suprahistorical resolution to the crisis of historicism by turning away from historical
experience to a transcendental theory of values.”41 The Baden Neo-Kantians sought
to formalize values in order to counter ethical relativism, which they thought was
“destroying the foundations of post-Kantian German thought.”42
Nietzsche stands in opposition to Kant in this regard, and for this debate. The
problems with relativism aside, both Windelband’s relegation of values to questions
of methodological validity, and Rickert’s explanation of value as a transcendental
conceptual category that “attaches” to historical objects divorce values from livedexperience. But values primarily pertain to life, not logic. In “Science as a Vocation,”
Weber, citing a passage from Tolstoy, sums up what is at stake: “Science is
meaningless because it gives no answer to our question, the only question
important for us: ‘What shall we do and how shall we live?’”43 Weber admits as
“indisputable” that science does not respond to this question, but this does not make
science itself meaningless or even valueless. He insists that the value of science is
that it provides results free of values.
Weber hopes to rehabilitate the scientific “vocation” by suggesting that science

Bambach, Crisis of Historicism, 85.
Bambach, Crisis of Historicism, 84.
43 Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” 143.
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has some relevance precisely insofar as it does not provide answers to such
subjectively murky question of life’s meaning. The value-relevance (Wertbeziehung)
of science is precisely its value-freedom (Wertfreiheit). That is, science provides
answers to questions without presupposing the world of competitive valueframeworks—the “ethical irrationality of the world.”44 Weber presupposes a
contradictory irrationality to the pre-conceptual world; there can exist no harmony
between the various worldviews in this world because the service of one “god” (by
which is meant a single worldview) necessarily means a rejection and offense to
another god or worldview. The “teacher,” as teacher, cannot be a “leader” promoting
some Weltanschauung or code of conduct. But the teacher at least has “the
intellectual integrity to see that it is one thing to state facts…, while it is another to
answer questions of value of culture and its individual contents.”45 Weber maintains
that philosophy—“as a discipline”—merely concerns the arrangement of individual
views in order for them to “subjectively make sense”46 because it is impossible for
them to do so objectively, i.e., universally.
Weber’s position may seem strange in light of the fact that Rickert spends much
of his career developing a theory of values, with a conception of the legitimation of
philosophy as a science precisely by including values within the domain of science.
Weber then responds by removing value judgments all together from scientific aims.
How do we interpret this maneuver? Is Weber surrendering the sphere of values to
the irrationalism of reality? Certainly, Nietzsche’s influence on Weber is not to be

Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” From Max Weber, 122.
Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” 146.
46 Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” 151-2.
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denied. However, his position is not as antagonistic to Rickert’s value theory as it
may seem. First, Weber was making a careful application of the Kantian distinction
between concept and reality that had taken various forms of expression through
Windelband and Rickert, namely, between nomothetic and ideographic,47 between
being (Sein) and validity (Gelten), the “world of reality” and the “world of value,”48
between Wissenschaft and Weltanschauung. This dualism was already evident.
Second, Weber was applying Rickert’s own distinction between making valuejudgments, or “valuing” (Wertung) on the one hand and value-reference, or valuerelevance (Wertbeziehung) on the other. Rickert had made this distinction after
criticisms that his value theory, which makes values central to historical science, in
fact historicizes the science, diminishing its objectivity.49 Rickert thought that
researchers could have a theoretical assent to the value of the research, on the basis
of an indisputable interest in the research, without committing to a practical
valuation which would subjectively influence the results of that research. A
theoretical judgment of the value of science does not necessitate that the sciences
make value-judgments in practical and political affairs.
At the Verein für Sozialpolitik meeting in Vienna in 1909, Weber and other new
generation sociologists had grown concerned that the Society had compromised its

Generally speaking, between natural sciences that deal with form and historical
sciences that deal with content, respectively. Windelband, “History and Natural Science,”
175.
48 Cf., Wilhelm Windelband, Introduction to Philosophy, trans. Joseph McCabe (London:
Unwin, 1921).
49 Cf., Bambach, Crisis of Historicism, 104-7.
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158

scientific integrity by acting as a political advisory committee for state decisions.50
As Pressler and Dasilva put it, “The conservative, “organic” conception of society
found in the old historical school was not as much a method of analysis as it was a
means of supporting political and ideological valuations of social phenomena.
Overcoming such presuppositions meant a liberation from the political implications
of historiography.”51 The original Werturteilsstreit is a name for the dispute
surrounding the controversial decision to launch a new sociological society in
Germany that would keep its discussion separate from political policy and goals in a
way that the Verein could not. These new generation sociologists (including
Ferdinand Tönnies, Weber, and Werner Sombart), broke from older generation
political economists (Schmoller, Philippovich, Herkner and Gottl-Ottlilienfeld) and
formed the German Sociological Association in 1910.
The dispute arose on the basis of confusion between the function of science for
prevailing political interests; it is the attempt to dissociate science from the state
that made the dispute about the irreconcilability of science and values, and Weber’s
remark about value-laden science, “a thing of the Devil.”52 But there seems to be two
different questions at play: first, the question concerning the scientific method and
its relation to value as such, and then the question of the content of the sciences as
inclusive of judgments concerning the particular values and goals of political
leadership. The problem for Weber and his allies is that if scientific methodology
allows for some relation to value, it becomes tremendously difficult, if not
50 Robert Proctor, Value-Free Science? Purity and Power in Modern Knowledge
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 86.
51 Pressler and Dasilva, Sociology and Interpretation, 19.
52 Quoted in Proctor, Value-Free Science?, 89.
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impossible, to prevent scientific results aligning with political interests. Although
there are possible logical and empirical ways that a scientist, qua scientist, can
confront the world of values,53 in doing so the scientist will invariably slip into a
realm of conscience and personal commitment where science cannot tread.54
It’s easy to sympathize with Weber and the newer generation’s arguments.
Consider some contemporary examples. What is currently being called “global
warming” is increasingly discussed on the level of policy rather than scientific
research; thus, American citizens tend to affirm or deny the phenomenon based
upon their political orientation and the policy decisions that align with them. The
recent shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary has prompted yet another debate on the
revision of gun laws in America, but the factual statistics of gun violence and deaths
ultimately play only a minor role in the public-wide discussion. Other intense
debates that have significant reference to scientific research, for example,
homosexuality and the physiology of sexual attraction, abortion and the stages of
fetal development, etc, are being discussed more in terms of partisan opposition
than factual data. However, if science seeks to distance itself from policy, it becomes
a question how much policy should be influenced by science.
Despite sympathy for the quest to emphasize the value-neutrality of scientific
research in order to investigate these and other matters outside of the context of
Proctor notes the following three legitimate ways Weber allows, taken from Weber’s
recorded words from the Verhandlung des Vereins für Sozialpolitik in Wien, 1909, Schriften
des Vereins für Sozialpolitik, 132 (1910): 565-6. (1) A scientist “can point out the
contradictions between a person’s values and their interests.” (2) “He can ask, empirically,
what means must be used to achieve those interests.” (3) “He may point out certain
unintended consequences of pursuing and achieving those interests.” Proctor, Value-Free
Science?, 88-9.
54 Proctor, Value-Free Science?, 89.
53
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social policy, certainly we cannot expect such matters to be considered primarily
outside of their moral significance. They are, after all, moral issues. Moreover,
Weber and others underestimate the interpretative aspect of the factual data that
are significant for questions of social and political norms and laws: what should be
done in these cases and others like them? Is the value-free research not to have any
bearing on policy? Weber may still underestimate the significance of the fact that
science cannot provide guidance on what to do and how to live.

Weltanschauung and the autonomy of philosophy
As opposed to Staude’s interpretation that Scheler “sides with Weber,” Scheler’s
critique of Weber is rather sharp, and he took the time to write on Weber’s “Science
as a Vocation” on more occasions than one.55 However, before embarking on the
critique, it is important to note that Scheler does explicity agree that the specific
task of science is not the expressed affirmation of a set of values and a specific
Weltanschauung, or worldview, insofar as Weltanschauungen stem from valueaffirmation. Methodologically, science is indeed value free with respect to the
objects of its research. It must have this status for the sake of its own validity in light
of its aims, but not as Weber maintains because of the subjective and irrational
status of values. Science is value free because it builds formal-deductive constructs
(e.g., natural laws) out of inductive processes (e.g. natural regularities). These

Scheler’s critique of Weber’s “Science as a Vocation” appears in two places, with
different emphases. First, the essay “Weltanschauungslehre, Soziologie and
Welanschauungssetzung” (GW VI, 13-26), and “Max Webers Ausschultung der Philosophie
(Zur Psychologie und Soziologie der nominalistischen Denkart)” (GW VIII, 430-438). Partial
translations by R. C. Speirs are included in Max Weber’s ‘Science as a Vocation’ 87-91; 92-98
(respectively).
55

161

formal constructs “make it possible to investigate the pure forms of a possible
Nature prior to real nature, and, with their help, to order and determine real
nature.”56 Inasmuch then as the sciences find and follow law-based regularities and
make predictions with respect to these laws, “it must voluntarily disregard all
values…in order to preserve its own object. This means that it investigates the world
‘as if’ there existed no free individuals or causes.”57 The removal of values from the
scientific purview, or better, the scientific suspension of value-affirmation, rests
upon the suspension of freedom. This in effect brackets all moral phenomena.
Science and ethics do not intersect.
The scientific exclusion of the domain of freedom, and with it, the exclusion of
moral factors demonstrates the “absurdity of the positivist project” to provide the
social and human sciences with a “scientific morality.”58 If the role of science is in
part to unveil the “law-governed relations that must be taken into account
technically from the point of view of any system of values or Weltanschauung,” then
it follows that “science is equally incapable of developing from within itself a system
of values and ideas which would be the basis of a Weltanschauung. Morality,
metaphysics, religion are all transcientific.”59 It’s not surprising then that, though
Scheler acknowledges the value neutrality of science, he rejects the significance
science can have for social policy and social crises precisely because of its value
neutrality.
Scheler, “Sociology and the Study and Formulation of Weltanschauung,” in Lassman
and Velody, Max Weber’s ‘Science as a Vocation,’ 88.
57 Scheler, “Sociology and the Study and Formulation of Weltanschauung,” 88.
58 Scheler, “Max Weber’s Exclusion of Philosophy (On the Psychology and Sociology of
Nominalist Thought),” in Max Weber’s ‘Science as a Vocation,’ 92.
59 Scheler, “Max Weber’s Exclusion of Philosophy,” 92-3.
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Scheler not only accepts the value neutrality of science as particular to the kind
of knowledge it is, but also, as if as a matter of course, rejects the possibility of a
“science of values,” and would not legitimate philosophy upon the success of this
project. Science is, after all, a deterministic rationality and unable to supply
philosophy with an ability to make judgments about validity. If philosophy does this,
it does so on its own and not from what it borrows from the positive sciences.
Moreover, to say that morality, metaphysics, and religion are not scientific is for
Scheler perfectly appropriate, but Weber goes too far in characterizing these
domains as “irrational” because they are not scientific and because they incorporate
values and Weltanschauung within themselves. Needless to say, Scheler is
suspicious of Weber’s “uncompromisingly dualistic separation [between] positive,
value-free, specialized science and [the] unfounded, blind abandonment to irrational
powers, for the formation of Weltanschauung.”60
This dualism is a result of a general exclusion of philosophy, according to
Scheler. This is the central claim of his critique. That is to say, the very dualism
reveals the exclusion of every kind of knowledge irreducible to “the logical and
epistemological foundations of the specialized sciences.”61 Scheler laments the
prevailing tendency to treat philosophy either as an “ancilla scientiarum”
(handmaiden of the sciences) or to shift it into the domain of “prophecy.” By
“handmaiden of the sciences,” Scheler indicates both the positivist trend to bestow
upon philosophy the task of organizing the results of science into an “homogeneous
‘Weltanschauung,’” as well as the Neo-Kantian logical task of playing the “science60
61

Scheler, “Max Weber’s Exclusion of Philosophy,” 92.
Scheler, “Max Weber’s Exclusion of Philosophy,” 95.
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police” by clarifying and elevating the exactitude of scientific methods and
premises.62 In the face of these trends, Scheler insists on the autonomy of
philosophy.63 Philosophy has “a right to decline subsumption,” and that it “really is
nothing else than simply philosophy: it even possesses its own idea of ‘strictness,’ its
[own] disciplines, and therefore is in no way obliged to be ruled by some ideal
notion of scientific discipline, which in measuring and counting is called
exactitude.”64
By means of its autonomy, philosophy has a role of “mediator” between being
and value, or, according to Weber’s characterization, between the rational and
irrational. If the domain of philosophy has an intermediate position between these
two, then its exclusion is rather serious. Not only does it amount to a mere dualism,
but it removes the very domain that provides a bridge toward unity, “binding
together those things which Weber separates so severely.”65 What is at stake here
for Scheler is very wide-ranging with respect to his entire philosophy, but in this
essay on Weber, he chooses to use the ancient beginning of philosophy as a model,
namely, that which for Plato served as the philosophical connection between the
knowledge of being, the consciousness of value, and “the readiness of the will to
obey the demands of obligation which arise from the synthesis of…being
and…value.”66 Their connection, for the Greeks, was encapsulated in the virtue of

Scheler, “The Nature of Philosophy,” 79.
Scheler’s essay “Vom Wesen der Philosophie,” though translated as “The Nature of
Philosophy” concerns the essence of philosophy, namely, what philosophy is as an
autonomous form of knowing without recourse to other forms.
64 Scheler, “The Nature of Philosophy,” 81.
65 Scheler, “Weber’s Exclusion of Philosophy,” 94.
66 Scheler, “Weber’s Exclusion of Philosophy,” 94.
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wisdom. The scientific mind, Scheler writes, rich as it is in categories, knew one
category least of all: the category of wisdom.67
For Scheler, love is more philosophically significant than wisdom, or at least love
is that which makes wisdom philosophically significant. But the importance of the
Greek conception of wisdom is its attitudinal reference, which is missing from
scientific cognition.68 Wisdom is a moral quality of the person—not a
methodological principle—enabling the person to think philosophically. It implies a
particular attitude or orientation toward the world and which is itself morally
significant. Furthermore, the appeal to ancient philosophy serves to show that it is
not only Scheler’s own view of philosophy that is threatened by the debate, but the
very basis of the Western philosophical tradition.
It is worth considering, though, whether Scheler’s endorsement of the attitude of
wisdom (or something qualitatively equivalent to it) puts Scheler’s own philosophy
within the so-called “Weltanschauung philosophy” due to the connection Husserl
notes between “the old-fashioned word ‘wisdom’ …[and] the now-beloved
expressions, ‘worldview,’...or simply, Weltanschauung”?69 Husserl writes that “the
value of Weltanschuung philosophy is primarily conditioned by the value of wisdom
and the striving for wisdom.”70 Also, Bambach explains that “the strategy behind the
philosophy of worldviews was to overcome the demands of science by synthesizing
knowledge into a personalized system of wisdom, relating all experience of the

Scheler, “Weber’s Exclusion of Philosophy,” 94.
Explained further in Chapter 2.
69 Edmund Husserl, “Philosophy as Rigorous Science,” Phenomenology and the Crisis of
Philosophy, trans. Quentin Lauer (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965), 131.
70 Husserl, “Philosophy as Rigorous Science,” 133.
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world to the subjective life-conditions of the individual.”71
Scheler’s insistence that philosophy is not a science may be seen as another
validation of worldview philosophy. According to the “wisdom” of the time—the
present Weltanschauung—a philosophy that is not Wissenschaft must be a
Weltanschauung. The dispute, again, goes back to the “objectivity” of research. There
seems to be only these alternatives at play: either philosophy can grasp a truth
independent from subjective, historical perspective or it cannot, and in the latter
case, it must, in good Nietzschean fashion, be resigned not only to competing, but
also irreconcilable, perspectives.72 Husserl promotes philosophy in its scientific
ideal—an ideal that he believes philosophy has never in its history achieved,
namely, a philosophy that is capable of “teaching in an objectively valid manner.”
Therefore, “Weltanschauung philosophy and scientific philosophy are sharply
distinguished.”73
In the face of the alternatives, Scheler responds to Husserl in the way he does to
Weber: by asserting the autonomy of philosophy in the face of attempts to reduce it
to something else. Philosophy is neither simply “scientific” in the positivist or NeoKantian sense, nor simply a “worldview,” in the historicist sense. And because of its
irreducibility, it can have relevance for both science and worldviews.
Scheler explains that much of the way he and Husserl conceive philosophy is in
fact essentially compatible, despite a semantic difference with Husserl’s habit of
calling philosophy a science. The difference is only semantic, though, because
Bambach, Crisis of Historicism, 26.
The influence of Nietzche on Weber in noticeable with respect of the irreconcilability
of values and perspectives.
73 Husserl, “Philosophy as Rigorous Science,” 136.
71
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Husserl uses the term scientific in its broadest possible conception, which by
Scheler’s estimation is meant to include not only positive knowledge, but also the
phenomenological knowledge of essence as well as the Greek understanding of
episteme (formal knowledge). Scheler struggles with this terminology applied to
philosophical knowledge because he knows no one who, upon hearing the word
‘science,’ would immediately think of Plato’s philosophy or any philosophy for that
matter.74 Indeed, Weber asks, concerning the vision of True Being in Plato’s cave
allegory, “who considers science in that way nowadays?”75
On the other hand, Scheler states that Husserl “gives the name
Weltanschauungsphilosophie to exactly what I call, with far more historical
justification, ‘scientific philosophy,’ that is the attempt either (in the spirit of
positivism) to shape the available ‘results’ of science into a ‘definitive’ metaphysics
or Weltanschauung, or [following the Neo-Kantians] to reduce philosophy to
scientific doctrine, i.e., theory of scientific methods and principles.”76 Scheler
suggests that whereas “scientific philosophy,” contrasts most with the philosophical
tradition, worldview philosophy on the other hand is firmly within the range of
possibilities for philosophical investigation.
On this matter there is more than a semantic difference. Scheler admits that,
although philosophy itself is not irreducible to a worldview, and especially to the
study of individual worldviews, such as the Indian, Christian, etc., nevertheless, a
phenomenological study of worldviews, and especially of the so-called “natural

Scheler, “The Nature of Philosophy,” 81.
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76 Scheler, “The Nature of Philosophy,” 82.
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worldview” could, among other benefits, asses both “the range of possible ‘variants’”
relevant for a theory of worldviews, and “the cognitive value of any given
Weltanschauung.”77 Interestingly, it is precisely on account of the range of influence
of worldview that Scheler and Husserl disagree, namely, with respect to the
independence that the positive sciences have from the prevailing worldview. Husserl
believed that philosophy is scientific because “the ‘idea’ of science is a
supratemporal one,” not limited to the spirit of any one time.78 Indeed, the absolute,
timeless values which science discovers and adds to “the treasure trove of all
succeeding humanity…determines…the material content of the idea of culture,
wisdom, Weltanschauung, as well as of Weltanschauung philosophy.”79 Science is
said here to be a determining factor for a worldview. Scheler’s view, in contrast,
maintains that a worldview is a greater determining factor for the content of science
than vice versa: “the structures of the prevailing Weltanschauungen both occasion
and control the structure, character and level of science effective in a society at any
given time.” 80 Therefore,
the structures of science, by which I mean prevailing systems of basic
concepts, change abruptly in history when the Weltanschauung changes, and
I conceive the possibilities of progress in a given scientific system, though
they are in principle unbounded, to lie within the limiting structure of the
overriding—say, the European—Weltanschauung.81
By way of application, a telling passage from Robert Proctor’s excellent book,
Value-Free Science?, concerns the possible political goals of an idea such as value-

Scheler, “The Nature of Philosophy,” 83.
Husserl, “Philosophy as Rigorous Science,” 136.
79 Husserl, “Philosophy as Rigorous Science,” 136.
80 Scheler, “The Nature of Philosophy,” 83.
81 Scheler, “The Nature of Philosophy,” 83.
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freedom. The effort to formulate the value-neutrality of science is itself a choice
made among the possible alternatives and goals contained within the overriding
worldview. The passage is an exemplary application of Scheler’s above claim.
…value-neutrality, far from being a timeless or self-evident principle, has a
distinctive geography: “value-freedom” has meant different things to
different people at different times. Slogans like “science must be value-free”
or “all knowledge is political” must be understood in light of specific fears
and goals that change over time. Value-neutrality may be a response to state
or religious suppression or scientific ideas; value-neutrality may be a way to
guard against personal interests obstructing scientific progress. … Neutrality
may provide a path along which one retreats or a platform from which one
launches an offensive.82
Is Scheler an example then of the so-called “extreme historicist”83 who Husserl
identifies as the one who denies objective validity to the positive sciences due to the
variations of cultural formations? Does the prevalent maxim that “what is today
accepted as a proved theory is recognized tomorrow as worthless,”84 prove the
worthlessness of science? That would be going too far. More details of Scheler’s
sociology of knowledge will have to be presented in order to respond fully, but
suffice it to say that a key resolution technique central to Scheler’s sociology of
knowledge is the claim that while, on the one hand, the forms of thinking are socially
conditioned with respect to one’s particular environment, prevailing social
interests, and patterns of selections, on the other hand, the contents of cognition are
not necessarily socially conditioned in the same way, and are more often dependent
upon individual attitudinal factors. This means that one can have socially
determined categories of thought but remain individually competent to have

Proctor, Value-Free Science?, x.
Husserl, “Philosophy as Rigorous Science,” 124.
84 Husserl, “Philosophy as Rigorous Science,” 124-5.
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adequate cognition of the things presented within the sphere of one’s own
environment or related to that environment. This theory, which hinges upon his
theory of functionalization, has possible problems yet to be worked out. However, as
far as it goes, it is possible to say that the “objective validity” of what science claims
about its results are not necessarily invalidated by the social embeddedness of
scientists’ thinking. For example, the various interests and goals which motivate
scientific research, goals which make sense according to the prevailing worldview
and which would change when the worldview changes, do not themselves invalidate
the content of research even if they complicate the claim of the “objectivity” of such
research.
More relevant to my argument at this point however is how this specifies what
Scheler primarily means by worldview, namely, socially conditioned form of
consciousness or way of thinking. The question about the extent the social origin of
the forms of thinking affect the validity of the contents of knowledge and cognition
will be of concern in the following chapter. Paramount in Scheler’s conception of
philosophy is that, among the alternatives between science and worldview,
philosophy alone is capable of preserving the attitudinal factors of knowledge and
thus, does not reduce them either to scientific methodology on the one hand nor to
the “fate” or “daemon” (to use Weber’s terms) of history and society on the other.

Phenomenology and value
Weber’s exclusion of philosophy means more than the exclusion of the
subjective philosophical attitude; it also means the exclusion of the philosophical
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object: that which a phenomenological attitude yields, namely, essence and value.
The first refers to Weber’s scientism (“dualism”). The second refers to his
Kantianism (“nominalism”). Like the subjective attitude, the objective essence also
has a role in guarding against the separation between facts and values. It is on
account of the pre-logical attitudinal factors that an experience of an essence, at the
very least, is an integrated and unified experience of components that are only later
broken apart through methodological distinctions.
Scheler writes that according to Weber “material values have only subjective
significance, and that there can be no way [of] binding knowledge of objective
phenomena and values, goods or systems of goods beyond positive science.85 The
critique, however, finds itself standing before the looming Kantian edifice and in
particular the “nominalism” of the Baden Neo-Kantian theory of concept formation.
Weber puts forth a theory of concept formation that rests upon either the
similarities of empirical characteristics or “home-made constructions” of ideal types
in borderline individual cases.86 Scheler chastises Weber for taking over Rickert’s
“uncompromising nominalism…without any profound criticism.”87
The charge of nominalism may appear not only rather strange coming from a
phenomenologist, since nominalism is a metaphysical assumption (even if a
skeptical one) and phenomenology brackets these assumptions, but it also seems
rather antiquated. Who but a strict metaphysical realist would put forth an
accusation against nominalism? Suppose we take a nominalist to maintain the
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following two propositions: (1) whatever exists is individual or particular and that
(2) universal meanings (essences) are only constructions of mental activity.88
Scheler would likely be in agreement with the first because essences for Scheler are
material, not formal. His reaction would be primarily directed against the second
proposition because although individual existence may complicate matters for
metaphysical universals, it does not follow that an existing individual thing, qua
individual, would be without an essence. Nor does it follow that as soon as one does
away with universals, that then, every intuitive givenness of an individual thing
must of necessity be empirical. The irony of nominalism is that, although it
originates in opposition to orthodox Scholasticism, it presupposes in its conclusions
the Scholastic theory that matter is the principle of individuation and so what is
individual is necessarily empirical. On could make a convincing case using Scheler’s
anthropology that the essence of an individual thing (which for human beings is
bound up with the person or spirit) is the most individualizing factor; by
comparison, our bodies are the most common thing about us.
Scheler thinks Weber’s theory of ideal types excludes essence as a datum of
givenness; he references Rickert’s theory of spatially extensive and individually
intensive, infinite multiplicities. Following the Kantian distinction between reality
and concept, reality for Rickert is a domain of unintelligible complexities, composed
as it is, extensively and intensively of infinite multiplicities. It is this complexity of
reality that makes the real, in itself, unintelligible and irrational. Facts are not simply
given, of course, they must first be conceptually constituted in order to be
Frederick Beiser, The German Historicist Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2011), 5.
88
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intelligible. Concepts perform a role of the simplification of the complexity of reality.
According to Bambach’s description “they reduce to manageable proportions the
mass of phenomenon which the mind encounters, turning the real as such into
something artificially rational.89 Furthermore, according to Rickert, value is a
concept functioning as a category of experience that accounts for valuing different
historical events differently. A man walking to a pub in England in 1649 is not of the
same value in history as the beheading of King Charles I. Though the events
themselves, in reality, are simply a complex of infinite multiplicities and cannot by
evaluated in themselves, when rationality touches them they not only become
intelligibly organized, but they become of greater or lesser importance, higher or
lower value.
In Chapter 2, I described Scheler’s view that the various forms of cognition,
including scientific cognition, do not “precede or ground phenomenology,” but
follow it.90 Cognition attests to the relation between conscious thought or judgment,
and “a world already unified and held together by prelogically given essences and
their connections.”91 As such, Scheler distances his philosophy from the Neo-Kantian
claim that thought is that which makes intelligible the contents of intuition.92
Scheler maintains, in contrast, that thinking itself requires pre-unified “facts,” which
thought organizes only logically and symbolically. The rationalist tradition errs in
denying autonomy to the intuited content and subsumes this content under the
solely autonomous logical forms of thinking. In this view, “it is only by means of
Bambach, Crisis of Historicism, 95-6.
Scheler, “Phenomenology,” 159.
91 Scheler, “Phenomenology,” 159.
92 Scheler, “Phenomenology,” 160.
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unities freely devised by thought that any kind of definiteness, limits, and
organization are imported from the sphere of meaning into that of intuitive being,
which in itself is consistently designated ‘chaos.’”93 On the other hand, the empiricist
tradition reduces intuition to sensible perception and denies the autonomy of
thinking. Scheler’s view is that thought and intuition, subject and object, each have
their own degree of autonomy, as well as a level of interdependence and reciprocity,
as correlates.
Scheler criticizes Weber for not maintaining a qualitative difference between
“empirical abstraction” and “ideational abstraction,”94 or in other words, between
sensory and essential content. For Weber, both kinds of abstraction relate to
sensory content in different ways, but according to Scheler, empirical abstraction
presupposes a single integrated (ideational) experience from which each of the
partial sensory content receives their meaning and unity.95
I defined essence, according to Scheler’s phenomenology, as an integral
experiential unity of meaning that is given in a single experience and which gives
meaning to all of the partial (contingent) content of that same experience. A
phenomenological experience is a direct (immediate) and asymbolic (immanent)
experience that discloses “patterns of wholeness” in the world in a single
experience, prior to a systematic decomposition of its contents as something
readied for empirical observation and conceptual symbolization. And it is the
phenomenological experience of the essence that binds an objective experience of
Scheler, “Idealism and Realism,” 308-9.
Scheler, “Max Weber’s Exclusion of Philosophy,” 96.
95 Scheler, Ressentiment, trans. Manfred Frings (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press,
2001), 20.
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value to things. An objective experience, which is an experience of essence (or
generally, with Sosein),96 is also a value experience. Weber, by excluding the
attitudinal dimension of knowledge, which belongs properly to philosophy, excludes
the original and objective connection between facts and values prior to the
distinction between something’s “objective” and “subjective” content. Scheler
explains it in the following way:
…the essences of the world form a necessary bridge between areas that fall
apart, according to Max Weber…: the value-imperative [on the one hand,]
and the existent, value-free reality [on the other]. In the essential order of
being, spirit perceives a being and an order which [experientially] precedes
the division into that which ‘is’ contingent, chance reality and that which it
‘ought’ to be and eventually become.97
Perhaps this will remind the reader of the passage chosen as a guide for the
second and third chapters: “In principle, the world is given in lived-experience as
the ‘bearer of value’ and as ‘resistance’ as immediately as it is given as an object (GW
X, 384).”98 Having examined the directness of the essential givenness of the object
(Chapter 2), and the way every object as object requires some confrontation with
reality in the lived-experience of resistance (Chapter 3), I arrive at the value-aspect
of a thing, which Scheler insists is given with every objective experience, and which
is given as originally as something’s objectivity and its reality. Before exploring
further the phenomenology of the matter, it may be helpful to see Scheler’s
metaphysical account. In one of Scheler’s late and posthumously published essays,
Scheler explains that Sein, or being as such, is subdivided into Dasein (existence, or
being-there), Sosein (the being-thus, which includes essence), and Wertsein (the
See my explanation for the difference between Wesen and Sosein in Chapter 3.
Scheler, “Max Weber’s Exclusion of Philosophy,” 97. Translation slightly modified.
98 Scheler, “Phenomenology,” 143.
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value-being) and that all three are metaphysically equal (GW XI, 60)99 He provides
the following figure:100
Sein

Dasein

Sosein

Wertsein

With the metaphysical equiprimodiality of all three elements, Scheler maintains
the ontological independence of value-being from both existence and essence
because the value of something has its own mode of givenness independent from
the givenness of existence and the givenness of essence. This mode of givenness is
an emotive one. Values, he says, are “feelable phenomena” (fühlbare Phänomene)
(GW II, 39).101 On a number of occasions Scheler expresses explicitly that existence
itself is indifferent to the good and bad, the valuable and valueless (GW IX, 44; GW
XI, 59-60).102 This metaphysical separation of value from reality bears the obvious
contrast with Greek philosophy. Scheler in effect separates ethics from metaphysics,
but accounts for the unity of value and being phenomenologically (with the
structures of givenness) not metaphysically. The value of something is a question for
the experiential givenness of phenomena (phenomenology), not for the logical
The essay is included withn Scheler’s incomplete manuscript on metaphysics and
epistemology. The essay is titled, “Zur Wesenslehre und Typologie der metaphysischen
Systeme und Weltanschauungen (Weltanschauungslehre).” It is translated by John Cutting
in Max Scheler, The Constitution of the Human Being, trans. John Cutting (Milwaukee:
Marquette University Press, 2010), “The Essential Theory and Typology of Metaphysical
Systems and Weltanschauungen.”
100 GW XI, 60. The figure is not included in Cutting’s translation; it only appears in the
original German.
101 Scheler, Formalism, 16. Scheler’s Formalism containes a great deal concerning
emotive value-givenness.
102 Scheler, The Human Place in the Cosmos, 40; Scheler, The Constitution of the Human
Being, 62.
99
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articulation of actuality (metaphysics). Scheler is heavily resistant to the project of
coming to the conclusion of something’s value simply by means of logical deduction,
and even more resistant to the deduction that something has value simply insofar as
it exists.103 Something’s value cannot be made to rest upon an analytic proposition,
it must be synthetic and supported in experience; knowledge of something’s value
requires a direct experiential contact with a thing or like-things.104
Furthermore, this proves to be a metaphysical explanation for the possibility of a
value-free form of knowing that Weber wants science to be. Following Rickert’s
distinction between valuation and value-reference, I read Scheler as in agreement
that scientists can refrain (qua scientists) from making value judgments with their
research that bear on political interests and social conditions, despite their inability
to refrain (qua human beings) from making judgments about the value of their
research since human beings are invariably situated within unique social conditions.
Scheler’s metaphysics supports the possible logical (and methodological) separation
of values from factual reality, but maintains that phenomenological experience
indicates otherwise. The phenomenological narrative is different than the
metaphysical one: Scheler writes, “in der Ordnung der Gegebenheit…das Wertsein es
ist, das «vor» dem Sosein und Dasein gegeben ist” (In the order of givenness, the
Wertsein is given “before” the Sosein and the Dasein) (GW XI, 62). Not only are the
three aspects of being presented phenomenologically in a single unified being

Cf. Scheler, The Constitution of the Human Being, 62-6.
For further exposition on this matter in Scheler’s philosophy and its relevance for a
critique of Aristotle’s ethics, see my essay, “Does Aristotle’s Ethics Represent Pharisaism?: A
Survey of Scheler’s Critique,” Quaestiones Disputatae, vol. 3, no. 1 (Fall 2012).
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immediately105 and with temporal simultaneity,106 but Scheler also insists that the
value-quality of being has an intentional priority with respect to the other two,
namely, reality (resistance) and essence (object), and therefore, also to whatever
science holds up as value-neutral. Scheler writes that
…in the objective sphere, value-qualities and value-units are received as data
[intuited] before anything belonging to the value-free sector of the object, so
that no information at all of an utterly value-free sector of the object can
become the original content of a perception, memory or expectation—
subsequently an object of thought and judgment—unless we have been given
beforehand, in some way, the value-quality of the entity or its value-relation
to some other thing.107
It would seem that the metaphysical equiprimodiality of all three aspects of
being account for the simultaneity of their givenness. Their simultaneity is only the
case in a temporal sense. The priority of value givenness does not mean the values
are given with a temporal priority to the other forms, but only with an intentional
priority. This means that even if one requires a (temporally prior) perception of an
object as the occasion to see the objects value, the intuition of the value is a
(intentional) perquisite for knowing the object. Referring to his use of the term
“beforehand” in the above passage, Scheler explains that “here ‘beforehand’ does not
necessarily imply duration of perception or chronological sequence, but refers only
to the priorities of data-reception [i.e., intuition].”108 However, not only does he at
times speak of intentional priority of value-givenness (phenomenologically), Scheler
also makes explicit that existence must be the metaphysical foundation of value-
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givenness.109 There emerges a kind of dialectical reciprocity between existence and
value: some existing thing can be given only in light of its value, but value can be given
only insofar as it is the value of an existing thing, or on account of existing things.110 In
Scheler’s words: the value of something can only be “the value of some already
existing thing,111 but that “any intellectual comprehension of what something is
presupposes an emotive value experience of the object. … Value-ception
[Wertnehmung] always precedes perception [Warnehmung].”112 Though value may
not have an ontological priority, “in itself,” it has, “for us” an experiential priority.113
It is significant that intentional priority be put this way in part because of the
problem Rickert gets himself into. According to Bambach, Rickert argues for the
impossibility of a value-free observation of reality because scientific investigation,
before it happens, must first “interest” the observer.114 The interest in the research
must precede in some way that content of research. Rickert explains that the natural
scientist, for example, is interested in the value of commonality; the historical
scientist, in the value of singularity.115 Apart from the question whether
“commonality” and “singularity” are to be properly considered values or valuemodalities, the issue is how this experiential observation squares with Rickert’s
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theory that values are formal categories. If value is a concept that is organizing the
intelligibility of experience, all valuation or value judgments could happen only after
the givenness of empirical intuition and representation; there must first be some
empirical content to be evaluated before any valuation of that content is possible.
That is to say, perception must precede valuation; something must be known in
order for it to be preferred or loved. Unless values are in some way intuitive, and
intuited prior to concept formation, they cannot be said to serve as motivating
factors for observation.
The question of the relation between being and value becomes a question of the
relation between cognition and love, knowledge and interest. Scheler admits that
“empirically one cannot love something without knowing something about the loved
object,”116 But, in vying for the intentional priority of value-givenness Scheler argues
for the autonomy and independence of value analogously to the way that he argues
for the autonomy of philosophical knowledge with respect to other forms of
knowing. And when the matter is considered phenomenologically (prior to the
methods of scientific observation) the priority of values is disclosed. What is the
evidence for the priority of values?
There is first of all the more obvious point that people tend not to come to know
something without first recognizing its importance. A student would not choose to
study what is not considered of value. However, Scheler’s descriptions are perhaps
more sophisticated because they are not based upon a deliberative choice.
Something, for example, can show itself as pleasant or unpleasant, distressing or
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serene, beautiful or ugly without knowing what it is about that thing that makes it
show itself with the value-qualities it does. It’s often the case that a person, work of
art, a landscape or a room in a house can be given as distinguished, pleasant,
beautiful, or friendly (or oppositely) without knowing which specific properties of
the object bear these values.117 Furthermore, suppose someone has an inclination
toward a benevolent or sacrificial action. The inclination (conation toward values) is
already present, grounded in content given in value-feeling, without having in mind
“those objects for or to which we want to do this [in action], and also without having
the [determinate] contents of such sacrifices and benevolent deeds in mind.”118 The
priority of value explains the common experience of wanting to be helpful
practically in a situation but not knowing how to be, or what course of action would
be helpful. The value of benevolence is not given only after determining a
benevolent deed, but “beforehand.” Thus, Scheler writes that “the world of ‘practical
objects’ is determined by values”;119 not vice versa.
The importance of this point for Scheler’s philosophy I think warrants a
sustained quotation from his essay “The Nature of Philosophy,” in which Scheler
applies this principle to prominent discoveries in the history of philosophy and
science.
It is true even of whole peoples and civilizations that the structure of
their value-consciousness dictate the ultimately formative principle within
their collective Weltanschauung. And it holds true for all progress of
knowledge in history that the objects touched upon by this cognitive process
must first be loved or hated before they may be intellectually known,
analysed and judged. Everywhere the “amateur” precedes the “savant,” and
Scheler, Formalism, 17; The Constitution of the Human Being, 66.
Scheler, Formalism, 35.
119 Scheler, Formalism, 134-5.
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there is no realm of objects, whether number, stars, plants, historical reality,
matters of divinity, etc., whose exploration did not pass through a phase of
bias before entering the impartial phase of value-free analysis—a first phase
which mostly coincided with a kind of metaphysicalization, a mistaken
transposition of the object-realm into the world of “absolute meaning.” To
the Pythagoreans numbers, even, were divinities…. For [Descartes] analytical
geometry had an entirely metaphysical meaning, coinciding with the
absolutely valid in physics…. To Leibniz differential calculus presented itself
as a special case of his metaphysically conceived lex continui…. In the
nineteenth century, it was thanks to the new, climactic interest taken in
economic processes by a class which was suffering economic hardship that
the embryo of economics was able to take form within the shell of the
metaphysical concept of economic history. The strictly scientific
investigation of nature was preceded, during the Renaissance, by a…fantastic
speculation about nature, flowering into a mighty outburst of quasipantheistic enthusiasm. The visible heavens, too, before they were genuinely
explored by exact astronomy, were for Giodorno Bruno the object of a new
enthusiasm…[namely], that Copernicus had discovered a new star in
heaven—the Earth—and that we were “already in Heaven,” so that
conversely the medieval conception of the merely “earthly” was invalidated.
In the same way, alchemy preceded chemistry; botanical and zoological
gardens, as objects of enjoyment and valuation of nature, preceded the
initiation of a more exact, scientific botany and zoology. A romantic “love” for
the Middle Ages preceded their strict historical exploration…. Moreover, it is
wellnigh a communis opinio of great theologians that in the investigation of
divine things all proofs of their existence are and must needs be preceded by
an emotional contact with God in the love of God, a feeling of his presence as
a summum bonum—when…the “sense of the divine” is aroused—since herein
lies the ultimate source of the materials of demonstration.120
I’ll use my own recent example. Astrophysicist, Sean Carroll, appeared on the
Colbert Report121 to speak about his book The Particle at the End of the Universe:
How the Hunt for the Higgs Boson Leads Us to the Edge of a New World, Stephen
Colbert, asked why the Higgs Boson has been called the ‘God Particle.’” Carroll
simply responds, interrogatively, but suggestively: “marketing?” When pressed,
Carroll said that physicists were trying to explain the importance of the Boson
because “it’s the last piece of this edifice we’ve been building for the last 2500
120
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years.” We might be able to expect Scheler’s reaction to the lofty phrase, “God
Particle,” as having arisen on account of its importance, its value for physicists,
which itself prompts the investigation. Physicists, in this case, construct the same
“metaphysicalization” or absolute transposition by likening to a supernatural value,
a natural particle arising from a natural energy field.

Values in theory and practice
Just as philosophy is said to be an autonomous alternative to the science and
Weltanschauung dichotomy, and is a type of knowing that has a priority to both the
positive knowledge of science and the “conventional wisdom” of worldview
philosophy, so the value-sphere of morality, according to Scheler, has an
autonomous priority to the theory and practice dichotomy. Quentin Lauer states
that, “Whether one chooses one or the other [Weltanschauung or Wissenschaft]
depends on the fundamental inclination by which one is guided be it theoretical or
practical.”122 Just as philosophy is an autonomous and foundational third category
between science and worldview, so the moral is an autonomous and foundational
third category between the theoretical and the practical.
If we pause here and review, the development of a certain tripartite schematic
can be detected. I’ve given the most attention so far to the phenomenological
givenness of essence (Chapter 2), existence (Chapter 3), and now value: Sosein,
Dasein, and Wertsein. Although essence, or more generally, “being-thus” is not
reducible to a theoretical object, nevertheless, insofar as it is an intentional object of
122
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consciousness and includes an ideal unit of meaning, for the purposes of argument
we can roughly align the givenness of essence with the theoretical as an
anthropological correlate. Although resistance and the givenness of existence do not
relate perfectly with practical willing for, as was shown, it includes more
fundamentally the entire constellation of drives, nevertheless, we can roughly align
the givenness of existence with practical willing as an anthropological correlate. The
obvious anthropological correlate of the givenness of value is neither theoretical nor
practical, but a moral one: the attitude of love (Liebe).
From this, the corresponding elements of knowledge and cognition can be seen.
It was said in Chapter 2 that essence is given by means of a proximal or direct
contact with something in the execution of an intentional act (Vollzug); in Chapter 3,
reality is given in the resistances that arise on account of the drive-based movement
in projects and deeds of willing; now it is said that value is given in human feeling,
guided by the act of loving. All of these, if standing alone, are necessary but
insufficient conditions for self-givenness. For example, a loving person, simply by
being loving, is not sufficiently a philosopher, however, a loving person, with a
certain practical comportment and (philosophical) intentional attitude, is one.
Together, all three complete an overall intuitive process.
Of the three, acts of loving (or hating) have an anthropological priority over
thinking and willing, just as value has an intuitive or intentional priority over what
something is and that something is. Scheler writes that “love is always what
awakens both knowledge and volition; indeed, it is the mother of spirit and reason
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itself.”123 The human being, he says, is an ens amans before being an ens cogitans or
an ens volens.124 The anthropological priority of love is congruent with the epistemic
priority of value and the givenness of value corresponds with the loving attitude
that elevates the moral quality of intentional acts.
However, the full range of values and value-complexes are given, in different
ways, in the entire stratification of human feeling. Generally speaking, the four
modalities of value (sensible, vital, spiritual, and sacred) correlate with an
anthropological stratification of human feeling and emotion.125 Love and hatred, in
effect, heighten or dull, expand or narrow (respectively) the sensitivity of valuefeeling.126 One can have more or less adequate value-intuition of something so long
as lived-experience is under the auspices of a proper moral attitude, namely one of
love. Hatred, on the other hand, frustrates the course of value-intuition. The main
point is that value-givenness, which for Scheler is the gateway for the cognition of
an object, depends upon love. If knowledge is a kind of ontological participation,
then
without a tendency in the knowing being to move from and out of itself to
partake in another being, no knowledge whatsoever is possible. I can think of
no other name for this tendency than “love,” dedication, and, so to speak, a
bursting of the limits of one’s own being [Sein] and character [Sosein]
through love (GW VIII, 204; GW IX, 113).127
As the ancients already maintained, there are moral preconditions for cognition.
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But the distinctive thing about Scheler’s approach is that it maintains the autonomy
(and primacy) of the moral domain without grafting the moral onto the theoretical
or the practical. Thus, Scheler’s reasons for distancing himself from wisdom is its
theoretical reference. Wisdom is an intellectual participation with an objectifiable
being and, thus, the highest attainable object of knowledge is a formal, logical
principle.128 But value, for Scheler, with its independence, is not an object and
therefore not something objectifiable. Values “attach”129 to objects (or acts), but are
not themselves objects. “Goods” or things of value (value-beings) are all that can
become objects of cognition. Although Aristotle calls the ultimate principle of
metaphysics “pure act,” the act itself, namely thinking, is still a possible object of
knowledge. This is the central issue. As was shown in Chapter 3, there is an essential
difference between object and act for Scheler. Pure act, which Scheler calls Geist, is
not objectifiable. If the ultimate being is spirit, this being cannot be an object of
cognition (which is, for Scheler, an essentially objectifying act: it is the taking of
something as something). An intellectual virtue of wisdom—that which illuminates
an object for a subject—is therefore insufficient for an ontological relation
(knowledge) that cannot be posed in terms of subject and object (cognition). It
therefore falls to a non-objectifying act, such as love, to be the proper act of
participation in the divine spirit, as non-objectifiable being.
On the other hand, it was Kant who famously claimed the primacy of the
practical over theoretical reason which grants rights in the practical sphere that
Cf. Scheler, “The Nature of Philosophy,” 77.
The jargon of the “attachment” of values is used by Scheler in the Formalism. Rickert
also uses this language, though its mechanism is different; it is the mind that attaches
conceptual values to things, for Rickert.
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were absent from the theoretical, and furthermore, subordinates the moral domain
to practical reason. The result is an ethics based entirely upon moral duty and at the
expense of love. The practical sphere is equated with the moral instead of
introducing an autonomous sphere of morality into the practical. Indeed, for Scheler
any duty, obligation, or imperative cannot have meaning for us without an insight
into its value and the value of the situation toward which it aims.
The late modern crisis era followed Kant’s disjunction between the theoretical
and practical as the only two alternatives. Neo-Kantian philosophers usually
followed Kant on the matter, that is, except allegedly for Rickert. Scheler interprets
him as following Kant because he, as Scheler put it, “turned theoretical into a
formation of practical reason by equating the being of things with the mere
demand…that [their truth-value] should be acknowledged by the act of
judgment.”130 However, Frederick Beiser disputes this interpretation saying that
Rickert explicitly warns against conflating practical and theoretical values, as well as
equating values with the realm of the practical.131 Indeed, Beiser’s interpretation is
more consistent all-around especially because it explains why there is, for Rickert,
no discrepancy between the value-dependence of the sciences and their possible
theoretical objectivity. Due to the view that values are primarily theoretical, they are
“directed toward the truth” for its own sake, without any practical (or political)
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significance.132 But it’s also possible that Beiser may be overlooking the practical
import of the “value” of truth. According to Scheler, the acknowledgment of truth,
precisely because it is a value, attaches to this acknowledgement, a moral duty. That
is to say, if truth is a value then there is practical obligation on the part of everyone
to judge according to an objective criterion (truth), as opposed to a subjective
criterion (seeking truth). This is perfectly Kantian because, for Kant, a sense of
moral obligation is required for metaphysical cognition; the theoretical is achieved
vis-à-vis the practical. However, truth is not a value, for Scheler.133 It is correct to
speak of the value of the searching, investigation, or knowledge of truth, but
Rickert’s “value-metaphysics” as Scheler calls it, “is nonsense, and so is the idea of a
transcendent region of values or truth.”134
Scheler points out that what was for Plato a subjective, “but not less necessary
prerequisite” for philosophy, is for Neo-Kantians “a primacy of the moral in the very
objective order of things.” The shift to the objective “shatters” and “repudiates” the
idea that “a certain moral way of life is the sine qua non” of objective knowledge.135
However, the point is more significant still. Scheler suggests that a moral attitude,
“through which we come to apprehend values and which are consequently the
source of all value-judgments as well as of all norms and decisions of obligation,
constitutes the unifying factor which is common to our practical conduct and all our
theoretical knowing and thinking.”136 Loving and hating are, for Scheler, the most
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fundamental acts of the spirit; they are acts necessarily prior to thinking and willing,
and thus constitutive for epistemology and practical decision. They “constitute the
common roots of our practical and theoretical behavior; they are the basic acts in
which alone our theoretic and our practical life discovers and conserves its ultimate
unity.”137

Critical Theory and the Positivismusstreit
This discussions concerning science and philosophy, the rational and irrational,
fact and value, theory and practice are of great importance for critical theory and
the members of the Frankfurt School. Perhaps the most general characterization of
critical theory historically is the attempt to form a solution to the so-called theory
and practice problem, or how to connect an evaluative theory of moral norms to the
level of practical, social reality. The problem resides within the relation between
science and philosophy because critical theorists thought that in order for theory to
be practically relevant, it must be both philosophy (as far as an evaluative and
normative endeavor is concerned) and social science (as far as an empirical relation
to material conditions are concerned). David Ingram explains that “During the
Enlightenment this problem took the following form: how does one reconcile the
idealistic and largely ethical heritage of philosophical reason with the materialistic
heritage of scientific reason?”138
But this is indeed an Enlightenment form of the problem. And when expressed
this way, the dichotomy reveals a nineteenth-century narrative at the latest: the
137
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opposition between the philosophical idealism of Hegel and the historical
materialism of Marx. In this story, Hegel plays the model philosopher and Marx, the
model scientist.139 In the historical reconstruction of this chapter, I’ve attempted to
show ways the story has changed and evolved since Hegel and Marx; ways which
have altered the opposition. With the arrival of Nietzsche, the Lebensphilosophie and
Weltanschauugsphilosophie traditions, and the onset of “irrationalism” (including
the ways psychoanalysis and the sociology of knowledge deal with human
irrationality), the dichotomy was no longer primarily between philosophical
idealism and the scientific materialism, but rather the opposite: science became
more associated with an “objective” law-based methodological form of knowing and
philosophy, with a “subjective” life-based experiential form of knowing. The natural
sciences, which in Marx and Darwin’s day had been revolutionary on account of its
empirical contact with nature, now in the twentieth century was the brunt of the
reaction against rationalism. The “nomothetic” natural sciences became associated
with terms that used to describe philosophy: method, logic and universality. Hence
the attempt by philosophers such as Windelband, Rickert, and Husserl to reclaim the
philosophical spirit by calling philosphy science, not because of its reference to
materiality but on account of its universal objectivity.
Besides the important influence of Freud, who forced the critical theorists to

139 I do not suggest here that Hegel is merely an idealist philosopher or that Marx is
merely a non-philosophical materialist; the opposition is ultimately a generalization and
makes straw men of them both. I only suggest that this is the traditional opposition that has
come down within the debate between philosophy and the social sciences.
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revise the theory of ideology in light of the dynamics of the unconscious,140 the new
modifications of the domain of philosophy have been largely unacknowledged by
critical theory. Arguably, they are still trying work with an idealist heritage that
continental philosophy had, for the most part, abandoned. Marcuse understands
“reason [to be] the fundamental category of philosophical thought,”141 and thus,
philosophy is understood as a logical pursuit of abstract universality. As such,
philosophy “has drawn its life from reason’s not yet being reality.”142 Abstract
philosophy must find a way to be brought to bear on concrete reality and rational
thinking toward the creation of rational society. This understanding of philosophy
influenced the way the theory and practice problem is posed, and what it meant for
critical theory to be, in part, philosophical. Critical theory either “remains faithful to
its philosophical heritage, in which case it runs the risk of becoming lost in utopian
speculation. Or…tries to be truthful to human nature as it really appears, in which
case it ceases to be critical.”143 It arguably requires both, needing to straddle the
disjunction. Marcuse writes, “Like philosophy, [critical theory] opposes making
reality into a criterion in the manner of complacent positivism. But unlike
philosophy, it always derives its goals only from present tendencies of the social
process. Therefore it has no fear of the utopia that the new order is denounced as
being.”144
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The dispute Adorno has with Popper at the 1961 German Sociological Congress,
called the Positivismusstreit, is itself also a sign that this story has changed.
Ironicially, a basic materialist assumption of Marxist thought, a century after Marx,
is nowhere to be found in the scientific framework of Karl Popper, namely, Marx’s
insistence that so-called “problems” of knowledge are not originally theoretical
problems, but are ideological reflections of social contradictions rooted in the
relations of production. This issue of the status of a “problem” comes up in Adorno
and Popper’s debate. We see an interesting situation arise: Popper, who abides by
more mainstream methodology of the social sciences, takes the position that is more
closely Hegelian since he understands problems to be originally within the context
of ideas. On the other hand, Adorno, the more philosophically oriented of the two,
insists that problems originate within reality.
Popper’s collection of twenty-seven theses presented at the Congress under the
title “The Logic of the Social Sciences,” explains that, methodologically, the social
sciences begin with certain problems. These problems are not only theoretical: they
are in fact the real social problems “of poverty, of illiteracy, of political suppression
or of uncertainty concerning legal rights….”145 However, these problems are
originally problems of knowledge insofar as the “tensions of knowledge or
ignorance” (or perhaps one could say, between rationality and irrationality) lead to
these social problems.146 It seems as though Popper is making the claim, in direct
opposition to Marx’s, that problems of society are in fact reflections of epistemic or
145 Karl Popper, “The Logic of the Social Sciences,” The Positivist Dispute in German
Sociology, ed. Theodor Adorno, trans. Glyn Adey and David Frisby (New York: Harper &
Row, 1976), 89 (Fifth thesis).
146 Popper, “The Logic of the Social Sciences,” 90 (Seventh thesis).
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logical contradictions since “each problem arises from the discovery that something
is not in order with our supposed knowledge; or, viewed logically, from the
discovery of an inner contradiction between our supposed knowledge and the
facts.”147
Adorno challenges Popper’s statements on the status of a “problem”:
The contradiction must not, as Popper at least presumes here, be a merely
‘supposed’ contradiction between subject and object, which would have to be
imputed to the subject alone as a deficiency of judgment. Instead, the
contradiction can, in very real terms, have its place in reality and can in no
way be removed by increased knowledge and clearer formulation. … The
conception of the contradictory nature of societal reality does not, however,
sabotage knowledge of it and expose it to the merely fortuitous. Such
knowledge is guaranteed by the possibility of grasping the contradiction as
necessary and thus extending rationality to it.148
The significance of this issue goes beyond the status of a problem, or even the
choice between Hegelianism and Marxism, but refers to the way reality is divided by
these problems and differences, in this case the separation of epistemic problems
and real ones. Adorno writes that “One would fetishize science if one radically
separated its immanent problems from the real ones, which are weakly reflected in
its formalisms.”149 Thus, we return to the problem of traditional theory and to a
more primary concern of the positivist dispute, the separation of being and value.
Habermas points to the separation of facts and values as an important example of
the separation of knowledge and interests endemic to traditional theories. Although
the ancient world separated knowledge from interests in other ways, Habermas,
shows the significance of the connection between theoria and a value-charged
Popper, “The Logic of the Social Sciences,” 88 (Fourth thesis).
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kosmos characteristic of ancient Greek philosophy. The idea of value-freedom,
Habermas writes, represents “psychologically an unconditional commitment to
theory, and epistemologically the severance of knowledge from interests.”150
Adorno echos Habermas on this issue, and against some of Popper’s statements
in his Fourteenth thesis on value and value-freedom. It is right away evident that
over time the social sciences have achieved a greater sophistication on this problem
than Weber had in 1909. It even seems that there is more agreement than
disagreement between Adorno and Popper on this point. Popper is adamant that a
blanket elimination of values from scientific research is not only impossible but is
paradoxical “since value-freedom itself is a value.”151 For Popper, suppressing valuejudgments not only robs the scientist of his humanity, but also destroys him as a
scientist. However, he makes a new distinction between scientific and extrascientific values which correspond to scientific and extra-scientific problems, and
“although it is impossible to separate scientific work from extra-scientific [let’s say
political] applications and evaluations,” nevertheless, the sciences must guard
against confusion of these value-spheres by separating “extra-scientific evaluations
from questions of truth.”152
Adorno commends Popper on his attempt to rethink the value problem that “has
been dogmatized in the meantime,” since Weber. But Adorno puts the problem on a
more metaphysical footing in claiming that all this talk of values, and the
distinctions between different spheres of them are reifications; reality therefore
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becomes viewed as “imperative-free or merely existent…through the dissections of
abstraction.”153 He continues, “the dichotomy of what is and what should be is as
false as it is historically compelling and, for this reason, it cannot be ignored.”154
Precisely because of this reification and its inevitability for the sciences, Adorno
insists that the self-reflection of knowledge in a critical theory of society is what
Popper is in fact searching for, namely, the self-reflection required to become aware
of one’s own implicit values. It takes a societal critique, i.e., “society’s awareness of
its contradictions and its necessity,” in order to “crystallize” a conception of a just
society around which the knowledge of sociology aims.155
Scheler emphasizes, with Adorno, the original unity of being and value in social
phenomenon and will agree that is it is only upon taking something as an object and
submitting to conceptual abstraction, which is where scientific observation begins,
that the aspects of the original unity of an object are separated: what Adorno calls
reification. But reification is just what empirical observation does insofar as it is a
cognitive and conceptual disruption of givenness, making transcendent the original
direct and asymbolic character of knowledge. Accordingly, I express warning that if
critical theory leaves out a notion of an essence by not incorporating
phenomenology into its program, then Scheler’s critique of Weber will also apply to
the Frankfurt School and will be unable to account for the unity for which it seeks. It
will effectively leave out that which can provide perceptual unity to social objects; it
is the essence that forms “a necessary bridge between areas that fall apart…in a
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purely, uncompromisingly dualistic manner: the value-imperative [on the one
hand,] and the existent, value-free reality [on the other].”
Adorno may object that this unity is provided not in the “essence,” but in its
“reality”; not in its Sosein, but in its Dasein. What is needed then is not a
phenomenology of essence but a philosophy of reality. The problem here is that,
although it is certainly the case that such unity is provided in the reality of an object,
for there to an epistemic relation, or “ontological participation” with this real unity,
it must happen with respect to what that object is, not simply that it is. The reality of
something may be a condition for an objective awareness to arise, through a
practical resistance, but it is insufficient to account for the knowledge of reality
because reality is not a knowable aspect of an object; it is ultimately precluded from
being a correlate of consciousness. “Reality is transintelligible to every possible
knowing mind. Only the what of the being, not the being of the what is
intelligible.”156 An essence is simply the meaningful unity of a real thing.
Despite the relevance of Adorno’s statements for the necessity for sociology to
incorporate critical theory, it is important that, for critical theory’s own interests, to
incorporate phenomenology since its entire aim is to leave the world in its original
intuitive unity. Critical theory needs phenomenology to guard against falling into the
very forms of reification and ideology they critique.
But as I’ve pointed out, critical theorists are proud to declare this dualism
between theory and practice, “subject and object, conceptual thought and sensuous
being, transcendent idea and mundane reality, universal essence and particular fact,
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‘ought’ and ‘is.’”157 The more uncompromising or “non-identical” it is, the more
profound the achievement of a dialectical unity. But perhaps this opposition itself is
also a reification? If the opposition between fact and value (is and ought) is one
reified by the “dissections of abstraction,” why aren’t the other oppositions? A
challenge to critical theory involves their unwavering idea that idealism is
something endemic to philosophy and that, in order not to be idealistic, one must,
following Marx, transform “philosophy into social science, idealistic critique of
knowledge into materialistic critique of political economy.”158 Furthermore, by
relating social theory to revolutionary practice, Marx creates a false dilemma
between whether rational knowledge is necessary for revolutionary action, or
whether revolutionary action is necessary for rational knowledge.159 The latter,
Marxist, alternative is dangerous. Scheler wants to shatter the binary and say that
value is necessary for both knowledge and action.
Scheler’s conception of philosophy and its autonomy is important here because
if the experiential and intuitive element of phenomenology is taken seriously, as
well as the philosophical attitude that he seeks to recover from the ancients, the
theory and practice problem as well as the rest of the “non-identicals” are misposed,
because it begins with the contradiction and aims at unity rather than maintaining
that the unity is more original than the contradiction. Critical theorists adopt
conception of philosophy that resides on one side of the spectrum, rather than one
whose task is to be a “mediator” between the ideal factors and real factors, and to be
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a source of unification between fact and value. Whereas critical theory tries to do
theory practically (and practice theoretically) precisely by being both Hegelian and
Marxist, for Scheler, the question of unity is not about bringing one side over to the
other, but by being grounded in an autonomous third term which constitutes “the
common roots of our practical and theoretical behavior.” It comes into its own on
the act of loving “in which alone our theoretic and our practical life discovers and
conserves its ultimate unity.”160
Marcuse writes in essay “Philosophy and Critical Theory,”
By defending the endangered and victimized potentialities of man against
cowardice and betrayal, critical theory is not to be supplemented by a
philosophy. It only makes explicit what was always the foundation of its
categories: the demand that through the abolition of previously existing
material conditions of existence the totality of human relations is liberated. If
critical theory, amidst today’s desperation, indicates that the reality it
intends must comprise the freedom and happiness of individuals, it is only
following the direction given by its economic concepts.161
Philosophy’s role, or lack of one, in oppressive and threatening social situations
applies because of Marcuse’s formalistic conception of philosophy, that it can only
provide universal moral principles or “ideals brought into social struggles from
outside.”162 However, philosophy should be an important supplement in the goal of
liberation precisely because values are inseparable from reality, and because
philosophy, or phenomenology, has a role of intuition and cognition of values.
Despite the fact that all human beings ascribe to some kind of value framework or
worldview, it is important to notice that for Scheler values are philosophical
phenomena, given in the context of social dynamics precisely through the lived
Scheler, “The Nature of Philosophy,” 88.
Marcuse, “Philosophy and Critical Theory,” 11.
162 Marcuse, “Philosophy and Critical Theory,” 12.
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experience of these dynamics of control and oppression, danger and victimization.
On the one hand, a phenomenological critique of society would be based upon this
experience, in light of which values and bearers of values are threatened and
victimized in society. Effective social critique requires a phenomenological
experience of social elements precisely by the investigation into the givenness of
values. The critique however cannot be based simply upon the anger toward the
oppressive elements of society, but upon the love for the bearers of value
endangered in the state of affairs. On the other hand, a phenomenological critique
does not operate by simply introducing into an existing society ideals abstractly
conceived outside of social struggles. Since values are only given with an encounter
with real things, the phenomenologist will make a value critique, but does so
precisely in the midst of the struggles of existing social conditions. The prospect for
social change is directly in relation to those endangered elements of society that
bear positive values or the possible arrival of elements into society that bear
negative ones.
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5
THE HISTORICITY OF SPIRIT AND LIFE
Although it was Scheler who officially launched the project of the Soziologie des
Wissens when he edited a volume of collected writings, Versuche zu einer Soziologie
des Wissens in 1924, Karl Mannheim deserves recognition for making the sociology
of knowledge an accepted and distinct sociological field of study. His work
intensified the debates surrounding the sociology of knowledge, which had occupied
“the center of the sociological stage in Germany”1 for nearly a decade. Scheler used
the sociology of knowledge as a way of addressing the problems for knowledge that
arise on account of what others had called the existential connectedness
(Seinsverbundenheit) of consciousness and the relation between different kinds of
knowledge and the goals of drive-conation. In Scheler’s words, the sociology of
knowledge attempts to manage “the problems posed by the fundamental fact of the
social nature of all knowledge and of its preservation and transmission, its
methodological expansion and progress.”2 I want to stress that the sociology of
knowledge, for Scheler, must take a philosophical approach. From the conclusions of
the previous chapter, philosophy is more effective than science for mediating
between domains that tend to be held in opposition, in this case, the ideal and the

Talcott Parsons, “Review of Alexander von Schelting’s Max Webers
Wissenschaftslehre,” American Sociological Review, 1 (1936), p. 680. Quoted in Nico Stehr
and Volker Meja, “Relativism and the Sociology of Knowledge,” Knowledge and Politics: The
Sociology of Knowledge Dispute, ed. Volker Meja and Nico Stehr (New York: Routledge,
1990), 285.
2 Scheler, Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge, trans. Manfred Frings (Boston:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), 33.
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real, conscious acts and vital drives, society and culture, etc.
This chapter will constitute the first part of the discussion concerning the
problems of a sociology of knowledge. I will reserve the inclusion of relevant ideas
of the Frankfurt School for the next chapter. My initial aim is to present Scheler’s
sociology of culture which he took to be an important propaedeutic for the sociology
of knowledge proper. Cultural sociology includes primarily a discussion of the
domains of ideal and real factors and their interrelation in the process of
“realization,” or bringing about ideal and real goals into existence. Much of the
controversy surrounding Scheler’s sociology of knowledge actually pertains more to
his sociology of culture. Part of my aim in the chapter is to dispel the controversy,
first, with respect to those writing on the sociology of knowledge whose critique of
Scheler largely follows the mold of Mannheim’s critique of Scheler’s so-called
“dualism.” And second, with respect to critiques against Scheler’s theory of the
powerlessness of spirit. I argue that, in both cases, even if these critiques aren’t
dispelled entirely, a better understanding of Scheler’s theory of ideal and real
factors can be offered by, one, referring to its phenomenological underpinnings and,
two, the way these factors achieve unification in Scheler’s philosophy of history.

Der Streit um die Wissenssoziologie: Mannheim’s Critique of Scheler
That which has come to be called the Der Streit um die Wissenssoziologie (the
sociology of knowledge dispute) officially began with Mannheim’s paper “Die
Bedeutung der Konkurrenz im Gebiete des Geistigen” at the sixth congress of the
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German Sociological Association at Zurich in September of 1928. 3 Scheler had died
earlier that year, in May. Mannheim’s paper was the second of two on the problem
of competition. The first was from a colleague of Scheler’s at Cologne, Leopold von
Weise.4 The overall concern of the congress participants was the relation between
knowledge and being, or the existential connectedness (Seinsverbundenheit) of
knowledge. David Frisby writes that the comments from the participants made it
clear that
the sociology of knowledge was seen to be forging nothing less than an
intellectual revolution in the human sciences. It was regarded as a new mode
of interpretation of phenomena which relied upon not merely traditional
hermeneutic methods but also empirical social science. In this respect, the
sociology of knowledge could be seen as forming a significant bridge
between the natural and cultural sciences as understood, for example, by
neo-Kantian philosophers. It was thus clearly viewed by some as bringing
about a paradigm shift in the humanities and social sciences.5
Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia (1929) must have been a more profound
advancement of this “intellectual revolution.” The book prompted greater discussion
and controversy than his congress paper had, and it was at this point that the
Frankfurt School became involved. Horkheimer, Marcuse, and Adorno all had critical
essays of the “sociology of knowledge,” which, for them, meant Mannheim’s
Mannheim’s paper is translated as “Competition as a Cultural Phenomenon,” in From
Karl Mannhiem, ed. Kurt Wolff (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 223ff., and in
Knowledge and Politics: The Sociology of Knowledge Dispute, ed. Volker Meja and Nico Stehr
(New York: Routledge, 1990). The Meja/Stehr volume also includes an account of the
discussion on Mannheim’s paper at the Sixth Sociological Congress along with a reply by
Mannheim. The discussion included Alfred Weber, Werner Sombart, Robert Wilbrandt, Emil
Lederer, Adolph Lowe, Alfred Meusel, Norbert Elias, Hans Jonas, and Paul Eppstein. David
Frisby offers a good summary of the discussion with select passages and frequent citations
in The Alienated Mind: The Sociology of Knowledge in Germany 1918-1933 (New York:
Routledge, 1992), 185-98.
4 Von Weise’s paper was titled “Die Konkurrenz, vorweigend in soziologischsystematicher Betrachtung” (Competition, Considered Predominantly in SociologicalSystematic Terms).
5 Frisby, The Alienated Mind, 195-6.
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sociology of knowledge, exclusively. By then, Scheler’s contribution for the most
part was ignored. Despite the fact that Scheler and Mannheim had never debated at
a sociological congress or in writing, I wish to include Mannheim’s critique of
Scheler’s sociology of knowledge as a part of the range of dispute on the sociology of
knowledge, or at least as an important preface to it. I do so not because of the high
quality of the critique. The critique is worthwhile, first, because of the fact that
Scheler and Mannheim are the two founders of the sociology of knowledge in
Germany, and second, because, in fact, the critique is rather poor, but one that has
nevertheless been influential for lessening the significance of Scheler’s contribution
to the sociology of knowledge.6
The reason Scheler’s contribution has been considered relatively insignificant is
not necessarily because of what his sociology of knowledge includes, but, first,
because Scheler did not seem concerned with forging a new independent field of
study; his focus was predominantly upon completing his book on philosophical
anthropology. Second, it was not strictly speaking sociology, insofar as sociology is a
positive science. That is, it did not relate well with the “substantive” or empirical
playing-field of the social sciences at the time. For example, in response to Scheler’s
paper, “Wissenschaft und Soziale Strukter,”7 some participants at the Fourth

Frisby states that “Mannheim’s critique is the only detailed one to appear from within
[the sociological] tradition” other than Adler’s reply to Scheler’s paper at the fourth
Sociological Congress in 1924. We can surmise then that Mannheim’s critique would have
been influential for those within this tradition.
7 Contained in Volker Meja and Nico Stehr (eds), Der Streit um die Wissenssoziologie,
Erster Band (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1982). This paper a brief display of his sociology of
knowledge insofar as it deals predominantly with the three kinds of knowledge and their
aims.
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Sociological Congress criticized Scheler for not being sufficiently sociological.8
Alfred Weber (Max’s brother) suggested that what Scheler had offered was “a
‘sociology’ only in quotation marks. I believe it was a philosophy with a sociological
prognostic.”9 Also, Max Adler, who was Scheler’s respondent at the conference
states that the direction of Scheler’s thought (and his sociology of knowledge in
general) is not from a sociological standpoint, but from an “intellectual-historical”
(geistesgeschichtlicher) one. Indeed, Frisby explains that “Adler’s central argument
against Scheler’s paper was framed around whether it has in fact formed a
contribution to sociology at all.”10 These only confirm that Scheler’s sociology of
knowledge is meant to be an introduction to his metaphysics and philosophical
anthropology, and as such, a philosophical contribution to questions concerning
cultural sociology. The criticisms seem to miss Scheler’s own attempt to challenge
these increasingly ingrained scientific approaches to sociological questions.
Insofar as the sociology of knowledge concerns itself with the Verbundenheit, or
connection, between consciousness and being, the ideal and the real, spirit and life,
theory and practice, then for its orientation to be philosophical is important in part
because philosophy, for Scheler, has the task of mediating these oppositions.
Phenomenological philosophy is an autonomous attitudinal mode of knowing that
begins in the sphere of pre-conceptual givenness and arises to conceptual cognition
in a way that attempts not to misrepresent the original self-given content. As such,
phenomenology has a unique role for these sociological problems that seek to show

David Frisby discusses these objections more thoroughly in The Alienated Mind.
Verhandlungen des Vierten Deutschen Soziologentages 1924 (Tubingen 1925), 216.
10 Frisby, The Alienated Mind, 178.
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the relation between the conscious and pre-conscious and the social influence upon
cognition. It seems that Scheler was optimistic that the inclusion of
phenomenological elements could level the playing field, so to speak, against the
sociological critique of knowledge, but in a way that anticipates the critique.
The most expressed complaints concern the metaphysical underpinnings of
Scheler’s sociological positions; such an orientation constitutes the “danger that his
central guiding cognitive principles can be misinterpreted as a metaphysics of
history.”11 Though the intertwining of Scheler’s metaphysical and sociological
positions may justify critiques that Scheler’s approach is not properly sociological
(e.g., Adler’s critique), critics often go further to use these metaphysical elements to
justify accusing Scheler of a “supra-temporal” theory of truth. Among them, Karl
Mannheim’s treatment of Scheler’s “phenomenological standpoint”12 may prove to
be the most impertinent. His critique of Scheler’s “Catholic dualism between the
eternal and temporal” is so extravagant that it is as though he may just as well be
talking about Plato, Plotinus, or, more likely, St. Augustine.
Mannheim acknowledges that Scheler “cannot rest satisfied with a line drawn
once and for all between eternity and temporality [and that Scheler] feels impelled
to account for the new cultural factors emerging in the world.”13 Paradoxically,
however, the critique amounts to the fact that Scheler seeks to account for these

Walter Bühl, “Max Scheler,” in D. Käsler (ed.), Klassiker des soziologischen Denkens,
vol. 2, Munich, 1978, 200. Quoted in Frisby, The Alienated Mind, 64.
12 Karl Mannheim, “The Problem of the Sociology of Knowledge” (1925), From Karl
Mannheim, ed. Kurt Wolff (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 79-104.
13 Mannheim, “Sociology of Knowledge,” 80.
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cultural factors while retaining the “extremely sharp line”14 between eternity and
temporality (the essential and factual, base and superstructure, etc.). Scheler “seeks
to incorporate new factors into an old framework,” and “tries to present the position
of ‘historicism’ and ‘sociologism’ in terms of a philosophy of timelessness.”15 And
“since Scheler’s philosophical point of view postulates a supra-temporal,
unchanging system of truths…, he is compelled to introduce the ‘contingency’ of
sociological factors as an afterthought into this immobile, supratemporal
framework.”16 Scheler, therefore, “never reaches the dynamic (he cannot bridge the
gap between the static and the dynamic).”17 Instead, Scheler’s theory contains two
specific “jumps,” and anthropological one and metaphysical one. The first is the
jump from historical man to the “superhuman capacity of shaking off all historical
limitation and determination.”18 This jump is supposedly so grandiose and quite
literally high-flying that “Scheler must imply that he looks upon the world with God’s
eyes.”19 The second ‘jump’ is the metaphysical jump from temporality into
“timelessness” since the historical process is renounced as “hopelessly relative.”20
The leading historian of German social thought, David Frisby, despite his often
careful and detailed scholarship, affirms Mannheim’s statements.21 But Frisby’s
assessment of Scheler is one more piece toward confirming my hypothesis that this
interpretation of Scheler’s sociology of knowledge persists among sociologists
Mannheim, “Sociology of Knowledge,” 80, 82.
Mannheim, “Sociology of Knowledge,” 80-1.
16 Mannheim, “Sociology of Knowledge,” 101.
17 Mannheim, “Sociology of Knowledge,” 104.
18 Mannheim, “Sociology of Knowledge,” 93.
19 Mannheim, “Sociology of Knowledge,” 103.
20 Mannheim, “Sociology of Knowledge,” 94.
21 Frisby, The Alienated Mind, 65.
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specifically because they typically read Scheler’s sociological writings out of context
from the rest of his philosophy. An irony in these criticisms is that if they are
accurate, i.e., if it is true that Scheler’s philosophy is so dualistic that it cannot
accommodate any alteration of “static” ideal factors by their relation to “dynamic”
real factors, then there is no way to explain why Scheler would have even made the
effort to investigate the sociology of knowledge in the first place.
Frisby questions whether Scheler’s contribution could be called
phenomenological, writing that Scheler’s “metaphysical position seriously prevents
him from establishing a consistent phenomenological approach. Hence it is only
with the greatest difficulty, and with the most spurious level of abstraction, that one
can claim that Scheler did establish a phenomenological basis of the sociology of
knowledge.”22 The fact of the matter is that Scheler maintains a phenomenological
approach already prior to the development of a metaphysics and sociology, so his
metaphysics could not prevent what had already come before it. Certainly, Frisby’s
statement should not be interpreted to mean that Scheler’s metaphysics had
prevented his phenomenology; my point is rather that the two are more connected
than it may seem. Without an acquaintance with Scheler’s earlier phenomenology,
it’s true that a reader of Scheler’s later sociology could very well be confused as to
how it is allegedly “phenomenological.” The answer lies in the fact that nearly all of
the operative elements of his sociology and metaphysics had already been
investigated phenomenologically in his earlier work and most of these
investigations are then incorporated and reconceived in this later writings to
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pertain to human social reality: anthropology (study of humanity), sociology (study
of society), metaphysics (study of the ground of being). Anthropology and sociology
rest upon his metaphysics because Scheler thinks the ground of being is the
“interpenetration” between Geist und Drang (spirit and life).23 But these
metaphysical categories, if Scheler is to be consistent with his own conception of
phenomenology (which he is) must necessarily refer back to the phenomenological
experience of spirit and life.
We already find a phenomenology of spirit (with reference to the phenomenon
of Person) and drive (with reference to the phenomenon of Streben), value and
action (Handlung) in the Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik
(1913/16), which continue in other writings, especially in Wesen und Formen der
Sympathie (1923), in which he also develops a phenomenology of social forms,
fellow-feeling and love, and otherness; a phenomenology of religion and the
absolute is developed in Vom Ewigen im Menschen (1921). At times, Scheler will
move from a phenomenology to a sociological application within the span of a single
text or essay. In Scheler’s early essay “Über Ressentiment und moralisches
Werturteil” (1912) he investigates the phenomenon of ressentiment (i.e., the basis of
value-delusion) and then applies the investigation sociologically.
Since many of the structural elements of Scheler’s metaphysics and sociology
were previously investigated phenomenologically, they are grounded in experiential
givenness and not some formal system of logic. It’s true that the validity of the
meaning or essence of phenomenological investigation is not reducible to the
Drang (usually translated either as urge, drive, or impulsion) is synonymous with life
(Leben). Life is most essentially drive.
23
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particular experiences in which it is given and selected to exemplify the phenomena,
but its irreducibility does not indicate its part within an “unchanging system of
truths”; it is rather an ideal meaning content that extends further than a single
environmental context. It is by no means the case then, as Mannheim assumes, that
“Scheler teaches a logical immanence of the ideal sphere.”24
It is interesting to note in light of Mannheim’s critique of Scheler that in another
place Mannheim insists that a phenomenological starting point is not only
acceptable, but is in fact required for a complete cultural sociology. In one of
Mannheim’s unpublished early essays, “Uber die Eigenart Kultursoziologischer
Erkenntnis” (1922), he claims that the exclusive utilization of “logicalmethodological analysis” that characterizes the sciences is insufficient, and that
the determination of the distinctive characteristics, of a cultural science,
above all, is complete only when the immanent logical analysis of the
knowledge it yields is complemented by ways of looking which are prior to
inquiry governed by questions strictly of logic. … This is because the
constitution of knowledge of a cultural-scientific sort is always distinguished
by the attitude with which the whole subject approaches the spiritual reality
it aims to investigate scientifically.25
Mannheim is here endorsing an attitudinal way of seeing, or “looking,” which is
prior to logical or methodological analysis, and which is, phenomenologically
speaking, an endorsement of forms of givenness in order for an analysis to be
complete. Perhaps it’s worthwhile to recall in comparison Scheler’s definition of
phenomenology as “an attitude of spiritual seeing…new facts themselves, before
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they have been fixed by logic.”26 Cultural sociology, Mannheim thinks, requires a
phenomenological analysis that will take into consideration the “subjective attitude”
as the basis for the determination of various “spiritual formations” (culture).
Specifically, there is required a phenomenological analysis of the attitude pertinent
to cultural sociology.27 According to Mannheim, without this phenomenological
orientation of cultural sociology, there will be neglect of “two essential moments”:
first, what he considers to be a Hegelian point, namely, that “cultural sciences are
themselves part of the process they are describing,” and the recognition of this—the
self-consciousness of the sciences—is a source of the unification of subject and
object. And second, Dilthey’s point that “the subject of cultural-scientific knowledge
is not the mere epistemological subject, but the ‘whole man.’”28
In describing his own views of the way cultural sociology is to be studied,
Mannheim effectively describes the core of Scheler’s phenomenology more
accurately than in his explicit attempt to do so (in sociology of knowledge essay).
Whereas, in Mannheim’s critique, it is Scheler’s phenomenological standpoint that
prevents him from “reaching the dynamic,” in this earlier essay, Mannheim affirms
that it is precisely the phenomenological complement to the logical-methodological
aspect that can do justice to the “dynamic change” within the concept of culture.29
This is because what is needed is not an explanation of change on the basis of the
concept, but a conceptualization that can preserve an experience of the process of
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change.30 An objective analysis alone can solve this problem only in part. For this
reason, Mannheim suggests that cultural sociology needs both a fundamental (prescientific) “immanent” investigation of phenomena on the experiential level, as well
as a “non-immanental” or methodological approach which creates distanciation and
objectification of the phenomenon in order to view the object in the totality of life
experiences and is capable of serving as a theoretical check upon the immanent
investigation.31
But Mannheim reveals an even more profound alignment with Scheler’s
phenomenology in his other unpublished essay, “Eine Soziologische Theorie der
Kultur und ihrer Erkennbarkeit” (1924). In previous chapters, I have been
describing phenomenology with respect to its subjective factors (attitude, acts) as
well as its objective ones (essence, value) and the importance of the subjective
factors to make the givenness of the objective ones possible. The pre-logical
givenness of essence makes possible empirical observation and methodological
analysis; the pre-logical givenness of value makes possible value-judgment and
moral principles. Furthermore, I have mentioned that the empirical dissection of
experiential heterogeneous units presupposes a single holistic or integrated
experience of the essence from which each of these partial units receives their
meaning and unity.32
In Mannheim’s critique of modern rationalist epistemology, he pinpoints the
attempt to reduce a single sphere of knowledge into “the paradigm for knowledge as
Mannheim, “The Distinctive Character,” 51.
Mannheim, “The Distinctive Character,” 55-65. Cf. Frisby, The Alienated Mind, 120-1.
32 Scheler, Ressentiment, trans. Manfred Frings (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press,
2001), 20.
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such.”33 Their “rationalizing fervor” conceals other spheres of knowledge
incomprehensible to the orientation of quantification that characterizes this
“calculating” epistemology. In contrast, Mannheim refers to what he calls
“physiognomic knowledge,” namely, “learning that does not emerge on grounds of
dissection and analysis but owes its assurance precisely to a holistic apprehension
which first makes analysis possible.”34 To call this knowledge physiognomic is indeed
apropos, especially since the term refers to physical (primarily facial)
characteristics insofar as they are indicative of an essential feature, such as
personality or personal character. Here we might recall Scheler’s phenomenology of
the otherness that I expounded in Chapter 2, where he suggests that evidence of the
Other is not simply as a body, or “self” but as expressive unities or “patterns of
wholeness”; qualitative content given in conjunction with sensations. Scheler writes
that “sensory appearances are given only insofar as they function as the basis of
these patterns, or can take upon the further office of signifying or representing such
[qualitative] wholes.”35 Mannheim likewise affirms that an individual can be
grasped without being articulated in terms of universal concepts or subjected to
universal laws. He writes that “a living Other belongs to us not only so far as it can
be dissolved into relations.”36 In comparison, according to Scheler, every essence is
individual until individual essences are functionalized into universal concepts.37
Furthermore, Mannheim writes that “we partake of spiritual and sensual learning
Karl Mannheim, “A Sociological Theory of Culture and Its Knowability,” Structures of
Thinking, 158.
34 Mannheim, “Sociological Theory of Culture,” 158. My emphasis.
35 Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, 264.
36 Mannheim, “Sociological Theory of Culture,” 159.
37 Cf. Scheler, “Phenomenology,” 157-8; Formalism, 48-50.
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whose substance we grasp directly and allow to affect us at a single contact.”38 In
comparison, the directness or immediacy of phenomenological intuition within a
single act of experience is foundational to Scheler’s phenomenology.39
The significance of this connection is more than the connection itself, but also
inasmuch as it puts Mannheim against Mannheim, and refutes his own critique of
Scheler’s phenomenological sociology of knowledge, which would have been
negated had Mannheim bothered to learn what Scheler took phenomenology to be
and how it connected with his sociology. Mannheim claims that this mode of “prescientific,” “physiognomic” learning, far from being a supra-temporal, eternal kind of
knowing, “gains its distinctiveness from being rooted in situations, while naturalscientific knowledge abstracts completely from the specific situation of the knowing
subject.”40 Much of what I want to show, so far and in what is to come, about
Scheler’s phenomenology is how it remains connected to “the basis of the [concrete]
situation.” Mannheim writes that “while general rules could teach anything except in
what concrete situation one happens to be placed at the moment, the special
capacity of the concrete, pre-scientific practical actor consists in…bringing the facts
given into an order relevant to himself and his own situation.”41 What is more, the
aim in part of this work is to ask along with Mannheim, in the context of Scheler’s
philosophy, “How [are] insights able to provide at least an orientation for action.”42
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Scheler’s Philosophy and Sociology of Culture
Scheler proceeds in his “Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens” (1925)
similarly to the way he does in his work on ressentiment. He begins with a
discussion of the “essence and concept of a sociology of culture”43 and moves into
the sociology of knowledge proper, which is, he says, “perhaps the most important
part of a cultural sociology.”44 What will be of great concern for cultural sociology is
the way we arrive at its most basic elements, and they are for Scheler, spirit (Geist)
and drive (Drang). He suggests that the methodological criteria of sociology is on the
one hand formal-ideal, concerning general rules, types and laws; and on the other
hand, empirical-factual, dealing with “the whole gamut of the human content of life”
through the forms of human association and relation.45 However, the study would
not be in any way phenomenological if the formal and empirical criteria were the
sole criteria. These methodological criteria must be supplemented by an
“immanent” or phenomenological investigation on an intentional level, by which
Scheler distinguishes between a “sociology of culture” and a “sociology of real
factors.” Thus, the distinction is grounded not only methodologically, but
ontologically, within that being to which we have the closest immediate access: the
beings we are. All cultural sociology and sociology of knowledge must be based
upon the phenomenological fact that human activity—activity that is always at once
spiritual and determined by drives—can be directed either toward ideal goals, or

That is to say, the difference between cultural sociology and the “sociology of real
factors.” Perhaps its clearer to say, the difference between a study of foundations of culture
and the study of the foundations of society, respectively.
44 Scheler, Problems, 65.
45 Scheler, Problems, 34.
43
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real goals. And since human intentional activity is always simultaneously
conditioned at once both spiritually (intentional acts) and vitally (drives), ideal
goals are only predominantly (i.e., not exclusively) spiritually conditioned, and real
goals “result [only] predominantly from drives…which at the same time are directed
toward the real alterations of such realities according to their social
determinancy.”46 This prospect of altering or changing reality in the context of
society is a perfect statement which Scheler attempts to account for in his cultural
sociology, and more specifically, what is the role of ideal factors for the emergence
of new real conditions, and the role of real factors for the attainment of ideal goals. It
might be helpful to state something of Scheler’s position at the outset.
Again it is simply of the nature of human beings, individually or communally, to
have both ideal and real goals. To neglect one for the other, or take either one as that
into which the other is subsumed, is a mistake. Ideal goals are not ideological simply
from of an unawareness of their determining real conditions, because ideal goals,
even while having a relationship of determination with real factors are not reducible
in content to these factors. More generally, the human being is neither merely a
rational being (“homo rationalis”) whose whole vital activity finds genuine
fulfillment only insofar as it aims toward an ideal goal: an intellectual eudaimonia,
“absolute knowing,” or “rest in God.” Nor is the human being merely a producing
being (“homo faber”) whose whole spiritual activity finds genuine fulfillment only
insofar as it aims toward a real goal: the reorganization of society through
revolution against oppressive socio-economic production relations. In fact, the

46

Scheler, Problems, 34.
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human being is both, without being exhausted in either one. Although Scheler will
insist that ideal goals cannot simply be subsumed by the real, nor real goals by the
ideal (as in a means-ends relationship), they each aim in some way toward the
improvement of life, the world, and society. Within the course of the attainment of
these goals, ideal and real factors combine and are indistinguishable to those
focused on their tasks. On the one hand, thinkers or artists (e.g., physicists, painters,
or musicians) seek to change reality in their experimentations, paintings, and
compositions. They utilize a variety of relevant tools and follow a course of conative
and physical action, but they do so to reach an irreducible ideal goal: e.g., “to acquire
knowledge of nature or to obtain from themselves and others an aesthetically
worthy meaning for intuitive understanding and appreciation.”47 On the other hand,
“the business administrator, as well as the simple industrial worker of lowest
qualification…, the prominent statesman as well as the voter in the election, still deal
with a great many preparatory and especially intellectual activities directed toward
the ideal realm…for the sake of a real objective”48 In Scheler’s words, all goals “serve
a becoming.”49
Concerning this becoming (Werden): what is it about? Who is it for? What is it
for? Scheler thinks there are three chief goals of becoming: (1) the practical
becoming or transformation of the material conditions of life; (2) the becoming or
edification of spirit of an individual (person), or a national or ecclesial community
(culture); (3) the becoming of the divine in the world.

Scheler, Problems, 34.
Scheler, Problems, 34-5.
49 Scheler, GW VIII, 205.
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In each of these cases, there corresponds a realization of a specific sphere of
values, respectively: (1) material transformation involves the realization of vital and
sensible values (along with the consecutive values of utility and luxury); (2)
edification of spirit involves the realization of spiritual values (moral, aesthetic
values, the value of knowledge, along with their consecutive cultural values); (3) the
realization of values of the sacred or holy.
And finally, there corresponds a kind of knowing for each goal of becoming and
value-realization, respectively: (1) scientific knowledge: 50 the kind of cognition
arising from practical intuitions by means of the experience of laboring or working;
(2) essence knowledge:51 the kind of cognition arising from the intuitions of person
or culture from an experience of spiritual acts, either one’s own or a sympathetic
acting-with; (3) redemptive knowledge: 52 that kind of (metaphysical) cognition that
arises from the intuitions of religious experience.
These three types of goals, levels of value-realization, and forms of knowledge
are only possible for human beings, who are the only beings in a “place” or situation
(Stellung) to refashion reality according to ideas or ideal content. In other words,
human beings have a universal destiny to make values and meanings real. This is the
meaning of human existence. Animals have a very powerful capacity to change
“Leistungswissen” (productive knowledge). This kind of knowledge is “Wissen der
positivien Wissenschaft” (knowledge of the positive sciences), or also called
“Herrschaftswissen” (knowledge of domination or control).
51 “Bildungswissen” (knowledge of culture). But, as Scheler adds, “knowledge of culture
is knowledge of essence” (“The Forms of Knowledge and Culture,” Philosophical
Perspectives, 37).
52 “Erlösungswissen.” This form of knowledge is rather curious because, though it
religious in nature, it is in fact a form of cognition, and not a form or belief or faith. This may
be why he tends to link it to metaphysics: a knowledge of the “ground of being,” or “ground
of the world.”
50
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reality, but because they are only vital beings (with limited capacity for intelligence
and choice) they cannot guide or direct their conations or inclinations toward
purposes by means of values or ideals above real or vital goals. On the other hand,
divine or angelic persons, who would presumably have a profound capacity for
spiritual acts, would, if there are such beings, be entirely unable to effect any change
in reality.53 The human being is the only “hope” for the divine to come to completion
in reality, and the divine is the only hope for human beings to redeem or “sanctify”
the world. The human being is the only being who can actualize or realize a divine
plan. Humanity and divinity, for Scheler, stand in mutual solidarity and
cooperation.54 But the human being, to achieve its task, must also achieve a
solidarity of all living beings by means of “vital sympathy.” Though one may criticize
Scheler’s vision here as anthropocentric, it is not at least with respect to other
anthropocentric views that use it justify human domination over other forms of
beings. Scheler’s vision culminates on the love of all beings, namely, “to capture the
great invisible solidarity of all living beings with each other in universal life, of all
spirits in the eternal spirit, the simultaneous solidarity of the world process with the
becoming fate [Werdeschicksal] of the highest ground, as well as its [the ground’s]
solidarity with this world process.”55

Scheler explains the idea of an omnipotent God from the historiography of religion.
Religions historically originate primarily according to needs of protection, and have
persisted because of the tenet of ancient philosophy that equates higher forms of being with
more actualized forms of being. God could not be both a being highest in value, but lowest in
power because lacking power would constitute a potentiality.
54 Scheler, The Human Place in the Cosmos, 66. My task must suspend detail on Scheler’s
notion of God and focus on this human capacity to effect change in the world.
55 GW IX, 162. My translation.
53
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The phenomenology of spirit and life
Scheler’s notion of spirit is fundamental for his phenomenology of the person56
(whether individual or collective), so much so that everything Scheler says about the
individual person (Person) can also be said of spirit (Geist), and vice versa. There are
four main points about the essence of spirit.
(1) Spirit is equated with the sphere of acts and all that possesses the nature of
act, e.g., “intentionality and fulfillment of meaning.”57 As was discussed in Chapter 3,
spirit (as an act-being) is never an object because acts are essentially nonobjectifiable.58 Its only mode of givenness is phenomenologically, namely, within the
very performance of acts. Another person, for example, “can only be disclosed to me
by my joining in the performance of his [or her] acts.59 Since intentional acts can
never hold the act itself (in its performance) as an object, the intentional object
toward which an act is directed composes a piece of the individual person’s world.
Every individual person (living in and through one’s acts), by essential necessity,
has a individual “world” (the realm of objects toward which the person acts).60
Person (Person) is the spirit of the factual human being. Every individual person has
his or her own world. On the other hand, an assemblage or association of persons
creates a community or society (the specific type of association is not important at
this point) and their interaction (the joint performance of acts) creates a shared

Scheler, Formalism, Ch. 6, pp. 370-595.
Scheler, Formalism, 389.
58 Scheler, Formalism, 386-7.
59 Scheler, Sympathy, 167.
60 Scheler, Formalism, 393.
56
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world or group-spirit (Gruppengeist).61 Children raised in a given community will
initially take their identity from the shared communal world before they create for
themselves an autonomous world of their own (if they create one).62 Culture
(Bildung) is the communal or collective equivalent of an individual person,63 namely,
the spirit of the factual community or society. Another culture, it follows, can only be
disclosed to me by my joining in the performance of the acts of the members of that
society.
(2) Spirit is a unity of different acts. In Scheler’s words, spirit is “the concrete and
essential unity of being of acts of different essences.”64 More specifically, it belongs
essentially to spirit that various possible kinds of conscious activities are uniformly
contained in it. It is only by means of differences of acts that we can account for
differences of subjects (individual or collective).65 This is profoundly important, for
Scheler, because personal autonomy is based not simply upon rationality, but upon
individuality, and individuality is grounded within the unique character or
orientation of this unity of different acts (personhood).66 It has become customary,
since philosophy’s beginning, to equate spirit with rational acts of thinking and
knowing, but Scheler argues forcefully that purely rational beings would be logical
Scheler, Problems, 69.
Cf. Scheler, Sympathy, 246-9.
63 This is a generalization. There is a distinction between a culture and the spirit of
society that will be discussed later, namely, culture is a “result” at every moment of
collective spiritual activity, but not this activity itself. In this way, an individual person can
have his or her own culture. My point so far is only to emphasize the association of culture
with a collective spirit.
64 Scheler, Formalism, 383.
65 Scheler, Formalism, 382-3.
66 It is worth noting here that autonomy for Scheler is grounded in personhood, and not
strictly speaking, in individuality. I will discuss at later the importance of the distinction
between the personhood of individuals and the individuality of the person.
61
62
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subjects that execute rational acts, but “they would not be ‘persons’.”67 Rational acts
(among a host of other acts) certainly belong to the being of the person, but the
person is not defined by rational acts (“acts corresponding to a certain lawfulness of
states of affairs”).68 Someone is rational because she is a person; not that she is a
person because she is rational. If the being of the person “becomes an indifferent
thoroughfare for an impersonal rational activity,” the concept of an individual
person becomes a contradiction.69 It is the personhood of the individual, not the
rationality of the person, for Scheler that grounds autonomy. This cannot be fully
demonstrated here, but will reprise in a later chapter.
(3) Spirit “precedes” and is not exhausted in these act-differences. This is the
condition for the possibility of spirit to be the “unity” of the differences, namely, a
“foundation” for the differences. In Scheler’s words: “The being of [spirit] is the
‘foundation’ of all essentially different acts.”70 The unity is a unity of possible
differences. So the person is a foundation for the differences, it is not the case that
the person comes into being only when these differences are actualized, but the
person is also in the possibility of acting differently. But what kind of foundation is
this? Scheler uses a subtle distinction between concrete and abstract essences. A
“contretum” is the essence foundation for every “abstractum,” in every “individuum.”
(4) Spirit, insofar as it is a foundation for acts, is the concretum of abstracta
(acts). Anything abstract requires supplementation for it to be.71 Just as redness

Scheler, Formalism, 382.
Scheler, Formalism, 372.
69 Scheler, Formalism, 372.
70 Scheler, Formalism, 383.
71 Scheler, Formalism, 383.
67
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cannot be without a concrete thing that is capable of being red and a specific value
cannot be without a concrete thing capable of having that value, so an act cannot be
without a concrete thing capable of performing acts. In other words it is upon the
distinction between concretum and abstractum that the distinction between spirit
and act is predicated. That concretum is spirit. One may speak for example of the
redness of the chair, the value of the artwork, the act of spirit. But just as the
concrete essence of chair does not rule out the possibility of being red or blue or
black, or of other kinds of qualitative variation, in some sense the essence of chair
pertains to an essential invariant with an entire, but perhaps limited, spectrum of
variable qualitative possibilities according to the kind of thing it is. A chair may bear
the value of agreeable or disagreeable (in comfort), and the consecutive use values,
it may even bear higher aesthetic values, but it is not the kind of thing that can be
noble (because it is not alive), or evil (because it does not form intentions and
execute acts of willing), or sacred (because it is not something divine or touched by
the divine).
This can be an analogy to explain part of what Scheler means by spirit. First of
all, spirit is not real,72 as a chair is. And a contretum, as an essence, does not have to
indicate reality. The number 3 is a concrete essence,73 but ideal and not real.
Furthermore, spirit is not a substance, as a chair is a substance, and it is because

“For us, [real-being], reality, and causality belong essentially together. That is not
[causally] effective is also not real. … Everything that we call spirit is originally only a sum of
intentions which are completely incapable of having causal effects” (Scheler, “Idealism and
Realism,” Selected Philosophical Essays, 351). The question of spiritual effectiveness for the
realization of goals will be significant later in this chapter.
73 Scheler, Formalism, 383. All of the possible equations that are fulfilled by the number
3 are “the abstracta of this concrete 3”: 4-1=3; 2+1=3; 17-14=3.
72
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chairs are substances that all chairs are essentially the same. For Scheler, all spirits
are not essentially the same. Insofar as part of the essence of spirit pertains to a
being providing unity, all persons are the same, but insofar as the essence of spirit
pertains to possible act-differences (both differences in acts and differences in
possible acts), and thus, to the very identity of spirit, each person is not essentially
the same. Spirit is a concrete, but non-substantial being. On the one hand, as a
concrete unity, spirit is not an empty “interconnective complex” of acts.74 On the
other hand: as being of “act-differences,” spirit is not a substance. Rather, Scheler
writes, “abstract act-essences concretize into concrete act-essences only by
belonging to the essence of this or that individual person.”75 The person (the spirit
of an individual being) experiences oneself as a being that executes acts. However,
this does not indicate that spirit is some invariable “point at rest,” like a substancecausality principle causing motion, for the person also experiences oneself as
dynamic and changing along with one’s acts. Scheler writes, “the whole person is
contained in each and every fully concrete act, and the whole person ‘varies’ in and
through every act,” without being exhausted in any one of these acts, and without
changing simply like a physical thing in physical time.76 The person varies in and
through one’s acts, but there is no need to posit an “enduring being,” behind this
variation, in order to preserve individual identity because identity, according to
Scheler, “lies solely in the qualitative direction of this pure becoming different.”77

A contemporary example is perhaps Donald Davidson’s “ontology of mental events,”
or even Sartre’s “being-for-itself.”
75 Scheler, Formalism, 384.
76 Scheler, Formalism, 385.
77 Scheler, Formalism, 385.
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The spiritual unity of acts, which varies with and in its acts, unifies only with respect
to the consistent collective orientation and direction of its acts. We will see that this
is ultimately a moral- or value-orientation toward the world. There is a qualitative
character that permeates the full unity of differences according to the direction of
that unity and those differences. That is, personal identity resides within that for
which one loves and strives, this pertains to individual persons as well as the spirit
(culture) of communities.
The investigation of spirit, or in the case of an individual person, is not complete
until we frame the person along with its necessary correlate: the world. A person is
a necessary non-objectifiable, individual, concrete being for abstract acts. A world is
a necessarily objective, individual, concrete being for abstract objects; it
individualizes according to the individuality of the person; and is concrete only as
the world of a person. If there is a person there must necessarily be a world. If there
is a world there must necessarily be a person. But the world of a person or culture is
not therefore simply a domain of a variety of objects of different type and status;
they are arranged by acts and rules of preferring and subordinating according to the
range of values that individual and communities attach to these objects. Likewise, a
person or culture is disclosed not simply with respect to the disclosure of the
objects toward which it acts, but more primarily, with respect to the value
prescribed to the objects constitutive of its world. Scheler writes in his essay “Ordo
Amoris,”
Whether I am investigating the innermost essence of an individual, a
historical era, a family, a people, a nation, or any other sociohistorical group, I
will know and understand it most profoundly when I have discerned the
system of its concrete value-assessments and value-preference, whatever
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organization this system has. I call this system the ethos of any such subject.
The fundamental root of this ethos is, first, the order of love and hate…. The
system always has a hand in directing the way the subject sees this world as
well as his deeds and activities.78
Loving and hating are “emotive” intentional acts by which a single value can be
grasped or given (or not given), through the expansion (in loving) or the contraction
(in hating) of “the value-realm accessible to the feeling”79 of some object of the
world. Loving and hating do not refer to values as such, but to “objects in respect of
their value.”80 They are conditional acts of the spirit for values to be more or less
disclosed. Therefore, they are foundational for ranking or ordering values, by any
individual or society, which is done by means of a different “class of emotional actexperiences,”81 namely, preferring (Vorziehen) or subordinating (Nachsetzen) things
of value in relation to others.
Scheler insists that the acts of preferring and subordinating belong to the sphere
of value-cognition (Werterkenntnis), and not to the sphere of conation, such as
choosing or willing.82 Choice refers to the decision to do this or that action, and for
some representational content “to-be-realized.” But preferring entails no action. One
can prefer some things (foods, occupations, sports, etc.) and subordinate others
according to their value without taking any action; preferring also happens
immediately, whereas making a choice may require a lengthy decision-making
process. One could even prefer one course of action to another without undertaking

Scheler, “Ordo Amoris,” 98-9.
Scheler, Formalism, 261; Cf. Sympathy, “Phenomenology of Love and Hatred,” 147-161
80 Scheler, Sympathy, 154.
81 Scheler, Formalism, 260.
82 In his later work, Scheler removes acts of willing from the sphere of conation. I state
the reasons for this later on this chapter.
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the action. Despite the difference, his point is that preferring and subordinating
must form the basis for choosing.83
Courses of action reflect the structure of value-preference and vision contained
in a certain moral qualification of either individuals of communities which Scheler
calls at different times either Gesinnung or Gemüt.84 In either case, they refer to a
value orientation of the individual or communal spirit, and concern the way the
objects that compose the world are valued or preferred in relation to other objects.
Good and evil are values attached only to spontaneous (uncaused) intentional acts
of the spirit; they are the values proper to acts and can never refer to objects. Good
and evil refer to the possible value range of a single act (including an action) or of
the entire spirit. The value of things range from lower to higher, or between
negative to positive, but there is a correlation between the two ranges, because a
good action is one that realizes (i.e. willing) a higher or positive value and an evil
action realizes a lower or negative value.85 I will go further on questions of ethics in
a later chapter.
It is with the elements foundational for willing and the practical sphere that a
transition is made from the acts of spirit to into the vital sphere. Willing for Scheler
is a “realizing act”; that is, from our value-cognition, value-feeling, and value-

Scheler, Formalism, 260.
Gesinnung is used in the Formalism in the section on the “Ethics of Success,” and
indicates a moral disposition of willing and action. Gemüt is used in his essay “Ordo Amoris”
and refers to a moral “ethos.” Both have been translated as an inner or basic “moral tenor,”
though Lachterman sometimes translates Gemüt simply as “the heart.”
85 Scheler, Formalism, 26.
83
84

226

conation, it spiritually conditions vital inclinations86 into a course of action which
attempts to make this content real within one’s own world and/or a shared
communal world. An act of willing has its primary intention directed toward
realization;87 or in other words, the content of willing is “what I will to be real.”88 As
such, willing completes or fulfills the criteria required for an action to be good or
evil; however (in contrast to Kant’s practical philosophy), the realizing act of willing
is not itself the criterion for good and evil.89 Any act of willing, whether good or evil,
is dependent not only upon (1) the representational value-content ordered by
means of intentional acts of preferring and subordinating (from the side of spirit),
but upon (2) the non-representational value-content contained within the goals of
conations, desires, or inclinations (from the side of vital drives). Acts of willing
obtain their “purpose” (Zweck) from the value-content of these “goals” (Ziele). To
put it differently, “behind” every act of willing, there is an interplay of values
happening on both a spiritual, intentional level with the preferring and
subordination of values, and on a vital, conative level with an inclination or conation
toward (Aufstreben) and an inclination or conation away from (Wegstreben).90 Both
intentional preferring/subordinating and conative tendencies toward or away, I
should add, depend in their own way upon the givenness of value in feeling and
feeling states (Fühl and Gefühl) which supply the original content of these processes.
Acts of willing (or any realizing act) are, at this stage in Scheler’s philosophy, the
I will discuss in more detail later the conditions by which spirit can influence the
realization of the goals of conation, namely, repression and sublimation.
87 Scheler, Formalism, 126.
88 Scheler, Formalism, 122.
89 Scheler, Formalism, 27.
90 Scheler, Formalism, 32.
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only intentional acts that are also conative.
With the phenomenon of conation (Streben), which for all intents and purposes
is the phenomenological basis for metaphysical jargon of drives, comes the entire
sphere of goals. All goals are orientated toward a value; it is the value that gives a
goal content. The value component (Wertkomponente) is distinguished from a
representational (“picture”) component (Bildkomponente). The picture-component
is always dependent upon the value-component, but the value-component need not
be represented or “pictured.” When the value-component of a goal is represented,
however, the goal becomes a purpose, i.e., that which one wishes to do (conation
without the intention for realization), achieves a plan for its possible willing
(conation with the intention for realization).91 The practical world for willing
acquires character and form on account of the value-components of the goals of
conation. “All willing,” Scheler writes, “occurs in reference to a ‘situation,’ a world of
(practical) ‘objects.’ … It is only in the unities of the ‘value-things’ and ‘complexes of
values’ that objects can become ‘practical objects,’”92 namely objects of a realizing
act, such as willing. Furthermore, The practical representational content of the
purposes or possible objects for the realization of value-complexes “are selected
according to and on the basis of those values which permeate the moral tenor of this
willing.”93 The contents of the goals of conation (the value-component), which are
the basis of the representational content of purposes of willing, find grounding in
reality in the experience of resistance. This is how Scheler is able to speak of

On the difference between wishing and willing, see Scheler, Formalism, 40, 123-4.
Scheler, Formalism, 133, 134.
93 Scheler, Formalism, 134.
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practical reality always as the same thing as a “value-reality.”94 The experience of
resistance, Scheler adds, constitutes a practical object, but “the experienced point of
departure” of resistance is in the “value-object,”95 insofar as the experience of
resistance requires conation.
In the discussion on conation in Chapter 3, I attempted to clarify the importance
(there, against Heidegger’s critique of resistance) of the fact that the goal-direction
of conation is immanent to the conation itself; it is not dependent upon
representational content in any way. Our inclinations guide and direct themselves,
though this statement will have to be qualified. While the major philosophical
currents in the Western tradition have argued that our inclinations follow what the
intellect thinks is good. Scheler’s attempt to turn the Greeks on their head in the
relation between love and knowledge has other significant ramifications here. There
is no cosmic self-conscious being, unmoved mover, or Form of the Good; no
universal principle toward which natural inclinations tend. Although it makes the
prospect of being good more difficult, Scheler thinks it is far more
phenomenologically accurate to say that what we think is good (our valuerepresentation) follows the values (either positive or negative) toward which we
are inclined. Our thoughts follow as secondary the goals of conation more than the
goals of conation follow our thinking. “The contents, range, and differentiation of
our lived conations are in no case distinctly dependent on the contents, range, and
differentiation of our intellectual activity of representation and thinking.”96 The

Scheler, Formalism, 135.
Scheler, Formalism, 135.
96 Scheler, Formalism, 39.
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“purposes of willing” are the represented contents dependent upon the goals of
conation, and the goals of conation are independent from all representation. Scheler
writes:
Anything that is called a purpose of the will therefore presupposes the
representation of the goal! Nothing can become a purpose that is not first a
goal! The purpose is grounded in the goal! Goals can be given without
purposes, but no purposes can be given without previous goals. We are not
able to create a purpose out of nothing, [nor] “posit” a purpose without a
prior “conation toward something.”97
This raises a myriad of questions and perhaps even slight scandal to some if, as it
seems, agents cannot rely on rationality to guide inclinations into a moral course of
action, and if Scheler’s right, then Kant’s practical philosophy is the first precluded
since a “good will,” which is good precisely insofar as it represents the ability of
practical reason to choose against inclinations, and derives its goodness from this
opposition, would be impossible. How then could one be morally good at all? Or
perhaps a more relevant question, how could we prevent from following the
principle that Scheler attributes to Spinoza: “what we desire is good; what we detest
is evil”?98 Though I must leave the details of ethical matters for another chapter, it
must be insisted that this is not what Scheler has in mind, but it is also not by means
of his reliance on rationality or thinking (of universal moral norms for example) that
he get out of this problem. I’ll give a brief indication here how Scheler avoids this
kind of moral relativism.
First, it is important how values or value-components are immanent to conation.
Values are immanent to the goals of conation, but the goals of conation are in some

97
98

Scheler, Formalism, 40. Exclamation points are Scheler’s own!
Scheler, Formalism, 37, n. 30.
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way formed. They are formed by means of value-givenness. Conation is not the basis
for value-givenness because one need not strive for a value for it to be given (i.e.,
felt). Rather, “every conation has its immediate foundation in value-feeling (in
preferring and loving and hating) and its contents.”99 A value has to be “first” given
in feeling (Fülen)100 and although conation does not “follow” a “good known”
(intellectually and with representation), it always follows a value felt. In other
words, value-feeling is that by which the content originally arises. I use quotations
around “first” and “follows” because though it is the case a value can be a
component to a goal of conation only after the value is given, sometimes, according
to Scheler, it is in the course of inclination and conation that we feel values.
However, even if a value is felt only in a conative process, it is still the feeling, not
the conation itself, that accounts for the givenness of the value-component. For
example, one may have a conation toward nourishment, and because of it, may be
inclined to eat some food, and actually eat food. The value of the food is not given
merely in the drive toward the food, but the value of the food is given in the
agreeableness of food and in the feeling of the satisfaction of the conation. Scheler
suggests that it is often the case that a certain satisfaction “is what first makes us
aware that we strove for the thing in question.”101 Scheler does not explain
sufficiently how a conation would be directed toward something in the first place
before there is a givenness of the value content that provides the conation with a
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goal. He does however speak of levels of conation to account for more fixed forms of
conation that happen instinctually, e.g., the conation toward food grounded in the
hunger drive, as opposed to less fixed conations of desire, e.g. the desire to sew a
scarf or play a game a baseball. The latter cannot happen without some value
already seen in these activities.
Value givenness (the feeling of values), like any kind of givenness can be more or
less adequate. The question is whether there is something that can guarantee
adequate value givenness and prevent what Scheler calls value-deception or valuedelusion. The role of guiding value-givenness with respect to feeling-states
(Gefühlen) (e.g. satisfaction, pleasure, sensible feelings) are the intentional feelings
(Fühlen) of loving and hating. As was already mentioned, loving expands the “the
value-realm accessible to feeling”;102 hatred contracts it (ressentiment).
Furthermore, although conation is largely “self-determined” in that it guides and
directs itself, it is possible that conative drives can receive some amount of guidance
and direction by spirit, but only negatively, but restricting and preventing certain
goals of conation from becoming purposes of willing (contents with the intention for
realization). More on this later. The best case scenario is if a person lives her whole
life lovingly, she will feel values correctly (in their proper order) and thus can “love
things as much as possible as God loves them,” which according to Scheler, is “the
highest thing of which [human beings] are capable.”103
With respect to Scheler’s sociology of culture, it is more important here to
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understand the significance of the fact that representational acts (spiritual acts of
thinking and willing) depend for their content and purposes (“ideal goals” that are
“predominantly spiritual”) upon the goals of conation, and that the goals of conation,
while dependent upon value-feeling, are independent from the representational acts
of thinking and willing. Loving and hating are acts of the spirit, but not strictly
speaking representational acts. They are at the forefront of all human activity; there
is never a time when they are not involved. They do not follow preferring and valuefeeling, thinking and willing, but are “ahead of them as a pioneer and a guide.”
Loving and hating is the fundamental disposition that conditions value-feeling,
which in turn conditions the goals of conations, which then “enter into the sphere of
central willing” and thinking by means of the “order of preference.”104
The content-dependency of representational acts upon vital conation, and the
representational-independency of conation from spirit, provides phenomenological
evidence for what will become Scheler’s notorious doctrine of the weakness or
powerlessness [Ohnmacht, Kraftlos] of spirit central to his metaphysical vision. This
theory is usually interpreted as a characteristic only of Scheler’s metaphysics and
philosophical anthropology that marks a very determinate break from his earlier
phenomenology. Although I grant that there is some new justification in the later
years absent in the earlier, I suggest that the doctrine is not a break, but rather the
bringing to conclusion what his phenomenology had already implied, namely, that
spirit is a necessary but insufficient condition to bring about real change in the
world. Scheler writes in his late lecture “Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos” that
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he had already expressed this principle in this ethics, but curiously, instead of citing
from his own book, he cites a line from Nicolai Hartmann because of its succinct
formulation: “Die hoheren Seins- und Wertkategorien sind von Hause aus die
schwacheren” (The higher categories of being and value are innately weaker)105
(GW IX, 51).
In addition to the content-dependency of representational acts, it is possible
already to see the relationship of determination is not one-sided, but has
reciprocity. Although thinking and willing (representational acts) depend upon
conation for their purposes, conation depends upon value-feeling, and ultimately
intentional feelings in the acts of love and hate to form its goals. Already here in his
phenomenology there is ultimately an interdependency between spiritual act and
vital conation that gives rise the possibility of willing and action toward the
realization of this content. This interdependency between act and conation, I argue, is
Scheler’s phenomenological explication of what will be called in his metaphysics, the
interpenetration between spirit and life.

The metaphysics of spirit and life
Scheler’s understanding of metaphysics is rather unique because it avoids what
he takes to be a one-sided perspective throughout the history of philosophy.
Metaphysics is neither a universal Logos that constitutes the immutable basis
behind the back of all material change, nor is it a material evolution from which
arises the ideal structure that reflects the material process. Metaphysics is indeed
Max Scheler, Human Place in the Cosmos, trans. Manfred Frings (Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 2009) 47.
105
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the mode of cognition pertaining to the “Ground of Being,” but this ground is neither
merely a spiritual determining ground (whether immutable or dialectical) for
material change nor a material determining ground for spiritual change. The ground
of being is the very “interpenetration” (Durchdringen) between spirit and life. The
interpenetration—the vitalization of spirit and the spiritualization of life—must
itself be the ground because neither spirit nor life by themselves qualify to be an
autonomous, independent determining ground for the other because both are
incomplete without the other. And I argue that this metaphysical “interpenetration”
comes directly from the relation of interdependency disclosed in Scheler’s
phenomenology of act and conation. Spirit needs something from life in order to
function, and life needs something from spirit. Spirit gains from life energy and
power. Life gains from spirit vision and direction. Before spelling this out further, I
should clarify Scheler’s understanding of the one-sided perspectives he attempts to
avoid and with which he seeks an intermediate position.
The first is the error of the “classical theory” which holds that higher forms of
being (spirit and reason), because of their purity and level of value in the order of
being, have greater power and effectiveness. This view, Scheler adds, leads to the
further “untenable nonsense of a ‘teleological’ worldview.”106 Scheler not only
assigns this position to Plato and the Christian Neo-Platonists, Aristotle and the
Scholastics, but it has entered the modern world via Descartes, as its “most
effective” proponent, and was expanded by the German idealists. He cites in
particular Hegel’s “panlogicism,” where world history (according Scheler’s
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description) is the dialectical “self-explication of the divine idea,” and human beings
are their “developing self-consciousness of freedom.”107 He also criticizes Hegel’s
notion of the “cunning of reason,” saying that “conditions and events are quite
indifferent to such ‘cunning’…, the course of real history is…indifferent to the logical
requirements of spiritual production.”108 Scheler takes this classical
conceptualization to be “the basic outlook held by the larger part of the Occidental
bourgeoisie.”109 Echoing Marx, the theory is sociologically “a class ideology or an
ideology of the upper classes of the bourgeoisie.”110
The second and corresponding error that Scheler also wants to avoid, which
retains in part some presuppositions of the first, is to think that since spirit and
ideas are without their own power or effectiveness, then spirit must simply be an
epiphenomenal reflection or product of material life, and as such, the history of
spiritual works of art, science, philosophy, law would be without an inherent and
autonomous logic or continuity.111 To say if spirit obtains its power through lifeforces, then spirit must obtain its being through these forces is a false inference for
Scheler. This opposite view—what Scheler calls the “negative theory” of spirit, and
of those “addicted to life values”112—is assigned to such diverse figures as Buddha
(theory of redemption), Arthur Schopenhauer (‘self-negation of the will to live’),
Paul Alsberg (his book, Das Menschheitsrätel [The Riddle of Mankind]), and Sigmund
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Freud (later theory, i.e., Beyond the Pleasure Principle).113 However, with respect to
Scheler’s sociology of culture, his attention is fixed on Marx. After spending a great
deal of effort underscoring the limitations of spirit for effecting reality, and arguing
against the theory that the material conditions of social reality are determined and
explained “as a rectilinear extension of the history of spirit,”114 Scheler does not
follow Marx either when he turns to the way real factors affect the ideal. It is just as
problematic, he thinks, to attempt leave it to material history to univocally
determine and explain the history of spirit.115
Scheler believes that the “negative” view denies the autonomy of spirit which he
identifies as the truth contained in the classical view.116 However it seems that the
negative view denies the autonomy of spirit precisely because they adopt the
classical idea that autonomy is identical with actuality. As such, that which contains
potentiality—potentiality to act—is not autonomous. Since spirit lacks its own
power, it would contain potency and therefore without autonomy. This line of
thinking seems to make a lot of sense. If spirit lives in its acts, and it is dependent
upon drives for its acting, how could its autonomy square with this dependency.
Scheler’s solution requires a revision of the notion of autonomy: as was mentioned
before, spiritual autonomy consists in the personal value-orientation of its acting, or
the direction of its “becoming different” or spiritual edification. Spirit requires vitalenergy to fulfill this orientation or direction of its own becoming, but the individual
direction and orientation itself are not the same as the directions and aims of vitalScheler, Human Place, 41.
Scheler, Problems, 54.
115 Scheler, Problems, 53.
116 Scheler, Human Place, 46.
113
114
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drives. Spirit is in fact an automous moral orientation, directed toward values that
are higher values than the biological needs of material life. As such, spiritual
autonomy is a moral autonomy; its being is in its value-orientation; and an
orientation that surpasses or exceeds in direction biological needs, such as nutrition,
reproduction, and power. For example, despite involuntary drive-orientation
toward the power to outdo or overcome resistances that lies within the paths of its
projects, spirit can use this energy, to inhibit the drive itself, and (paradoxically)
divest itself of power, or humble itself, so to speak.
Scheler would ultimately side, I think, with Socrates in his debate with
Thrasymachus that the moral orientation of justice, as a rational one, is not the same
orientation of outdoing or commanding authority over others. However, it has this
different orientation not because spirit is a separate substance with its own power;
its being is in its very moral orientation. Scheler would think Plato would be hard
pressed to explain the fact that a rational orientation could differ from a bodily one
given the new advancements in psychology, physiology, and physics that energy is a
counterpart of matter, not spirit. Spirit is without power either to produce or
withdraw energy in drives, or to increase or diminish this energy. Spirit is able only
“to call upon various drive-gestalts, which lets the organism do what spirit
‘wills’.”117 Thus, Scheler writes, “from the beginning, what is lowly is powerful and
what is highest is impotent. … The highest points of a culture are [relatively brief]
and rare in human history. [Brief] and rare is what is beautiful, in its tenderness and
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vulnerability.”118
From what has been said earlier about willing as both practical conation and
intentional act, it is not surprising that the way the goals or purposes of spirit come
to be effective in society is by means of willing. However, Scheler seems have
revised his theory of willing to be more consistent with the powerlessness of spirit.
That willing takes spiritual intentions into a practical conation, oriented toward
acting, this part of the theory remains. But insofar as willing is a spiritual act, the act
itself cannot be effective to bring about its purposes. Willing alone cannot empower
kinesthetic movements required for the completion of an action. In the Formalism,
in the articulation of the “elements of an action” (Bezüglich der Handlung), Scheler
distinguishes between on the one hand, the “willing of the contents” (i.e., the willing
for something to be done [Wollen des Tuns]) and on the other hand, the “willing-todo” (Tunwollen). In the course of the process of action, the willing-to-do follows
after the mere willing of the content, and is described as “the class of activities
directed toward the lived body leading to movements of the members.”119 He then
goes on to explain that the willing of content alone (Wollen des Tuns) is a pure
spiritual willing which cannot accomplish an action or bring about its success unless
such willing changes into a will-to-do.120 All willing intends the realization of a
content (which distinguishes it from wishing) but only a special kind of willing—the
will-to-do—can have enough effectiveness to issue forth into bodily movement. For
example, I may “will” that a lamp be upon this desk rather than that one (willing of
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content), but in order for this content to be realized I must “will” the series of
movements required to have the lamp on a different desk (the will-to-do). This is
the “efficacy of willing (as willing-to-do)” which Scheler castigates Hume and other
empiricists for denying.121
Ironically, Scheler will later come to deny this also, but not because he denies
“the phenomenon of effecting,” as he says Hume does, but because he comes to deny
this phenomenon pertains within in the sphere of willing. It seems Scheler comes to
give to the domain of involuntary conation (drives) the kind of efficacy with which
he describes the will-to-do in his earlier work. This interpretation is consistent with
the explanation of the relation of willing to the phenomenon of resistance discussed
in Chapter 3. I mentioned that Scheler had earlier ascribed resistance to the sphere
of willing, but that later he ascribes exclusively to the sphere of drives and explicitly
denies the experience of resistance in willing. Both of the changes (that acts of
willing have efficacy, and that acts of willing meet resistance) have the same
explanation: that willing on the one hand becomes identified with a pure spiritual
act (the willing of content) and loses any of its former efficacy (the will-to-do).
Scheler comes to expand the domain and efficacy of the involuntary conation
(drives) and diminishes the domain and efficacy of voluntary conation (willing).
This does not mean that willing is no longer able to have influence upon the
course of action, but its influence is no longer a positive one; it is only negative. I
referenced in the previous subsection on the phenomenology spirit and life a
“spiritual conditioning of vital inclinations.” The role of willing, as a purely spiritual
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act, can influence the conative efficacy of drives by means of sublimation, on the one
hand, and repression on the other. The terms Scheler uses for these two ways of
spiritual influencing, Leitung and Lenkung are not different enough to portray the
distinction very well. The words are synonymous; they both can mean “guiding,”
“directing,” or “leading.” Lietung means “sublimation.”122 It refers to the primary
spiritual function to lure “the lurking drives with the bait of appropriate images and
values to coordinate drive impulses so that they will execute the project of the will,
posited by spirit, and make it real.”123 Lenkung means “repression,”124 namely the
secondary function of spirit to inhibit (or release) the conative impulses that counter
(or align with) the ideas and values of the spirit.125 Thus, spirit can influence drives
and impulses negatively by sublimating and/or repressing their energy. However,
spirit can only have this influence if and only if it can present to drives some positive
content (as an idea or value) that aims toward a higher value and some
representation of how it can be realized. In other words, spirit extends an invitation,
so to speak, to the (non-representational) goals of conation toward the purposes of
willing, by means of the representation or “picture-content” of such purposes. But
spirit must have some image of the purpose to present, and there must be some
insight into the value of the purpose, in order for the purposes to gain energy and
motivation. Scheler warns that if spirit attempts to wage war directly and
intentionally against an impulse toward what a person takes to be lower or negative
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values, without something positive to redirect the impulse, spirit will inevitably lose.
After all, drives are stronger than spirit. Scheler explains it this way:
Willing always produces the opposite of what it wills when, instead of
intending a higher value, whose realization makes us forget what is bad and
attracts human energies, it directs itself instead to a mere fight against and
negation of a drive whose goal appears to our conscience as “bad.” Thus, the
human being also has to learn how to tolerate himself, even those
inclinations which he recognizes to be bad or pernicious. He should not fight
them directly, but learn to overcome them indirectly by mobilizing his
energies toward valuable tasks known by his conscience to be good and
proper and possible for him to achieve.
There is a qualification to spirit’s impotence—a proviso that might appease the
Aristotelian virtue theorist—in this process of sublimation. It is true, Scheler adds,
that spirit initially is without power or energy of its own, but
spirit is able to gain power by virtue of the processes of sublimation,
and…drive-life can enter (or not enter) under the laws of spirit and into the
structure of ideas and meanings that spirit holds out before the desires. …[I]n
the course of such interpenetration between drives and spirit in individuals
and in history, drive-life makes powers available to spirit.126

The history of spirit and life
I.
I have argued that Scheler’s metaphysics of the interpenetration of spirit and
drive comes directly from his phenomenology of the interdependency of act and
conation. I want to emphasize now that this interpenetration is itself a process of
becoming, and is therefore a history. Indeed, it does not have a history, it is history. I
suggest also that Scheler’s philosophy of history (the becoming of the
interpenetration of spirit and life) relies on his phenomenology of temporality.
126
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In Chapter 3, I explained Scheler’s position that history acquires meaning for us
with the givenness of temporality in the lived experience of the power to affect a
change. However, the notion of “power” has since become a problem. Spirit as such
“has in itself no original trace of ‘power’ or ‘efficacy’ to bring [new] content into
existence.”127 With respect to the development or growth of “emerging real factors
such as a new allocation of political powers, the economic relations of production,
racial miscegenation, and racial tension,”128 spirit has only a negative determination
(restraining or releasing) of that which has a tendency to come into existence on its
own accord. Realization for these factors—their “becoming possible”—tend to
follow a causal pattern relatively indifferent to ideal goals; qualitative goals of spirit
or mind (for political, economic, or racial social relations) that are not within the
latitude of these patterns “bites on granite and its ‘utopia’ fades away into
nothing.”129
But how might one speak of spiritual history if spirit is powerless for effective
realization of its purposes and ideal goals? The power to affect change lies within
real conditions, which, as I mentioned, determine the narrative of acts: both in the
structure and direction of drive conations and in the existing structures of society.
Scheler admits that spirit can be a positive “determining factor,” but only for the
quality of cultural content, and never a “realizing factor” for possible cultural
developments. The scope of possible cultural development is determined by the
“real, drive-conditioned factors of life, that is, the peculiar combinations of real
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factors: the constellation of [political] powers, the factors of economic production,
the factors of the qualitative and quantitative conditions of populations [i.e., family
and blood relationships], as well as geographical and geopolitical factors.”130
Cultural diffusion not only requires the backing of drive conations to indirectly
acquire the power for the realization of ideas or ideal goals, but this happens from a
small number of “leading persons” who can attract either deliberate or nondeliberate imitation of a large number, or majority.131
To summarize briefly the relationships of determination: spirit is never a
realizing factor; drives are always the realizing factor. Spirit can play a positive
determination of cultural qualitative development, but only a negative
determination of material development (it is in this determination that spirit can
exercise normative regulation). Drives, though the source of any realization, cannot
provide content for cultural development; they provide the goals and content only
for material development. The three basic real factors that Scheler identifies: family,
economy, and politics (along with their infinite forms of organization in history)
directly refer to the three basic drives: reproduction, nourishment, and power.
Scheler writes that
It is senseless to maintain that economics has nothing to do with the drive
for nutrition and the feeding of men because there are publishing houses and
art shops, because one can buy and sell books and buttercups, and because
even animals have a drive for nutrition and nourish themselves without
economics. Without the nutritive drive and the objective goal that it serves
biologically…there would be no economics—and no publishing houses or art
shops either.132
Scheler, Problems, 37.
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Real factors operate as selective conditions that determine which ideas can
become realized. When the conditions are fitting, this opens the “sluice-gates” for
the dissemination of certain ideas, artistic vision, etc. Raphael needs a brush—
his ideas and his artistic visions do not create it; he needs politically and
socially powerful patrons to employ him to exalt their ideals: otherwise he
cannot act out his own genius. Luther needed the interests of dukes, cities,
territorial lords leaning toward particularism, and the rising bourgeoisie;
without these factors nothing would have come out of the dissemination of
[his doctrines.]133
On the other hand, real conditions cannot fully determine or explain the ideas or
vision that is ultimately realized by means of these factors. Besides the
determination of the goals of our drives and conation, there is also a qualitative
determination corresponding to higher values to which drives are blind. Scheler
states in an early review essay134 that the conditions of the medieval economy could
never fully explain the magnificent style and unique architecture of the Cologne
cathedral. The conditions prevailing in the Middle Ages, the means of productions as
well as interested influential parties in building a cathedral, could only determine
that it was materially possible to build a cathedral, and that this possibility could be
realized, but it could not determine the content of the idea or meaning of the
cathedral, its religious symbolism and cultural beauty, etc.
Neither the drive alone nor the idea alone is enough to effect history, the two
must be united within a single course of action, and they are, even in courses of
action that are toward predominantly ideal goals, or those that are toward
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predominantly real ones. Although spirit and drives have their material and content
interdependencies, they each possess their own process of development, mode of
temporality. I have already spoken about Scheler’s connection of different kinds of
knowledge with different modes of becoming, particularly, becoming within the
sphere of the material life-condition, and becoming in the sphere of spirit. Not only
his human action is always, even at once, directed toward both ideal and real goals,
but that all goals “serve a becoming.”
In the Formalism, spirit (or “person” in this case) is identified as a nonsubstantial “foundation” for a “pure becoming different.” Spirit is always forward
moving; it is “futural” or “ahead of itself” like Heidegger had later described the
being of Dasein. Indeed, the individual identity of spirit is captured in the fact that it
is essentially a qualitative direction or orientation of different acts. Spirit, Scheler
writes, “lives into [physical-relative] time and executes [its] acts into time in
becoming different. …[spirit] lives [its] existence precisely in the experiencing of [its]
possible experiences.”135 If spirit is the human being directed toward the possibilities
of becoming, it is the “ego” (Ich), or the human self, who carries along with the
possibilities of spirit, the history of its acts; “all that we experience is experienced as
‘together and interwoven’ in the ego.”136 The temporality of spirit is above the
phenomenal temporal predicates of past, present, and future, which only have
meaning by means of some present-time point-of-reference. Past and future are
always relative to the now-point. For Scheler, it is due to the now-point position of
the lived-body, which grounds human anticipation and memory into the present,
135
136

Scheler, Formalism, 385-6.
Scheler, Formalism, 415.

246

that the ego can carry with it that which is given as “past," and which spirit can be
directed toward what is given as “future.” The whole human being, who, in one
respect, never stops becoming different with respect to possible experiences, and
another respect can never escape his or her past, may now physically stand in the
gap that separates “the history that is possible and becoming at every point of time,
and the history, the event, work, and actual condition, that has already occurred.”137
Scheler once wrote that the “Eighteenth-century thinkers, Kant included, erred
in not noticing in history the common…growth of the spirit itself and of…a priori
forms of thought, reflection, value-judgment, preference, love, etc.”138 To be clear,
Scheler refers here to the development of the forms or categories of mind or spirit.
Scheler thinks that spirit grows and develops with respect to the following:
1. The forms of thought and attitude: e.g., the transition from primitive to
civilized mentality.
2. The forms of ethos or value-preference, and not merely factual changes in
“esteem for goods.”
3. The feeling for styles and artistic sentiment.
4. The development of worldview: e.g., from an organismic to mechanistic
worldview.
5. The development of forms of association: e.g., from primitive clans to a
political society or state; from life-community to individualistic society.
6. The development of technique: e.g., from a magical form of technology to a
scientific one.
These are cases of the development of the categorial forms themselves—the
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spirit’s own constitution—and are not simply cases of application, where a single
unchanging spirit or ethos adapts to different historical circumstances, such as, for
example, when the Christian ethos is applied to and made to adapt to the different
economic and social conditions in ancient, medieval and modern periods of history
alike. Though it is left unsaid, it seems Scheler would interpret such application or
adaptation as being a result of the changes of the patterns of thinking and
worldview. That is to say, the Christian ethos does adapt to every society and time
because Christians in those places and times are a product of their stage of spiritual
history (either progression or regression), namely, of the way of thinking, their
moral orientation or attitude, and their value-preference (ethos). Scheler thinks that
there is “no distinction more important” for the sociology of knowledge than this
one, between the development of spirit itself and the various applications within
different stages of material development.
To say that spirit has its own mode of development is not to say that spirit
develops on its own. Its development would have to rely on real factors in ways
already described, but also in another way. Spirit grows, Scheler says, in a
“functional” manner: it draws within itself content from lived experience (individual
or communal) and forms itself by this content. It has been said that “knowledge of
essence” is that kind of knowledge that contributes to the becoming and edification
of spirit. Scheler is not saying that philosophy is required in order for spirit to
change, and that culture develops only in reference to its philosophy. Rather,
through the course of one’s lived-experience and intuition of the world, the content
of this knowledge (Wissen, which is ontological, not theoretical) is transmuted or
248

functionalized into the forms of the way of thinking, loving, preferring, perceiving,
etc. Scheler’s theory of functionalization is the way he explains how contents of
experience and givenness, through acts of the spirit or person, condition the valueorientation, attitude (Einstellung), or moral tenor (Gesinnug) of an individual or
community. That functionalization happens by means of act-experiences is
important. It is not in the various occurrences or happenings individuals or
communities undergo that accounts for changes of spirit and a fluctuation of the
“self-value” of spirit (good/evil); spiritual change requires spiritual acts, for spirit
“lives in and through its acts.” Functionalization, more specifically, is the “process of
cultivating the spirit”139 by means of the transmutation of the essence and value
content of its acts and their objects into the attainment of culture (Bildung).
Culture, for Scheler, is not the cultivating process itself; it is the result, or point at
which, for an individual or community, act-experiences become an integrated or
imbedded way of life to an extent that it is no longer decipherable to those living
that life “how this knowledge was acquired, nor where it came from.”140 It is
“primarily a form, a shape, and a rhythm peculiar to each individual”;141 it is an actexperience that “develops as its function and becomes, so to speak, its blood and
life.”142 This functionalized content is also the best indicator of the way one will
spontaneously react to new practical situations. Scheler writes, “It is a knowledge
fully prepared for every concrete situation, ready to act, which has become ‘second
nature’ and fully adapted to the concrete task and to the demand of the hour, fitting
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like a natural skin, not like a ready-made suit.”143 It isn’t a deliberate application of
principles or concepts that require theories upon theories as to how they might fit
or apply to life situations; rather it is a “possession…with such relevance that the
application ‘seems to’ put to work simultaneously an infinite number of rules and
concepts.”144

II.
Scheler’s theory of culture and functionalization can provide a clue for the way
the distinction between ideal and real or spirit and life, form a unified history. It is
important to note that these distinctions are phenomenological in origin; they arise,
for Scheler, from a phenomenology of human intentionally, conation and action
which are integrated within his metaphysics and anthropology. It is from a
phenomenology of the interdependency of act and conation, to the interpenetration
of spirit and life (in part through the process of functionalization) which compose
the elements of a single history. My claim is that history is not separated into two
different histories according the distinction between ideal and real factors but that
their interrelation both constitutes and discloses history.
That there are not two histories, however, may require some explanation since it
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does not seem to square with some of Scheler’s references to the “history of spirit”
on the one hand, and the “history of emerging real factors” on the other. It also
seems to be a problem with respect to all of Scheler’s references (which are
considerable in number) to “timeless” phenomena. I already defended Scheler
against the charges made by Mannheim of a supratemporal ideal domain. Whatever
Scheler calls timeless is not strictly speaking without temporality. Spirit is
sometimes said to be timeless, but not only is it defined by means of its “becoming
different,” but it is contrasted with the notion of an enduring substance. Scheler uses
the phrase “timeless becoming” also in his sociology of knowledge.145
Timelessness refers to phenomena that are given with an immeasurable
development in contrast to the measurable rate of change by which time is normally
identified, i.e., clock-time. It refers, in other words, to that which does not “change
like a thing in time,” to use a common phrase of his. That is to say, that which is not
relative to the changes of physical time. Scheler’s own explanation is provided:
It is incorrect to regard ideas as standing outside time or as eternal,
without first specifying the notion of time which one has in mind here. We
would like to show that the actual essences are outside time, if time is taken
in this context to be physical or relative time, which is measurable. In this
sort of time, ideas are absolutely constant and there is no question of any
repetition of different examples of the same idea: there is simply no
exchange, no passing away, and no new creations. All this does not apply
when we have in mind the notion of an absolute time—to which no space
corresponds—a time in which the very history of the world takes place,
where coming-to-be and passing away do occur, and which is no longer
relative to any particular life.146
The spiritual history of a community is an example of what Scheler calls
“absolute time.” I suggested in Chapter 3 that terminology, “absolute time” is a
145
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rather misleading because absolute time is itself relative to the being of spirit, and
that it is less misleading to call Scheler’s conception of absolute time, “immanent
time” because it is characterized above all by the fact that the contents of history are
immanent to or inseparable from their historical position. That is to say, it refers to
a time that cannot recur. In other words: a “time in which temporal positions and
locations, on the one hand, and temporal contents, on the other, are necessarily
connected with one another.”147 All acts and events may be able to be abstractly
characterized by the kinds of acts and events they are. In this way, they belong more
to the conceptual patterns for the understanding of historical events then they
belong to historical understanding. Acts and events (individual or communal) also
have an immanent connection to their concrete historical position and in this way
contribute to the irreversible historical development of an individual human being
or community; they are acts and events that remain in the “ego” or self (Ich) of that
individual human being or community. This is the meaning of history, for it “belongs
to the nature of history that a past is at every moment still active and living, and that
the contents of this past are variously brought into relief by the tasks belonging to
the future.”148
All change is a becoming, and temporality is the form of becoming. The
experience of the power to affect change happens spatially: to affect a quantitative
change in the experience of the power to move (relocate), and temporally: to affect a
qualitative change in the power to modify, either in the transition of an intentional
object (Sosein) into existence (Dasein) (i.e., realization) or in the transition of a being
147
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with such and such a character (Sosein) into another character (Andersein) (i.e., rechararacterization or reformation). Therefore, all spatial change is also temporal (a
kind of becoming), but not all temporal change is spatial. Non-spatial temporal
change, as qualitative change, is irreversible change, and this is, for Scheler, the time
of history. Even if what a person or group of people worked to realize or reform was
eventually destroyed, the very process of the realization or reform alone—the
immeasurable moments of those processes—could not be reversed. History moves
on even through period of regression or decline; these low periods that refer to the
loss of something that was once present do not reverse history, they contribute to
that history. The community itself, its spiritual history, would have been irreversible
even if what was realized or reformed had been reversed. That past experience
would still have some psychological and qualitative bearing upon the individual or
collective spirit at every moment, and for future possibilities.
History is the qualitative becoming of the acts of a community and the objective
changes to its world on account of these acts. The spiritual narrative of a community
or society (it cultural narrative) is an independent mode of temporality from the
physical changes that a community undergoes, but is invariably connected to spatial
change and physical-relative time in the same way that spiritual acts are dependent
upon, and partially determined by, interests and conative drives. The variation of
real factors or material circumstances, namely, all the various quantifiable changes
at any given time, differ from how these changes contribute to the overall qualitative
dimension of that society, to the narrative of acts that are behind those real changes
and the way that real changes themselves determine the narrative of acts.
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Although all spiritual history is within immanent time, not all immanent time
refers to the history of spirit. Even natural process, such as the organic flow of
seasons, has an immanent temporal quality, or “vital time.”149 Not every
summertime, for example, is the same as every other. The season of Summer is not
simply the abstract causal position between Spring and Autumn, or the time when
the sun is in a certain position in relation the orbit of the Earth, but every
summertime is unlike every other in some qualitative dimension. There is some
irreversible and unrepeatable quality of the natural history of the world and of the
experiences of the communities of the world obtained in every time of Summer. It is
due to the unrepeatability of the temporal content of one time with respect to every
other that marks that irreducibility of their histories to every other. Every
individual, every society, every organic unity has a history that is qualitatively
distinct from every other. It must be then that “there are as many absolute times as
there are individuals, societies, and organic unities.”150 Scheler’s conception of
history does not exclude the material life and conditions of a community or specific
time of history. That absolute or immanent time (the time of history) remains
existentially relative to spirit and not to life does not mean that life is not historical
and that only spirit is. It means that historical temporality is the form of the life
process itself, and therefore not a part of the life process. As such, only beings with
spirit can have an historical consciousness because they are able to see this lifeprocess and the form of its becoming.151
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The consequences of Scheler’s conception include the fact that, though causal
factors do contribute to the composition of history, history is not simply a temporal
causal progression, entirely accessible to empirical measurement and
quantification. This refers, for example, to the tendency to suggest that history is
reducible to, or at least fundamentally based within, the causal position of its mode
of production at any given time. This would mean that history consists of
generalizable transition periods of its economic base: the feudal mode of production
for some period of time; the capitalist mode of production for a time afterward; and
the socialist and communist modes of production, (necessarily) beginning some
time in the future. Scheler’s notion of history would likewise exclude abstract
characterizations of certain periods of history or places geographically, e.g.,
communities x, y, and z, are all “capitalist societies”; communities a, b, and c, are all
“socialist,” etc. None of these ways of characterizing societies in terms of historical
phases ultimately say anything about the history of these societies: their irreducible
and unrepeatable way of life, their own unique cultural becoming and the value
orientation or direction of their “becoming different.” Abstract generalizations such
as these exclude historical understanding for they necessarily separate temporal
content from temporal position.
If Marx’s conception of history rests simply upon abstract phases of the modes of
production, then the conception does not actually ever achieve an historical
perspective. A dialectical understanding of history, despite its strengths, is not
immune to this problem. Its strengths consist in the fact that: (1) it takes history to
be a process of becoming (without settling the disagreement about whether spirit or
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life is that which leads this process); (2) it takes the process of becoming as one that
preserves the elements of the past and their gestation into new social synthesis; and
(3) it recognizes that history does not ever move backwards or in reverse even if it
regresses either materially or culturally. However, if the forces of the dialectic
generalize or abstract temporal contents (e.g., various modes of production) with
respect to their temporal position and mistake historical development for
quantifiable features of which social structures rise and fall, without a grasp of the
orientation of the spirit and the meaning behind the rise or fall of its structures, the
dialectical understanding will remain largely causal in focus.
But this is a rather cheap rendition of Marx’s view of history, which seems to
have very much in focus the particular relations within society. When Marx claims
that a particular mode of production belongs to a single society, he does so with
respect to the social intercourse and their relations of production. Therefore, an
abstract mode of production does not serve as the form to understand its social
relations, rather, the social relations of a society are used to understand its mode of
production. And although the basis for social relations is the production relations
(determined by the forces of production) and class relations, which are economic
features, Marx is not saying that all social relations are strictly economic, but that
other (superstructural) relations, particularly cultural or religious ones, will bear
some reflection of the (substructural) economic relations of production.
Marx’s conception of historical development is dialectical on account of the
tensions of these economic relations in society, especially with respect to the
tensions that arise between human workers (labor) and the means of production
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(capital), namely, the “social relations of production.” These economic relations find
expression within social classes, and their tensions within class conflicts in which
the contesting needs and interests of the classes are fought in cultural, political, and
military terms. A mode of production is simply a particular set of production
relations, and these relations are determined by the forces of production (or
productive powers, Produktivkräfte), which refers to the instruments of production
and the technique or skill of the laborers (and their stage of development). Social
change (i.e., changes of the relations of production) happens when these relations
cannot accommodate the expansion and development of the forces of production.
Allen Wood explains that “To win out over the production relations and
accommodate these relations to themselves, the expanding productive powers must
wage a victorious struggle against these other social forces.”152
Thus, the forces of production constitute the independent variable that
determines not only all the other variables in an single economic system or mode of
production but also the transition into new modes of production. With respect to
Marx’s notion of an independent variable, which Scheler also calls a historical
constant, Scheler recalls Werner Sombart’s disagreement with Marx and
acknowledges his evidence that an economic base does not apply to all societies
beyond Western history nor even to the whole history of the West. Accordingly,
Scheler asserts that “in the course of history there is no constant independent
variable among the three chief groups of real factors: blood [family/race], power
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[politics], or economics.”153 He does however point to evidence that suggests
periods where a single factor among the three, serves as an independent variable for
a time that “determine[s] at least primarily the form of groupings, i.e., determine the
latitude for that which can happen through other [real] causes.”154 In other words,
Scheler is interpreting the phases of history by means of a single set of real factors
that have a greater determination of what can or cannot be accomplished culturally
or spiritually, that is, those factors which are the primary gatekeepers of “the
‘sluices’ for the realization of spiritual potencies.”155 However, it is interesting to
note that despite Scheler’s resistance to Marx’s univocal, overly economic,
interpretation of historical phases, Scheler takes the independent variable at any
given time period to be that which is the basis for the class-stratification of society,
or as he says, the “form of groupings.” The main difference is that Scheler does not
take social class divisions to be always primarily about economic classes of
ownership and production. It is interesting also to note that Scheler’s three phases
of history follow closely to the same transition points as Marx’s, but downplaying
the economic interpretation.
With respect, first, to that period which Marx takes to constitute the slave mode
of production, Scheler insists that social groupings then did not follow economic
lines of division, but followed lines of blood relationships of family and race and “the
institutions rationally regulating them (rights of fathers and mothers, forms of
marriage, exogamy and endogamy, clan groups, integration and segregation of races,
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together with the ‘limits’ set of them by law and custom).”156 For example, that
which determined social position in ancient Greece or Rome was not according to
economic factors, but simply according to the extent that one was, racially, in fact
Greek or Roman. Those who were of mixed racial ancestry, and less racially pure,
were either slaves or excluded from political participation. Scheler speaks, in the
regard, of the “stratification of races on the basis of their inborn dynamic powers
and, above all, on the basis of their urge for domination or submission.”157 Consider
Alexander the Great. Though he was Macedonian and not Greek, he functionalized
the stories of Achilles into his character and disposition so thoroughly that he, in a
certain sense, became Greek in spirit. It was this racial factor that was at this time the
independent variable that in turn determined social position politically and
economically. It is also worth noting that Alexander, having become Greek, ventured
in to the Eastern lands perhaps with the intention of bringing Greek culture to the
rest of the world. The result was a shattering of political and racial boundaries, and
estrangement of Greeks from their homeland. Alexander’s habit of taking Persian
wives showed how little he cared for the racially pure social organization.
Something similar happened with the Roman world nearly a century later. With
the weakening of the Roman Empire, the influx of Germanic tribes and “barbaric”
races into the Western Roman territories made it impossible to keep track of racial
purity and thus to maintain such strict racial customs. Ostrogoths and Visigoths
sitting on Roman thrones as emperors would have been unthinkable less than a
century earlier. It was also during this time that we see the rise of what scholar’s
156
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now dislike calling “feudalism.” The Carolingian Empire was divided into various
kingdoms; Magyars, Muslims, and Vikings were on attacking sprees for over a
century, collectively; social life moved into the countryside, close to farmland; cities
and towns were mostly abandoned. The manorial village life was motivated largely
by defense and protection, hence the rise of the knight as vassals to lords. Although
Marx again primarily speaks of the feudal relationships of vassalage as basically
economic relations, it was primarily for protection that people choose to become
vassals. Consider the fact that a fief (what a vassal receives in exchange for service
to a lord) was not only a piece of property, though it was this also, but primarily
something over which one could wield control and power. The social class
stratification at this time (from which derived the three Estates in France and other
countries in early modern Europe) consisted in the noble lords who fought, clergy
who prayed, and serfs who farmed (later becoming the clergy, nobility, and
peasantry). These social strata were ranked primarily according to those who had
the power to protect (nobility) and those who could serve the protectors (priests
and peasantry) in exchange for their protection. As Scheler states,
The political principle of power, which secondarily leads to the formation
of classes, remains the springboard and germ of all class divisions and, at the
same time, regulates the latitude of potential economic configurations until
the end of the absolutist and mercantilist era. Moreover, capitalism is, up to
this point in time, primarily the instrument of politically derived powers and
of powers not based on economics at all, however much the simultaneous
economic development may have come to their aid.158
It is not surprising then that the most dominant social conflicts that arose in the
Middle Ages were not between the rulers and ruled, but between the divisions of
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authority: secular authority (emperor and kings) vs. ecclesiastical authority (popes
and bishops).
The watershed event that ushered in the late Western situation was the French
Revolution. That event marked the first break from the determination of social
position upon hereditary birth-rite toward social mobility according to factors of
wealth and achievement. It was the catalyst for the possibility that the relatively
wealthy business classes, who had since been included among the Third Estate
peasantry, were recognized as their own urban middle class (the burgher class, i.e.,
bourgeoisie). It ushered in a new situation, one that took nearly a century to unfold,
that was based in part upon a new rule: people were not wealthy only on account of
their political power (and native birth rite), but people had power because they
were wealthy. Scheler writes that “only in the age of high capitalism…does there
gradually dawn an era that can be described in a relative way a predominantly
economic.”159 This late situation is the first time in the West for it to become socially
universal that classes or the forms of groupings were divided along economic
factors, namely, wealth, property and production, and that these factors became the
independent variable by which the other social variables are determined.
Despite their disagreement, I hope to emphasize that with respect to this late
historical situation, Scheler and Marx agree on two fundamental points. First, that it
is the economic variables that, in our day, are the determining variables for the rest
of the variables of society, and that the primary evidence of this is that, second, it is
according to the economic variables that class-divisions of society are
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predominantly (though not entirely) determined. As we will come to see, this does
not make Scheler a Marxist in really any sense of the term (other than some cursory
agreement in some places) but that it does put both of them on the same field is
significant, especially on the note that the Schelerian assessment of the social
situation, because of this alignment, must refer to these economic variables and
class divisions. We will see that the way he describes the patterns and forms of
ideology pertain directly to economic classes.
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6
TOWARDS A PHENOMENOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY
In the previous chapter, I give an account of the conflict between Scheler and
Mannheim in relation to issues surrounding the Streit um die Wissenssoziologie, or,
the sociology of knowledge dispute. This dispute involved more than sociologists of
knowledge. Members of the Frankfurt School became embroiled when Mannheim’s
sociology of knowledge proved influential in reformulating—and, for them,
endangering—the Marxist view of ideology. It is important to keep in mind that for
social researchers in the 1930’s, as David Frisby points out, “the sociology of
knowledge was seen to be forging nothing less than an intellectual revolution.”1
Mannheim insisted that a sociology of knowledge could clarify scientifically, and
therefore, objectively, many rival interpretations that are encumbered by biased,
partisan worldviews—worldviews which are themselves therefore prone to
ideology.
According to Mannheim, what most needs correcting is a conception of ideology
that is formulated in such a way as to be employed as intellectual artillery of any one
party or class who, because of their class-status, are somehow conditionally immune
to ideological thinking. Mannheim sought to abolish once and for all using the word
ideology “as a weapon by the proletariat against the dominant group.”2 His
reasoning is not because of an intention to liberate the dominant group from
accusations of ideological thinking, but because using ideology this way falls prey to
1
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its own kind of illusion insofar as it absolutizes its own point of view. Mannheim
explains:
In short, such a revealing insight into the basis of thought as that offered by
the notion of ideology cannot, in the long run, remain the exclusive privilege
of one class. But it is precisely the expansion and diffusion of the ideological
approach which leads finally to a juncture at which it is no longer possible for
one point of view and interpretation to assail all others as ideological without
itself being placed in the position of having to meet that challenge.3
After Mannheim criticized Marxism as the ideology of the proletariat, critical
theorists came to Marx’s defense. They did not necessarily come for the sake of
saving Marxism, but for the sake of maintaining a critical function with respect to a
conception of ideology, which they thought was threatened not only by Mannheim’s
generalization of the theory, but its non-evaluative scientific approach.
To be sure, Mannheim was not the first to make the charge that Marxist thinking
is just as ideologically-prone as any other, nor was Scheler, who made this claim a
half decade earlier. The expansion, or generalization, however, was a consistent and
explicit theme among sociologists of knowledge. There definitely is a sense in which
Mannheim’s work is a more detailed development of remarks that Scheler had
already made about Marxism and ideology. However, there is an even greater
disparity between Mannheim’s and Scheler’s views, and the disparity is grounded
not merely in the difference of some of their conclusions, but with respect to their
methods. As I have been urging, Scheler’s sociology of knowledge is first and
foremost a philosophical study, and one that is an outgrowth of his phenomenology.
Mannheim’s scientific, non-evaluative approach to ideology is therefore
fundamentally at odds with what Scheler has in mind. Value, value-givenness and
3
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the conditions of value-givenness are central to Scheler’s discussion of ideology,
which will cast the issue in terms of devaluation and overvaluation. As I will show,
Scheler’s approach to the question of ideology, when considered in light of the
phenomenological paradigm that I have been setting up throughout this work,
contains a critical function that places Scheler’s work in closer proximity with the
critical theorists than it is with the research status the sociology of knowledge came
to adopt when Mannheim took over the field.

Mannheim’s Reformulation of Ideology and the Frankfurt School Critique
It is important to keep in mind the problems from which a theory of ideology
emerged historically and what is at stake for critical theorists in general. All
knowledge has an emancipatory function. That knowledge is considered to be
liberating has been a basic tenet of the history of Western philosophy since its
ancient Greek origins. The terms of emancipation, however, changes over time, and
especially through the course of the Enlightenment. The meaning of freedom
gradually shifted from a pure and theoretical status, to a practically relevant one.
For Hegel, history is on a course of emerging rationalization. Knowledge, then, is
emancipatory when truth is bound up with being realistic and able to further this
course of rationalization by restructuring the irrational structures of society,
dialectically, one by one. Knowledge cannot be emancipatory if, on the one hand, it
becomes lost in utopian speculation indifferent to social conditions and that
perpetuate conditions of unfreedom. But, on the other hand, knowledge cannot be
critical of those social conditions if it remains merely beholden to the social
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conditions themselves. David Ingram suggests that this “paradox constitutes the
chief dilemma addressed by critical theory.” He continues:
Critical theory is critical of both the utopian idealism of social and political
philosophy and the uncritical realism of social and political science. Social
and political theory ought not be so far removed from actual practice as to be
useless [i.e., unrealistic]. Yet it ought not limit itself to describing the regular
patterns of existing social practice for fear of becoming an uncritical tool in
the service of government officials and public opinion manipulators bent on
maintaining the status quo.4
According to Marx, an ideology is a theory or belief that uncritically reflects the
contradictory (irrational) structure of society. Its falsity is on account of harboring
and concealing irrationality and due to its implicit justification of economic or
political domination of one class over another. Critical theorists are said to disagree
with Marx that ideas are ideological simply because they transcended social and
historical relations. Rather, they are more inclined to “agree with Hegel that the
truth of these ideas consisted precisely in their transcendence of a ‘false’ or
imperfect social reality.”5 Not all transcendent ideas are ideological because their
transcendence provides those ideas with a critical function. But, however
“transcendent” ideas happen to be, their historical dependence must be kept in
awareness. The transcendent ideas that are ideological are those that cannot
perform a critical function, namely, insofar as they anticipate purely utopian states
of affairs and are therefore unable to achieve realization.6
Mannheim notes that this scenario suggests a change in the criterion of truth
from a traditional religious one to a modern secular one. The idea of a false
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consciousness—“where the lie lay in the soul”—was formerly thought in terms of
whether one was or was not “of God.”7 Inspirational truth was determined on
account of a union with the divine, so “when the prophet doubted the genuineness
of his vision it was because he felt himself deserted by God.”8 Ideology in the
modern sense is used to regard some thought with practical futility or being
practically unrealistic. In this view, “all thought labeled as ‘ideology’ is regarded as
futile when it comes to practice, and the only reliable access to reality is to be sought
in practical activity.”9 Ideas that are practically futile are also regarded as trivial.
Mannheim notes that accusations of ideological thinking gradually extended
beyond reference to the bourgeoisie and ended up being an accusation that groups
of every standpoint use against all the rest.10 Before long, an ideology came to
denote the way of thinking of one’s opponents as a way of coping with “the
advantage of the adversary in the competitive struggle.”11 We will see later in this
chapter how Scheler characterizes ideology similarly as developing within the social
experiences of ressentiment. While this usage of ideology is not exactly the Marxist
view, it is the usage to which Marx’s view led. It is important to note that (in contrast
to critical theorist criticism of the sociology of knowledge) Mannheim does not see
his conception of ideology as an introduction of a new theoretical counterpoint to
Marxism, but an elucidation of the way the concept of ideology has changed
historically, and one to which he thinks Marx unwittingly contributed. That is to say,
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it is a situation where “one does not call his own position into question, but regards
it as absolute, while interpreting his opponent’s ideas as a mere function of the
social positions they occupy.”12 Mannheim’s historical analysis of the idea of
ideology seems ultimately to suggest that it is history that has refuted Marxism, not
Mannheim.
According to Mannheim, it is the task of a sociology of knowledge to show that
all ideas and theories, including Marxist ideas, are a function of the social positions
people occupy, making them therefore no less susceptible to ideology. Mannheim
differentiates between a general and special formulation of ideology. The general
formulation is the one Mannheim endorses because it acknowledges that “the
thought of all groups (including one’s own)…is recognized as socially determined,”13
not just the thought of only specific groups, as the special formulation denotes.
Due to the fact that all ideas and theories are functional of the subject’s social
position, they represent perspectives which necessarily have limited adequacy.
Mannheim does not take the view that socially- or historically-situated cognition is
the source of error, rather it is the source of its own adequacy, but one that is
inherently constricted by means of the position. A particular perspective is not
erroneous merely because it is not comprehensive. He writes: “The circumstance
that thought is bound by the social- and life-situation in which it arises creates
handicaps as well as opportunities.”14 As such, Mannheim does not think this makes
knowledge “merely relative,” in the sense of objectively inadequate and partially

Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, 77.
Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, 77, n17.
14 Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, 81.
12
13

268

invalid, but that it does suggest a relational quality of knowledge: knowledge refers
to the very relation between the subject and his or her social and historical
situation.15
The sociology of knowledge, for Mannheim, is an alternative to—and in many
ways a substitution for—the critique of ideology, because the project of a critique of
ideology seems to imply that there is some theoretical position from which to
critique other ways of thinking. With the sociology of knowledge, Mannheim says,
“what was once the intellectual armament of a party16 is transformed into a method
of research in social and intellectual history generally.”17 And as a method of
scientific research, Mannheim insists that with the sociology of knowledge, the
theory of ideology takes on a value-neutral character. A scientific theory of ideology
neutralizes its traditional evaluative component. Volker Meja observes that
“Mannheim’s ‘total conception of ideology’…implies a rejection of the goals of
critical ideological analysis: ‘ideology’ becomes a value-neutral concept….”18
Mannheim suggests that the purpose of the nonevaluative approach to ideology, is
“to confine oneself to showing everywhere the interrelationships between the
intellectual point of view held and the social position occupied.”19
Mannheim’s general formulation and non-evaluative approach to ideology was
the primary focus of the Frankfurt School critique of the sociology of knowledge. In
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his essay “A New Concept of Ideology?” Horkheimer identifies what I take to be the
most important oversight of Mannheim’s conception of ideology, namely, that it
misunderstands the emancipatory function of knowledge (or at least emancipatory
in the critical, rather than the traditional sense) and the fact that Marx conceives of
ideology in light of this critical function.20 Horkheimer was distraught not because of
Mannheim’s critique of Marxism, but because of Mannheim’s inversion and
distortion of Marx’s original concept. Since Mannheim locates ideology in any
intellectual perspective that is socially conditioned and existentially bound, ideology
is based upon a criterion of totality, whereby the view that is better able to
incorporate a totality of different perspectives is the more valid one. Since most (if
not all) knowledge is unable to bypass a particular social perspective, most (if not
all) knowing is ideological. Knowing is ideological not insofar as it achieves
epistemic adequacy (which all perspectives achieve to some extent), but insofar as
knowing bears a degree of epistemic inadequacy, or incompleteness. Knowledge is
necessarily ideological simply on account of its inadequacy. On account of this
theory, any view that considers itself ideology-free, as Marxists presumably do,
means that it wins for itself some unconditioned view of a totality of perspectives.
Ideology, for Mannheim, is therefore nothing more than the fact of “existentiallybounded thought” and no one is immune to thinking in the context of existence.
But certainly Marx of all people did not think his critique of capitalism was
somehow outside of an existential context. Horkheimer writes that “the goal of
Marx’s science was neither the discovery of a ‘totality’ nor of some total and
Max Horkheimer, “A New Concept of Ideology?” Knowledge and Politics: The Sociology
of Knowledge Dispute, ed. Volker Meja and Nico Stehr (New York: Routledge, 1990), 140-56.
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absolute truth, but rather the transformation of particular social conditions.”21 He
continues that therefore, “In the sociology of knowledge, the modern concept of
ideology is assigned a task which runs counter to the theory from which it arose.”22
Critical theorists are, of course, very comfortable with admitting a side of
unknowing to conceptual understanding—a nonconceptual side to our concepts.
However, for critical theorists, ideas are not ideological simply because they are
incommensurable with the fullness of the social and historical world, and therefore
perspectival. That is to say, ideological thinking is not based upon the criteria of the
completeness or incompleteness of knowledge at all. Rather, ideology arises in the
failure on the part of subject to admit a space of incompleteness in one’s ideas—to
assume identity where it is not. Mannheim’s admission that all knowledge is
inadequate on account of perspective may be a claim that guards against the
formation of ideology, but Mannheim has the problem perfectly backwards, by
reversing the conditions of ideology: Ideology is in the claim of completeness, not in
the recognition of incompleteness. The very condition that Mannheim considers
ideological, critical theorists suggest guards against ideology. Ideology is in
judgment that one’s knowing extends further than it does or is fuller than it actually
is.
Furthermore, the explanation of ideology is different. For Adorno, inadequacy is
not a matter of social position and perspective, it is contained necessarily in the nonidentical nature of concepts. The object is always more than the concept. It is
nonidentity, not perspective, that accounts for the incompleteness of knowledge.
21
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Because of this, Mannheim’s intelligentsia,23 to whom he assigns the role of
proffering a totality of perspective (or at least the greatest possible totality) is, for
the critical theorist, the one who is most steeped ideology due to a certain arrogance
of completeness. Among the intelligentsia, not only is there a lack of self-awareness
of the inadequacy of one’s concepts, as concepts, but it inevitably views knowledge
in the manner of traditional theory, as an interconnection of abstract ideas without
reference to social reality.24 We have to keep in mind that for Marx, ideology was in
those whose ideas are existentially dependent, but who consider them to be more
independent (more abstract) than they in fact are. According to Mannheim, the
thinking of the intelligentsia is, “socially unattached” or “free-floating” and therefore
are “best equipped to mediate between contending standpoints and synthesize a
comprehensive understanding of the totality.”25 The idea that the Intelligentsia are
the group less ideologically-prone represents not only a reversal of Marx’s view, but
a regression from Marx’s view.
Consequently, overcoming ideology is not, for critical theorists, the impossible
task of compensating for incomplete knowledge by accumulating the amount of
perspectives toward a (ever elusive) theoretical totality of perspectives. In this view,
how could you ever know one has accumulated all of the actual perspectives as well
as all the possible perspectives. On the contrary, for critical theorists, overcoming
Cf. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, 153ff.
This does not suggest Mannheim’s views avoid reference to social reality, but the idea
that completeness of knowledge is simply the sum-total of perspectives, to form some kind
of theoretical whole, represents a regression, it seems to me, from the view of ideology that
critical theorists espoused. Marx’s theory of ideology is more sophisticated than Mannheim
credits.
25 Leon Bailey, Critical Theory and the Sociology of Knowledge: A Comparative Study in
the Theory of Ideology (New York: Peter Lang, 1994), 55.
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ideology is a more manageable task, and one that is essentially Socratic: to increase
self-awareness with respect the inadequacy of one’s own concepts and to removing
the discrepancy between a limited concept and the totality that a subject tries to
claim for that concept, or conceptual framework.
As such, Mannheim and the Frankfurt School have different methods of
dissolving ideology. We could call Mannheim’s the accumulative approach and the
Frankfurt one the reflective approach. Interestingly, Mannheim’s approach can, in
this way, be more closely aligned with Lukács’ view of ideology since they both
agreed on a certain point that critical theorists rejected. Leon Bailey expressed their
agreement this way: “there is one social standpoint from which the totality may be
known. One group of class is presented with the objective possibility of grasping to
whole. It is the mission of this group or class to synthesize a comprehensive
understanding of the totality.”26 The difference, however, between Mannheim and
Lukács is that while Lukács points to the Marxist tradition and suggests this mission
belongs to the working class (proletariat), Mannheim aligns with the idealist
tradition and suggests this mission of synthesis and comprehension belongs to the
intellectual class (intelligentsia).

Scheler’s Concept of Ideology and Ideology Critique
While I will ultimately show how Scheler’s view of ideology has greater
consistency with critical theorists’, than with Mannheim’s, Scheler’s position shows
us that that we need not decide between the set of problems treated by the
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sociology of knowledge and those treated by critical theory. The epistemological
question about the possible validity of cognition in relation to the social origin of the
content of cognition remains an important question for the critique of ideas that
perpetuate structures of oppression in society. We must not only consider the effect
that inadequate, or “false” forms of consciousness have on social behavior, but
provide an explanation of those forms of consciousness. However, it should be
familiar enough to the reader at this point that, for Scheler, forms of consciousness
are always derivative of underlying elements and attitudes. It is in there that the
discussion of ideology will have to play out. But we first have to reach that sphere in
the course of the discussion.
There is a part of Scheler’s writings that conceive the problem to be Mannheim’s
version of it, where the concern is about absolute truth, its form and contents, and
sees its mission as an illumination of this matter. On the other hand, Scheler will not
opt for a non-evaluative, or value-free, approach to the problem, and so will offer a
conception of ideology that maintains a critical function, without generalizing
ideology very broadly or too thinly. My aim is to show that a critique of ideology
must reach into the sociology of knowledge, and that a sociology of knowledge can
bolster a critique of ideology. The two should not be interpreted too exclusively, as
Mannheim and Horkheimer each do. It is counterproductive to take sides with
respect to the two approaches to ideology. However, both positions may have to
compromise something in order to cooperate. The sociology of knowledge should
not be so tied to scientific methodology as to make itself irrelevant for social
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critique. And the critique of ideology should not be so closed to utilizing nonevaluative approaches that they consider incapable of harnessing a critical function.
It is significant to keep in mind that Scheler’s sociology of knowledge is not his
entire philosophy (like, to a large extent, it is for Mannheim). Scheler’s
phenomenology matters a great deal for his sociology of knowledge, despite
attempts to separate these two sections of Scheler’s career, or worse, consider them
to be opposed. I’ve already stressed, in the previous chapter, how all the basic
concepts in Scheler’s metaphysics and anthropology, upon which he constructs a
sociology of knowledge, are concepts that come from his phenomenology and are
already phenomenologically clarified. The metaphysics and sociology of knowledge
would not, and could not, be what they are without the phenomenology of these
concepts.
My fundamental aim in this chapter is not only to show the way that Scheler can
provide a critique of ideology. I argue also, on the one hand, that his critique of
ideology is grounded largely in his phenomenology of values and the person (that is
to say, it is the phenomenology that provides the critical function). On the other
hand, I argue that the sociology of knowledge serves as an explanation of the criteria
of validity (in a social context) that will be operative for the critique of ideology.
Scheler’s critique of ideology, however, will differ substantially from the critical
theorists by the fact that Scheler will insist that a critique of ideology must be a
moral critique. The problem of ideology is not only identity-thinking, but
overvaluation and devaluation. We will see that the ideological arena is more
fundamental than the conceptual inadequacy and the recognition of this inadequacy.
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It rests ultimately within the very moral attitudes or value orientations with which
we approach the world. Scheler’s sociology of knowledge gets us to the place—the
arena—where the drama plays out, and explains why the drama must play out
there.

Ideology and Idols
The number of times Scheler uses the term “Ideologie” is scarce, but the idea or
problem that theories of ideology are invested in disclosing by the term is a problem
central to Scheler’s philosophy as a whole, and his sociology of knowledge
specifically. Scheler first raises the issue of ideology within the context of his
cultural sociology; ideology is mentioned in relation to, but with distinction with, the
meaning of prejudice. Explaining the relation and difference of ideology and
prejudice is the first important task.
Cultural sociology, if we recall from the previous chapter, is that part of human
activity that is predominantly directed (intentionally) toward ideal goals, namely
the realization of these goals within one’s own social context. Ideal goals are
inextricably connected toward real factors, whether this be in terms of the way
spiritual activity is determined by drives toward “real goals,” or the way social
conditions make the realization of some ideas futile. Scheler just assumes that goals
have to be practically realistic, not in order to be worthwhile, or of value, but at least
in order to be effective in transforming the material or spiritual quality of society.
All goals, Scheler thinks, serve a distinct domain of historical becoming, either
practically (in terms of material transformation), spiritually (in terms of personal or
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cultural transformation), or soteriologically (in terms of the becoming of God’s
redemptive value in the world). It is worth repeating that these domains of goals
have correlations with different kinds of knowing, which arise from different types
of intuitions. The empirical intuitions of the material world tend toward a scientific
knowledge of the ways of controlling the material world. Intuitions of persons or
cultures, arising from interpersonal and intercultural experiences tend toward a
knowledge of essences. Religious experience and corresponding intuitions about the
nature of the divine tend toward a redemptive knowledge.
These three types of knowing correspond to what Scheler calls “social forms of
spiritual cooperation.”27 First, the type corresponding to scientific knowledge are
various research organizations among the positive sciences which are united (and
distinguished) by the objects and practical goals of research. These organizations,
Scheler notes, are usually “connected with the organizations of technology and
industry or with certain professional [i.e., legal, medical, or political]
organizations.”28 Second, the type corresponding to knowledge of essences are
educational communities united (and distinguished) by a certain system of ideas or
values. And third, corresponding with redemptive knowledge are religious
communities or churches, united (and distinguished) theologically.
Scheler insists that these higher organizations of knowledge are to be
distinguished from the social groups of “estate, profession, class, or party,” where
belonging is based upon collective interests on the level of prejudice.29 Scheler
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characterizes the prejudices of social class or political party as “pseudoknowledge”—or better presumed knowledge, on the level of presupposition. By this
phrase, he indicates the situation where “those who have [this ‘knowledge’] in
common remain unaware of both the collective root of interests behind [it] and of
the circumstances that only they as a group, and only by virtue of belonging to one
of these groups, have this knowledge in common.”30 Prejudices, as prejudices,
(namely, “automatic and unconscious” sentiments of a particular social group on
account of shared interests) are inevitable and natural. And on the level of prejudice,
these shared interests have not yet achieved the status of ideology. Prejudices form
the necessary basis of ideology, but an additional condition must apply in order for a
prejudice to become an ideology, namely, the legitimation of prejudice on a
conscious level. Ideologies are the conscious and deliberate theoretical justification
of prejudices “behind the aegis of religious, metaphysical, or scientific thinking, or
by drawing on dogmas, principles, and theories originating in [any one of] those
higher organizations of knowledge.”31 Ideologies are, in effect, consciously justified
class or party interests.
Within a later section concerning the “material problems” of the sociology of
knowledge, Scheler says more about ideology in relation to class-interests. His
intent in this case is to consider the task that Mannheim says a sociology of
knowledge has with respect to ideology, which is mapping out, in a non-evaluative
sense, the correspondence between intellectual perspectives and social position.
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Scheler calls the following list “formal types of thinking that are determined by
classes.”32 It considers the categorial tendencies of class-based thinking.
Lower-Class Mentality

Upper-Class Mentality

Value-prospectivism
Reflection upon becoming
Mechanical worldview
Realism
(world as ‘resistance’)
Materialism

Value-retrospectivism
Reflection upon being
Teleological worldview
Idealism
(world as ‘realm of ideas’)
Spiritualism
A priori knowledge,
rationalism
Intellectualism
Pessimistic view of the future
and optimistic retrospection
Identity thinking
Nativistic thinking

Induction, empiricism
Pragmatism
Optimistic view of the future
and pessimistic retrospection
Dialectical thinking
Thinking about milieu

Scheler insists these class-based categories “are not to be construed as merely
philosophical theories bearing the same titles. Rather they represent the very
functions of living types of thinking and living forms of intuition—not reflective
knowledge about these forms.”33 And, furthermore, these types of thinking are not
subject to strict determination, but are tendencies that can, in principle, be
overcome. Scheler also does not consider these “class-conditioned, subconscious
inclinations” to be prejudices, or at least not necessarily. They represent attitudes of
class position (Klassenlage) that are functional for the formation of prejudices.
Scheler considers the elucidation of the necessary origins of these attitudes to be
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what he refers as a “sociological doctrine of idols.” “Idols,” here, is used in the
Baconian sense of certain “deceptions” of perception.
In the early part of his career, Scheler was so influenced by Bacon’s theory of the
idols of outer perception that he continued the theme in a work that considers the
“idols” or deceptions of inner perception. The essay was first published in 1911
under the title “Über Selbsttäuschungen” (“On Self-Deceptions”). An expanded
version has been translated as “The Idols of Self-Knowledge,” which attempts to
refute the idea that “one cannot be deceived or mistaken about one’s own internal
mental experiences.”34 The essay is Scheler’s contribution to a phenomenology of
illusion and error which leads him to make an important distinction between them
as two different source of false propositions. An error is a falsity on the level of
inferential judgment. An illusion, on the other hand, is a deception on the prepropositional level of intuition; it refers to something that is given in intuition, but is
not itself present.
To use Scheler’s own example: “If, on the basis of some moisture which I see on
the way to my house, I judge that ‘it has been raining,’ and if I find afterward that
farther along the street is not wet, and if, finally, I learn that a street-cleaning truck
has passed by my house, I know that my judgment is in error.”35 An error pertains
specifically, and exclusively to a mistaken propositional inference made on account
of an accurate perception. An illusion, on the other hand, is when the perception
itself is mistaken (not merely, though, on the level of appearance, but on the level of

David Lachterman, “Translator’s Introduction” to Scheler, Selected Philosophical
Essays, xxx.
35 Scheler, “The Idols of Self-Knowledge,” Selected Philosophical Essays, 12.
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taking an appearance as indicating a certain state of affairs which is incongruent
with the actual state of affairs). When, for example, on the way to my house, I notice
that the street or part of the street looks wet. The street is given in intuition as wet,
but it turns out that a shadow or a glare on the street had given the impression of
wetness. Although I might later on make the true judgment that the street, in fact, is
not wet, the intuition remains an illusion, and the illusion is essentially different
from the judgment that I make about the street: whether I infer from the given state
of affairs whether the street is or is not wet. Scheler writes that,
Consequently, illusion is wholly independent of the sphere of judgment, the
sphere of ‘believeing,’ ‘asserting,’ and ‘supposing,’ Illusion takes place in the
prelogical sphere of states of affairs and consists in an incongruous relation
between at least two states of affairs and the levels of being to which they
belong. … While illusion remains wholly within the sphere of the intuitive,
error consists in a relationship between what is thought and what is
intuited.36
This reference to illusion (or deception, “idols”) in the domain of intuition plays
a significant role in the phenomenology of ideology, but it extends further than
deceptions within that domain, because ideology, as Scheler acknowledges, refers
the elevation of “idols” (intuitive deception) to ideology (cognitive error), as it
pertains to the sociologically-conditioned mentality. What Scheler calls a
sociological theory of idols is, he says, “an analogy to my own theory of the idols of
inner perception.”37 Idols, though, are not ideologies, they are on the level of class
attitudes, which, become prejudices, and are the stuff out of which ideologies
emerge when they are raised to the level of conscious justification. That is to say,
such “idols” refer to the way the world is given: “the world itself presents different
36
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formal reliefs to the upper and lower classes and to both of them insofar as they
themselves are aware of their [own] ‘rising’ or ‘sinking.’”38
On the one hand, Scheler insists that sociologically-conditioned idols are “more
than errors.” Rather they pertain to class-based intuitions: “what presents itself to a
member of a class” and pertains to “the objective forms in which it is presented.”39
Idols on the intuitive (and attitudinal) level are the basis of ideology with any or all
of the following three types of equations: (1) The equation of “class-conditioned
systems of idols” with the very being and becoming of things. (2) Their equation
with “the objective forms of thought, intuition, and valuation”40 and their analogy to
these categorial class interests and perspectives. (3) Their equation with universal
class-obligations. In Scheler’s words: “one not only regards such systems [of idols]
as inclinations of thinking and institutional beginnings…, but also holds that, out of
causal necessity, all individuals, belonging to a class, must follow these inclinations
and drives in their super-automatic, conscious, mental activities of cognition.”41
It is important to make clear that, with respect to these “systems of idols” or
class-attitudes that Scheler marks out, he is in agreement with Mannheim’s
designation of ideology as “total” rather than “particular.” That is to say, it is
something that affects more than certain partial contents of thinking, but to the
“total” forms of thinking themselves. In Scheler’s words: “class attitude widely
determines both the ethos [i.e., the type of value-preferencing] and the type of
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thinking—not just the objects and contents of thinking and cognition.”42 Ideology
pervades the entire thought-process and the very conceptual apparatus. To a certain
extent, it is an acknowledgement of what Marx called “false consciousness.” As we
will see in what follows, this means that, for Scheler, there are ontological (and even
moral) conditions of ideology, not simply epistemic conditions.
But despite the deep-seated nature of such deceptions (that can find their way
into the very structure of one’s own personal character or “basic moral tenor”
[Gesinnuing]), Scheler insists that “Class prejudices, and also the formal laws of their
formation [i.e., the systems of idols or attitudes], can, in principle, be overcome by
any individual of a class. They can be put out of action by anyone—no matter what
his class—the more they are recognized in their sociological lawfulness.”43 It is
remarkable here that, although Scheler agrees with Mannheim that ideologies have
a “total” (rather than a “particular” or partial influence), he seems to be in
disagreement with the “general” characterization of ideology: that ideologies apply
to every perspective insofar as that perspective is conditioned by a social position or
particular perspective. Consequently, Scheler is taking the critical theorist side
against the generalization of the idea of ideology, that not all perspectives are
ideologically saturated equally. Scheler writes that “If there were no realm within
the human mind that could raise itself above all class ideologies and their
perspectival interests, all possible cognitions of truth would have to be deception.
All cognition would then be nothing but a function of the outcome of class
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struggles.”44 I take Scheler’s view of ideology to be consistent with the critical
theorist critique of Mannheim’s view on both counts: (1) ideologies cannot be
generalized as pervasive or saturating all points of view equally. The situatedness of
knowledge is admitted, but ideology means more than what is caused by merely
having a perspective that is not all-encompassing. (2) That a philosophy of ideology
cannot be a non-evaluative study, but must be a value-relevant critical study. I argue
that a view of ideology can be garnered from Scheler’s philosophy that follows a
critical model ultimately because of a third consistency: (3) that ideology is more
about a lack of self-awareness of incomplete perspectives (or what I called in the
introduction to this work, an “incongruence between concept and intuition”) than it
is about the incompleteness itself.
An analysis of these three points constitute the remainder of the chapter. But
there is a difficulty here because although Scheler insists that ideologies can be
overcome, he does not provide any further exposition about the way he thinks this
is to happen. He does, however, make two statements that hint toward a way one is
able to overcome ideology. In the Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge, when
Scheler acknowledges the “apparent contradiction” between the deep-seated nature
of class attitudes and the ability of “any individual of a class” to overcome them, he
points to his theory of functionalization as a way out of the aporia. He thinks it is
significant to keep in mind that, in his words: “categorial systems of intuition,
thinking, and valuation, which form themselves in history by functionalizing the
comprehension of essences, are determined not according to the validity and

44

Scheler, Problems, 68-9.

284

possible origins [of knowing] but through selection and choice, as well as by
classes.”45 He means to suggest that there is a difference between the social
constitution of forms of thinking and the validity of the contents of knowledge. The
social constitution of categorial forms or concepts does not necessarily imply the
social constitution of epistemic content, or at least in a way that would eradicate the
validity of the content of knowledge. The genesis or origin of cognition does not
invalidate the adequacy of the content of cognition. I will investigate this claim in
the next section.
The second statement is contained in “The Idols of Self-Knowledge,” which
Scheler wrote a decade earlier. He acknowledges that the idea of the
phenomenological insight into essences suggests that “absolute being [where what
is meant is what is given] in every sphere of the external and the inner world alike,
can be known with self-evident and adequate knowledge [i.e., intuitive knowing].”
However, in light of this total capacity of human knowing, Scheler acknowledges
also that this kind of knowledge is hindered by the “separation, detachment, and
seclusion” of the human spirit from being. This separation, say says, does not rest on
“something inalterable in the constitution of the knowing subject, but only on the
weaknesses and inclinations which we can, in principle, overcome.”46
These two passages aim at away to frame Scheler’s critique of ideology, first,
with respect to epistemic considerations in terms of his sociology of knowledge and
second, with respect to ontological consideration, namely, on the level of moral
preconditions of intuition and cognition.
45
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The Sociology of Knowledge and Functionalization
The basic principles Scheler takes to be fundamental for a sociology of
knowledge stimulate reflection upon the origin and nature of communal prejudices
that sometimes lead to ideological thinking. Scheler takes it as axiomatic in the
sociology of knowledge that all human beings begin in a stage of identification with a
social group. “Identification” is rather technical terminology in his social philosophy,
meaning not simply taking other’s feelings as one’s own feelings, but taking another
self as one’s own self.47 Elsewhere, Scheler writes that, “In other words, [one] tends,
in the first instance, to live more in others than in [oneself]; more in the community
than in [one’s] own individual self.”48 Younger members of a community are often so
immersed by the content of their social environment that their inner awareness is
predominantly constituted by experiences “which fit into [socially] conditioned
patterns which form a kind of channel for the stream of [their spiritual]
environment.”49 Insofar as the spiritual threshold of a community contains certain
kinds of judgments or emotional reactions, during one’s early years, such judgments
are not understood as those of another, and then assented to consciously and
autonomously. Rather, Scheler says, “We fall in with it, without being consciously
aware of the element of cooperation involved. And the effect of this is that we begin
by regarding it as our own judgment or emotional reaction.”50 It is important to keep
in mind that his kind of preconscious falling-in with other’s judgments and
emotional reactions (as one’s own) are on the level prejudice and not ideology (that
Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, 18.
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is, at least for the one who is falling-in, in contrast to the one whose ideas they
originally are). It is, therefore, not a judgment as such, but rather a “pre-judgment”
or presupposition. At this stage of development, he or she has not chosen either to
justify those judgments (uncritically) or to accept or reject critically.
Scheler’s first principle of the sociology of knowledge states that
All human knowledge, insofar as [a human being] is a member of a society in
general, is not empirical but ‘a priori’ knowledge. The genesis of such
knowledge shows that it precedes levels of self-consciousness and
consciousness of one’s self-value. There is no ‘I’ without a ‘we.’ The ‘we’ is
filled with contents prior to the ‘I’.51
Only in individualistic society, Scheler adds, are others experienced as alien,
perceived as an other (alter ego) merely by analogy of bodily gestures and common
experiences, and with whom one forms contracts.52 This reference to individualistic
society shows that, while human beings begin in a state of social identification with
the feelings, attitudes, and spiritual character of their community, it is possible, and
even natural, to transition away from this identification. Human beings are capable
of such intense transition away from the mindset of their native communities that
those with whom they originally self-identified can suddenly be considered alien
and strange.
However, this kind of transition is a process because it is a transition not only
out of a complex of social attitudes of which one is a part, but away from one’s own
self, albeit, a heteronomous self where one’s inner awareness is to a large extent, if
not entirely, socially conditioned. Scheler uses the metaphor of the current of a
stream with respect to socially conditioned patterns of experience. Only in time
51
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does one have the strength to move upstream, against the current. Or in Scheler’s
words, “Only very slowly does [one] raise [one’s spirit] above this stream flooding
over it, and find [oneself] as a being who also, at times, has feelings, ideas and
tendencies of [one’s] own.”53
How does this transition occur? Again, to articulate a Schelerian response
requires piecing one together from various disparate statements. Scheler suggests
that “raising one’s spirit above the stream,” is possible only “to the extent that [one]
objectifies the experiences of [one’s] environment in which [one] lives and partakes,
and thereby gains detachment from them.”54 He then mentions the significance of
the act of remembering for this process of objectification: “It is only in recollection
that the experience normally comes to have the character of something acquired
from without, depending on how far we have succeeded by then…in separating our
own experience (and its individual contents) from that of other people.”55
While it is the case that ideologies require an objectification of prejudices in
order for them to be given rational justification (making them ideologies), a critical
appraisal of ideologies, as prejudices, also requires objectification. In this case,
objectification is awareness, and the objectification (by the act of recollection) of
ones own prejudices, as prejudice, is self-awareness—one becomes aware of the
inadequacy of one’s own former perspective. Scheler suggests that recollection can
achieve this objectification and detachment when one has new experiences beyond
one’s “original communal threshold.” He says that although one’s consciousness is
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originally “already filled with ideas and experiences of whose real origin [one] is
completely unaware…once [one] has begun to lay hold of experiences of [one’s]
own…he [or she] can call upon such ideas in order to make sense of [one’s]
environment, because that is just where they [i.e., the ideas] have come from in the
first place.”56
It is obvious to see at this point that Scheler considers an undeniable sociological
fact that all knowledge is, to some extent, socially conditioned. His insistence that
“the ‘social’ sphere of the ‘with-world’ and the ‘world of the historical past’ is
pregiven to all other spheres [of knowing]”57 is likely to have led him into
considerations of the sociology of knowledge in the first place, whose most
fundamental aim was simply to consider the extent to which knowledge is (and is
not) bound to specific social and existential contexts. Scheler’s position is that all
knowledge invariably arises out of such contexts, however, the validity of the
content of knowledge is not necessarily buried and obscured on account of its social
origination. Scheler puts it this way:
all knowledge, all forms of thought, perception, and cognition are
undoubtedly of sociological character. This proposition does not refer to the
content of knowledge, and still less to its objective validity. It means that
[the] selection of the objects of knowledge is made according to the ruling
[social perspective of interests]. The ‘forms’ of the mental acts by which
knowledge is acquired are always necessarily co-conditioned sociologically,
that is, by the structure of society.58
Put in other terms, Scheler is claiming that it is undeniable that all knowledge is
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socially conditioned. This refers especially to all forms of thinking, intuition, and
cognition. However, it does not follow from this social conditioning that the contents
of knowledge and their validity are also socially conditioned in a way that would
invalidate their adequacy; for this reason the contents of knowledge cannot be the
source of the sociological character of both knowledge and the forms of thinking.
Rather, the source of socially conditioned knowledge is in the selection of objects of
knowledge which conditions the forms of thought, and does so upon the basis of the
prevailing social perspectives of interests.
Scheler is isolating the process of the selection of certain objects of knowledge,
according to what he calls the social perspectives of interests, as being most
fundamentally the basis of the social determination of knowledge. Societies,
historically and geographically, differ with respect to the things of which those
societies are composed (among other ways). Confronting different objects within
our environment conditions the framework of knowledge. But, he is also isolating
the social constitution of the “forms” of thinking (epistemic categories and concepts)
in contradistinction to the “contents” of knowledge (knowledge of this and of that).
The contents of knowledge may have universal validity even if the forms of thinking
are conditioned by our social environment. However, this is a very peculiar position
to take because the forms of thinking—our conceptual apparatus—constitute a lens,
so to speak, by which our empirical knowledge of particular things is filtered. How
then can it be that the forms of thinking are socially conditioned, but the contents of
knowledge are not? In actual fact, this is, but in a sense is not, what Scheler is
indicating.
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One the one hand, if the process of selection is socially conditioned, then all
thinking and knowing will be conditioned by the items we select to consider.
However, on the other hand, if his comments are considered in light of his
phenomenology, we can recall that Scheler considers the validity of intuition (the
data given in lived-experience) independent from the status of cognitive forms.
Intuitive knowledge (Wissen) operates with greater independence from the forms of
thinking than other kinds of knowing, such as cognition (Erkenntnis). Cognition,
Scheler says, is the unity or correlation between intuition and concept.59 If that is
what cognition is, then intuition is knowledge independent of concepts. Intuition
does not derive meaning from concepts, rather concepts derive meaning from
intuition. This is what Scheler’s theory of functionalization shows. The idea is
contained in the following passage, which is a footnote to the previously quoted
passage:
…false paths in sociology [e.g., sociologism] can be avoided if all functional
forms of thought are reduced to functionalized comprehension of essences in
the things themselves. In this way, the particular selection to which this
functionalization is subject may be seen as the work of society and its
interest perspective rather an a ‘pure’ realm of essences.60
In taking up a question that, in his time, was growing in importance for
sociologists (namely, the relation between social context and epistemic validity),
Scheler is urging that sociologists consider phenomenology and the contribution its
findings have for this problem. That is to say, the phenomenological claim of the
intuition of essence does not disregard or contradict the fact that all knowing it
socially contextualized and conditioned by that context, but nor does it follow that
59
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essential insight is not possible simply because people live in particular societies.
Essences are, in this case, intuitive content that supersede contingent factors, whose
meaning unifies those factors, and when functionalized, has relevance beyond the
confines of one’s particular social experience. The findings of phenomenology do not
presuppose one to be a god—to have “a view from nowhere”; they pertain to people
living in different times and places. Ultimately, Scheler’s position is that though the
intentional objects that comprise a variety of worlds differ according to social
differences, the knowledge that we can have of those objects need not be tainted
simply on account of their differences. The only thing that we can guarantee will
differ are the objects of which one has experience; it doesn’t mean that the
experience of those objects (as pertaining to those objects) will not yield an
essential insight. However, on account of the particular objects that compose the
purview of our experience, the forms of thinking will be conditioned according to
the experience of those objects, and not others. Like Mannheim, Scheler is insisting
that although social position circumscribes a perspective, the social position does
not invalidate the adequacy of intuition or cognition within the perspective. In
Mannheim’s words, social context “creates handicaps as well as opportunities.”61
Scheler’s idea of functionalization—the way intuitive content is operative in the
formation of concepts—is grounded in his phenomenology and, as we have seen, is
employed as a centerpiece of the conclusions he draws from his sociology of
knowledge. It may be surprising therefore to learn that the idea is first developed in
Scheler’s work on the philosophy of religion, and that, as important as the idea is for
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his philosophy as a whole, the idea is given relatively short shrift (only a few pages).
The discussion comes up in his treatment on innate ideas, and specifically the
question of an innate idea of God. Scheler says, that “It is only because there is no
innate idea of God that in principle there may be unlimited growth of the natural
knowledge of God through constant acts of cognitive acquisition spread over the
history of the human [spirit].”62 His general point is that a priori knowledge is not
strictly speaking independent of experience (Erlebnis), but independent only of
empirical, inductive experience (Erfahrung). As I discussed in Chapter 2, only a
single, unified experience is necessary for essential insight. It is also important to
keep in mind from that chapter that Scheler divides a priori content into formal and
material domains, and the content that gains entry into the categorial domain is
transmuted essences (material a priori) generalized for the way we understand new
perceptual experience. Scheler explains the phenomenon this way:
…essential knowledge is functionally transmuted into a law governing the
very ‘employment’ of the intellect with regard to contingent facts; under its
guidance the intellect conceives, analyzes, regards and judges the contingent
factual world as ‘determined’ in ‘accordance’ with the principles concerning
the cohesion of essences.63
I want to point out that the functionalization of essences becomes formal
categories or laws governing what is given in empirical, perceptual experience (of
the “contingent factual world”). The new forms do not hold sway over subsequent
intuition of essence. This reinforces the independence Scheler thinks intuition has
with respect to concept formation and why the forms of thinking can be socially
constituted in a way that the contents of (intuitive) knowledge are not.
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Scheler adds that, by the process of functionalization, “What before was a thing
becomes a form of thinking about things; what was an object of love becomes a form
of love, in which a limitless number of objects can now be loved....”64 The givenness
of the essence of friendship, as was discussed in the second chapter, can be
employed here: the essence of friendship is given in the lived-experience of having a
friend and the act of being a friend. The friendships that we have early on in life
establish for us what a friend is, as the idea or concept of a friend. What a friend
means comes from a functionally transmuted essence (the individual meaning and
value content without contingent factors). However, transmuted content from
childhood friendships is so hidden and habituated (like a second nature) that, by the
time one advances in age, they seem as though they are “innate.” By the time we are
mature enough to reflect (as philosophers) on these transmuted essences (or
forms), they are so structurally present, and so pure (i.e., independent from the
actual friendships from which they arose), that it is as if they could have no origin in
one’s natural life. This might point to a phenomenological explanation of Plato’s idea
that knowing is recollecting a previous dwelling of the mind amongst the forms.
Plato’s idea of recollection is accurate, but in coming to a formal awareness, one is
not recollecting a qualitatively different life prior to his birth, but just one’s past life
prior to the onset of a philosophical consciousness and the capacity for selfreflection.
One’s social context and immediate environment (e.g., the neighborhood that
one lives, the school one attends, the activities or sports in which one is involved)
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present a limited domain of people among whom an individual is able to select as
friends. This is usually not—at least not at a young age—a process of intense
deliberation: people tend to fall into friendships in the course of their social
interaction. One does so on the basis of what Scheler calls Interessenperspektive or
the perspective of interests, which he says governs the objects of interest, attention,
and love which seems to vary according to an object’s nearness or remoteness.
Scheler thinks that we take interest or ignore objects in our environment according
to a range of increasing and diminishing intensity of value-givenness. It seems we
turn to objects and select them as objects to know and love primarily in seeing
(intuiting) their value. And this may refer to those we experience the most
(quantitatively), and experience the most genuinely (qualitatively). On the other
hand, the diminishing intensity of the perspective-range holds with respect to those
with whom we have less acquaintance or diminished accessibility.65
This might seem to be obvious, but its nevertheless curious that, as Scheler
explains,
If we do not see someone we love for a long time, our attachment for him
slowly diminishes. We may read in a newspaper that a thousand Japanese
have been drowned, or even that twenty million Russians are starving, but
this normally has less effect on our sympathies than when our wife cuts her
finger or young Johnny has a stomachache.66
The principle is that a certain experiential context is necessary in order for the value
of an object to be given, and value-givenness establishes a framework of imperatives
with respect to what ought to be loved (by that individual).67
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Scheler criticizes the idea that the love of all of humanity, collectively, is superior
to the love of self, friends, family, country, etc. He references, for example, the
utilitarian imperative to act for the sake of the “greatest number.” While, on the one
hand, Scheler admits that “Assuredly, [humanity] as a whole is intrinsically more
worthy of love than any one nation or country,” on the other hand, the act of love for
one’s own country or family “has intrinsically greater value than the love of
[humanity]; and this because one’s country affords an intrinsically greater positive
value-content than ‘humanity’ for the possible experience of any [single individual]
whatever.”68
It is by means of these rules of the perspective of interests that we select friends.
A single individual will inevitably end up with a different set of friendships from
nearly everyone else, from those in his or her hometown to those in foreign lands.
Insofar as friendships differ, Scheler thinks that there is an individual essence to
each one, a unity of meaning for all that various perceptual experiences pertaining
to a particular friendship. There is a difference with respect to the meaning of one’s
friendship with Dave, or her friendship with Kara, and or with John. However, her
friendships with all three are collectively transmuted (along with perhaps many
others) into what she takes friendship to be: the concept of friendship.
Insofar as concepts are derived out of a specific experiential context, they will
invariably have existential relativity. That is to say, concepts are indubitably socially
conditioned since they are necessarily derived only from those objects in the
environment which are possible objects of selection, bearing in mind the existential
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and social diversity of possible objects of selection. However, the existential
relativity does not indicate that the intuitions of friendship that are given
throughout the course of my lived-experience of having friends and being a friend
have lesser validity. Far from invalidating the content of knowledge on account of its
relativity, the experiential context is precisely a condition for the adequacy of
intuitive knowledge. Knowledge is an ontological participation, so the participatory
element in an object or with another person is a greater guarantee of adequacy of
knowledge, not an epistemic hindrance. Essence and value are given more
adequately the more we are actively engaged in and with those objects or persons.
This is one reason why, for example, “the witnessing of an accident [has] such a very
different effect from the mere report of it.”69 The proximity to and the participation
within the happenings of a situation increases the ability to see (intuit) the content
of that situation all the more. Knowledge is limited by a circumscribed set of objects
that constitute possible experience, but among those objects, and by means of
experiencing them, the validity of knowledge is intensified, not diminished. This
explanation is what I take to be behind Scheler’s claim that the validity of the
contents of knowledge are not necessarily affected by the socially conditioned
character of knowledge.
Part of what makes socially conditioned knowledge a problem originally is due to
false presupposition. According to Scheler, we have become too accustomed to
taking truth as a universal category: something that must be the same for everyone,
necessarily. In this case, something cannot be valid unless it applies everywhere. But
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Scheler thinks is it just as accurate to speak of an individual validity to one’s own
intuitions with respect to different friendships, even if they do not apply to all other
friendships everywhere: there is the truth and value of this friendship which is true
for me, but is also objectively true (and can be objectively true even if no other
person ever sees it). What makes it objectively true is simply that it is grounded in
an adequate intuition of the intentional object (the friendship itself). However,
insofar as these essences are functionalized into formal concepts, one concept of
friendship may differ from another concept (according to their different experiences
of friends) and they may both have their own validity. The different concepts may
overlap, and thus we can, through philosophical analysis (and a phenomenology of
friendship) try to point to universally valid claims about friendship, but this does
not mean content must be universally valid, first, in order to have any validity (or
adequacy) at all.
Scheler maintains that absolute (nonrelative) being is construed as unknowable
only if we assume the falsification that what is absolute must, necessarily, also be
universally valid. Scheler writes that the idea of a material essence “does not
exclude the possibility that something is true and good for an individual and thus
that an absolute truth and insight is essentially valid for one individual and yet
strictly objective.”70

Delusion and Falsification of Values
If the above analysis pertains, it cannot be the whole story, at least not if we are
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to consider the possibility of ideology and a critique of ideology. If knowledge is
socially conditioned only according to a socially demarcated set of objects, then we
would be at a loss concerning how ideology is even something of a possibility. There
is nothing in this description to account for error or illusion, for delusional thinking,
or false consciousness. If intuition is always adequate, and the forms of thinking are
given social constitution merely with respect to the different experiential contexts
and the various objects that fill those contexts, then knowledge would hardly be
much of a problem. Cultural knowledge would change with respect to different
experiences, but it could all, in principle, indicate perfectly valid thinking with
respect to those experiences. Scheler is assuming intuition with ideal adequation
(absolute intuition) of essences and values, but the question is whether it is
appropriate to assume ideal intuitive adequation in the first place. Perhaps what
Scheler means to say is that insofar as it is the case that intuition is adequate, social
factors only determine knowledge on the basis of the time and place you find
yourself and the set of objects you have on account of that time and place.
But again this cannot be the whole story. And indeed, the story that Scheler
offers in his sociology of knowledge, which concentrates on the process of the
selection of culturally-specific objects as the primary social determinant of knowing,
is not the only story that Scheler offers if we consider the whole range of his
writings. The other part of the story, and the part that will be most relevant for the
idea of ideology, is whether social conditions negatively affect knowledge on the
intuitive level. Scheler has written of this problem at length on different occasions. I
have already shown earlier in this chapter what Scheler considers illusion to be, in
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“Idols of Self-Knowledge,” and how illusion pertains to intuitive inadequacy—a
certain blindness in the realm of givenness. He speaks of an “idol” in this case as
intuitive illusion. As we will see, this is only half of the meaning of idol or idolization.
He reprises the theme of idolatry or idolization in another early essay entitled
“Ordo Amoris” where he considers what he calls “the confusion of the ordo amoris,”
or the proper order of preferencing in relation to an objective rank of values. Idol is
referred to in this essay as the absolutization of finite goods, or whenever one’s
loving and preferring of goods contradicts the rank-order of values. In other words,
this is the problem of overvaluation.
Finally, in his book Ressentiment, Scheler explores a specific invective, but
extremely prevalent and possibly inevitable social dynamic which leads to, at least,
value-delusion and, at most, what he calls the falsification of value (value-inversion).
Ressentiment remains arguably Scheler’s most profound investigation into the social
dynamics of disordered valuing. The problem considered in this work focuses
primarily on the pertinent social conditions that explain the devaluation of things. I
will show the ways that devaluation is oftentimes an influential factor for the
subsequent overvaluation of things, or idolization, which, on the conscious level,
leads to ideological thinking.
Again, each of these deal with factors that pertain to the conditioning of
knowledge on the level of intuition, which makes it seems surprising that, in his
sociology of knowledge, he would say that it is “only in the respective selections [that
we see] a product of society,” because he had already written extensively on how
social factors influence and are reflected in our attitudes—the very attitudes by
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which we account for adequate and inadequate intuition. But perhaps it is important
to consider that Scheler says it is in the respective selections that we see not only a
product of society, but also “its perspectives of interests,” because what is selected is
a function of its interests. The particular range of objects for any individual is
susceptible to the influence of prevailing social perspectives, and especially when
these interests are, in part, “defective.”71
The fact of the matter is that, according to the perspectives of interests, we not
only have friends nearby, but enemies. While it’s likely that indifference grows with
the increasing remoteness of things, the people we hate are usually just as close as
the people we love. It is not guaranteed that we will see the value of something just
by means of the thing being close enough to experience it. Sometimes—who knows,
maybe even most of the time—we will not see the value of something we
experience, or worse we take that thing as bearing a negative value. Likewise, it is
possible for entire societies bear a predominant attitude of hatred to things of
higher value and an attitude of esteem to things of lower value. Prevailing social
interests quite literally demarcate an interest-range, according to what a society or
culture esteems as most valuable. This greatly influences individual valuation, not
only with respect to devaluing, but also to overvaluing.
Earlier (in Chapter 4), I referred to a lengthy passage where Scheler refers to the
idea of “metaphysicalization” which he defines as “a mistaken transposition of the
object-realm into the world of ‘absolute meaning.’”72 This is also the way that he
describes the formation of idols. He described how new discoveries in intellectual
71
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and scientific history were succeeded by a period of intense overvaluation:
discoveries of new objects or sets of objects, “whether number, stars, plants,
historical reality, matters of divinity, etc., whose exploration did not pass through a
phase of bias before entering the impartial phase of value-free analysis.”73 I used the
point in part to demonstrate Scheler’s view of the priority of value in our perceptual
and cognitive engagement with the world. And just as, in the domain of being,
Wertsein or the value-being of an object, according to Scheler, has intuitive priority
over Sosein (being-thus) and Dasein (existence), in the domain of intentional act,
loving has priority over thinking and willing.
The perspective of interests is paramount in the conditioning of knowledge
because we encounter the world first and foremost on the level of drive-based
striving and taking-interest. Knowledge, for Scheler, is an ontological participation
of one being with another whose beings are not merged in the process. Love he says
is the “primal act by which a being, without ceasing to be this one delimited being,
abandons itself in order to share and participate in another being as an ens
intentionale.”74 Knowledge, therefore, presupposes this primal act of “abandoning
the self and its conditions, its own ‘contents of consciousness,’ or transcending them,
in order to come into experiential contact with the world as far as possible.”75 What
I have been referring to throughout the work as two distinct preconditions for
knowledge: (1) experiential contact in the execution of intentional acts (Vollzug)
and (2) the moral precondition in acts of loving (Liebe), are now considered as being
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bound up in a single act since the experiential contact, whenever willed and sought
freely, requires and must be accompanied by the act of love. Furthermore, and more
significant for our purposes here: the extent of the participation and experiential
contact (which knowledge requires) directly depends upon the purity of love. In
other words, knowing is more or less adequate according to the degree of moral
adequacy in the act of loving.
Recall also Scheler’s claim that intuitive adequacy is hindered not primarily on a
methodological level, but by an ontological detachment: the separation or seclusion
of the human spirit from being. This separation, he insists, does not rest on
“something inalterable in the constitution of the knowing subject, but only on the
weaknesses and inclinations which we can, in principle, overcome.”76 Pointing to
these moral preconditions of knowing, we see here that this ontological detachment
from being can be guided back into course by means of a loving attitude motivating
participation in being.
The ontological elements of Scheler’s epistemology leave us with a startling
conclusion: knowledge (including intuition) cannot have ideal adequacy without
being accompanied and qualified by perfect loving, in a moral sense of the term. This
means that the kind of experiential contact that we have with our enemies is not the
same kind of participation in relation to the person, as we have with our friends. The
act-unity of love and participation is also an extremely important piece in
assembling a complete picture of a Schelerian conception of ideology as well as a
critique of ideology, but a piece that lacks consideration in his sociology of
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knowledge. While on the one hand, Scheler’s sociology of knowledge sought to
ground the validity of cognition in the adequacy of intuition, we see now that, on the
other hand, the fact that Scheler connects epistemic and ontological features
(intuitive quality with moral quality), ideal intuitive adequacy seems not only less
likely, but nearly impossible. This does not negate the possibility of coming to
genuine insight in a kind of piecemeal fashion, but it does present significant
obstacles to participating (and therefore knowing) things fully.

A. The Order of Values
Scheler begins his essay “Ordo Amoris” with a captivating description:
I find myself in an immeasurably vast world of sensible and spiritual
objects which set my heart and passions in constant motion. In know that the
objects I can recognize through perception and thought, as well as all that I
will, choose, do, perform, and accomplish, depend on the play of this
movement of my heart. It follows that any sort of rightness or falseness and
perversity in my life and activity are determined by whether there is an
objectively correct order of these stirrings of my love and hate, my
inclination and disinclination, my many-sided interest in the things of this
world.77
There are two aspects here worth pointing out: first, that ultimately all human
activity and intentionality are grounded within one’s “stirrings of love and hate.”
Second, that any reference to righteousness and wrongdoing has to depend upon
some kind of measure of validity: an order whose validity is grounded objectively,
beyond one’s own stirrings of love and hate. Scheler calls this the “ordo amoris,” or
elsewhere, the “rank of values.”78 The ordo amoris is an objectively valid rank of
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what is more or less worthy of love. He states that “Loving can be characterized as
correct or false only because a man’s actual inclinations and acts of love can be in
harmony with or oppose the rank-ordering of what is worthy of love.”79
The value of something—that which makes something worthy of love—is
originally given affectively, through various emotional comportments, depending on
the kind of value is given. Values correlate, in their givenness, with respect to a
stratified emotional life, from localized feeling-states to intentional feelings.80
Scheler thinks that all particular values that can possibly be given fall into, or are
related to, one of four categories, or value-modalities.81 From lowest to highest, the
four modalities pertain to the following domains: the sensible, the psychical (vital),
the spiritual, the sacred. The general characteristics of each modality are as follows:
1. Sensible values (agreeable and disagreeable).82 Values in this modality
correlate with sensible feelings, (pleasure and pain). Specifically, pleasure
and pains that are extended and localized with respect to the physical body
(Körper).
connotation that can confuse the idea. Scheler’s main point is that there is a universally
valid domain of values that may initially seem to appear chaotic and unordered. The idea of
a rank of values is analogous to a scale of musical notes or a spectrum of colors.
79 Scheler, “Ordo Amoris,” 111.
80 On the difference between feeling-states (Gefühle) and the intentional feeling-ofsomething (Fühlen), see, Formalism, 253-264.
81 Scheler’s value modalities parallel Kant’s reference and ordered set of various goods:
(1) “agreeableness and disagreeableness” (pertaining to sense) (2) “well-being and woe”
(pertaining to psychological health) (3) “good and evil” (pertaining to the will). Scheler’s
highest value modality, the sacred, parallels Kant’s idea of the “highest good,” or summum
bonum (in a category of its own, even for Kant). Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, in
Practical Philosophy, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996),
188.
82 Values of utility—which are sometimes demarcated as a modality in their own right
by scholars, are in fact considered by Scheler as consecutive of or derived from this
modality, and therefore, are neither higher nor lower.
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2. Psychical or Vital values (noble and ignoble).83 These values correlate with
“vital feelings,” or feelings that represent the quality of vital well-being of the
lived-body (fatigue and vigor, health and illness) and psyche (gladness and
sadness, anxiety and courage).
3. Spiritual values (aesthetic: beautiful and ugly; moral: right and wrong; and
intellectual: knowledge and ignorance). These values correlate with
intentional or spiritual feelings, namely, emotional comportment that is in
regard to an object, such as, loving and hating, preferring and subordinating,
hoping, kindness, generosity, sympathy, etc. Cultural values are consecutive
of this modality.
4. Sacred/Profane (values of the holy and unholy, given in objects considered
as absolute). These values correlate with the feelings of bliss and despair
indicative of the nearness or remoteness of the divine in experience.
However, this sphere of values is given specifically in the love of the person
(person being that which is of absolute value).
Before considering the factors at play in falling into confusions of this value
order, it is important to see some of the ways Scheler justifies the idea of a value
order, and the particular order he gives. I will refer to two sources of evidence, the
It may be difficult to see immediately why “noble” (Edlen) and “ignoble” (Gemeinen)
are chosen to represent vital values. Scheler has in mind racial or blood distinctions that
have become largely obsolete these days. Literally, Gemeinen means “common,” which is an
indication that Scheler refers to “nobility” (“noble birth rite”) as opposed to a “commoner.”
However, in a footnote Scheler also seems to indicate that he does not wish to be
controversial because he thinks we just as well use “noble” to describe things like horses
and trees when they are dignified (Formalism, 106, n. 82.). However, there’s still something
amiss, because the term noble refers more these days to actions or deeds, rather than one’s
heredity or a condition of one’s life.
83

306

first is phenomenological, the second is logical (inferential).84 First of all, it is
important to point out that ordering things with respect to their importance is
something human beings cannot avoid. All people are constantly preferring some
things to others things: we are always in the midst of preferring this or that, and
ordering things on a continuum of higher or lower. We might, for example, consider
the amount of time we want to dedicate to certain things in the course of our day.
The question is whether this preferring (Vorziehen) or subordinating (Nachsetzen)
is empty of normativity or whether it is indicative of a standard of validity beyond
our own preferring: that is to say, whether it is inappropriate to prefer some things
or subordinate others. It might seem that since there is vast difference in the things
that people are ordering as higher or lower, it does not indicate a normative
dimension, however, phenomenologically it is possible to glean a normative
dimension to this process more than initially presents itself.
Despite the difference in the kinds of things we prefer to include in each of the
value categories, upon a closer inspection we notice the four modalities that Scheler
identifies remain in the same order. For example, different religions or religious
views may disagree about what it is that bears a sacred value (divine). Perhaps the
highest value belongs to an idea or logical category (e.g., “pure act,” or “that-whichnothing-greater-can-be-thought”); a personal being who is said to be revealed or is
considered divine, whether the person is also human or not (e.g., Yahweh, Jesus,
Allah, an Egyptian Pharaoh, Buddah, etc.); a part of nature (e.g, the sun: “Aten,” holy
ground: “Mount Olympus,” a terrifying thunderstorm, etc.); and finally something
There is a theological argument that Scheler provides in “Ordo Amoris” that I will
forego here.
84
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artificial (e.g., Golden Calf). Whatever specific object an individual or group prefers
to include in the position of the Holy and as bearing that value, does not, in any of
those very different instances, change the fact that the value-position of the holy or
divine is the supreme value-position. All religious belief agrees that holiness is
highest, irrespective of the different factual things or persons that are the objects of
belief, considered to bear that value.
Likewise, the value of sensible pleasure is always given as lower than the value
of life. It would be absurd to sacrifice one’s very life for greater pleasure—a pleasure
that consequently could not be enjoyed. Among all the different kinds of things one
could consider painful or pleasurable, one does not prefer some physical pain
(sensible value) over the loss of life or over diminished health. Even severely injured
patients who would prefer to die rather than continue in the pain of staying alive
usually do not prefer death merely on account of the pain. It is because their injury
is given as a loss of their life. Actual physical death is not seen, therefore, as any
lower in value than the event that has already taken place. Furthermore, we might
intuitively consider it degrading when, that which is of a higher spiritual or cultural
value, such as a human being or even one’s civic or cultural identity, are put up for
sale.85 Human trafficking is reprehensible because it treats that which is inherently
of higher value (spiritual value) as a value of utility (sensible value).
Although buying and selling people should not be done, it could still actually be
done. There are some things, however, that could never be bought and sold as a

Michael Sandel’s book What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets, explores
the corrupting effect markets have on society when they influence wide scale devaluation of
things that ought to be valued more highly.
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piece of property: one could pay someone to act like a friend but she could never
purchase their friendship (or their enmity); one could hire someone to act like a
spouse, but he could never buy the love of a wife. One could pay someone to perform
a good action, but she can never purchase virtue or a good moral character (nor a
vicious one); one could hire a tutor, or pay a college to issue a diploma at the
completion of a course of study, but he can never, strictly speaking, buy knowledge
(nor ignorance). The irreducibility of these kinds of goods not only show that the
goods themselves are irreducible to lower values, but that they are because the
spiritual values they bear are irreducible.
It is, however, possible for one to love a new car more than the love of his
spouse, for example. It is possible to value all sorts of material goods above personal
love, virtue, or knowledge, but the latter are nevertheless more worthy of love—not
because of their being (as was traditionally thought) but because of their value.86
We can sometimes value things incorrectly—and we do not usually need a
philosophical theory to identify this; usually a candid discussion with the people
whose relationships we are valuing below material things will be revelatory enough.
It seems noble and heroic to sacrifice material possessions, pleasures, and useful
things for the sake of other people or even for the sake of one’s own moral or
spiritual well-being. However, it seems proportionately abhorrent to sacrifice those
things for the sake of material goods, even if they are necessary goods.
Being and value have, for Scheler, a phenomenological independence that traditional
metaphysics does not allow. All things bear some kind of positive or negative value, but
existence as such is value-neutral. This is because Scheler thinks that one kind of thing can
genuinely bear different kinds of values at different times or in different places, without
contradicting the value-rank. The value of something is not always written into the nature of
a thing.
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These phenomenological considerations relate to an inferential argument
regarding the relation between higher and lower value modalities. Scheler writes
that “one can easily imagine vital values without pleasure, but [imagining pleasure
without vital values] is impossible. … The value of both [the vital and the sensible] is
itself determined by their capacity or incapacity of strengthening vital values.
Therefore a pleasurable thing that obstructs life is bad,”87 i.e., of negative value. By
way of inference, it is possible to apply this relation to the rest of the rank:
1. Spiritual values strengthen values of the holy, so spiritual things that
obstruct holiness are of negative value (e.g., wrongdoing, ignorance, etc.).88
2. Vital values strengthen spiritual values, so things pertaining to our vitality
that obstruct spirituality are of negative value (e.g., depression, anxiety,
illness, etc.).
3. Sensible values strengthen vital values, so pleasure that obstructs vital health
is of negative value (e.g., too much candy, deserts, or other unhealthy food).89

Scheler, Ressentiment, 107. Scheler gives a similar argument in the Formalism, which
states that lower values are always “founded” on higher values (Formalism, 94-6). This
argument about value-foundations justifies my application of the Ressentiment passage to
the rest of the scale, but I prefer the way Scheler states the mode of foundation in
Ressentiment because it says more about the character of each value modality.
88 A person is a better person the more they share in the essence of the divine, or
Urwesen (primal essence; ground of being). For Scheler, the Urwesen is most characterized
by love, so one shares in the essence of the divine the more genuinely one loves (Cf. “The
Nature of Philosophy,” 75). Scheler says that “the highest thing of which a human being is
capable is to love things as much as possible as God loves them” (“Ordo Amoris,” 99).
89 It is fitting to make a distinction between something of lower value specifically
obstructing the realization of a higher value and something pleasurable that merely does not
contribute to the realization of a higher value. Certain deserts that have no nutritional value,
enjoyed in moderation, cannot be of negative value because they offer pleasure without
other harmful side effects. However, too much of such foods can end up causing greater pain
(pertaining to health problems, or stomach aches) than the pleasure that they cause. What
constitutes too much, however, is ultimately, as Aristotle puts it, “relative to us.”
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4. “Useful” things that obstruct pleasure and agreeableness are of negative
value (useless). “Nothing can meaningfully be called ‘useful’ except as a
means to pleasure.”90

B. Falsifying the Order of Values
Recall Scheler’s admission that “any sort of rightness or falseness and perversity
in my life and activity are determined by whether there is an objectively correct
order of these stirrings of my love and hate.” We have considered the order, but
what about the falsification, confusion, or inversion of values? The falsification of
values is an effect of that from which all value inversions begin: the feeling of
ressentiment. The phenomenon of ressentiment refers to a situation of angst and
Scheler, Ressentiment, 108. It has unfortunately become a common interpretation of
Scheler’s value rank that values of utility occupy a higher position than sensible values. This
view is not only mistaken, but, according to Scheler himself, an absurdity: “It is true that
enjoyment can and should be subordinated to higher values…. But subordinating it [i.e.,
enjoyment, pleasure] to utility is an absurdity, for this is a subordination of the end to the
means” (108). He continues in saying that “it has become a rule of modern morality that
useful work is better than the enjoyment of pleasure” (108). Scheler’s value rank is thereby
interpreted by some as consistent with the very rule of morality that Scheler specifically
rejects. It should be mentioned that when Manfred Frings suggested that use-values have an
independence from, and a position higher than, sensible values, he implied that this
interpretation is a departure from Scheler’s own view, or at least from what Scheler
explicitly articulates (Frings, The Mind of Max Scheler, 28-9). However, Zachary Davis’ recent
entry “Max Scheler,” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy lists the values in the way
Frings does (“pleasure, utility, vitality, culture, and holiness”) as if this ranking is
unproblematic (Davis, Zachary and Anthony Steinbock, "Max Scheler", The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)). One point that
supports Frings’ and Davis’ view is Scheler’s ranking of the personality of the “leader of
civilization” (which allegedly corresponds with the value of efficiency and utility) above the
“bon vivant” (which allegedly corresponds with the pleasure values) (Formalism, 583ff.).
The way Scheler ranks model persons could be an indication that he has changed his view
about the value-relation of utility and pleasure since writing Ressentiment. While this is
intriguing, Scheler does not mention in this section any alteration in the way he ranks the
value-modalities, specifically, and so this inference, which is to serve as sole evidence,
cannot be conclusive. There is still little reason why we should make some assumptions by
inference to trump what Scheler actually says—very clearly and forcefully—about the
value-relation between utility and pleasure.
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emotional repression that is caused by the social dynamic where an experience of
envy or an impulse for revenge is coupled with an experience of weakness or
impotence to act upon the inclination, leaving the impulse unfulfilled. This plays out
in all sorts of ways that represent the common paradigm of someone growing in
disdain for something one cannot have or obtain, because one cannot obtain it. This
is played out constantly among children who typically want to play with a toy with
which another is playing. When the struggle ends with an adult issuing the toy to the
one, perhaps, “who had it first,” the other child commonly dismisses the value of the
toy: “I don’t want to play with your stupid toy anyway.”91 To be sure, this scenario
plays out among adults in perhaps more vicious ways.
The envious or vengeful, however, will not be plagued by ressentiment when
those feelings are able to achieve expression, either in relation to their proper
objects or some other outlet of energy (e.g., “venting” or forgiveness). Scheler states
that “Ressentiment can only arise if these emotions are particularly powerful and yet
must be suppressed because they are coupled with the feeling that one is unable to
act them out—either because of weakness, physical or mental, or because of fear.”92
Ressentiment creates a new impulse to detract that which is causing the
ressentiment, leading one to see the object in terms of those negative feelings

The “bully” in these scenarios who tends to be able to take things from peers and get
away with it usually does so as a coping mechanism, carried over from his own ressentiment
in a different context. Scheler supports this in his claim that those who hate are those
who’ve been the recipient of hatred (or simply an absence of answering or responding to
their acts of love, i.e., unfulfilled). Those who love are those who have been loved (or who’ve
had their acts of love answered, i.e., fulfilled). This is a fundamental insight for his theory of
co-responsibility and theory of solidarity: “the occurrence of wickedness always has a
communal basis” (Nature of Sympathy, 164-5).
92 Scheler, Ressentiment, 26-7.
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leading to a devaluation of the object. The situation of envy is particularly poignant
because in this case, the object is originally desirable and seen to be of great value,
but when one experiences an inability to attain the object desired, there is an effort
to convince oneself that the object is not in fact something of value; the thing is
devalued, and the one devaluing takes on an attitude of value-delusion with respect
to all things of that type. If the case is constant enough, the givenness of valuable
things as of negative value may functionalize into a way of cognizing the thing in
question. For example, even a single (but extremely painful) case of unrequited love
may lead one to detract or devalue “all men” or “all women,” whatever the case may
be. This may last until some some kind of recompense or genuine forgiveness is
achieved. Scheler explains,
“To relieve the tension, the common man seeks a feeling of superiority of
equality, and he attains his purpose by an illusory devaluation of the other man’s
qualities or by a specific ‘blindness’ to these qualities. But secondly—and here lies
the main achievement of ressentiment—he falsifies the values themselves which
could bestow excellence on any possible objects of comparison.”93 The falsification
of values is different in kind from simply devaluing of things. To use Scheler’s
example, the fox who could not, with all his might, obtain the grapes, devalues the
grapes, comforting itself with the fact that they “are not really savory; indeed they
may be ‘sour’.”94
Idolization is a result of delusion, namely, the absolutizing of certain goods that
are opposed to the good that one could not obtain—the devaluation has a
93
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Scheler, Ressentiment, 34.
Scheler, Ressentiment, 46.
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concomitant valuation of opposite things. Scheler calls “a good absolutized through
delusion a (formal) idol.”95 He also uses the term infatuation “to designate the most
general form of the destruction and confusion of ordo amoris….”96 There is a
difference, though, between absolute and relative infatuation. The absolute sort is
when one takes a finite good to be something of absolute value (holiness). Relative
infatuation pertains to when one’s order of preferencing “transgresses against the
objective rank-ordering of what is worthy of love.”97 Each type of infatuation
manifests a certain degree of idolatry, but only the first is idolatry in the strict sense.
The most important point, however, is the way idolatry (overvaluation) is
concomitant with ressentiment (devaluation). The things we turn into idols are a
result of the value delusions that arise with respect the things we originally take to
be of value but cannot obtain for whatever reason. I consider the process of
idolization to be the intuitive beginnings of what becomes, on the conscious level,
full-fledged ideology.
The fox and the grapes scenario of devaluing is not yet on the level of the
falsification of values. It is a value-delusion, but not yet a value-inversion. “The fox
does not say that sweetness is bad, but that the grapes our sour.”98 A delusion
pertains to whether or not a certain good bears a value of a certain height;
falsification pertains to rejecting the height of the values themselves. Consider again
the differences among that which different religions consider holy or bearing an
absolute value. In the case of a disillusionment with one’s particular religious
Scheler, “Ordo Amoris,” 115.
Scheler, “Ordo Amoris,” 114.
97 Scheler, “Ordo Amoris,” 115.
98 Scheler, Ressentiment, 46.
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beliefs, it is possible to devalue the particular objects of belief with respect to what
he or she used to consider holy (and unholy), and substitute old religious beliefs for
new ones. In this case, the position of holiness is still considered the highest
position—there may be a delusion here, but no falsification. Suppose, on the other
hand, one becomes disillusioned with religion as such and rejects holiness to be of
value. This would be an example of the falsification of value.99
According to Scheler, industrial capitalism is an example not only valuedelusional, but is inverts the value scale by subordinating the higher value of life to
the lower value of utility. Scheler considers the kind of valuation that is the ruling
ethos of industrialism: “the exaltation of utility values and instrumental values over
vital and organic values.”100 The practice of slavery, for example, may have been
abolished and previous slaves emancipated, but this does not mean that seeing
people primarily as objects to put to use has changed. Social changes may not
indicate a change in the mindset and valuation. Abolition may not indicate any
alteration in the cultural ethos and worldview that once supported the structural
oppression of African Americans. It simply means that certain factual mechanisms of
society have changed. Devaluing organs as tools,101 people as workers, may still
prevail in more subtle and socially acceptable ways.
It is important to point out that, for Scheler, these falsifications (which, I argue,
It is worth mentioning that, at least in the case of the holy, its falsification is
impossible. Since we are always preferring and subordinating things to be of higher and
lower value, we will invariably take something to be of highest value. That which we take to
be of highest value will invariably occupy the position of the holy, whether we consider it to
be or not. “Every finite spirit believes either in God or in idols.” See, Scheler, On the Eternal
in Man, 267ff.
100 Scheler, Ressentiment, 116.
101 About viewing organs as tools, see Scheler, Ressentiment, 120-5.
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on the conscious level constitute ideology in the fullest sense) are not formed in
consciousness, as a reaction to certain concepts or theories, “but at the same stage of
mental process as the impressions and value feelings themselves: on the road of
experience into consciousness.”102 That is to say, value judgments are based upon,
and are an outgrowth of, a more original (unconscious) falsification in the sphere of
value givenness. Indeed, the point that I am stressing is that this original falsification
resides on the intuitive level. Falsification of values, as the “accomplishment” of
ressentiment, seeps in with our intuitions, their effects become “fixed attitudes,
detached from all determinate objects.”103 Scheler continues that the ressentiment
attitude “even plays a role in the formation of perceptions, expectations, and
memories. It automatically selects those aspects of experience which can justify the
factual application of this pattern of feeling.”104 Ressentiment influences the social
perspective of interests, on the level of what we select in terms of its value, whereby
a specific ruling ethos or dominant morality conditions the ethos (or order of
preferring) of all individuals in that society. What one selects and by what value one
selects it, is what one comes to know and the way one knows it. The falsification of
values leads to the falsification of worldview, and indeed, to “false consciousness”—
ideology.
A discrepancy between Marx’s and Scheler’s views of ideology is that Marx
attributed ideology to the upper classes, while the lower classes had a more healthy
dose of realism that prevented divorcing ideas from material conditions. Scheler’s

Scheler, Ressentiment, 49.
Scheler, Ressentiment, 46.
104 Scheler, Ressentiment, 47.
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view of ressentiment, as a condition for ideology, pertains more in situations of
oppression and is therefore, “the attitude of the weaker party.”105 A more important
question than whose view is correct, is how Scheler can account for ideologies
forming among the more dominant class if ressentiment is conditional in ideologies
forming, and since dominant classes usually do not suffer from involuntary
repression or feelings of impotence. Even if, for Scheler, Marxism is itself an
ideology insofar as it represents both a certain class attitude and a specific pattern
of valuation, is it the case that upper class attitudes are free from ressentiment, and
therefore free from ideology? Putting the discussion in a Marxist context of class
struggle, we should see that the bourgeoisie were not always the dominant class;
they were once, in most Eurpoean countries, consigned to the status of peasantry
since they were neither nobility nor clergy. What was once an oppressed group later
became dominant, as a result of the 19th century liberal revolutions throughout
Europe. The working class struggles and labor movements were likely to succumb
to even greater bitterness and resentment since the status afforded to the
bourgeoisie from revolutionary success was not also afforded to the proletariat.
The prevailing valuation and worldview that arose as a result of the century-long
disintegration of the social privilege of heredity and the new mobility of the middle
class by business wealth is not necessarily free of ressentiment. Rather, it represents
a positive value-framework that was born out of ressentiment in an earlier period,
characterized by their previous oppression. Therefore, the specific bourgeois valueframework takes on a unique ideological character arising from its reactions to the
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worldview of the ancién regime. Scheler writes “all seemingly positive valuations
and judgments of ressentiment are hidden devaluations and negations.”106 Indeed,
ressentiment forces us to “go so far as to extol another object which is somehow
opposed to the first.”107 The prevailing ethos of a new dominant class is
characterized by a reaction against the older and oppressive pattern of valuation.
Once the attitudes of the previously weaker class are liberated from their social
restrictions and impotence, there is an extension of the influence of these values
well beyond the time and place, people and situations, from which they arose.
Scheler remarks that
When a reversal of values comes to dominate accepted morality and is
invested with the power of the ruling ethos, it is transmitted by tradition,
suggestion, and education to those who are endowed with the seemingly
devaluated qualities. They are struck with a ‘bad conscience’ and secretly
condemn themselves. The ‘slaves,’ as Nietzsche says, infect the ‘masters.’
Ressentiment man, on the other hand, now feels ‘good,’ ‘pure,’ and ‘human’—
at least in the conscious layers of his mind. He is delivered from hatred, from
the tormenting desire of an impossible revenge, though deep down his
poisoned sense of life and the true values may still shine through the illusory
ones.108
All devaluation that occurs in a ressentiment situation may constitute an ideology
for a certain individual or small group, but it is by no means something contagious
throughout all society. Some change in the social status of such individuals or
groups has to take place for their pattern of valuation to become influential for
forming the mentality and attitudes of society as a whole, or at least of a large
portion of society. The prevailing status of ideology is important because it suggests
the culminating moment in Scheler’s view of the social conditioning of knowing:
Scheler, Ressentiment, 41.
Scheler, Ressentiment, 46.
108 Scheler, Ressentiment, 48-9.
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107
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individual attitudes reflect or mirror social attitudes. We are influenced cognitively,
first and foremost, by the patterns of valuation prevalent in our own society.
Adorno’s idea of Selbstbesinnung (self-awareness) rings true here, but it is
considerably modified. Adorno’s idea urges awareness of the way our concepts
contain a history—the way they are historically dependent and therefore reflect the
socio-historical reality from which they arise. Scheler introduces a worthwhile
addendum to this idea: just as our concepts, according to Adorno, have a history and
reflect society, so do our attitudes and our patterns of valuation. The issue does not
pertain primarily to the content of our concepts or conceptual frameworks, but
more originally to our attitudes and value-frameworks—to the ethos or order of
preferencing of one’s specific socio-historical reality.
There are therefore two forms of self-reflection. Critical theory suggests an
exclusively conceptual form of reflection while Scheler suggests a conceptual
reflection to be rooted in a deeper attitudinal form of reflection. I suggest that a
more profound critique of society can be achieved by means of a reflection on our
attitudes and value-orientations than that which can be achieved by means of a
reflection upon our concepts. Self-reflection has to be more than about the way we
think, it has to be more originally about the way we are oriented and attuned to the
world. Instrumental rationality is itself a reflection of the way society values things.
Critical rationality can counter this trend by bringing out a better way of valuing by
opposing the current valuations of society. However, if a critical theory can be more
than about the content of our concepts, and if it can include the value dimension, I
argue that it has to be able to incorporate phenomenology, or if not phenomenology,
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then at least an adequate conception of intuition that can accommodate the intuition
of value. I do not know of a better articulated theory of intuition that contains
feature of value-givenness so prominently than Scheler’s phenomenology does.

The Critique of Ideology
The way I see phenomenology incorporating a critical function, or having a
capacity for the critique of ideology, pertains significantly to the function of
intuition. Indeed, it pertains to the issue of nonconceptuality with which I framed
the discussion from the start, in the introduction. Adorno and Scheler both
acknowledge some discrepancy between the formal content of a concept and the
material content of experience. For Adorno, this plays out ultimately in a
discrepancy of purity. Concepts present material circumstances abstractly, but we
also know this conceptual purity is not the way things are. A pure concept
propagated as capable of capturing reality is ideological. There is a dimension of
nonconceptuality that harnesses, in contrast, individuality, materiality, particularity
“things which ever since Plato used to be dismissed as transitory and insignificant,
and which Hegel labeled ‘lazy Existenz’.”109 Concepts in and of themselves present
the world as an unantagonistic entirety. They do not themselves contain a dialectic
that is true to history; rather they give the illusion of identity. Critical theory insists
that we critique these concepts insofar as the identity they present is illusory—and
that there is always more to the particular object—the “material moment”—than
what the concept expresses.
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The phrase “material moment” is fitting not only for Marxist and neo-Marxist
materialistic theories, but also for Scheler’s phenomenology. Scheler’s
phenomenology is, indeed, a kind of materialism, but material in the sense of the
non-formal—not in the sense of an exclusion of the a priori. However, if a priori
meant a strict abandonment of experience, Scheler would also be forced to abandon
the a priori. But there is a material a priori that is given in (non-empirical) livedexperience. This is the domain of intuition. Since Adorno rejects the critical
significance of intuition (as consistent with the domain of nonconceptuality) he is
forced to make his critique of concepts by means of an epistemic assumption: that
all concepts, as concepts, necessarily represent the object inadequately, and it is by
this assumption that the critique plays out. As a result, all philosophy is capable of is
critique: there is no possibility of insight or nonconceptual intuition of the
individual as individual to advance a positive thesis or present a reliable alternative
to that which one is critiquing.
On the other hand, the nonconceptual domain for Scheler is not just an empty
point of departure for critique, but it is a domain that is full: full of content (as
opposed to form), full of insight. Concepts can be criticized by means of actual
intuitive content—“data” that is consistent with and given right within actual
material, historical, and social circumstances. The main thrust of this work is to
show how Scheler’s theory of intuition able to incorporate non-formal elements,
nonconceptually: individuality (essence), history, reality, and society. This has been
groundwork for a critique of ideology. However, from here is it not difficult to see at
least an outline of how a phenomenological critique of ideology is accomplished.
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There are these three basic features of a phenomenological critique of ideology:
1. A critique of ideology is ultimately a value critique of society by criticizing
the ways that social organization institutionalizes value-delusions and/or
value-inversions.110 One must be able to see the way certain social practices
manifest a fundamental improper order of preferencing (the ethos, or
“heart,” of society is disordered) and to see, within the structure of society,
where that which is of higher value is threatened by the elevation of that
which is of lower value.
2. In order to see the way the heart of society is disordered, one has to become
self-aware of the ways one’s own heart is disordered, and see the way one’s
own attitude is a reflection of the wider attitude or ethos of society. Each has
to become aware of the way our individual preferencing is a reflection of
prevailing social attitudes and values and the prevailing social perspective of
interests. Ideology critique is to disclose the improper valuations of society
by a reflection upon one’s own ordo amoris.
3. In order to see the disorder of the prevailing social attitudes and valuation,
one has to be attuned to the discrepancy between one’s own intuitions and
the conceptual framework that has solidified perverse or delusional
valuations, by being ingrained within cultural traditions.

Social agency is not simply an aggregate of all individual agents within society,
because not all individuals in a society influence social conceptions and prejudices equally.
Scheler would point to the leaders of a society as those who predominantly institutionalize
ways of thinking, but it is more complicated than that in our society. Insofar as the dictum
“money is speech” holds good, social agency is led primarily (but not exclusively) by those
most wealthy.
110
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The third point requires the most explanation since it is most particular to my
argument and since it is the one that makes the other two possible. The question
that has to be answered in order to see the plausibility of the third point is the
following: how is it that the value order that an individual can intuit (more or less
correctly) be different from the prevailing social valuation, since, as was just
mentioned, individual attitudes reflect social ones.
On the one hand, ideologies are valuations and prejudices consciously justified—
they are functionalized idols. As ideologies, they reside ultimately on the level of
concepts and ideas that dictate and express something about the society,
specifically, a certain social order of preferencing. This order of preferencing is
sustained intergenerationally by means of passing on ideas through education,
practice, and tradition. On the other hand, as idolizations, they pertain to a specific
historical situation, one in which the leaders of a new society may have been
oppressed in an older one. When the “slaves” become “master,” their previous
devaluations as slaves influence what becomes the predominant positive valuations
(the value emphasized) as masters. The valuations that become ideologies in the
new society really only make sense in the older one, within the ressentiment
situation. By way of example, an emphasis on the value of frugality in a later society
or generation of that same society can be a reaction against the extravagance of a
older one (e.g., the dissolution from Timocracy to Oligarchy in Plato’s Republic.)
Democracy may be valued now not only in and of itself, but as a reaction against
authoritarian absolutism. No doubt atheism or protestant Christianity were in part
subsequent reactions to the disgust people had for Catholic practices in the late
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Middle Ages. A certain historical dialectic is noticeable, here, but not in terms
opposition among ideas (theses or anitheses), nor in terms of opposition among
production relations, but most originally in terms of opposition among patterns of
valuation (devaluations and overvaluations).
Although a dialectical pattern is noticeable, Scheler will emphatically reject the
notion that proper valuation (a coherent ordo amoris) is some kind of historical
accomplishment to the tension between opposing valuations. This is because it is
perfectly possible for valuations to become more disordered as history advances, and
also because it is perfectly possible for certain individuals to value things correctly
even when the society in which they live represents a particular value disorder. This
can happen first and foremost insofar as later generations of individuals are
removed from the conditions of ressentiment that influenced certain valuations, and
the justification of a certain framework of ideas (ideologies). Overtime, people living
in a society characteristic of a certain ethos, gain distance from the circumstances
from which those patterns of valuation arose in the first place. In such cases, the
ideology affects members of that society on a theoretical level, but being removed
from the situation, they have a greater capacity for a less tainted and less prejudicial
set of intuition.111
There are two reasons that explain the possibility that distancing oneself

Scheler does not speak of being removed from historical situations in this way, but
he does provide a way of considering the different ways being removed. The most
important way of have distance and being removed is intentionally. This means being
removed from the attitudes (Einstellung) prevalent at the time. Being removed temporally is
significant only insofar as the passage of time allows for greater objectification and
intentional removal from a social situation and the prevalent attitudes of the players in the
situation.
111
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diminishes the effects of ressentiment and ideological thinking. The first pertains to
Scheler’s insistence on the independence of intuitions and concepts. One of the most
important moves I made in the argument of this chapter is that social factors do not
condition the content of knowledge in the same way as the forms of thinking
because of the independence of the validity of intuition from the status of cognitive
forms. Intuition does not derive meaning from concepts, rather concepts derive
meaning from intuition. It is therefore possible to inherit a certain set of ideas,
concepts, and practices from our social circumstances, that remain on a conceptual
level, while also remaining independent enough (on an intuitive level) to have
intuitions that contradict the ideologies of society insofar as one is free from the
same ressentiment that conditioned the value-preferencing in the first place.
Distance implies freedom from ressentiment attitudes insofar as one is intentionally
liberated from them. By paying attention to the way our own value-givenness
contradicts and conflicts with the prevailing ethos, a member of a society is able to
critique the prevailing ethos. It is in paying attention to one’s value-givenness that
provides an area of leverage for social criticism.
Even if the independence of intuition from conceptual content may be true, it
only becomes significant if it is also true that ideologies only affect members of
society conceptually, and not intuitively. Indeed, another argument I make in the
chapter is that ideology refers to a falsification on the intuitive level. My additional
caveat is that ideologies form on an intuitive level only for those in a certain
experiential context, in a situation of ressentiment. When certain ideological
patterns of valuation gets handed down to others removed from that experiential
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context, one’s intuitions may in fact contradict the ideas taught to him or her in
school. Consider Scheler’s sociological suggestion, mentioned above, that a growing
capacity to objectify the experiences of one’s environment conditions the ability to
detach from them. Interestingly, he refers to the significance of remembering or
recollecting for gaining objectification and detachment when one has new
experiences—and therefore different intuitions—beyond one’s “original communal
threshold.” Scheler adds that “once [one] has begun to lay hold of experiences of
[one’s] own…he [or she] can call upon such ideas in order to make sense of [one’s]
environment, because that is just where they [i.e., the ideas] have come from in the
first place.”112 At that point, one is compelled to consider communal ideas of one’s
youth, and the ressentiment they carry, as “something acquired from without.”113 I
also mentioned above how this natural pattern of development goes hand and hand
with a growing self-awareness of the character of one’s community and therefore
the character of one’s previous experience. It provides additional leverage for a
critique of ideology.
Therefore the first condition for the possibility of one’s own experience and
valuations be inconsistent with the prevailing social attitudes is on the condition of
being removed from previous historical conditions that led to those social
valuations which provides the opportunity to objectify the prevailing attitudes of
the society. The first condition is detachment.
However, this isn’t enough, because one could have this detachment and still
value things in the way the society at large endorses. It is possible that one may
112
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never objectify social experiences enough to notice the ways that the prevailing
social ethos is disordered and threatens the realization of higher values. In my
estimation, this would be a Schelerian (value) rendition of Heidegger’s description
of inauthenticity and “falling-prey” to Das Man. As was mentioned, proper valuation
is not an accomplishment of a determinate historical and dialectical process, nor is it
growing in anticipatory resoluteness, it is the condition for each of those: cultivating
a morally qualitative change in one’s attitude and character (gesinnung) in and
through acts of loving. The second condition that guarantees independence of one’s
personal intuitions from the prevailing social ethos is love.
The adequacy of our value-givenness grows in love and is diminished in hatred.
If it is in a more adequate (less prejudicial) value-givenness that allows for greater
social opposition, then it is in cultivating an attitude of love that gives us greater
capacity to critique society insofar as this critique is a value critique. It allows us to
see more clearly when social policy is threatening the realization of higher value.
Ressentiment is not itself hatred, and therefore only “overcasts” or covers
(überdeckt) value intuition,114 but it can lead to hatred, which is the narrowing of
one’s ability to see values of higher types, and hinders loved-based preferring which
properly orders values given. Certainly Socrates did not criticize Athenians because
he hated them, nor because he hated Athens. It was his love of Athens that motivated
his criticism of it, and his love of Athens that made him see its value all the more.
The third condition that guarantees the independence of intuition from ideology
is that which love brings about, but which is the opposite from the first condition:
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participation. On the one hand, recall that Scheler calls love not only the act that
discloses higher values, but also the act whereby one abandons oneself “in order to
share and participate in another being.” This participation is required for adequate
knowing. Indeed, knowing is participation, as an ontological relation. On the other
hand, this participation is in a different sense than the detachment that was
mentioned above. Detachment refers to a temporal removal from a certain historical
context of experience that laid the path to the ethos of a society or community.
Participation, on the other hand, refers to intentionality rather than temporality. It
suggests that the one who is in a position to be engaged in social conflict is the one
not only who can understand the conflict on an intellectual level, but who can see
the values threatened in the conflict on an intuitive level. Academics can cognitively
understand conflicts from their proverbial Ivory Tower, or from a perspective in the
future looking into the past (by studying conflicts historical). However, one cannot
participate in those conflicts, and so are entirely incapable of knowing the situation
in the most intimate sense: intuitively. One cannot be given the values and valuecomplex at work in this situation. The means that the person in the best position to
critique social organization is the one who can best see the falsification of higher
values for lower ones, positive values for negative ones. This person would seem to
possess the following three characteristics.
(1) This person must have a position in society which would put him or her
within proximity to heavy social conflict and oppression. Not necessarily to
be an oppressed minority, but to be near them and with them (in solidarity).
Someone in a leadership position may hear of much social turmoil, but may
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also rarely witness it.
(2) This person must possess an attitude of love. He or she must be removed
from ressentiment and have overcome ideology. This person can love the
oppressed without hating the oppressor. Not hating the oppressor does not
mean a lack of resolve for action required to change society. “Love forbids
class hatred, but not an honest class struggle.”115 However, though social
change is important, this person sees that what is more fundamentally
required is a change of hearts and cultivating an attitude of love in society, by
being a model of love.
(3) This person must be able to have a vision of the whole scale of values.
Though there is authentic humanitarianism, it is important for Scheler that
humanitarianism not be employed as a polemic against religion, but
consistent with it.116 Humanitarianism must not itself be motivated by
ressentiment (one must not make an idol out of material welfare). Therefore,
it requires religious experience, and the givenness of the value of the Holy.
This person must see that the genuine transformation of society does not
mean only structural transformation of material conditions, but means also
an edification of spirit in person and culture as well as the realization of the
divine in the world.
A “rationally organized society” or emancipation from ideology would be for
Scheler, among other things, a society geared toward the prevention of ressentiment,
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at least on a collective scale. All sorts of private ressentiment are unavoidable
(sibling rivalry, ostricization from group of friends, etc.). However, “Ressentiment
must therefore be strongest in a society like ours, where approximately equal rights
or formal social equality, publicly recognized, go hand in hand with wide factual
inequality in power, property, and education.”117 This issue most likely pertains to
our society far more than it did to Scheler’s.
But, nothing dispels ideology more than love. I emphasize this to make a point
against the way critical theory is customarily conceived and practiced. It tends to fall
prey to its own kind of ressentiment out of which Scheler calls “ressentiment
criticism.” Not all critical theory is criticism of this kind, but it is the problem that
critical theory is most susceptible. Scheler states that ressentiment criticism is
“indiscriminate criticism without any positive aims.”118 He continues: “a secret
ressentiment underlies every way of thinking which attributes creative power to
mere negation and criticism.”119 This infection of thinking can go so far “that
improvements in [social] conditions criticized cause no satisfaction—they merely
cause discontent, for they destroy the growing pleasure afforded by invective and
negation.”120 Or again, this attitude that accompanies thought “does not seriously
desire that its demands be fulfilled. It does not want to cure the evil: the evil is
merely a pretext for the criticism.”121
This is an attitudinal problem that may accompany negative dialectics, but
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Scheler stresses also a concomitant issue with epistemological commitments of the
dialectical method itself. He finds it problematic that the object is no longer the
standard of adequacy in thought. He writes: “I am referring to the view that the
‘true’ and the ‘given’ is not that which is self-evident [i.e., given with self-evidence,
or self-given], but rather that which is ‘indubitable’ or ‘inconstestable,’ which can be
maintained against doubt and criticism.”122 Scheler is suggesting harnessing the
epistemic significance of intuition frees one from a ressentiment mentality. He
makes the point even clearer as follows: “Whenever convictions are not arrived at
by direct [i.e., immediate] contact with the world and the objects themselves, but
indirectly through a critique of the opinions of others, the processes of thinking are
impregnated with ressentiment.”123 Notice, however, that Scheler is not dismissing
the importance of critique, for “Genuine and fruitful criticism judges all opinions
with reference to the object itself. Ressentiment criticism, on the contrary, accepts
no object that has not stood the test of criticism.”124
It is safe to say that this work as a whole aims at a defense of Scheler’s theory of
intuition, the elements of intuition and their relation, as well as the relation between
intuition and cognition. I have in mind that Scheler’s phenomenology and sociology
of knowledge are neither a kind of idealism, nor a kind of irrationalism, but draws
upon moderate elements of each (intentional consciousness and ecstatic [i.e.,
preconscious] and pre-conceptual intuition). In large part, I have done so by
attempting to justify phenomenology to critical theorists, using critical theory as a
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kind of model of social criticism. To some degree, using critical theory as a standard
and model is warranted and necessary. However, the significance of these final
remarks show that Scheler is under the impression that phenomenological method
is in fact more objective than the procedure of immanent critique, it is able to be
more engaged in the socio-historical situation than immanent critique, and it is less
prone to ressentiment and ideological thinking than immanent critique. To some
extent, this work is a kind of immanent critique of critical theory, that is to say, that
their methods do not fully serve their own aims, and that phenomenology elucidates
prior grounds for the possibility of emancipatory critique.
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